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7Voorwoord
“In het begin is het altijd donker” (keizerin Moonchild in Michael Ende’s ”The 
Neverending Story”). Er zijn nog geen vastomlijnde ideeën, wensen, en dromen. 
Die ontstaan gaandeweg, door de verhalen van anderen en door de gesprekken 
die je voert.  Een proefschrift is slechts een momentopname  van een eindeloos 
gesprek tussen schrijver en lezers.  Hoewel ik opgelucht ben dat dit boek toch 
een einde heeft gevonden, hoop ik dat we het gesprek gaan voortzetten in de 
toekomst.    
Op enig moment tijdens mijn studie werd ik gegrepen door de communicatieve 
aspecten van ruimtelijke planning, met name de vaak moeizame communicatie 
tussen burgers en overheid in ruimtelijke vraagstukken. Ik ging planning steeds 
meer zien als communicatie en vond dit zo’n boeiende gedachte dat ik er 
een promotieonderzoek aan wilde wijden. Toen deze wens uitkwam, werd ik 
gewaarschuwd dat promoveren een eenzame activiteit is. Zeker zijn er eenzame 
momenten geweest, maar het geheel overziend, ervaar ik dit boek als een 
coproductie van een groot aantal mensen die door de jaren heen betrokken 
zijn geweest bij mijn onderzoek.  
Allereerst wil ik mijn begeleiders bedanken: Adri van den Brink en Noelle Aarts. 
Zij hebben al vroeg in mijn loopbaan, tijdens mijn studie, een gevoelige snaar 
geraakt. Door de vroege samenwerking met hen ontkiemde er in mij een passie 
voor wetenschap, waarvan ik me eerder niet bewust was. Het boekje over 
Ponte smaakte naar meer! Samen met Adri heb ik mooie en leerzame projecten 
uitgevoerd die de opmaat vormden voor een promotieonderzoek. Hij zorgde 
er op verschillende manieren voor dat ik mijn ideeën voor het onderzoek kon 
uitvoeren en daarvoor ben ik hem heel dankbaar. Noelle heeft ontzaglijk veel 
betekend in mijn ontwikkeling als onderzoeker. Ze deelde haar uitgebreide 
kennis over communicatie processen en sociologie met mij. De vele gesprekken 
met haar waren altijd waardevol, inspirerend, enthousiasmerend. Katalytisch! 
Veel nieuwe vondsten kwamen tot stand in onze discussies. Ik ging altijd weer 
weg met nieuwe ideeën en, nog belangrijker, met veel zin om door te gaan en 
die ideeën uit te werken. Ik bewonder haar eindeloze gedrevenheid en energie 
en ben heel dankbaar dat ze die in mij heeft willen investeren. Bovendien dank 
ik haar voor het vertrouwen dat ze in me had en het zelfvertrouwen dat ze me 
gaf wanneer ik dat ontbeerde. 
 
8De leerstoelgroep Landgebruiksplanning en de sectie Communication Science 
wil ik bedanken voor de mogelijkheden die ik heb gekregen om dit proefschrift 
te schrijven. Ik ben Arnold dankbaar voor de interessante gesprekken en 
zijn feedback op conceptteksten en Adrie en Luc voor hun hulp bij het 
beeldmateriaal. De collega’s en ex-collega’s bij de diverse leerstoelgroepen 
in Gaia en de Leeuwenborch ben ik dankbaar voor de fijne werkomgeving en 
hun feedback en input. In het bijzonder: Janneke, Jasper, Raoul, Petra, Monique, 
Jeroen, Fennie, Astrid, Terry, Barbara, Ilja, Martijn, Severine, Roel en Maartje. 
Jasper stelde edelmoedig zijn vormgeving talenten ter beschikking, waarvoor 
veel dank! En Monique ben ik heel dankbaar voor het lay-outen, haar creativiteit, 
en haar vriendschap. 
Ik wil alle collega’s van Geografie, Planologie en Milieu (Radboud Universiteit 
Nijmegen) bedanken voor de prettige en stimulerende werkomgeving. Mijn 
boek is gerijpt tijdens de periode bij GPM en veel van de latere ideeën zijn mede 
gevormd door de samenwerking met hen. In het bijzonder dank aan Pieter 
en Erwin, voor de ruimte die ik kreeg om mijn proefschrift af te maken, en de 
mogelijkheid om me verder te ontwikkelen als docent en onderzoeker. De URD-
collega’s, met name de ‘droge’ club, dank ik voor de interessante discussies over 
governance en finance en de gezelligheid op de gang. Daarin betrek ik ook de 
plezierige samenwerking met de ‘Duckstedelingen’. 
De verschillende secretariaten zijn een onmisbare steun en toeverlaat geweest 
in dit traject. Jannie, Audrey, Sylvia, Keen en Yvonne: bedankt voor al jullie hulp!
De samenwerking met onderzoekers en experts van andere instituten in het 
project Vitale Coalities heeft een rijke casus over Heuvelland opgeleverd. De 
discussies met hen over regimes, vitale coalities, leiderschap en KOMBI vond ik 
altijd erg inspirerend. Mijn speciale dank gaat uit naar Ina Horlings, Julien van 
Ostaaijen, Christian Curré, en Madeleine van Mansfeld.   
Vanzelfsprekend was er zonder de gesprekken en interviews met betrokkenen 
in de cases Heuvelland en Gouda-Krimpenerwaard geen proefschrift geweest. 
Aan alle informanten en geïnterviewden die zo openhartig hun verhalen en 
ervaringen met mij hebben gedeeld, veel dank!
Tot slot wil ik mijn familie en vrienden bedanken voor hun begrip, steun en alle 
plezier tussen de bedrijven door. Vrienden en familie kennen je van haver tot 
gort en kunnen je daardoor wijzen op de dingen die je echt belangrijk vindt. 
Ze zorgen ervoor dat je de dingen in een ander perspectief ziet. Niet in de 
9laatste plaats herinneren ze je eraan dat promoveren uiteindelijk maar een klein 
hoofdstuk in je leven is. In het bijzonder wil ik mijn ouders bedanken. Op allerlei 
manieren hebben zij onvoorwaardelijke steun gegeven. Onvoorwaardelijk in 
vette letters, want het was hen vaak niet duidelijk waarom ik dit zo belangrijk 
vond. Zij gingen mee op een reis met een vage bestemming en deelden met 
mij zowel moeilijke als blije momenten. Ik ben hen hiervoor altijd dankbaar. Ik 
hoop dat ze zien dat de reis minstens zoveel heeft gebracht als de bestemming. 
Ulrik, dat je het met mij en mijn boek hebt volgehouden vind ik een bijzonder 
geschenk. Al die uren die jij besteedde aan het reilen en zeilen thuis, zodat ik 
rustig kon werken. Al jouw geduld, begrip en vertrouwen in mij. Je bent mijn 
held. Anna en Simon, jullie maken iedere dag zonnig.
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The dilemma of civic engagement
1.1 Moving mountains in the polder
In August 2011, media attention, both national and international, suddenly 
focused on a Dutch sports journalist who proposed to collectively design and 
build a mountain, two kilometres high, in the Dutch Flevopolder. He wanted 
a mountain to facilitate mountain-related sports like cycling and skiing. The 
initiative was called Die Berg Komt Er, which can be translated as ‘That Mountain 
Will Be There’ 1. I remember being amazed and thinking it was an absolutely 
ridiculous and unrealistic idea. Who would want to destroy the archetypal open 
landscape of the Flevopolder and beyond? And why on earth should we want 
such an enormous project if we had so many more urgent problems to solve? 
On the other hand, like probably every planner or landscape designer, I was 
intrigued by the mountain idea that contradicted every spatial vision that had 
ever sprouted from national government offices, but also revived malleability 
ideals of the post-war reconstruction when engineers used to make land out of 
water (again the Flevopolder). 
Over a short period of time, the initiative managed to excite and mobilize 
many companies, architects, consultants, knowledge institutions, and 
government organizations. It did so mainly by using social and mass media. 
From one person’s wild idea, the initiative seemed to spontaneously grow into 
something big and serious. A year after its emergence, the initiative had 5,000 
followers on Facebook and 3,600 followers on Twitter, and 96 companies and 
knowledge institutions that individually or collectively produced drafts and 
design alternatives for multifunctional use of a mountain. It strove to remain as 
autonomous as possible by attracting private financing, like shareholders, and 
by building social support. 
1 I refer to it as ‘The Dutch Mountain’. More information: www.diebergkomter.nl
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The massive media attention on The Dutch Mountain was caused not only by the 
shocking images of a radical landscape transformation, but also by the fact that 
the initiative started unexpectedly with a few passionate cyclers who wondered 
‘what if there were a mountain…?’ It is widely considered as an inspiring 
example of civic engagement and self-organization, and its proponents are 
invited to all kinds of symposia and seminars on that subject (e.g. the national 
participation conference I Love Citizens). The initiative is also being discussed on 
fora of planning practitioners and is referred to as ‘flash-mob planning’ and ‘the 
ultimate bottom-up planning’. 
To me, The Dutch Mountain, as a ‘seed of change’ spontaneously emerging 
from civil society, is a nice metaphor for the phenomenon that this book aims 
to understand: self-organizing civic initiatives and the way they engage in, and 
connect to, planning practices aimed at the improvement of the quality of 
places.
1.2 The driving seat of planning
The key challenge of spatial planning is, in the words of Healey (2006, p. 
321), addressing collective concerns about the quality of local and regional 
environments by focusing policy attention on the social and natural forces that 
lead to change in the qualities of places and by offering ideas about the processes 
of governance through which stakeholders work out what to do and how to 
act. Planning as a governance endeavour, aimed at managing co-existence in 
shared spaces, has in modern societies generally been associated with what 
governments do (Healey, 2006). However, the emergence of other powerful 
actors, collectives, and self-organizing civic initiatives like The Dutch Mountain, 
who also claim ownership in the planning domain, confront governmental 
planners with serious questions about their role in an increasingly fragmented 
and dynamically changing society (Swyngedouw, 2005; Healey, 2008). This 
certainly is the case in the Dutch context of spatial planning, which has been 
portrayed as a ‘planner’s paradise lost’ in reference to the state’s problems in 
managing change in accordance with rationally designed plans and visions 
(Bontje, 2003; Korthals Altes, 2006; Boelens, 2010). 
Planning for the people
For a long time, the activity of planning was dominated by an instrumental–
rational approach in which planning work was performed by professionals ‘for 
the people’ on behalf of the government. As long as sufficient information was 
available, problems were assumed to be manageable by objectively establishing 
diagnoses and by relating means (how to do things) to ends (what should be 
achieved) in logical, systemic, and value-free ways (Friedmann, 1987; Faludi & 
Van der Valk, 1994; Allmendinger, 2002). This linear way of thinking about the 
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management of change, i.e. the idea that socio-physical systems could be made 
and steered like a machine, has been criticized since the 1960s (Allmendinger, 
2002; Healey, 2006; Hillier & Healey, 2010). 
Those who challenged the instrumental–rational model considered it unrealistic 
to think that situations could be understood objectively and sufficiently to 
be able to identify and assess all possible alternatives. Even if such rational 
planning were possible, it was considered idealistic and unrealistic to think that 
politicians would stick to the resulting plans (Healey, 2006; Allmendinger, 2002). 
It was recognized that what happens in practice is actually a combination of 
serendipity and strategy in which planned interventions play a catalytic but not 
a controlling role (cf. Gilchrist, 2000). 
The recognition that the instrumental model is not well suited to deal with 
unpredictable and capricious change, i.e. non-linearity, has led to a continuous 
search for alternative approaches (De Roo & Silva, 2010; Hillier & Healey, 2010). 
In reaction to the instrumental–rational approach, new planning approaches 
emerged, focusing on bounded rationality, incrementalism, and contingency 
(Lindblom, 1959; Andersen, 2003). Advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965) and 
research focusing on the implementation of plans (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984) 
emphasized the interactive and bottom-up nature of ‘doing planning work’ 
(Healey, 2006, p. 27). Out of such approaches, participatory and communicative 
approaches were developed to deal more effectively with the postmodern 
challenges of an increasingly complex, fragmented, unpredictable, and 
pluralistic society (Healey, 1997; Forester, 1999; Innes, 1995).
Planning with the people
The communicative turn in planning theory and practice is the term used for 
the movement that emerged two decades ago and calls for a more inclusive 
and deliberative approach to planning to manage change more effectively. 
It implies a shift in focus from means–end thinking to the interdependencies 
and social interactions between stakeholders as critical factors in change 
(Healey, 1997; Forester, 1999; Innes, 1995). In the communicative or interpretive 
perspective of planning, it is considered unrealistic to objectively know 
a reality that is ‘out there’ and to design interventions that fit to that reality. 
Instead, reality is considered to be socially constructed. The reality we know is 
interpreted, constructed, enacted, and maintained through discourse (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966; Weick, 1995).  
The communicative turn encompasses a wide range of different participatory 
approaches originating from political science, policy science, and planning, such 
as consensus-building (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Susskind et al., 1999; Innes, 
1995, 2004), collaborative problem solving (Gray & Trist, 1989; Aarts & Leeuwis, 
2010), social learning (Leeuwis et al., 2002; Wals, 2007), network approaches 
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(Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997), collaborative planning (Healey, 1997), and 
deliberative planning (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999). Many of these 
approaches co-evolved and were inspired by one another. 
The ideal of these participatory approaches is that collaboration and deliberation 
will lead to a better fit with perspectives of relevant stakeholders on social 
reality. Collaborative approaches are considered to improve the rationality and 
quality of decision making through deliberative processes in which stakeholders 
exchange and combine different forms of local and expert knowledge (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; Forester, 1999; Healey, 1997). Moreover, achieving as inclusive 
a representation of stakeholders as possible is supposed to enable consensus 
building and social support, thus improving the effectiveness and democratic 
legitimacy of decisions (Innes, 1995, 2004; Ellis, 2000). Collaborative approaches 
are considered to stimulate both active citizen involvement and self-organizing 
capacity (Innes & Booher, 1999; Booher & Innes, 2002). Consequently, the 
communicative turn is accompanied by a call for a shift from hierarchical forms 
of steering to more participative modes of governance, commonly phrased as 
the shift from government to governance (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Pierre & Peters, 
2000; Rhodes, 1997), with the intention of fitting policymaking and planning 
better to specific contexts and different sites of governance and decision 
making (Healey, 2006). The different strands in communicative approaches have 
in common a strong normative focus on how planning should be done, and 
on how professional planners should create optimal conditions for dialogue 
between the stakeholders and for relating outcomes to policymaking and 
politics (Healey, 2006; Innes & Booher, 1999; Susskind et al., 1999; Forester, 1999).
Citizen participation and government self-centredness 
Although communicative or collaborative approaches have become normal 
practice in western planning practices (Booher, 2008; Healey, 2006; Aarts & 
Leeuwis, 2010), there has also been a great deal of criticism concerning the 
difficulties experienced by collaborative approaches to meet the promises of 
more realistic, qualitative, and democratic decision making (Aarts and Leeuwis, 
2010; Van der Arend, 2007; Van Bommel, 2008; Turnhout et al., 2010; Boonstra & 
Boelens, 2011; Hillier, 2003; Yiftachel & Huxley, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 1998). 
The central problem addressed is that participatory approaches run the danger 
of falling into an instrumental–rationalistic trap, reflecting a continued belief 
in the malleability of the planning process (Swyngedouw, 2005; Brand & 
Gaffikin, 2007; Van der Arend, 2007; Uitermark & Van Beek, 2010). In the strive 
to achieve consensus and support, planners and facilitators, acting on behalf 
of the government, define the ‘invited spaces’ for the collaboration of selected 
stakeholders as well as the rules for the dialogue in these invited spaces. 
Participatory approaches are said to focus too much on what should be done 
and too little on what is actually done by stakeholders (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 
2002; Brand and Gaffikin, 2007). Like the instrumental–rational model, 
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collaborative approaches are criticized for focusing too much on the design and 
architecture of the process, the rules for decision making, and creating the right 
circumstances for a dialogue which produces effective solutions shared by all 
involved (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Chettiparamb, 2007).
The consequences of a strong focus on managing and conditioning participation 
are two-fold. First, critics point to the problem of consensus-oriented styles 
of process management suffocating agonistic discourse, which is the source 
of creativity and unexpected viewpoints (Hillier, 2003; Aarts & Leeuwis, 2010; 
Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007). Trying to create a Habermasian power-free 
ideal speech situation in order to reach consensus among all participants is not 
only an illusion, but also leads to undesirable smoothening of ‘sharp edges’ and 
passion in the discussion. Thus, the innovative potential of the collective effort 
is left untapped. Too much managerial control of planners constrains creativity 
and transformative energy, thereby leading to saltless compromises that do not 
bring sustainable solutions (Torfing & Sørensen, 2008; Aarts & Leeuwis, 2010). 
The result is that plans or policies are more ‘symbolic expressions’ of incomplete 
consensus building (Hillier, 2003, p. 52) than realistic visions on the future. 
Second, a focus on process management diverts attention away from what 
the groups targeted for participation actually do to achieve their goals 
(Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Not everybody is willing to participate in 
invited participatory processes; this can lead to uneven representation and 
biased outcomes (Nienhuis et al., 2011; Van Bommel, 2008). Some stakeholders 
may decide to achieve their goals and influence policy and planning agendas 
through other routes of communication (Hillier, 2000), such as lobbying through 
media, informal access to politicians, speaking at public hearings, and so forth. 
Moreover, participants within the invited spaces may use power inside and 
outside the boundaries of the participatory process in ways that are difficult 
to grasp or that are unexpected. Participatory approaches are criticized for 
neglecting or downplaying such influences of power differences and relations 
on the process and the outcomes (Taylor, 2007; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Hillier, 
2003; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2005). Participatory processes are like 
other policy making arenas politically constructed spaces predicated on acts of 
exclusion (Torfing and Sørensen, 2008). ‘Hence, public deliberation is premised 
on a certain agenda setting, a hegemonic storyline and a particular truth 
regime’ (ibid. p. 398). 
It is argued that the instrumentality of participatory processes can partly be 
blamed on a top-down managerial strategy of government agencies to ‘tame 
citizens’ protest’ (Healey, 2008) as a necessary step in achieving social and 
political support (Turnhout et al., 2010; Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Van Assche 
et al., 2011; Van der Arend, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2004). Administrators tend to 
use citizen participation, not to empower citizens and to change things, but 
to empower themselves, by regularizing conflict and legitimizing decisions 
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(Healey, 2008; Uitermark & Van Beek, 2010). Citizen participation in that view is 
merely a way to get support for already developed solutions, a ‘public support 
machine’ (e.g. Woltjer, 2002; Van Assche et al., 2011). 
The above-discussed criticisms indicate that participatory approaches manifest 
a great deal of self-centred behaviour on the part of the initiators and facilitators 
of such processes (Chettiparamb, 2007; Boonstra & Boelens, 2011). Collaborative 
planning is developed within the regimes of public government and ‘the 
methods used to bring forth citizen involvement are frequently largely based 
on government preconditions’ (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011, p. 103). Government-
centred participation pre-fixes process, content, and place or scale; this 
works counterproductively when, during the process issues, people and 
developments occur which do not fit in these pre-defined boundaries. When 
participatory processes do not generate expected outcomes, diagnoses and 
advices usually point to the methods and techniques of participation. This in 
effect reproduces the tendency of planners to get control over the participatory 
process (Innes & Booher, 2004; Hillier, 2003; Turnhout et al., 2010). In sum, 
planners face the dilemma that they want to involve citizens from the outset of 
planning processes, but are ‘hardly able to think beyond the confines and path-
dependencies of government’ (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011, p. 116).
Therefore, it is argued that, to understand and influence civic engagement, 
the focus should be shifted from the activities of planners acting on behalf of 
governments (what planners should do) to the actions of other stakeholders 
(what is actually done by stakeholders), not only inside the participative 
process, but also outside (Van der Arend, 2007; Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Aarts 
& Lokhorst, 2012). 
Planning by the people
In reaction to disappointment about government-led citizen participation, 
attention is increasingly being paid to self-governing and self-organizing 
movements in civil society (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Aarts & Leeuwis, 2010; 
Aarts & Lokhorst, 2012). In the literature, renewed political attention is signalled 
for planning work where citizens ‘take the driving seat in developing policy 
ideas and project briefs’ (Healey, 2008, p. 379; Booher, 2008; Torfing & Sørensen, 
2008). Civic engagement is not limited to formal participation arenas. ‘Civic 
engagement happens “in the flow of interaction” throughout strategy formation 
processes and is likely to be part of the ongoing “flow of life” of all those who 
“encounter” urban governance processes in some way’ (Healey, 2007, p. 259). 
Similarly, Booher (2008) refers to forms of citizen-driven engagement that seek 
to put pressure on public institutions and prifvate firms by using modes other 
than the regular channels of political representation and decision making. 
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Self-initiatives and ‘do-it-yourself’ or ‘make-it-yourself’ initiatives (e.g. Booher, 
2008; Gibson, 2006; Van Dam et al., 2008; Van Twist et al., 2009) are being 
promoted by the state, which is seeking to decentralize and off-load public 
responsibilities like the management of public space to the voluntary and 
business sector and to private individuals (Healey, 2006). It is believed that 
self-organizing forms of citizen participation can remove policy deadlocks 
as well as mobilize private resources and energies of civic society (Torfing & 
Sørensen, 2008; Healey, 2008). There is a growing belief that people are able to 
construct their own places by developing capacity to envision possible futures 
and constructing relevant governance structures as well as legitimacy to act 
(Albrechts, 2008; Booher, 2008). 
In the Netherlands, current financial problems in spatial planning and budget 
cuts are strengthening government calls for more civic engagement and 
civic initiative. Uitermark & van Beek (2010, p. 3) speak of a ‘participation rage’ 
(‘participatiedrift’) on the part of the Dutch government. This is accompanied by 
the emergence of a significant focus on active citizenship and local initiatives of 
citizens, companies, and interest groups. This attention comes from politicians, 
policymakers, mass media2  as well as research (Van Gunsteren, 2006; Tonkens, 
2006; Van Dam et al., 2008). It is also referred to as the ‘doing-democracy’ 
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2012; Van Twist et al., 
2009; Van de Wijdeven & Hendriks, 2010; Van de Wijdeven, 2012) and do-it-
yourself initiatives of citizens (Van Dam et al., 2008; van der Heijden et al., 2011). 
Practitioners and researchers have been pointing to the phenomenon and 
potentials of emerging local initiatives of citizens who produce unsolicited 
proposals and plans for place making, or who take responsibility for 
implementation and maintenance (Aarts & During, 2006; Floor & Salverda, 2006; 
Rotmans, 2011). These initiatives are citizen driven and go beyond traditional 
participation coordinated by the government. 
Political and professional attention on active citizenship is manifested in 
professional conferences, policy programmes, and research programmes. For 
example, in the last few years there have been many conferences on the topic of 
do-it-yourself and active citizenship . Political attention on citizen engagement 
and active citizenship is reflected in policy programmes and reports (e.g. 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2012; Raad voor het 
openbaar bestuur, 2012; Raad voor de Leefomgeving en Infrastructuur, 2012). 
In spatial planning practices, the topics of civic engagement, do-it-yourself 
initiatives, and active citizenship3 are also manifested. For example, a popular 
topic in the current talk of Dutch planning practitioners is ‘the spontaneous 
2 The doing-democracy was the subject of a series of publications in the newspaper Trouw in 2012 
and 2013 (for example ‘The Doing Citizen now organizes his own healthcare too’, 21 August 2012, 
3 Examples of these conferences and events: Dag van de Ruimte: Doe-Het-Zelf (10 November 
2011); Joint Venture. Burgers Maken de Stad (July 2011); I Love Burgers (2011); Doe-Het-Zelfrevolutie 
(Studium Generale Universiteit Utrecht, 9 October 2012); Actief Burgerschap: How to Make it Work? (9 
September 2012, workshop series Felix Meritis Amsterdam)
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city’, also known as ‘organic development’, both referring to adaptive planning 
and self-organization of owners and end-users of places (Buitelaar et al., 2012; 
Luijten, 2011; Uitermark, 2012). It is proposed as an alternative to large-scale 
planning projects orchestrated by governments, and it stresses spontaneous 
and small-scale forms of cooperation between citizens, entrepreneurs, project 
developers, interest groups, and so on (Rotmans, 2011). 
Parallel to the attention in politics and policy and planning practices on active 
citizenship and self-organizing civic initiatives, scientific attention seems to be 
shifting from the methodology of citizen participation to understanding the 
phenomenon of social self-organization and its meaning for spatial planning. 
For example, Boonstra & Boelens (2011) analyse examples of self-organizing 
citizens in urban planning contexts. Research about vital coalitions is similar, 
citizens who self-organize and build coalitions with other public and private 
stakeholders (Hendriks & Tops, 2005; Horlings et al., 2009; Horlings, 2010; Van 
Ostaaijen et al., 2010; Van de Wijdeven et al., 2006). Another example, in a rural 
planning context, is research about self-organization and active citizenship in 
relation to the preservation and development of landscape values or sustainable 
agriculture (Poppe et al., 2009; Klerkx et al., 2010; Klerkx & Aarts, 2013; Aarts 
& Lokhorst, 2012; Floor & Salverda, 2006; Aarts & During, 2006; Buizer, 2008). 
These studies have in common that they aim to understand the circumstances 
in which self-organizing initiatives overcome the problems of government-led 
citizen participation as previously presented, and how they can actually bring 
transformative change.  
Transformative potential or business as usual
When civil society actors self-organize to start a collaborative project, they will 
encounter government at some point, for example when they require financial 
support, building permits, knowledge, or other resources (Boonstra & Boelens, 
2011; Aarts et al., 2007; Floor & Salverda, 2006). Complete self-governance is not 
likely to occur in the increasingly fragmented, complex, and multi-layered polity 
in which public and private actors are interdependent (Torfing & Sørensen, 
2008). 
Concern is expressed about what happens when civic initiatives encounter 
government actors. Similar to the critique about the instrumentality and 
government-centrism of collaborative planning approaches, it is argued that 
the promotion of the idea of civic engagement is just political rhetoric, and that 
citizen-driven engagement will be ‘regularized’ and adjusted to fit in existing 
government procedures and frameworks which define content, place, and 
process (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Torfing & Sørensen, 2008). Healey (Healey et 
al., 2003; Healey, 2006) found in her own research, as well as in other literature 
on new forms of collaboration, many situations where the flow of creative 
learning to other governance sites was blocked by the structures and routines 
of established governance processes and administrative practices. It is feared 
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that transformative energy will be squeezed out of movements emerging in 
civil society and that civic engagement will return to business as usual (Healey, 
2008; Booher, 2008; Boonstra & Boelens, 2011).
Established practices and governance processes are produced and reproduced 
through a strong self-referentiality that blocks out innovation arising in new 
ways and in sites not recognized by those practices. Even despite an agenda 
searching for new perspectives, new concepts, and innovative ideas, existing 
government organizations are inclined to reproduce traditional concepts and 
structures, which form institutional constraints for innovation (Wagemans, 
2002; Elzen et al., 2004; Chettiparamb, 2007; Van Assche & Verschraegen, 
2008; Van Herzele & Aarts, 2013). The government is only receptive to what is 
meaningful and relevant within its formal perspectives, or frames, on society 
(Wagemans, 2002; Rein & Schön, 1996). Planning agencies, like any social 
system, select and interpret every new piece of incoming information in 
accordance with self-referential frames that consequently reproduce those 
frames. Local civic initiatives that do not fit into self-referential perspectives of 
government organizations are overlooked, even though they may contribute to 
governments’ ambitions (see Figure 1.1). It is also possible for self-reference to 
result in absorption and integration of local civic initiatives such that dominant 
interpretations are no longer disputed (Horlings et al., 2006; Boonstra & Boelens, 
2011). 
Figure 1.1: Limited perspective of government on social reality and effort of civic initiatives to 
attract government attention (adapted from Wagemans, 2004).
To overcome institutional blockages, civic initiatives would have to make 
greater efforts to be noticed and simultaneously remain vital and energetic 
(Horlings et al., 2006; Horlings, 2010). Citizens are in an unfavourable situation 
because the formal domain is not easily understandable or familiar to them as it 
is fragmented and peppered with many detailed technical and legal concepts. 
If initiatives want to express their views and be heard, they need knowledge 
of dominant policy frameworks as well as a great deal of communicative skills, 
creativity, and persistence (Wagemans, 2002; Turnhout et al., 2010). Securing not 
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only political attention but also transformative power would entail developing 
a capacity to travel to different sites of governance by invoking a flow of ideas, 
rules, and resources (Healey, 2006). 
This raises the question of how the planning work of civic initiatives relates to 
governmental planning, why some initiatives manage to overcome the blocks 
of existing governance processes, and how they transform policy and planning, 
whereas other initiatives fail in such attempts. 
1.3 Research goals and objectives 
The goal of this research is to contribute to insights about how planners can 
make better connections with civil society initiatives without falling into the 
trap of government-centrism. It is argued that a more responsive and enabling 
planning practice should give careful attention to where civic initiatives emerge 
and to the meaning they have for planning practices that promote liveable and 
sustainable places (Healey, 2006; Booher, 2008; Albrechts, 2008). This requires 
an ‘outside-in’ approach to civic engagement in planning practices (cf. Boonstra 
& Boelens, 2011); and this entails understanding the dynamics of social networks 
beyond the boundaries of formal planning processes. The focus of analysis, 
therefore, should not be on how planners engage citizens, but on how citizens 
engage planners in their planning work. 
We have still little understanding of this process, how civic initiatives organize 
themselves and relate to government-led planning and policy practices, and the 
circumstances under which they manage to overcome the blockages of a self-
referential government and transform planning agendas for regional spatial 
development (e.g. Healey, 2006). If we understand better how civic initiatives 
connect to government organizations and engage in planning practices, it 
may be possible to develop alternative directions for planners to establish 
meaningful connections with civil society in ways that do not reduce but 
embrace complexity, that is, the interdependence in the myriads of interactions 
and relations that result in dynamic and sometimes unexpected socio-spatial 
change. 
This results in the following central question for the research:
How do civic initiatives connect to government organizations, and how can we 
understand outcomes of these connections in terms of the achievement of ambitions 
of civic initiatives and planning agendas for regional spatial development?
We focus on civic initiatives that propose alternative plans and visions for 
improving the spatial quality of places, not just at local but also at regional 
level. The focus is on the influence of civic initiatives on decision making at 
both local and regional governance levels to address the extent to which they 
may contribute to the transformation of spatial policies and ultimately spatial 
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transformation. Moreover, a focus on civic initiatives that produce proposals 
concerning local-regional governance levels enables inquiry into how they 
engage with multiple government actors to achieve goals.
We consider initiatives that consist of multiple stakeholders who share concerns 
or ambitions; the initiatives are civic in the sense that they start out as initiatives 
of a small group of citizens, interest groups, or business entrepreneurs. We 
follow the process of coalition building in which initial small groups connect 
to other stakeholders, both private and public. Civic initiatives in this research 
can be indicated as local and regional as they concern the planning, design, and 
management of places that are sometimes indicated as local and sometimes 
as regional when issues go beyond municipal boundaries. By government 
organizations, we refer to all tiers of government, organizations, and (sub)
departments, at the local, regional, and national level, that deal with regional 
planning. Which government organizations are part of the process depends on 
the perspective and actions of civic initiatives, because this research takes civic 
initiatives as its starting point, not the formal planning system. 
The word ‘connect’ in the research question points to the ways in which 
civic initiatives engage and interact with professional planning agents and 
government organizations to achieve their ambitions. Following an outside-in 
approach, we start from the civic initiatives’ perspectives on social reality, their 
ideas about the futures of places, and we follow their efforts to connect with 
other stakeholders in planning practices to mobilize support and attention. 
1.4 Research strategy
In the thesis, we develop an interpretive view of policymaking and planning, 
with an emphasis on the way policy agendas are constructed and filled with 
meaning through interactive social processes (Healey, 2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 
2003; Yanow, 2000, 2006). Therefore, we have operationalized ‘connecting’ 
in terms of agenda-setting strategies, and outcomes in terms of changes in 
governments’ policy and planning agendas. The mobilization of attention is 
an important notion for the question of how self-organizing civic initiatives 
connect with government agents who tend to overlook events and initiatives 
that fall outside their self-referential views on what is meaningful and important. 
Framing processes play an important role in this mobilization of attention. 
Framing theory and policy agenda-setting theory are therefore used to build 
the analytic construct elaborated in Chapter 2 (Shifting agendas: framing and 
storytelling). 
The strategy for data collection and analysis involved two in-depth case 
studies of local–regional civic initiatives which over a long period of time tried 
to mobilize attention and support for their unsolicited proposals concerning 
regional spatial development: New Markets Heuvelland (Heuvelland case) and 
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Landscape Development in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard Urban–Rural Fringe 
(Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case). The way these case studies were analysed using 
an interpretive strategy is elaborately discussed in Chapter 3 (A tale of doing 
interpretive analysis). 
Heuvelland Case
The Heuvelland case contains three stories that in the end competed with each 
other for attention and (financial and political) support. All three started with 
the New Markets initiative to build a community of capital rich entrepreneurs 
who would invest in landscape qualities through new product–market 
combinations which were assumed to generate economic returns (improved 
tourism). However, this initiative could not mobilize enough support from 
entrepreneurs and relevant governments and stagnated, while at the same time 
stories about Healthy Living and Regional Branding emerged, around which a 
number of participating entrepreneurs self-organized. This latter initiative was 
very successful in mobilizing support and, like the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
case, resulted in investments of some 8 million euros in a regional branding 
campaign.
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard Case
The initiative of citizens in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe area led to 
successful agenda-setting of landscape values over a period of 25 years. 
The initiative started because governments were paying only limited and 
fragmented attention to the area in question, and this was perceived by the 
initiative as a big threat to natural and historical landscape values. After 25 years, 
the attention and support of local and regional governments was mobilized, 
and this resulted in the investment of several millions of euros in the protection 
and development of landscape values.  
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1.5 Structure of the book
This book is structured as follows. An elaborate discussion of the theoretical 
framework and methodological considerations is found in, respectively, Chapter 
2 (Shifting agendas: framing and storytelling) and Chapter 3 (A tale of doing 
interpretive analysis). The chapters that report the two case studies (Chapters 
4 and 5) read as separate stories about how civic initiatives in the Heuvelland 
and Gouda-Krimpenerwaard cases tried to bring alternative perspectives on 
local–regional development to the attention of governments, and why they 
did or did not succeed. In Chapter 6 (Sticky stories: conversations, connectors, 
and opportunities), we compare the outcomes of the case studies. In the final 
Chapter 7 (Planning as connective storytelling: conclusions and discussion), we 
summarize the research findings, and we present a model that may be of help in 
other inquiries into agenda-setting processes. The book ends by discussing the 
meaning of the findings for future planning research and practice.

2Shifting agendas: 
framing and 
storytelling
Planning practice is about organising other people 
to give attention to certain issues. It is a political 
activity that focuses on mobilising bias. It defines 
the issue that the planning process is about. And 
this is a political endeavour surrounded with 
ambiguity and uncertainty.  
(Forester, 1989) 
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The growing discourse of self-organization, self-governance, and citizen-driven 
planning, discussed in Chapter 1, suggests that civic initiatives can perform as 
the ‘seeds’ of smaller and bigger policy change or institutional change when 
they manage to overcome institutional blockages. Although the established 
policy science literature suggests that individuals and groups of individuals 
have a limited possibility of making a difference, and that policy change is 
rather the result of randomness (Kingdon, 1984, 2003), ‘punctuated’ resistance 
of policy systems to change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005), or shock events that shift policy attention (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Sabatier & 
Jenkins, 1993), policy science is also open to the possibility that, under certain 
circumstances, individual agents can influence or even create conditions for 
change. Analytic frameworks, inspired by Gidden’s structuration theory (1984), 
like discursive institutional perspectives (Leroy & Arts, 2006; Schmidt, 2008) and 
sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Healey, 2006a/b; Scott, 2001), 
are based on the idea that policy change can be explained by the dialectic of 
human agency and the structural forces and routines that are both medium and 
outcome of actions of individual agents. 
Macro forces interact with the micro-politics of the daily life of governance, and 
structuring forces are continually encountered by, and shaped by the power of 
agency. (Healey, 2006, p. 326)
Thus, change cannot be managed, preplanned, or controlled, but it is prepared 
and navigated by people (cf. Birkland, 1997; Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Olsson 
et al., 2006). Taking an agency-centred perspective, this chapter builds an 
analytical framework that helps to elucidate how civic initiatives connect to 
governments to get support for their ambitions, under which circumstances 
they may be successful, and how their proposed alternatives may travel to 
other governance arenas, sometimes leading to policy change and governance 
change (cf. Healey, 2006a/b).
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2.1 Understanding planned and unplanned change
Change as order without a boss
Policy change (and stability) seems far less the result of rational choice than the 
result of coincidence, interdependencies, and context. In policy, planning, and 
organization studies, attention is increasingly focused on the non-linearity and 
unpredictability of social change (e.g. Aarts et al., 2007; Burnes, 2005; Gilchrist, 
2000; Innes & Booher, 2010; Morgan, 1986; Silva & De Roo, 2010; Stacey et al., 
2000; Van Woerkum et al., 2011). It is argued that, although policymakers often 
still perceive policymaking in terms of the ‘clockwork universe’ – a machine with 
somebody who controls the switches – we can also perceive social systems, like 
policy systems, as ‘order without a boss’ (Van Ginneken, 2003; Van Gunsteren, 
2006), i.e. as the result of self-organization. In complexity perspectives on 
planning and policy that build on the works of among others Holland (1998), 
Johnson (2001), and Luhmann (1995), socio-spatial change is explained as the 
unpredictable and spontaneous outcome of interactions of elements in complex 
systems and subsystems, which all act on the basis of self-referential reactions 
to the world outside. As a consequence, complex systems cannot be controlled 
from outside, and there is no superordinate centre that governs change. 
Byrne (2003) points out that complexity science and planning are not strangers. 
The concepts of complexity and self-organization appear to be especially 
used to understand cities as complex systems in which order emerges without 
central coordination (e.g. Allen & Sanglier, 1981; Webster & Wu, 2001; Garmestani 
et al., 2007; Alfasi & Portugali, 2007; Portugali, 2008;  Devisch, 2008). Geography 
too has been informed by various theories of complex systems1 . There is also 
growing attention on social self-organization and complexity in relation to 
change processes in the physical environment (see e.g. Chettiparamb,  2007a, 
2007b, 2013; Van Assche & Verschraegen, 2008; De Roo & Silva, 2010; Innes & 
Booher, 1999, 2010; Innes et al., 2011).
Notions about complexity and self-organization point to a more humble role 
for the planner. Devisch (2008) observes a shift in 30 years from planners as 
technocrats to planners as spectators. The planner is no longer the engineer 
who can determine change, but an observer or participant (Portugali, 2000). A 
complexity perspective on policy and planning acknowledges that planning 
interventions have a limited effect on change, because change can equally 
result from change by chance, change from social interaction, or combinations 
of these causes (Van Woerkum et al., 2011). The question thus is how policy and 
planning practice is the result of a combination of  serendipity and strategy (cf. 
Gilchrist, 2000). 
1 See Portugali (2006) for a discussion of different theories of complex systems and how they 
have been applied in geography (Haken’s synergetics, Prigogine’s dissipative structures, Bak’s self-
organized criticality, Mandelbrot’s geometry of fractals, and Kohonen’s self-organizing maps).
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Critical junctures for change
The notion that change cannot be controlled, and is the result of an interplay 
between serendipity and strategy, i.e. a concurrence of circumstances at 
particular junctures, is also addressed by various policy science models, such 
as the multiple streams model (Kingdon, 1984, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007), the 
punctuated equilibrium framework (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), and transition 
management e.g. Elzen et al., 2004; Rotmans et al. 2001). The critical junctures 
to which these frameworks refer are labelled tipping points (Gladwell, 2000), 
windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 1984; Birkland, 1998; Zahariadis, 2007), 
punctuations (Jones & Baumgarnter, 2005), or acceleration phase (Geels, 2004; 
Rotmans et al., 2001). They all refer to junctures at which the critical mass is 
reached for a situation to change rapidly into another situation. The way policies 
change is often represented as an initially stable system that is continuously 
balancing around an equilibrium, but, under the influence of external forces 
and under certain circumstances, flips into another state of being (e.g. Coleman, 
2006; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).
In the multiple streams model (Kingdon, 1984, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007), the more 
or less sudden changes on policy agendas are understood as the coupling of 
three streams at critical junctures: the problem stream, which represents the 
identification of issues as problems in society; the policy stream, in which 
solutions are constructed for various problems; and the politics stream, in 
which decisions are taken about priorities. Windows of opportunity is the term 
used for the critical junctures at which the three streams come together. The 
agenda-setting literature pays much attention to the role of focusing events that 
open up policy windows, and particular agents, called policy entrepreneurs, who 
establish couplings between the three streams of problems, policy, and politics. 
Research on policy entrepreneurs focuses on the way these individuals couple 
the streams through manipulation strategies and by taking immediate action 
when windows of opportunity occur. Focusing events are usually portrayed as 
potentially harmful or shocking events (Birkland, 1998; Wiering & Immink, 2006; 
Veenman et al., 2009) that shift attention to particular issues. Based on Cohen 
et al.’s (1972) garbage can model, the multiple streams model assumes that 
solutions and ideas float around for a longer period of time before they become 
connected to problems and events. In that context, change is portrayed as 
gradual rather than radical. 
In the punctuated equilibrium framework (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), change 
is perceived as punctuated. Stability is the norm because policy systems are 
resistant to change, but, under the influence of outside forces, suddenly new 
items can arise on policy agendas causing a punctuated pattern.  Again, this 
points to sudden changes at particular junctures at which various circumstances 
together lead to a shift on the agenda. 
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In innovation and transition studies, such sudden change is also noticed and 
described as a ‘take-off’ of initial novelties from a niche level to large scale 
adoption of innovation at a regime and a macro level (Geels, 2004; Elzen et al., 
2004; Rotmans et al., 2001). 
Self-referentiality and institutional resistance to change
The resistance of policy systems to change is explained in social systems 
theory (Luhmann, 1995, 2006; Morgan, 1986; Kickert, 1993) as the result of the 
self-reproduction (autopoiesis) and self-reference of social systems. The term 
autopoiesis, originally used by Maturana & Varela (1980) to define the self-
maintaining chemistry of living cells, indicates that all organizations and clusters 
of individuals tend to self-organize into a fixed structure in which system 
elements are continuously reproduced. The values and beliefs that constitute 
the social system form the frames of reference used to interpret, select, and 
respond to information about the ‘world out there’. Thus, groups, organizations, 
and networks, in order to survive, continuously reproduce their own identity, 
and thereby create stability. 
In an optimistic view on self-reference, social systems have self-organizing 
capacity and are resilient to changes in the environment. In a pessimistic 
view, self-referentiality is interpreted as ‘bureaucracy never dies’ (Kickert, 
1993, p. 73), meaning that governments are inclined to reproduce traditional 
concepts and structures that form institutional constraints for innovation. By 
filtering incoming information through self-referential frames, some issues 
are highlighted, whereas other issues remain in the shadow because they are 
considered irrelevant in light of the dominant policy frame (Schön & Rein, 
1994; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Other concepts used to indicate the self-
referentiality of policy systems that continuously reproduce existing practices 
and routines are policy paradigms (e.g. Hall, 1993), hegemonic policy discourse 
(Hajer & Versteeg, 2005), or policy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991).
The consequence of self-referentiality is that innovation arising in new ways and 
sites is not recognized in established policy practices (Wagemans, 2002; Elzen 
et al., 2004; Chettiparamb, 2007; Van Assche & Verschraegen, 2008; Van Herzele 
& Aarts, 2013). Civic initiatives that do not fit into self-referential perspectives 
of government organizations are thus overlooked, whether or not they may 
contribute to the ambitions of governments; or self-reference of government 
organizations results in absorption and integration of local civic initiatives into 
existing government policies and programmes, such that dominant policy 
frames are no longer disputed (Horlings et al., 2006; Boonstra & Boelens, 2011). 
The metaphor of attractors (Coleman, 2006; Coleman et al., 2007) helps to 
elucidate how self-referentiality is the basis for self-organization of people, 
explaining both institutional resistance to change and conditions in which that 
resistance may be broken.
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Attractors and overcoming barriers to change
Coleman et al. (2007) explain that individuals’ self-organization takes place 
around attractors, defined as sets of beliefs, feelings, and ideas, or frames of 
reference, that guide people’s actions. In system-theoretical terms, an attractor 
is a state or a pattern of changes toward which a dynamical system tends to 
evolve over time, i.e. is attracted to, and to which the system returns if perturbed 
by an outside influence. This implies that persons or a group, clustered in an 
attractor, may encounter alternative ideas and actions, but only the ideas and 
actions that are consistent with the attractor are embraced as relevant and 
credible (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 5). The consequence is that, if an individual 
within a cluster changes his or her opinion, other members of the cluster will 
try to bring him or her back into the fold. So, if elements of a system tend to 
move to another attractor, forces are triggered that pull the system back into 
the original attractor.
The idea is that there are dominant attractors, for example particular policy 
systems with their policy frames and related policy networks, and there are 
latent attractors2  of, for example, citizen groups who propose alternatives for 
the development and management of qualities in a particular place or region. 
Both attractors are visualized in Figure 2.1. The basins represent attractors in 
which individuals self-organize around sets of beliefs, feelings, ideas, and so 
forth. Change takes place when the system (the ball in the figure) under the 
influence of pulling or pushing forces moves to another attractor. The system 
is always moving between a state of equilibrium (the basin) and the attracting 
force of alternative ideas and actions (other attractors). Certain events, e.g. the 
previously mentioned focusing events, can push a group out of its current basin 
of attraction (attractor) into an alternative latent attractor, marking a tipping 
point or juncture. The attractor landscape may also be changed such that the 
dominant attractor embraces and incorporates a latent attractor, meaning that 
the range of ideas that are accepted as relevant and meaningful becomes wider. 
In the words of Sherif & Hovland (1961), the ‘latitude of acceptance’3  of the 
dominant attractor towards new ideas then becomes wider.   
For this research, it is important to note that an analysis of changing planning 
agendas should consider the forces that form and maintain attractors, i.e. the 
sets of ideas and beliefs around which people self-organize, and the forces that 
make their attraction stronger or weaker. In this research, the efforts of civic 
initiatives to promote their alternative proposals can be perceived as latent 
attractors exerting influence on dominant policy and planning frames. The 
attractor notion shows that policymakers and planners, clustered in a dominant 
2 A latent attractor is described by Vallacher et al. (2007, p. 11) as follows: ‘Several attractors may 
co-exist in a system. At any one time, only one attractor will capture the dynamics of the system. The 
existence of other attractors will not be visible in the system’s dynamics and thus can be considered 
latent as opposed to manifest.’
3 The range of ideas that a person sees as reasonable or worthy of consideration (cf. Sherif and 
Hovland, 1961).
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attractor, will embrace alternative ideas as credible and relevant when they are 
consistent with the dominant attractor. Moreover, attractors may change shape, 
changing the level of acceptance and responsiveness, under the influence of 
certain circumstances and events.
Figure 2.1: A dynamical system with two attractors, start situation, and possible results of 
forces (t=x1 and t=x2).
Source: adapted from Coleman et al. (2007, p. 6)
Note: Attractor A represents a latent attractor. In Figure 2.1, situation t=0 represents an 
initial stage in which the system is residing in attractor B with forces that pull on the 
attractor landscape (the hill between A and B) and forces that pull and push the ball 
over the hill because of the attraction of attractor A and possibly other factors (external 
events or internal problems in B). If forces pulling the ball over the hill are dominant 
(see situation t=x1 in the figure), the latent attractor A becomes the dominant attractor 
influencing actions in the policy system. This would mean that the cluster of individuals is 
now embracing an alternative set of ideas and beliefs that are different from the previous 
ones. Here, we can speak of system innovation (e.g. Geels, 2004). Pulling the hill down 
(situation t=x2 in the figure) would mean that attractors A and B become one attractor 
that holds a broader set of ideas and beliefs that are deemed credible and relevant.
The question is which combinations of forces, such as focusing events and 
efforts of policy entrepreneurs, change the shape and attraction of latent 
and dominant attractors? In other words, which conditions and forces hinder 
or enable the embracement of alternative ideas and issues? Can we identify 
tipping points, and, if so, by what events and processes are these preceded?
2.2 Framing as an agenda-setting strategy
The policy science literature points to the efforts of policy entrepreneurs4 
(Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom, 1997; Zahariadis, 2007) to manipulate attractors 
and overcome institutional resistance to change. Policy entrepreneurs are 
4 Change agents in policy science are also referred as policy advocates (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993), boundary spanners (Noble & Jones, 2006; Williams, 2002), or innovation brokers (Winch 
& Courtney, 2007; Klerckx & Leeuwis, 2009; Klerckx & Aarts, 2013).
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challenged to develop strong latent attractors to become noticed ‘inside’ 
policymakers’ perceptions of social reality and what they consider relevant 
and meaningful. Such latent attractors may concern the development of 
alternative policy frames (Schön & Rein, 1994; Rein & Schön, 1996), policy images 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), transition agendas 
(Van der Brugge et al., 2005), or storylines (Hajer, 1995). The strategies frequently 
addressed (e.g. Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom, 1997; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) 
are: framing issues as problems, building coalitions and networking to influence 
policy communities, recognizing and exploiting windows of opportunity, and 
recognizing, exploiting, and creating multiple venues for agenda setting. 
The colouring of issues as problems is critical to agenda-setting strategies. 
‘The chances of a given proposal or subject rising on an agenda are markedly 
enhanced if it is connected to an important problem’ (Kingdon, 2003, p. 198). 
Agenda-setting researchers seek to explain why some problems catch the 
attention of governmental officials more than others. ‘The process of fixing 
attention on one problem rather than another is a central part of agenda-setting’ 
(Kingdon, 2003, p. 115). Issue proponents highlight indicators of problems, point 
to conditions that violate important values, and classify conditions into one 
category rather than another to identify them as problematic. Issue proponents 
dramatize problems, they create situations that focus policymakers’ attention 
on a certain problem, they use symbols to make the problem more salient, and 
they assign meaning to certain events that will enable coupling of problems to 
political attention or to specific policy proposals (Kingdon, 2003; Mintrom, 1997; 
Zahariadis, 2007). Much of the work of issue proponents involves developing 
and crafting arguments that will persuade others to support ideas and shape 
the terms of the debate (Mossberger & Stoker, 1997). 
The words shaping, colouring, dramatizing, packaging, and portraying of 
information, issues, and arguments point to the importance of framing 
strategies in agenda setting. Framing refers to the selective interpretations of 
information to make it possible to make sense of the world and to be able to 
decide on a course of action (Gray, 2002). The essence of framing is the notion 
that individuals constantly struggle to make sense of the world around them and 
subconsciously or consciously use cognitive frames of reference (schemata) to 
decide on actions (Goffman, 1974).  Frames, according to Goffman, are: ‘schemata 
of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large’ (1974, p. 21). Essentially 
this means that people give meaning to the world around them by selecting 
pieces of information and interpreting some aspects as more important or 
relevant than other aspects. ‘Framing essentially involves selection and salience’ 
(Entman, 1993, p. 52).
Media agenda-setting researchers acknowledge framing as a powerful agenda-
setting strategy (McCombs & Shaw, 1993; Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Scheuffele & 
Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007). The central idea is that in agenda setting, it is 
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not only ‘what issues to think about’, but essentially influencing ‘how to think 
about issues’, that is important (McCombs & Shaw, 1993, p. 62). Thus, agenda 
setting is not only about a ranking of issues, but essentially about how issues 
get meaning in terms of problems, causes, solutions, and motivations for action. 
Both the selection of objects for attention and the construction of frames for 
thinking about these objects are powerful agenda-setting roles. 
The policy science also points to the importance of framing and discourse 
in politics, planning, and policymaking, also called the argumentative turn 
(Fischer & Forester, 1993) and the deliberative turn (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). 
The framing of issues is judged to be an important precursor to more detailed 
policymaking (Hajer, 1995; Schön & Rein, 1994). Framing is discursive power that 
is constitutive of power exerted through more material entities, such as money, 
labour, land, and regulations (Hajer & Laws, 2006; Healey 2006a/b; Arts & Van 
Tatenhove, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 1998). Thus, policy entrepreneurs develop framing 
strategies as part of their negotiating and networking skills (Mintrom, 1997). 
Framing in social interactions
The concept of framing had its origins in cognitive psychology (Bartlett, 1932) 
and anthropology (Bateson, 1972) and was later on applied in various other 
disciplines such as policy analysis (e.g. Schön & Rein, 1994) and social movement 
research (e.g. Snow & Benford, 1986; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The framing 
concept is interpreted and operationalized in many different ways (see Dewulf 
et al., 2009, for an overview of framing research traditions and interpretations 
of framing). In the context of agenda setting and coalition building, a relevant 
interpretation is that used in research on social movements and collective 
action. In this line of research, framing is regarded as an important dynamic in 
collective action and in the building of support for ideas (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
The framing concept is used to understand both how people interpret incoming 
information based on their cognitive frames (frames in thought) – which refer 
to their life experience, cultural values, and belief systems – and how people 
strategically frame messages (frames in communication) to mobilize support 
for certain problem definitions and proposals for solutions (e.g. Entman, 1993; 
Dewulf et al., 2009; Chong & Druckman, 2007). In the context of collective action 
and social movements, Benford & Snow (2000) understand framing in terms of 
‘simplifying and condensing aspects of the “world out there”, in ways that are 
intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander 
support, and to demobilize antagonists’ (p. 614). This intentional type of framing 
aimed at coalition building is also highly relevant to framing as an agenda-
setting strategy. Framing as a strategy involves selecting ‘some aspects of a 
perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’ 
(Entman, 1993, p. 52).  
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In his definition of framing, Entman emphasizes that analysis should be 
focused on the precise ways in which communicating texts (written or spoken) 
influence the human consciousness. In other words, framing is accomplished 
largely through the use of language (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Language is 
understood not only as something that represents what to think about and 
how to think about it (McCombs & Shaw, 1993), but also as something that 
people use to accomplish things (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Language-in-action 
is performative, it does something to reality (Drake & Donohue, 1996). It can 
provoke frames of listeners who may mobilize to some form of (collective) 
action. Language-in-action mobilizes political attention. Therefore, it is argued 
that analysis of the dynamics of agenda setting should focus on micro-level, 
day-to-day interactions between people (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Hajer & Laws, 
2005):
If we accept that language interferes, that it is more than a medium of something 
‘outside’ it (Fischer and Forester 1993), then analysis of policy work ...acquires a 
concrete focus on the interaction among actors and on the way in which they 
interactively frame a situation (Hajer and Laws, 2005, p. 262)
Following this principle, we understand framing as an interactional and dynamic 
process in which language-in-action continuously and subtly reproduces, 
adjusts, and transforms the frames that are communicated and applied (Gray, 
2002; Snow & Benford, 1986; Benford & Snow, 2000). Strategic framing through 
communication (linguistic framing) interplays with cognitive framing, that is, 
people’s expectations about other people, objects, events, and settings in the 
world (Benford & Snow, 2000; Entman, 2003). Framing can be understood as a 
co-construction between communicator and receiver; this makes the process of 
framing dynamic and unpredictable. The dynamics of framing are even clearer 
when we realize that receivers become communicators and communicators 
become receivers during social interactions. Information changes subtly 
during interactions in which messages are constantly being interpreted and 
communicated in specific ways. It is like the game of passing on a story through 
a line of participants by whispering it to a neighbour who passes it on to the 
next, and so on until the final participant is reached. At the end of the line, the 
message is adjusted or maybe even transformed as some information has been 
left out and new information added during the interactions. What remains of 
the original information are the pieces that were most salient to the teller–
listeners in the chain, and, depending on the participants’ frames of reference, 
the information may have acquired a totally different meaning and may perform 
in a different way than was originally meant. Thus, framing concerns not only 
selection of information, but also ‘resemiotization’ (Iedema, 2001) as people 
talk and listen to one another and subtly reframe their own perspectives on the 
basis of an understanding of one another’s frames (Van Herzele & Aarts, 2013). 
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What gets framed? 
Agenda-setting analysis focuses on the framing of issues as urgent problems to 
raise attention. In this research, this concerns the framing of problems relating to 
the quality of places and spaces. However, a wider array of ‘things’ that are framed 
are of relevance for the mobilization of action. In social movement research (e.g. 
Snow & Benford, 1986; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000), three 
categories are distinguished: 1) diagnostic framing: problem identification and 
attributions (who and what is to blame); 2) prognostic framing: articulation of 
a proposed solution to the problem and strategies for implementation; and 3) 
motivational framing: a ‘call to arms’ or rationale for engaging in ameliorative 
collective action. Together, the three forms of framing are used to explain how 
support and action are mobilized among actors.
Dewulf et al. (2009) argue that framing can also concern the relations that are 
needed to achieve ambitions (relation framing); for example, emphasizing a 
strong role of a particular government actor as a condition for success. Relation 
framing concerns talk about the actors, coalitions, and relations that are 
considered as necessary or undesirable. In this process, identities of ‘self’ and 
‘others’ are discursively constructed. Besides issue framing and relation framing, 
framing can also concern the process of interaction itself. In the agenda-setting 
context, we think of talk about the formal and informal communication needed 
to achieve ambitions. Framing may include a perspective on how to connect to 
specific policy procedures that will enable a desired action or situation; and it can 
also concern informal communication strategies to engage influential politicians in 
the ambitions that are being pursued. See Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: Agenda-setting strategies: interplay of issue, relation, and process framing
When issues, relations, and processes are connected to one another, normative–
prescriptive stories may emerge that provide sense of what the problem is and 
what should be done about it (Rein and Schön, 1996). It is widely acknowledged 
that stories play an important role in disseminating a vision or a message (Hajer, 
1995; Gabriel & Connell, 2010; Throgmorton, 1996). 
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2.3 What’s in a story?
Stories and storytelling are viewed as powerful change agents in various 
disciplines. Connected to the interpretive turn in social science, attention 
has turned to the role of stories or narratives as conveyors of meaning and 
constitutors of social realities (Yanow, 2000). In organizational studies, 
storytelling is a hot topic, as the many books, articles, and social media groups 
on the theme demonstrate. Storytelling is viewed as an important way to both 
enable and resist innovation and change in organizations (Bate, 2004, 2005; 
Gabriel & Connell, 2010; Boje, 1991; Czarniawska, 1997). Storytelling is also used 
as an explanation for sudden shifts in public opinion (Gladwell, 2000; Heath 
& Heath, 2007; Van Ginneken, 2009). A growing stream in policy science uses 
insights about storytelling to understand dynamics in policymaking and to help 
find ways out of complex policy controversies (Hajer & Laws, 2005; Rein & Schön, 
1996; Schön & Rein, 1994). In planning research as well, attention is growing 
in relation to the importance of storytelling in how planners interpret and 
prioritize their decisions and actions in situations characterized by uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and limited time and information (Forester, 1999; Baum, 1997; 
Mandelbaum, 1991; Marris, 1997; Sandercock, 2003; Throgmorton, 1996, 2003; 
Innes and Booher, 1999; Innes & Booher, 2010).  
Storytelling is a way of ordering and constructing shared meaning (Boyce, 
1996). Stories provide a plot with a more or less logical course and coherence of 
events. They contain a structure with a beginning and an end, key characters, 
often a transformation from one situation to an other, and a moral (Sandercock, 
2003). It is a framework for interpretation to which listeners can attach their own 
understandings, experiences, and emotions. Thus, stories and the interactive 
development of plots help to deal with ambiguity and to coordinate different 
realities (Throgmorton, 1996; Forester, 1999; Van Dijk, 2011). By ordering 
meaning, storytelling assists the setting of priorities in the face of little time and 
conflicting goals and interests, that is, making claims about what is to be taken as 
important, relevant, and worth time and attention (Forester, 1999). Storytelling 
not only helps actors to understand situations in a certain way, but also contains 
moral tension and motivation for action (Sandercock, 2003; Hajer and Laws, 
2005)5. Stories therefore mobilize or galvanize people into action (Bate, 2004; 
Rein & Schon, 1996; Hajer & Laws, 2005). Rather than moving to action based 
on facts and figures, people are moved by emotion. ‘Once upon a time…’ is the 
best way to emotionally connect people to our agenda (cf. Gottschall, 2012).
The emotions of fiction are highly contagious, and so are the ideas. …In fact, 
fiction seems to be more effective at changing beliefs than nonfiction, which is 
designed to persuade through argument and evidence. …And in this there is an 
important lesson about the molding power of story. When we read nonfiction, 
5 Sandercock (2003) gives an example of how stakeholders were mobilized into action by 
presenting to them success stories that demonstrated that change can actually happen.
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we read with our shields up. We are critical and sceptical. But when we are 
absorbed in a story, we drop our intellectual guard. We are moved emotionally, 
and this seems to leave us defense-less. (Gottschall, 2012, p. 110, 111) 
Baker (2010) shows that storytelling performs in many different ways. Besides 
dealing with ambiguity and constructing new organizational realities, stories 
help to improve the negotiability of issues because they are more inclusive of 
actors. Stories invite listeners to share their experiences and contribute to the 
story in their own way and become tellers themselves. People are not pushed 
into a prescribed form of participation but invited to join in a way that is relevant 
and logical for them. There is room for multiple interpretations. Moreover, 
stories provide a way to give meaning to factual arguments and findings and to 
connect these to imagination of possible futures. By being inviting, stories also 
enable access to various knowledge sources. Normally, it is difficult to access 
tacit knowledge, but as storytelling invites sharing personal experiences, tacit 
knowledge is also shared. In this way, it is possible to tap alternative forms of 
knowledge and to integrate them in the discussion. By tapping and constructing 
knowledge and linking knowledge to action, stories create potential for 
innovation.
Design and visualization can contribute to the on-going construction of inviting 
and imaginative stories (Van Dijk & Beunen, 2009; De Jonge, 2009). ‘Design turns 
ambitions into stories... Designs fill in the gaps regarding the precise intention 
of a project, examining the consequences of planning by confronting abstract 
ambitions for the future with practical restrictions and the range of possibilities 
for the physical present. Designs also touch the emotional, associative, persuasive 
modes of human thought, speech and behaviour’ (Van Dijk, 2011, p. 131). 
Stories are highly performative as they provide a framework for understanding, 
decision making, and action, and improve negotiation and knowledge creation. 
Stories are not only persuasive but also constitutive (Throgmorton, 1996; 
Forester, 1999). ‘They do work by organizing attention, practically and politically, 
not only to the facts at hand, but to why the facts at hand matter’ (Forester, 
1999, p. 29). They do descriptive work, moral work of constructing identities and 
character, political work of identifying friends and foes, interests, and needs, 
and deliberative work of values and options, and what is relevant and significant 
(Forester, 1999). Stories can become self-fulfilling (Watzlawick, 1984)6. When we 
tell stories, listen to stories, discuss them, and pass them on, we are reproducing 
and subtly changing ourselves and our behaviours. We are creating the future 
that the story is representing (Van Dijk, 2011); or, in the words of Sandercock 
(2003, p. 16), ‘We become our stories’. This implies that stories do much more 
than provide a framework for understanding complex realities. They actually 
create new patterns and reshape those complex realities. 
6 A self-fulfilling prophecy is ‘an assumption or prediction that, purely as a result of having been 
made, causes the expected or predicted event to occur and thus confirms its own “accuracy”’ 
(Watzlawick, 1984, p. 95).
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Stories are shaped in social interactions
As described above, stories influence and constitute policymaking and social 
reality; but stories cannot themselves cause change. The concept of storytelling 
emphasizes that stories emerge in interactions between people and that they 
are constantly being reshaped in those interactions (Hajer & Laws, 2005). Stories 
are narrated by people, they cannot tell themselves. This requires interaction 
between tellers and listeners who then become tellers themselves. 
A story is as much the product of the listener as it is the product of the teller 
(Boje, 1991; Baker, 2010; Throgmorton, 2003). When listeners hear a story that 
involves experiences of the other, they are reminded of things they experienced 
themselves. So what triggers in a story depends on the personal perception of 
the listener who will retell the story according to his own personal interpretation 
(Baker, 2010). ‘Our personal experience mingles with what we hear and then see. 
As listeners, we are coproducers with the teller of the story’ (Boje, 1991, p. 107). A 
nice metaphor for this reader–response principle is the famous children’s book 
The Never Ending Story by Michael Ende. Main character, Bastian, starts reading 
a story, becomes part of the story, and is challenged to determine the plot (he 
decides whether Fantastica is destroyed or not). Like Bastian, we also become 
participants in stories by telling and retelling them. We add aspects and leave 
out other aspects depending on our own experiences and imaginations. 
Telling, listening, and retelling in interactions implies not only that stories 
are changeable, but also that stories are able to ‘travel’ and obtain a large 
‘telling community’. Stories are elastic in the sense that there is room for the 
interpretations and experiences of others (Baker, 2010). Listeners are invited to 
incorporate the story within their own frames and then pass it on to others in 
ways that are meaningful and relevant to them (Baker, 2010; Van Dijk, 2011). This 
elasticity enables stories to travel among a wider audience. 
If listeners reshape stories and can even change the plot of the story, we may 
wonder what elements of stories remain in the on-going interactions between 
tellers and listeners, and why. Many stories can be told about the future of 
places, and this raises questions about how competing stories are interpreted, 
valued, and compared (Throgmorton, 2003; Sandercock, 2003). How can we 
explain why some stories become strong attractors of attention and support, 
whereas other stories fade? 
How stories become strong attractors 
The challenge that civic initiatives face is to construct and share stories that 
are considered meaningful and relevant by government actors from whom 
they seek support. These stories have to fit with existing policy stories and 
government actors’ self-referential frames. So when do stories resonate in 
planning offices and government departments, i.e. how do they become strong 
attractors? 
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In his book The Deliberative Practitioner, Forester (1999) asks a similar question. 
He wonders how planners learn from other people’s stories when they read, 
hear, and listen to them and thereby become not only reflective practitioners 
(cf. Schön, 1983), but also deliberative practitioners acting and interacting 
with others.  He suggests that planners may learn from ‘practice stories’, as 
we learn from friends. The point stressed is that we learn when people tell us 
stories that matter to us because they are appropriate to the situations we are 
in. This requires storytellers to have knowledge of, and to be able to empathize 
with, our particular situation, needs, and possibilities. This is also an important 
assumption in Benford and Snow’s ideas (2000; Snow and Benford, 1986) about 
the conditions in which people get positive responses to proposed stories.  
Responsiveness and frame alignment
Snow & Benford’s concepts of frame resonance and frame alignment processes 
(Snow & Benford, 1986; Benford & Snow, 2000) help conceptualize how stories 
become strong attractors and effectively mobilize attention and support. These 
concepts form an explanatory framework that elucidates how alternative stories 
are fitted strategically to existing stories in order to become noticed and get a 
positive response from targeted supporters. 
Frame alignment processes concern framing that is directed at linking up 
interests with those of the targets of mobilization. There are four basic alignment 
processes (Benford & Snow, 2000): Bridging concerns linking ideologically similar 
but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem. 
Amplification refers to the idealization, exaggeration, or reinforcement of 
existing beliefs and values. Extension concerns inclusion of issues and concerns 
which are thought to be important to potential supporters and that extend 
beyond primary interests and frames. And finally, transformation is the situation 
in which old frames are changed into new understandings and meanings. 
Storytellers can employ each of these strategies depending on targeted actors’ 
level of receptivity. Sometimes stories do not have to change much to persuade 
listeners to join in, whereas in other cases the plot needs to be transformed to 
get the required (political) support. 
The concept of frame resonance concerns the conditions that influence listeners’ 
responsiveness, that is, whether they will accept a story as credible, relevant, 
and meaningful. The neutral term resonance may also be associated with 
negative responses, leading to opposition, but that is not how Benford & Snow 
(2000) understand the concept. Resonance increases the chance that targets 
of mobilization will support the initiative or proposal. When stories resonate 
among listeners, the latter are more inclined to participate in storytelling. The 
resonance concept points to the crucial role of the listener who interprets and (re)
frames incoming information. To get a positive response (to be heard, read, and 
remembered), a story should fit with the self-referential frames of the listener. 
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The two basic elements that determine whether stories get a response are their 
perceived credibility and salience to listeners.  Stories are salient when targeted 
listeners believe that the underlying beliefs, values, and ideas of the story are 
essential to their lives (centrality). Moreover, salient stories connect with the 
personal, everyday experiences of listeners (experiential commensurability) and 
are therefore not too abstract or distant. And finally, salient stories connect to 
the culture with which listeners identify themselves (narrative fidelity or cultural 
resonance). 
Stories are perceived as credible when they are consistent, empirically credible, 
and when the storytellers are considered credible (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
Consistency means that the communicated frames should be consistent with 
the actions of the articulators. Simply said, actions have to conform to the 
claims. One has to walk the talk. Empirical credibility refers to the consistency 
of articulated frames with events that are considered relevant by listeners. 
Evidence is not about providing facts that can be observed objectively, but 
about pointing to events that, by at least part of the listening group, are 
considered relevant and important. Here, we can see a relation with experiential 
commensurability.  ‘Empirical credibility is in the eyes of the beholder’ (Jasper 
& Poulsen, 1995, p. 496). A last important element attributing credibility to stories 
is the perceived credibility of the storytellers. Benford & Snow (2000), referring to 
the social psychology literature (e.g. Aronson & Golden, 1962; Hass, 1981; McGuire, 
1985), argue that speakers and writers who are considered more credible are more 
persuasive, and that their persuasiveness is associated with status, expertise, and 
credentials. ‘Hypothetically, the greater the status and/or perceived expertise of 
the frame articulator and/or the organization they represent from the vantage 
point of potential adherents and constituents, the more plausible and resonant 
the framings or claims’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 621). 
In sum, promoters of alternative stories face the challenge of enhancing the 
attractiveness of their story, and the chance of a positive response, by framing it 
into targeted supporters’ latitude of acceptance (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif et 
al., 1965). In order to do this, strategic fitting takes place (Snow & Benford, 1986), 
resulting in continuous reproduction, adjustment, and resemiotization in social 
interactions (Van Herzele & Aarts, 2013). This is not always an intentional process. 
It cannot be predicted beforehand what will happen in social interactions and 
how conversation partners will subtly change their talk as they improvise and 
anticipate on what is being told. As Van Woerkum et al. (2011, p. 146) point out: 
Dynamics of group discussion follow an unpredictable path. ‘Our discussions, 
especially in an informal setting, show a lot of variation. In this interaction, “the 
future is under perpetual construction” (Stacey, 2000, p. 128)’.
Strategic fitting requires new stories to be fluid and elastic to incorporate the 
frames and stories of targeted supporters. This principle is illustrated in Figure 
2.3. The story changes shape over time, and the frames and stories of people 
participating in storytelling change as well. As a consequence, the clustering 
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and self-organization of people around stories is also fluid and elastic. If a 
competing story gets stronger, becomes a strong latent attractor, then people 
might disconnect from their original cluster and join another.
Figure 2.3: Clustering of people around elastic stories
Slow warming up and focusing events
The ideas about frame alignment and strategic fitting support the arguments 
in agenda-setting research that, although change sometimes may seem radical 
(punctuated), tipping points are often preceded by an enduring process of 
‘softening up’ the policy system (Kingdon, 2003). The softening-up process is a 
matter of many social interactions in which tellers and listeners continually tell, 
retell, and change stories in more or less subtle ways. During this process, the 
imagination of listeners needs to be triggered or warmed up in order to seize 
opportunities when they occur. Storytelling can be compared to the warming-up 
exercises before hard physical activity (Baker, 2010). Like warming-up exercises, 
storytelling involves taking time and effort to open up the imagination. Thinking 
processes will only loosen if the image-creating part of listeners is tapped. The 
warming-up process of storytelling therefore necessarily takes time; and this 
requires patience and perseverance from storytellers. 
Stories can become strong attractors when they coincide with windows of 
opportunity (Throgmorton, 1996; Rein & Schön, 1996). These windows of 
opportunity often result from focusing events that shift attention to new 
issues (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Such a momentum of 
shifting attention can be used to direct attention to a new story. To be inviting 
to listeners, a latent story should be so elastic that it can incorporate focusing 
events that are considered important by these listeners. Thus, fitting a story to 
potential supporters’ existing stories through frame alignment strategies and 
continuous resemiotization also involves fitting stories to the events that are 
considered relevant and important by these potential supporters. 
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2.4 Towards a framework for analysis
This chapter provides the theoretical concepts with which the central question 
of this research is operationalized. Our question concerns the process in 
which civic initiatives connect to government organizations, and how we can 
understand the outcomes for planning agendas relating to regional spatial 
development. The starting point for the empirical research is the efforts of civic 
initiatives to get connected to the self-referential perspective of government 
actors in order to secure attention and support. The question is how they do this 
and which circumstances increase the chance of such connections occurring. 
The concept of attractors was used to illustrate how self-reference is the basis 
of the self-organization of people around sets of beliefs, convictions, and 
values that are continuously reproduced. The concept also illustrates how 
civic initiatives, forming latent attractors, may exercise attracting forces on a 
dominant attractor (formal government perspectives) to become noticed and 
become considered as meaningful and relevant. Government organizations 
and policy networks, which reside in a particular attractor, move continuously 
in different states of being under the influence of other attractors who exert 
influence. Under certain circumstances, they can flip to another attractor, or 
embrace a wider range of ideas and values, when the attractor in which the 
system resides changes shape. 
On the basis of the policy science literature discussed in this chapter, we 
argue that policy entrepreneurs’ agenda-setting strategies as well as focusing 
events are important forces that can change the shape of attractors. Framing 
and storytelling have been identified as important agenda-setting strategies. 
Framing is dynamic and interactive, and involves the continuous negotiation, 
reproduction, and alteration of frames in and through daily interactions 
between people. Stories and storytelling have been described as effective forms 
of framing in which problem definitions, solutions, strategies, and motivations 
for action are brought together in a coherent whole, providing an interpretive 
framework for listeners to make sense of ambiguity and decide on future 
actions. Some stories become strong attractors and manage to effectively 
mobilize support and attention. Other stories fade away. The question is under 
which circumstances alternative stories, which form latent attractors, become 
so attractive to people that they become accepted as meaningful and relevant 
to government actors and may even transform planning agendas.  
From the theory presented in this chapter, we can derive the following principles 
and sensitizing concepts which are the basis for inquiry in two case studies 
(see Chapter 3). First, stories will mobilize attention and be more attractive 
if they resonate with targeted listeners’ ambitions and frames. Framing in 
interaction concerns the alignment of the promoted story with listeners’ 
personal experiences, ambitions, and experiences. Stories become strong 
attractors when they are framed and resemiotized such that listeners, thinking 
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from their own frames of reference, consider them relevant, credible, truthful, 
and emotive. Therefore, it is important in this research to consider how frame 
alignment processes in day-to-day human interactions enhance the chance of 
civic initiatives eliciting a positive response to their storytelling. Second, it was 
argued that the attraction of stories is enhanced when they are connected to 
events that open policy windows or cause a momentum of shifting attention. 
In the meanwhile, audiences are warmed up to the unfolding story and invited 
to participate in storytelling, which enables seizing opportunities as they occur. 
Together, the processes of frame alignment and resemiotization in relation to 
focusing events and windows of opportunity may elucidate how stories ‘tip’. 
Within this framework, with its strong focus on framing and storytelling as 
drivers of change, the empirical analysis must continuously confront ‘who is 
telling what to whom in what context and why’. In the next chapter, we discuss 
how this interpretive work was performed.
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A tale of doing 
interpretive analysis
‘Tell me one last thing,’ said Harry. ‘Is this 
real? Or has this been happening inside my 
head?’ Dumbledore beamed at him, and his voice 
sounded loud and strong in Harry’s ears even 
though the bright mist was descending again, 
obscuring his figure. ‘Of course it is happening 
inside your head, Harry, but why on earth 
should that mean that it is not real?’
(J.K. Rowling, 2007. Harry Potter and the 
Deathly Hallows, p. 579). 
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3.1 Interpretive approach
Interpretivists believe there is no single reality, but rather multiple 
interpretations of realities that come about inside and between the heads of 
people. Interpretive research starts from the ontological and epistemological 
assumption that (social and physical) realities and knowledge are constructed 
in and out of interactions between people (Crotty, 2003; Geertz, 1973; Yanow, 
2000). ‘There are no “brute data” whose meaning is beyond dispute’ (Yanow, 
2000, p. 5), as objectivist research suggests. Interpretations of the world can 
be useful, fulfilling, rewarding, and so forth, but there are no true or valid 
interpretations (Crotty, 2003). 
We position this research, with its focus on human interactions, communication 
processes, and struggles for meaning in spatial planning contexts, within the 
interpretive research tradition. It contributes to the growing body of interpretive 
work that has appeared ever since the interpretive or argumentative turn in 
policy and planning science (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Yanow, 2006; Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; Healey, 2006). An interpretive approach to policy and planning 
processes focuses on the various meanings that people give to the world around 
them (events, objects, actions, etc.), and how people through these meanings 
express and exchange their feelings, values, and beliefs (Yanow, 2000). This 
enables understanding of how actors and organizations (re)frame their interests 
and arguments in order to solve a problem. It adds to institutional analysis or 
analysis of interests a tool to understand the dynamics of policymaking and 
planning by focusing on how changes in meanings and arguments can result in 
changes in politics and policymaking (Van den Brink & Metze, 2006). 
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This research is based on the assumption that people’s actions are guided by 
the meanings they construct for phenomena that they consider relevant to 
their actions, and that the meaning of such things derives from, is handled in, 
and modified through social interaction with other people (cf. Blumer, 1969; 
Goffman, 1974). Language plays a crucial role in these inter-human interactions. 
Dialogues between people reflect people’s perceptions, feelings, and attitudes, 
and enable interpretation of their meanings and intent. Most interpretive 
researchers analyse (symbolic) language, such as texts, talk, and non-verbal 
behaviour and visuals, as they are the mediums in which interpretations and 
their underlying meanings are manifested (Crotty, 2003; Schwartz-Shea & 
Yanow, 2012). The focus is on the way language shapes what things we see, how 
we see them, and how this shaping of things constitutes reality (Crotty, 2003). 
In the wide spectrum of interpretive methods and methodologies (see e.g. 
Wood & Kroger, 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 
2006; Van den Brink, 2009), such as narrative analysis, poststructuralist discourse 
analysis, and discursive psychological analysis, framing analysis is used to focus 
on what happens between the ‘noses’ and ‘ears’ of people when they engage in 
conversation (Dewulf et al., 2009; Entman, 2003; Goffman, 1974; Benford & Snow, 
2000). In this research, we used framing analysis to understand the nature, 
process, and outcomes of social interactions between civic initiatives and their 
targets of mobilization (both governmental and non-governmental actors). The 
verb ‘framing’, in contrast to the noun ‘frame’, emphasizes the dynamic activity 
of constructing and reconstructing frames over time (cf. Yanow, 2000). 
3.2 Writing a meaningful and convincing scientific narrative
Interpretive research requires the researcher to engage in double hermeneutics 
(Giddens, 1984; Yanow, 2006), or even triple hermeneutics (Schwartz-Shea 
& Yanow, 2009; Yanow, 2009). Like the interpretations of people under study, 
the researcher’s interpreting is not a neutral or objective activity. Researchers’ 
interpretive work is guided by their own values, background, and the questions, 
assumptions, goals, and concepts that have informed their analysis. To justify 
the claim that interpretations of the studied phenomena are meaningful and 
plausible, researchers have to meet certain scientific criteria. 
The criteria for interpretive analysis differ from what counts as good research in 
objectivist research because interpretive analysis does not aim for universally 
valid explanations and causal relations, or for generating general laws by testing 
hypotheses, or for enabling predictability. ‘Predictive theories and universals 
cannot be found in the study of human affairs’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224). ‘What is 
going on here and why’ cannot be adequately answered with a priori hypotheses 
about what is going on because ‘what is going on here’ depends on the context-
specific interpretations of the people being studied. Interpretive analysis 
requires an open abductive approach in empirical research without fixed a 
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priori assumptions about what is going on (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Yanow, 
2000). Therefore, the criteria of validity, generalizability, and reliability are not 
appropriate in interpretivist research (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012; Schwartz-
Shea, 2006; Silverman, 2001). However, as in objectivist research, interpretive 
researchers have to account for the meaningfulness and trustworthiness of their 
interpretations (Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Van Bommel & Van der Zouwen; 2003). 
A scientific narrative
Good interpretive research can be considered as creating scientific narratives 
that are both meaningful and convincing to their readers and listeners (cf. 
Czarniawska, 1997, 2004; Yanow, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2002; Van Bommel & Van der 
Zouwen, 2013). A scientific narrative is meaningful when readers consider it 
relevant and important, that is, when they do not raise the ‘so what?’ question. 
A scientific narrative is convincing when it meets criteria for trustworthiness, 
which are different in each scientific community, and does not prompt readers 
to ask: ‘did it really happen?’ (Van Bommel & Van der Zouwen, 2013). 
Like any narrative, a scientific narrative should contain a plot, and a beginning 
with a puzzle or tension, a middle, and an inspiring finale (Czarniawska, 2004; 
Van Bommel & Van der Zouwen, 2013; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012) that invites 
readers to participate, share, and continue the story. Scientific narratives can 
actually be considered never-ending stories because the research and the 
narration about research will continue. To accommodate both meaningfulness 
and plausibility, a scientific narrative should interweave in a natural flow a 
theoretical plot and an empirical plot or plots. This book contains case narratives 
that tell the empirical plots of the case studies. These necessarily serve goals 
with respect to the theoretical plot and therefore involve a selective narration of 
what has happened, based on a framework of sensitizing concepts. At the same 
time, the theoretical plot is connected to the empirical plot and unfolds, while 
reflection on the case narratives leads to refinement of sensitizing concepts.
Sensitizing concepts and the hermeneutic circle
To make sense of what happened in the cases, I used sensitizing concepts, 
which do not have fixed definitions but direct our attention to relevant aspects 
of the phenomenon under study and form a preliminary interpretive framework 
(cf. Blumer, 1969). These preliminary sensitizing concepts and frameworks were 
refined as I went up in the hermeneutic ‘circle’ or ‘spiral’ (Yanow & Schwartz-
Shea, 2006; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). A hermeneutic circle or spiral reflects 
the idea that there is no fixed starting point for analysis. The process begins with 
getting a first rudimentary understanding of what is happening with the help 
of what is known at that moment, including the terms and concepts that enable 
sense-making at that moment. Next, understanding evolves as concepts and 
frameworks for interpretation are refined and become more specific over time 
in a continual process of sense-making of, and reflection on, both the practice 
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under study and the concepts and meanings that are considered meaningful 
and useful (Crotty, 2003; Van den Brink & Metze, 2006; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 
2012). ‘This doesn’t mean that interpretive researchers are on “shaky” or “loose” 
ground. Rather, it means that, like captains of a ship, they are more attuned 
to changing weather conditions and riding the resulting waves, instead of 
strictly following the initial course that they might have laid out on dry ground’ 
(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 36).  
Criteria for interpretive analysis
To arrive at a trustworthy scientific narrative, I used criteria that are widely 
accepted in interpretive research (Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985): 
thick description, transparency, systematics, reflexivity, triangulation, and 
feedback from informants and peers. 
A thick description is the contextualized description of the most important 
events, settings, persons, interactions, and so forth in which interpretations are 
embedded (cf. Geertz, 1973; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). It accounts for the 
extent to which the researcher has succeeded in understanding the specific 
historical, social, cultural, and political context of the practice she is studying and 
how she has integrated that in her own interpretations of what was going on. A 
thick description adds the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ that underlie the (thin) description’s 
‘whats’ by providing all historical, demographic, geographic, economic, and 
cultural context and details that are relevant to the research questions of the 
researcher. Thickness is a relative measure: the level of detail is related to the 
research question as well as what the readers already know (Schwartz-Shea & 
Yanow, 2012). 
I created thick descriptions of the case studies by systematically collecting and 
analysing events and relevant data and reporting these in the form of case 
narratives following Flyvbjerg (2002, 2006) and Throgmorton (2008). In both 
case studies, the challenge was to find a way to get thick descriptions that were 
meaningful and that could be easily connected to a more analytical reflection. 
I did that in the form of case narratives. My case narratives served to elucidate 
the process of agenda setting and outcomes over time in the context of other 
events and related issues. They served to uncover and elucidate what things 
and processes preceded tipping points in the agenda-setting process. Both 
narratives are simultaneously detailed and selective. They are not exhaustive 
overviews, but for the sake of telling the story selections of issues and events are 
described in detail. This helps readers to find their own paths of interpretation. 
Trustworthiness is about whether the interpretation of raw data into results 
is credible (Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). This involves 
dependability, whether other researchers with the same approach would 
come to the same sort of conclusions taking changing circumstances into 
account. Trustworthiness is further supported by transparent and systematic 
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data collection as well as systematic data analysis in which interpretations are 
related to theoretical concepts and frameworks. Transparency is important to 
all choices that are made during the research process. The remainder of this 
chapter about the case studies (section 3), the methods of data collection, and 
analysis narrated in section 4 are devoted to providing transparency about my 
interpretive work and to account for how I systematically collected and analysed 
data. Computer-aided qualitative analysis is used increasingly to meet criteria 
of trustworthiness by improving transparency and systematics. It enables a 
systematic approach by relating data to concepts and by recording the steps 
that have been taken to develop interpretations. For information about how I 
used the software Atlas.ti, see section 5.
Reflexivity involves a critical reflection by the researcher on her own 
interpretations, and adaptation of interpretation methods if necessary. To 
achieve this, I organized feedback from peers for both cases in different ways. 
For the case study about New Markets Heuvelland, I discussed findings and 
interpretive frameworks formally and informally with other researchers within 
the framework of the project, Vital Coalitions. Colleagues on that research 
team were involved in the same case study. I also discussed findings and 
interpretations with experts involved in the New Markets process. Although 
there was no such research setting and team for the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
case study, I was able to check my interpretations with two key stakeholders. 
Moreover, I presented and discussed findings and interpretations of both cases 
in seminars with colleagues, at conferences, and of course with my supervisors. 
Triangulation involves combining different methods, theories, perspectives, 
and information sources. ‘This form of comparison derives from navigation, 
where different bearings give the correct position of an object’ (Silverman, 
2001, p. 233). However, it does not so much enable a more objective or correct 
account of what is happening, as add complexity, wealth, and depth to the 
study. Triangulation enables making sense of one perspective by involving 
another. It enables deeper and multi-perspectival understanding of the 
studied situation and improves credibility. In this research, triangulation was an 
important strategy to get detailed information about events and interactions, 
and relations between them. I used  interviews and (policy) document analysis 
in both cases, I gathered visual data, and in the case of Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
I added analysis of newspaper articles as well as (e-mail) correspondence 
containing real-life and real-time interactions between actors. 
Holistic, evolutionary, and comparative perspective
I aimed to get meaningful and convincing interpretations through a holistic, 
evolutionary, and comparative research approach (cf. Blok, 1977). This entailed 
essentially getting a deeper insight into cases by understanding them in their 
context (Aarts, 2009). A holistic perspective implied an effort to shed light on 
the connections between, and interactions of, various phenomena in a greater 
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whole, in line with the complexity assumptions that underlie this research. A 
focus on relations between phenomena that happen simultaneously starts 
from the idea that every social phenomenon happens in a wider framework and 
can only be understood in terms of that wider web of relations. 
In relation to a holistic perspective, I used an evolutionary perspective to 
uncover how events and phenomena in the past affected following events and 
phenomena. Social change is a process in which actions build on one another 
and can only be understood in terms of their historical context. I followed this 
principle by analysing developments over time and by addressing how past 
events and new events concur.  
A comparative perspective enabled refinement of interpretations produced 
in the separate case studies, as well as of the concepts and frameworks used 
to create interpretations. Comparison of similar phenomena generates 
interpretations that go beyond the specificity of the one case or occurrence 
(Blok, 1977; Howarth, 2005). The perspective of one case or occurrence can 
cast new light on the other, because it de-sediments and de-familiarises our 
existing understanding (Howarth, 2005). Comparison in this research thus did 
not involve sampling and comparing data based on a prefixed set of concepts, 
variables, or hypotheses, as is common in positivist traditions (e.g. Gerring, 
2004; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006), but involved ‘unfolding learning’ about 
key concepts as the research progressed (Yanow, forthcoming).  I arranged a 
comparative perspective by selecting two case studies that contained the same 
phenomenon central to this research (self-organizing civic initiatives and the 
way they connect to local and regional governments), but provided different 
contexts (type of civic initiative, time, place, culture, institutions, and so on). The 
next section provides more information about the position and comparison of 
the two cases in this research.  
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3.3 Case studies 
Interpretive analysis frequently entails a research design with case studies, 
because meaning construction can only be understood within its specific 
and unique contexts (time, place, history, culture). Case studies offer a good 
way to generate context-dependent interpretations and in-depth and multi-
perspectival understanding of social phenomena that cannot be grasped with 
general laws and rules (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2006; Yanow, 2000). Flyvbjerg points to 
the limitations of summarizing cases on the basis of preconceived notions about 
what might be going on. He advises keeping the case open and preventing 
the loss of details that contribute to the complexity of the case. Phenomena 
should be explored broadly (including the ‘backstage’ and ‘side streets’) before 
categorization takes place on the basis of theories or hypotheses. ‘Good studies 
should be read as narrative in their entirety’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 241). 
Selection of the cases 
Selecting cases prompts the question “what are the cases a case of?”. According 
to Haverland & Yanow (2012, p. 406): 
An interpretive researcher’s answer at the beginning of the research would be, “I 
do not know, although I have some informed expectations, and I want to find out 
more.” In this sense, an interpretive researcher is concerned with what Ragin calls 
“casing” (1992, 17), in which the study’s goal is to find out what the entity studied 
is a case of, rather than to speculate or specify that ahead of time.
Denzin & Lincoln (2005) argue that the researcher should select a case which 
offers the most opportunity to learn, for example because it is most accessible or 
because the researcher can spend more time with it. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
(2012, p. 147) argue that interpretive researchers are engaged in ‘mapping the 
variety of people, places, events, texts etc., to expose the researcher to multiple 
perspectives on the research question.’ Following these strategies, I chose two 
cases that corresponded with respect to the phenomenon under study, that 
is, self-organization of civic initiatives and their agenda-setting strategies, and 
varied as much as possible on other aspects. I was already familiar with the 
two cases which improved my possibilities to access data and learn about the 
specific contexts of the cases.
The case studies concern two different types of civic initiatives in two different 
metropolitan regions in the Netherlands (see Figure 3.1). The first case is about 
initiatives of prominent business entrepreneurs within the framework of the 
project, New Markets Heuvelland, in the Heuvelland region (southern part of 
Limburg Province). The second case concerns citizens’ initiatives to protect 
and strengthen landscape values in the southern urban–rural fringe of the 
city of Gouda (Zuid-Holland Province). Both case studies entail forms of self-
organization of people around shared ambitions for spatial development 
Heuvelland (Zuid-Limburg)
Urban-rural fringe 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard
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of places that are valuable to them in one way or the other (working, living, 
recreation, and so on). In both cases, civic initiatives developed their own 
proposals for local/regional development and tried to connect to local and 
regional governments, resulting in varying outcomes in terms of achievement 
of their ambitions and government agendas for regional (spatial) development. 
Figure 3.1:  Location of the two case studies 
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As figure 3.1 shows, the cases are both situated in urban–rural areas. Urban–rural 
areas are characterized by complicated multi-level governance processes which 
provide extreme cases of civic initiatives trying to overcome the blockages 
presented by these governance contexts to mobilize support and attention. 
Urban–rural regions are characterized by a governance gap at the regional level 
(Van den Brink et al. 2006; Hajer et al. 2006). Although many government bodies 
at the municipal, provincial, and national level are involved and work together 
in different steering groups for different issues, nobody has exclusive power 
to act in regional governance matters. In such situations, it is not at all evident 
which government representative or department should be addressed.   
The variation between the cases serves comparison in terms of shedding new 
light on each unique case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Variation therefore did not involve 
preconceived variables that were the same for the selected cases, or a priori 
assumptions about how variations would influence outcomes in order to enable 
generalizations. Our interpretive approach involved accepting that I did not yet 
know what sort of differences would matter. Therefore I looked for maximum 
variance to enrich the information and improve understanding of the findings 
in the unique cases through a secondary analysis with refined concepts. The 
contextual differences between the two cases (such as scale, evaluated time 
period, entrepreneur initiative vs. citizen initiative) enabled a critical reflection 
on the significance and scope of the findings (cf. Blok, 1977). Important 
characteristics of the cases are summarized in Table 3.1.
The choice of time periods evaluated in the cases needs some more explanation. 
For the New Markets initiatives in Heuvelland, I analysed the period 2004–2009. 
I have set the start date for the analysis at 2004 because this was the year in 
which the initiative for New Markets first occurred, and at that time I did not 
consider it relevant to consider possible forerunning initiatives in the past. The 
analysis was limited to the constraints and opportunities that the initiatives 
encountered in the process after 2004. The end date was set at 2009 when 
the regional branding initiative entered a take-off phase at the cost of another 
New Markets initiative. Of course the story continues, and storylines provided 
by other initiatives (or New Markets) take on a new life in other regions or as 
adjusted ideas or business plans; but for the sake of our research, I stopped with 
the success of Regional Branding, which marked a meaningful and illustrative 
tipping point in the agenda-setting process.
The case of civic initiatives in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe concerns 
agenda-setting processes from halfway the 1980s to 2010. Civic initiatives in 
the fringe sprouted from older civic initiatives which emerged about 1985 and 
concerned the protection and rehabilitation of heritage in the city of Gouda. 
The narrative stops in 2010 when local and regional governments decided to 
implement and finance plans for restoration of a canal lock that had historical 
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significance, which was an important goal for civic initiatives. By that time, many 
of the issues promoted by civic initiatives were successfully put on government 
agendas. 
Table 3.1: Summary characteristics of the two cases: Gouda-Krimpenerwaard and New 
Markets Heuvelland
Characteristics on 
which cases differ
Civic initiatives 
southern fringe Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard
New Markets Heuvelland 
initiatives
Location Southern urban–rural fringe 
of city of Gouda, connecting 
to Krimpenerwaard polder 
region
Urban-rural region Zuid-
Limburg (Heuvelland)
Initiative Citizens, interest groups Prominent business persons 
and invited experts
Ambition Securing attention and 
(financial and political) 
support for the protection 
of landscape values (nature, 
historical landscape 
structure, historical canal 
lock)
Integrated improvement of 
(tourist and rural) economy 
and landscape quality: 
founding of a business 
community around New 
Markets
Ambition achieved? Yes No/yes (one initiative did, 
others did not)
Connection to what 
sort of government 
agendas?
Local and regional 
development plans (spatial, 
economic, rural)
Regional development plans 
(spatial, economic, rural)
Demography Demography stable Shrinking region (city and 
countryside)
Landscape Peat meadow landscape, 
cattle farming, meadows 
with medieval rational 
parcelling
Hilly and varied landscape, 
horticulture, mixed farming 
Evaluated period 1985–2010 (25 years) 2004–2009 (5 years)
Short description of the cases
New Markets Heuvelland
New Markets Heuvelland, in the south of Limburg Province, is an initiative of 
the provincial government to bring together a group of entrepreneurs from 
different economic sectors with the aim of boosting the rural economy in the 
region, while safeguarding or strengthening rural landscape values. For some, 
the project was about an innovative approach to area development (regional 
and local), starting from economic activities instead of spatial visions. 
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In 2005, Heuvelland (Hilly Land) was designated a National Landscape (NL) by the 
national government because of its special landscape values and characteristics: 
contrasts between extensive plateaus and steep slopes and narrow valleys, river 
terraces, the history of human occupation from prehistoric times, and many 
cultural historical elements such as steep earth walls engineered to prevent 
erosion, and orchards of standard fruit trees (Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied, 
2005). One reason for the NL status designation was urban pressure causing 
increasing fragmentation of the landscape and worsening the conditions for 
agricultural activities. The NL status was supposed to provide an extra stimulus 
for the relevant authorities to protect Heuvelland’s landscape qualities. 
Another problem in the region was the shrinking population, leading to vacant 
properties, including valuable historic farmsteads and cloisters. The provincial 
government was tackling these problems through a long-term programme for 
rural development and had adopted a Landscape Vision as a framework for 
subsidized investments in the Heuvelland National Landscape.
Another problem was the rapid decline in tourism, traditionally one of the most 
important economic sectors in the region. The decline was said to be caused 
by structural problems in the tourism sector (ZKA et al., 2005; Mommaas & 
Janssen, 2008). Experts and public officials argued that tourism was being 
threatened by a deterioration in the rural landscape due to the increasing scale 
of agricultural production and urbanization, which made the landscape less 
attractive to tourists. The provincial government argued that it was necessary 
to do something to improve the tourism economy that would also preserve the 
quality and identity of the region. This resulted in the New Markets Heuvelland 
initiative.
In 2004, invited experts came up with the New Markets Heuvelland programme 
to connect tourism and landscape protection to other business sectors and 
to develop together with business entrepreneurs innovative product–market 
combinations. Provincial officials and experts decided to offer these business 
leaders as much opportunity as possible to develop their own ideas on the 
economic regeneration of Heuvelland. They were afraid that the process 
might become bogged down in discussions between provincial government 
officers and executive councillors; this is why the provincial government did 
not participate actively in the planning process (Horlings & Haarmann, 2008; 
Mommaas & Janssen, 2008).
The case narrative tells the story about how the initiative to form a regional 
network organization with entrepreneurs, NGOs, and governmental 
organizations failed, whereas separate initiatives of entrepreneurs (Healing 
Hills and Regional Branding) were more successful in agenda setting and were 
adopted to a certain extent by local and regional governments.  The case study 
focuses on the question of how these varying outcomes can be understood as 
well as the preceding process, conceptualized as an agenda-setting process. 
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Protecting landscape values in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard urban–rural fringe 
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard urban–rural fringe is situated to the south of the 
city of Gouda and borders on the other side the Krimpenerwaard polder, which 
is part of the National Landscape, Het Groene Hart (The Green Heart). The 
landscape in the fringe area fits in that of the Krimpenerwaard polder, which 
is generally characterized as a wet meadow landscape. The openness of the 
area as well as the sharp contrast between city and countryside are regarded as 
important landscape values. Other landscape values in the fringe area concern 
several historical assets, such as a canal lock, the medieval parcelling structure, 
and the architectural heritage in the Stolwijkersluis community. These tell the 
story of the struggles against water in the area as well as the historic relations 
between the countryside and the city. 
Twenty-five years ago, policymakers’ attention on the area can be described 
as limited to viewing it as a backyard or an appendix to the city of Gouda. In 
1964, the area became the territory of Gouda to enable expansion in the future. 
Policymakers’ attention focused only on the city itself, on the north side of the 
river. The area south of the river was more a place where on an ad-hoc basis new 
urban developments took place, such as a wastewater plant, an asphalt plant, 
and a road bypass through the area. These ad-hoc urban developments, and 
the lack of an integral perspective on the part of the municipality on the future 
of the area in relation to the city and the bordering rural region, resulted in an 
initiative by a small group of citizens from the city to protect landscape values 
in the fringe area. By presenting and promoting their own plans, they tried to 
convince local and regional authorities that an integrated plan for the fringe 
should be designed to prevent further congestion.
Although for a long time this seemed an impossible mission, the initiative and 
the coalitions they built over time were able to achieve most of their ambitions 
over a period of 25 years. In recent years, the fringe has become valued by local 
and regional governments as an area with great recreational potential for both 
the city of Gouda and stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard polder. It is perceived 
as a recreational node between the city and the countryside that strengthens 
the position of both the city and the countryside. The area is being developed as 
a nature park accessible to visitors and inhabitants. The province has embraced 
the renovation of the lock and the development of the nature park as projects 
of regional importance and has translated this into major financial investments, 
complemented with contributions from local authorities. 
The story about civic initiatives in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe is 
intriguing as, in the beginning, not one of the involved authorities seemed to 
take an interest, whereas, at the end, they not only started collaborating and 
coordinating actions but also invested a substantial amount of money. The case 
study explores how this happened and what process preceded the successful 
inclusion of landscape values in the fringe on the policy agenda. 
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Comparing the cases
The two cases enable a comparative perspective, but not in terms of a comparison 
based on pre-fixed variables and indicators. The aim of our comparison is not 
generalization of knowledge but improving insight into every unique case to 
get in-depth understanding (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
I used a sequential hierarchical case study approach to enable moving up 
the hermeneutic spiral, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The case comparison was 
executed with a refined set of concepts. 
Figure 3.2: Sequence of cases and steps in refining sensitizing concepts
Step 1
In the first step, I collected data on the New Markets Heuvelland case with 
the help of an initial set of sensitizing concepts and questions. My initial way 
to approach the New Markets initiatives was with (policy) network concepts 
and tracking discourses to understand the relation between the initiatives and 
policymaking. I aimed to look at formal and informal communication to see 
what happened in the communication between relevant governments and the 
initiatives, and what sort of strategy had effect. 
Step 2
When I confronted these concepts with the data and simultaneously read 
literature, I started thinking about the case study in terms of an agenda-setting 
process. Therefore, I interpreted the data with the interrelated concepts of 
coalition building, issue framing, and relation framing. Moreover, not surprising 
in light of the agenda-setting framework, the data pointed to the role of 
coincidence, or rather concurrences of events. 
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Step 3 
These findings and new set of concepts formed the starting point for the 
conceptual design of the second case study, Gouda-Krimpenerwaard. I 
collected data with the framework of agenda-setting mechanisms, which I then 
understood as the relations between coalition building, issue framing, relation 
framing, and the role of trigger events. 
Step 4
In the Heuvelland case, in the framing analysis, I missed people’s ‘talk’ about 
the relevant and necessary strategies and procedures of formal and informal 
interaction, including references to formal policy and planning processes. 
I included this in the questions about how people tried to get attention and 
mobilize support. When special roles of individual agents (‘policy entrepreneurs’) 
came out of the raw data, I decided to take these into account too. As my analysis 
intentionally had not aimed to identify such policy entrepreneurs or investigate 
their characteristics, but rather the activity of constructing meanings in social 
interactions, I decided to focus on the connecting roles of particular people. 
As I started writing the narrative about what had happened and tried to make 
sense of the raw data, I first identified tipping points in the agenda-setting 
process based on pivotal shifts in coalitions and/or storylines. Next, I analysed 
the circumstances that preceded those tipping points: 1) the construction of 
storylines around the proposed issues through the interaction between groups 
and individuals in the region; 2) the events and concurring circumstances 
that enabled frame alignment, and 3) the role of particular individuals who 
connected people, frames, resources, and contexts, and thereby also enabled 
the spreading of stories across a wider network. I started labelling these 
individuals as connectors (after Shirky, 2008, and Gladwell, 2000). 
Step 5
Next, I used the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard results to see how this would enrich 
the results of the Heuvelland case, and vice versa. This secondary analysis 
focused on the relations between the spreading of ‘sticky’ stories, conversations 
as mediums of framing and storytelling, concurring events, and connectors. 
This process elucidated the unique agenda-setting processes in the two cases.  
3.4 From data to case narratives 
The analytical approach for the two cases followed approximately the line 
that Yanow (2000) proposes for the analytical process. I first established initial 
questions for analysis. I identified the interpretive communities (initiatives, 
coalitions, other) that were at play as well as the artefacts (talk, texts, actions) 
that carried the interpretations of those groups and actors. I identified how 
actors, groups, and coalitions talked and acted with regard to the issues that 
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civic initiatives addressed, or that competed for attention. Furthermore, I 
identified how different interpretations and storylines conflicted or fitted, and 
whether and how interpretations in the form of storylines shifted over time. 
Both case studies were performed by using triangulation of methods and 
information sources. In addition to using information sources such as 
documents, interviews, and newspaper articles, I used participant observation 
to a certain extent because of my engagement as a consultant and researcher 
in parts of the investigated processes. In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, 
I coordinated a collaborative process to develop a plan for the urban fringe 
together with civic initiators, government representatives, and experts (2004–
2006). However, at the time I was not aware that I would later use the information 
for my dissertation. Technically, in order to call this participant observation, I 
should have had certain research questions and concepts in mind that were 
relevant for this book. However, my ‘way of knowing’ (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 
2012) is to a great extent related to my activities in that period, which are quite 
similar to what is defined as participant observation (Silverman, 2001): a field 
strategy that simultaneously combines document analysis, respondent and 
informant interviewing, direct participation and observation, and introspection. 
Moreover, my encounter with civic initiatives that initiated the plan-making 
process and mobilized all kinds of other actors was one of the reasons that I 
started this research in the first place. It has inspired the current formulation 
of the research problem and research question in this book. Although later on 
I collected many other data to provide answers to my research questions, I still 
feel that my earlier involvement in another role was crucial as a way of knowing. 
It enabled ethnographic sensitivity, even though later on I used more distant 
research methods.  
What I did in Heuvelland
Getting data
My journey in the New Markets process started in 2006 when the group of business 
entrepreneurs was working together with experts on further developing New 
Markets. They experienced problems in implementing and further crystallizing 
ideas to get concrete business cases. That is why the research institute, Alterra, 
was asked to facilitate a multi-stakeholder process in which a community of 
practice would be founded for collectively collecting and constructing relevant 
knowledge. I was invited to join for my own purpose of observing, but also to 
give feedback about the process based on my observations (Van Mansfeld & 
Van der Stoep, 2008). This became embedded also in the research project, Vital 
Coalitions1, in which I worked with a multi-disciplinary research team that had 
selected Heuvelland as one of the central case studies. 
1 For more information about the project see: http://www.transforum.nl/projecten/
wetenschappelijke-projecten/item/52-vital-coalitions (last accessed 16 August 2012).
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As a first step, to prepare for data collection, I identified initial questions and 
sensitizing concepts that sprang from my understanding at that time. The 
concepts that I used were inspired by reading about, amongst others things, 
policy networks (e.g. Kickert et al., 1997), policy arrangements (e.g. Arts & Leroy, 
2006), and discourse analysis and framing (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Laws, 2006; 
Van den Brink & Metze, 2006). Moreover, an important source of inspiration 
at that time were the discussions in the Vital Coalitions research team about 
the concept of vital coalitions (Horlings et al., 2009; Horlings et al., 2006) 
and a conceptual framework inspired by urban regime theory (Stone, 2005; 
Mossberger & Stoker, 2001), which directed attention to actor coalitions, modes 
of alignment, agendas, and resources as the constituents of regimes. This 
seemed to resemble to a great extent the dimensions of policy arrangements 
(cf. Arts & Leroy, 2006), but added a focus both on informal relations and 
communication and on productivity and energy in coalitions.  
This first conceptual ‘knowing’ resulted in initial questions to make sense of 
what was going on with the New Markets initiatives: 1) how could the network, 
in which the New Markets initiatives operated, be characterized in terms of 
actors, relations, interdependencies, and ambitions?; 2) how did vital coalitions 
(the New Markets initiatives) relate to dominant policy discourse about regional 
planning and development, and how did they talk about the perceived problem 
and their role?, and 3) what sort of formal and informal communication strategies 
were used?
While engaging in the conceptual puzzle, and trying to get to know the case, 
I attended, reported and gathered reports of meetings that were held in the 
framework of the New Markets process in the period April 2006 – April 2008 
(see Appendix 1). These meetings provided information about the issues 
discussed, how they were framed by different participants, and how they came 
to agreements or not. Another important information source and a way to 
make sense of what was going on were the conversations with my colleague 
researchers tasked with facilitating the New Markets process and/or involved 
in the monitoring of that process. While attending meetings and trying to 
understand what was going on, I read relevant documents produced in earlier 
stages of the process and had conversations with one of the process facilitators 
about what had preceded the state of affairs at that time. 
Next, I looked for more information about opinions and views of stakeholders in 
the process. This information was collected through a total of 18 semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders in the New Markets process. First of all, I tried 
to get a better understanding of what had happened before and during the 
process by reading and analysing the transcripts of colleagues on the research 
team who had performed interviews with participants and stakeholders in 
the New Markets process for monitoring purposes. This involved a total of 8 
interviews. 
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Next, I conducted interviews myself with stakeholders that had not yet been 
interviewed and that were central to the interactions between the initiators of 
the New Markets projects (entrepreneurs and experts) and other stakeholders, 
especially governmental representatives (province, municipalities). In total, 
this involved 10 interviews, a few of which I conducted together with another 
colleague on the research team. Because I still had only vague ideas of how to 
conceptualize and understand what was going on, and more generally how 
to understand and analyse the relations between self-organizing initiatives 
and governmental initiatives, these interviews were semi-structured based 
on the initial questions mentioned earlier. Interviews with participants in the 
New Markets process (project managers, entrepreneurs, and a representative 
from the Provincial Council’s economic affairs department) generated data 
about how issues developed during the process, how this related to the 
goals of the participating parties, and frames about the construction of 
the coalitions during the New Markets process. Interviews with executive 
councillors, provincial government officers, and a representative from a nature 
conservation organization generated data about dominant policy frames on 
regional development and about whether and how the New Markets initiatives 
affected the ideas and policies of regional and local authorities and other 
decision-making bodies. See Appendix 2 and 3 for the list of interviewees and 
the interview topics and questions.     
During the process of data collection, I became aware that participating 
entrepreneurs as well as experts called for the involvement and facilitation of 
provincial government actors as well as business cases in which connection with 
local planning agendas would be tried out. Here, it became clear that there was 
tension between the initial attitude of keeping the government out to remain 
vital and energetic and the wish to get support from provincial government 
in terms of embedding initiatives in provincial programmes and, together 
with that, financial resources and ideas to link up new markets to existing 
initiatives in provincial programmes. I started reading up on the province’s 
policy programmes concerning economic development (it was especially this 
department that was being involved in the process), but also spatial and rural 
development as the involvement of this department was considered important 
by the Alterra project managers, but this proved difficult. I tried to understand 
the divide that presented itself between the province’s economic policy and 
its policy for spatial development and rural development. I studied policy 
documents that I considered relevant based on what I knew at that time. 
Creating interpretations in rounds
I coded interviews and records of meetings and started with an in-vivo method 
of coding that generated broad categories:  relations between actors, roles, 
cooperation, conflict, issues in regional development (perceived problems and 
possible futures), communication strategies, and agendas (both policy agendas 
and agendas/ambitions of individual actors). In particular, the latter category of 
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agendas and a simultaneous reading of more theoretical work about agenda 
setting (Kingdon, 2003; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005) inspired a focus on 
agenda-setting strategies and processes. I identified two factors to analyse how 
initiatives built agenda-setting capacity. First, agenda setting involves issue 
framing, which involves problem identification as well as selecting a particular 
perspective from which to promote the issue. Second, agenda setting involves 
coalition building to attract supporters for the issue and improve the chances 
of getting the issue onto the policy agenda. I suggested that coalitions are built 
around powerful and appealing storylines that somehow address the collective 
goal of the coalition. Moreover, I considered the development (or falling apart) 
of coalitions between people by analysing their own interpretations of relations 
and coalitions. Framing analysis provided a way to study both coalition building 
and issue construction in agenda-setting processes. 
To write findings down in a report, I started making a chronological description 
of how issues developed over time and which events were related. Thus, a case 
narrative developed that gave a contextualized account of what had happened. 
While writing, I started seeing relations between the shifts of coalitions and 
issues and the coinciding with particular political or social events. The result 
was a book chapter about this case study (Van der Stoep & Aarts, 2010) in the 
book Vital Coalitions, Vital Regions (Horlings, 2010), and Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
The arguments in the chapter are illustrated with interview quotes. I provide the 
original Dutch interview quotes in Appendix 7 to prevent a loss of meaning in 
the translating process. The numbering in the appendix corresponds with the 
numbers of the quotes in the chapter. 
What I did in Gouda-Krimpenerwaard
The findings and conclusions in the New Markets Heuvelland case formed the 
starting point for an adjusted set of sensitizing concepts for the initiatives in 
the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case. As in the Heuvelland case, I focused on 
issue framing as an agenda-setting strategy, identifying storylines and relation 
framing to understand shifts in coalitions. In conversations, people talk about 
the role of various actors in the process and thereby construct ‘we’ and ‘they’ 
groups, or i.e. coalitions and groups that compete or cooperate. In addition, 
I had developed the thought, based on experiences in Heuvelland as well as 
reading about what gets framed (e.g. Dewulf, 2009), that it was not only the 
framing of the required interaction process itself that mattered in the formation 
of coalitions and storylines. Interaction processes in our framework refer to 
informal and formal interactions – often in policy and planning contexts – that 
civic initiatives encounter when they negotiate with governmental actors. 
Interaction framing includes talk about the way connections can be established 
with on-going planning and policy processes to get the support of local and 
regional governments. 
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Another dimension of the agenda-setting process highlighted in the conclusions 
of the Heuvelland case was the role of trigger events and synchronicity (of 
events). I decided to address the issue of trigger events explicitly in the Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard case as one of the ‘things’ that precede or mark tipping points. 
This resulted in the following questions with which I started the case study:
•	 Which issues were pushed by civic initiatives, and how were they framed?
•	 Which coalitions developed around which issues (frames), and how did 
talking about actor relations result in coalition building (characterization, 
identity framing, relation framing)?
•	 How did formal and informal interaction take place between civic initiatives 
and governmental actors?
•	 Were civic initiatives’ issues prioritized on government agendas, and how 
did they relate to the policy issues prioritized over time by governmental 
decision makers?
•	 Which events triggered the opening of policy windows, and how did they 
relate to other agenda-setting factors?
With these questions and their coherence, I aimed to answer the more general 
question of why civic initiatives succeeded (or not) in attracting the attention of 
governmental decision makers.  
Getting data and first interpretations, round I
On the basis of prior knowledge about the initiatives in the fringe, I identified a 
group of citizens from Gouda, called Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
(Working Group Gouda <—>  Krimpenerwaard), as the first civic initiative that 
aimed to push conservation of landscape values in the fringe onto the city 
of Gouda’s agenda. Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard  seemed to be 
an important node in the network that supported the inclusion of landscape 
values in the fringe on the policy agenda, including in earlier and later years, 
as supported in additional information that I collected (newspaper articles, 
correspondence, documents).
As a first step, I aimed to track the activities and issues raised by Werkgroep 
Gouda <—>  Krimpenerwaard over time by reading their proposals and 
pamphlets and analysing articles from local newspapers. I selected 130 articles 
from the regional daily newspapers Rijn & Gouwe (1994–2005) and AD Groene 
Hart (2005–2009) by using as a search term the name Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard and a related interest group called Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard (Consultation Group Gouda-Krimpenerwaard Fringe). These 
documents and articles were used to find issue, relation, and process framings 
as well as to identify the various formal and informal communication strategies 
that initiatives used to attract governments’ attention. 
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Next, I qualitatively analysed relevant policy documents and spatial plans of the 
municipality of Gouda and provincial and municipal policy documents about 
the redevelopment of the Krimpenerwaard polder. For a short time, I strayed 
along an unsuccessful side road trying to do a quantitative analysis of political 
attention shifts within the relevant rural municipalities and the city of Gouda 
by retrieving policy programmes of municipal executives over the period 
1985–2009. I did this because I wanted to see whether I could find evidence of 
issues appearing on local agendas that were prompted by the civic initiatives 
under study and generate an overview of competing issues in the relevant 
governments’ policy processes. When I encountered difficulties in finding the 
required data for a time series, I decided to leave this path. Moreover, I wanted to 
understand not so much which shifts occurred for all policy issues, as why certain 
shifts occurred that were relevant to the issues promoted by civic initiatives in 
the fringe. I needed to concentrate on what happened (and how and why) in 
relation to getting fringe-area issues onto the agenda. Policy documents could 
not provide that information because these reflect only the formal decisions 
that have been made, and rarely the discussions that preceded those decisions. I 
had to find other information (artefacts) that carried the meaning constructions 
and shifts in those constructions.  
For the framing analysis with regard to the coalition-building process and 
the construction of storylines about the fringe, I needed data concerning 
interactions between actors or at least addressing interaction between actors. 
To study real interaction processes, I could use data generated in the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis project (see Van der Stoep & Van den Brink, 2006) and the 
processes that developed from that project. I was involved in the coordination 
of the project and therefore had access to the reports of meetings organized 
and to the e-mail correspondence about the project. After the project ended, I 
stayed up-to-date with the further developments through stakeholders’ e-mails. 
Furthermore, I found correspondence between initiatives and governments via 
e-mails and internet searches. Another source of real interaction was provided 
by the reports of meetings of local and regional government councils in which 
important decisions were taken about the fringe.
I analysed e-mail discussions between civic initiatives and other stakeholders 
concerning the inclusion of fringe-area issues on the policy agenda. E-mail 
discussions are a rich source of information about interactional framing in 
negotiations because negotiations are increasingly taking place through e-mail 
and other on-line formats (Friedman et al., 2007; Landry, 2000). In the Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard case, e-mails provided information about ways of reasoning 
and debates between governments and citizens, as well as discussions among 
different citizen groups. They gave unique insight into the informal and formal 
interactions that took place over time. Members of civic initiatives discussed and 
prepared interaction strategies for formal and informal negotiations not only 
face-to-face, but also through e-mails. E-mail was also used as a medium, next 
to other mediums, to evaluate and make sense of what had happened during 
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formal and informal meetings and encounters with targets of mobilization, 
and subsequently to discuss future action. Thus, e-mails carried real-time, real-
life, and genuine interactions and meaning constructions that I could observe, 
similar to conversation analysis, but with the advantage that the ‘objects’ were 
not aware of the observer.
Using e-mails as data source is quite different from an interview setting in which 
respondents know about the research and about how the acquired information 
is processed. Whereas interviews are carefully planned beforehand and the 
setting of the conversation and the participants are controlled, a collection of 
e-mails is rather messy and uncontrollable. They contain all kinds of information 
about persons, and utterances of persons, but the persons involved do not 
know who reads their messages as they are circulating between computers. To 
deal with this ethically, I only once or twice used a quotation from the e-mail 
database and anonimized those carefully. 
The database was constructed with e-mails written directly to me by 
stakeholders of the earlier mentioned Masterplan Stolwijkersluis project in the 
period 2004–2009. These e-mails contained many forwarded conversations 
between members of civic initiatives as well as sometimes governmental 
stakeholders. Framings in the on-going e-mail conversations were derived from 
the words and sentences (language) used. I carefully coded all e-mails to be able 
to create a manageable output with relevant text fragments. 
I coded the e-mails and other information that I had collected up to that point. 
Codes were based on the questions and sensitizing concepts to enable a 
systematic analysis. I coded types of initiatives’ formal and informal strategies 
to attract the attention of politicians and policymakers, issues (problems/
solutions) raised, and issue frames, various events, relation frames, and results of 
agenda setting (e.g. decisions made or actions taken). I wrote memos connected 
to coded text fragments to record my on-going interpretations. I was thus able 
to construct a line of reasoning and to reflect on that reasoning as I went.  
In an early phase, I started constructing a timetable with important events 
in the agenda-setting process. This table, which over time amounted to a 
large document of 20 pages, contains a chronological overview of events in 
governmental decision making and political events (like elections), as well as 
activities of citizen initiatives and important formal and informal meetings (as 
derived from utterances in talk and text). I categorized these along a number 
of issues that seemed most prominent in civic initiatives’ activities in the fringe. 
These were: 1) protest against, and alternative proposals for, a bypass through 
the fringe, and related to that the governmental plans for a new industrial area 
in the fringe; 2) renovation of the historical lock, and related to that the spatial 
plan for the wider environment; 3) the plan to reintroduce sailing/boating in 
the Krimpenerwaard, and 4) related to that the sequence of plans for the rural 
renovation of the Krimpenerwaard polder. I tried to include all the information 
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collected from the various sources in this table to get a chronological 
account and to be able to see events and issues in relation to one another. 
New information (for example from interviews and e-mails) was continually 
added. The timetable enabled me to identify important junctures and shifts in 
coalitions and storylines and to get deeper understanding while I was digging 
for more information.   
Getting data and interpretations, round II
My understanding about events that marked important turns in the process, 
and about what preceded those events, grew through reflection on the 
timetable. I observed new actors in coalitions, new issues that emerged, 
opportunities that arose in related decision-making processes initiated by local 
and regional governments. However, I still had a number of ‘why’ questions 
that could only be answered through interviews, for example questions about 
why initiatives had emerged in the first place, and how and why ambitions 
developed and were framed in a certain way. I also needed interviews to get 
more understanding about decisive moments (my interpretation and theirs), 
and why people perceived them as decisive or not.  I decided to interview a 
small number of key stakeholders. I conducted nine semi-structured interviews 
in the period November 2009 to the summer of 2011 with representatives of 
both civic initiatives and the local governments with whom they interacted the 
most. I conducted five interviews with initiators of civic initiatives in the fringe, 
and four with representatives of local governments (from Krimpenerwaard 
and the city of Gouda). See Appendix 5 and 6 for the list of interviewees.  The 
number of interviews could be limited because the focus of my analysis was 
especially on framing processes in real-life and real-time interactions for which I 
had already a large amount of data from e-mails, other correspondence (letters), 
and reports of meetings. The interviews with the key stakeholders served 
mainly to clarify and get more contextualized and detailed understanding of 
the relations between certain events, and the strategies and relations between 
actors that really mattered. They also provided more in-depth information 
about how issues were framed and ‘storied’ over time. Essentially, the interviews 
provided feedback on my interpretations of important patterns in the process 
and pointed to other patterns that were meaningful in understanding the 
agenda-setting process.
Again, I coded the transcriptions of the interviews with the same coding strategy 
as before.  As in the former step, I coded in-vivo but related such codes to the basic 
concepts of events, strategies, issue frame, relation frame to retain a rough and 
always visible categorization. An important analytical step now was to find relations 
between different codes and memos, and support these with relevant quotations. 
Finally, I decided to write the findings and conclusions down in a case narrative 
similar to the chapter I had written about the Heuvelland case. On the basis of 
the conclusions about shifting issue frames and coalitions as well as events that 
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were crucial to explain both the process and outcomes of the agenda-setting 
process, I identified tipping points, which formed the backbone of the narrative. 
From the timetable and the ‘hermeneutic unit’ that contained the raw data and 
text fragments, I collected the relevant information to narrate the selected 
tipping points chronologically. Thus, a thick description developed that gave a 
contextualized account of what had happened and also already gave the reader 
some idea of why things had happened as an overture to the theoretical plot. 
The result is Chapter 5 in this book. The arguments in the chapter are illustrated 
with interview quotes. I provide the original Dutch interview quotes in Appendix 
8 to prevent a loss of meaning in the translating process. The numbering in the 
appendix corresponds with the numbers of the quotes in the chapter. 
3.5 Computer-aided qualitative analysis
Computer-aided qualitative analysis is used increasingly to meet criteria of 
trustworthiness by improving transparency and systematics. It enables a 
systematic approach by relating data to concepts and by recording the steps 
that have been taken to develop interpretations. In this research, the Atlas.ti 
programme was used. In Atlas.ti, the researcher creates one hermeneutic unit 
that contains the raw data, the texts that carry interpretations of the interpretive 
communities under study, and the interpretations of the researcher herself. 
Data and analytical interpretations are linked to one another, thus enabling 
transparency. Coding and writing memos is an important procedure in the 
analysis, which involves the categorizing of raw data iteratively until hypotheses 
and concepts can be derived from those data. However, the use of software 
should not supersede the interpretation and analytical effort of the researcher.  
In the Heuvelland case, I used the Atlas.ti software to code interviews and 
records of meetings and started with an in-vivo method of coding that 
generated broad categories: relations between actors, roles, cooperation, 
conflict, issues in regional development (perceived problems and possible 
futures), communication strategies, and agendas (both policy agendas and 
agendas/ambitions of individual actors). However, my work with Atlas.ti had 
generated too many codes, and I decided not to invest time in unravelling 
the chaos that had emerged in my hermeneutic unit. Therefore, I used a 
combination of mindmapping (with the MindManager programme), including 
other information sources (policy documents) as well, and re-coding transcripts 
and documents manually. 
In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, I coded the transcriptions of the interviews, 
e-mails, and other information partly in-vivo but also on the basis of the refined 
set of sensitizing concepts to enable a systematic analysis. I wrote memos 
connected to coded text fragments to record my on-going interpretations. I was 
thus able to construct a line of reasoning and to reflect on that reasoning as I 
went. An important analytical step was to find relations between different codes 
and memos, and support these with relevant quotations. I did this by creating 
networks in the hermeneutic unit. This networking is a matter of connecting 
sets of similar elements together in a visual diagram and discovering structure. 
Making networks is a way to build theories about the relevant relations between 
phenomena. I created networks to discover and support conclusions about, 
for example, the way different frames were aligned and how coalitions shifted 
through relation framing.
New Markets 
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In this chapter1, we address the efforts of civic initiatives that developed from 
the New Markets Heuvelland project to bring to the attention of policymakers 
alternative approaches to regional spatial development. It concerns an in-depth 
case study about civic initiatives that tried to achieve goals by building coalitions 
with other (governmental) actors and by relating to existing policies for regional 
spatial development. New Markets Heuvelland is an initiative instigated by the 
Limburg provincial government to bring together business entrepreneurs 
from different economic sectors to let them discuss strategies to improve the 
rural economy as well as the landscape qualities that performed as unique 
selling points of the Heuvelland region. The expectation was that the resulting 
initiatives, which focused on economic activities and private investment, would 
be an innovative alternative to landscape development traditionally managed by 
landscape architects and spatial planners working for governments.   
In a nutshell, the conundrum provided by the case is why over time some 
initiatives managed to develop a story that successfully mobilized support and 
attention from governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, whereas 
other stories and initiatives faded. During the process, storytelling developed 
from ‘improvement of the tourism structure by securing and strengthening 
the environmental qualities of Heuvelland’ to a prioritization of ‘Healthy Living 
in South Limburg’ and later to an emphasis on ‘regional branding’ aimed at 
attracting and retaining young people for the region’s economy. The latter story 
about the benefits of regional branding generated wide political support, and a 
collective investment of some 8 million euros by a multitude of businesses in the 
region as well as municipalities and the provincial government. 
The research question for this case study:
What did the New Markets initiatives do to build support for their ambitions, what 
were the outcomes in terms of the ambitions of New Markets initiatives as well as 
the planning agendas of governments for the Heuvelland region, and how can these 
outcomes be understood?
The first section is a narrative about the processes through which the New 
Markets initiatives developed in the period between 2005 and 2009 and resulted 
in certain outcomes.  We identify tipping points in agenda-setting processes in 
relation to changing coalitions and changes in issue framing and storytelling 
over time. We then analyse the processes that preceded these tipping points in 
terms of framing, coalition building, and changing circumstances and events. 
The interview quotes and text segments in this chapter are translated from 
Dutch interview data and text segments. The original quotes in Dutch are listed 
in Appendix 7 and are referred by numbering the quotes. 
1 Adapted from Van der Stoep & Aarts (2010). New Markets in Heuvelland: coalition building 
and agenda setting. Chapter 6 in: Horlings, I. (ed.) Vital Coalitions, Vital Regions: Partnerships for 
Sustainable Regional Development. Wageningen, Wageningen Academic Publishers.
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4.1 Shifting agendas and stories
Start of the New Markets Heuvelland initiative
The New Markets Heuvelland project was launched in 2004 in response to 
economic problems in the rural–urban region of Heuvelland (ZKA et al, 2005). 
The region is located in the southern tip of the province of Limburg, borders 
with Belgium and Germany, and covers about 30,000 hectares. It has a 
population of 600,000 inhabitants and after the Randstad in the western part of 
the Netherlands is the second most urbanized area in the Netherlands. The three 
cities of Maastricht, Sittard/Geleen, and Heerlen form an urban crescent around 
the northern half of the rural landscape, which is commonly called Heuvelland 
(see Figure 4.1). 
In 2005, Heuvelland was designated a National Landscape (NL) by the national 
government because of its special landscape values and characteristics: 
contrasts between extensive plateaus and steep slopes and narrow valleys, river 
terraces, the history of human occupation from prehistoric times, and many 
cultural historical elements such as steep earth walls engineered to prevent 
erosion, and orchards of standard fruit trees (Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied, 
2005). One of the reasons for the NL designation was urban pressure causing 
increasing fragmentation of the landscape and worsening the conditions for 
agricultural activities. The NL status is supposed to provide an extra stimulus 
for the relevant authorities to protect the landscape qualities of Heuvelland. 
Another problem in the region is the shrinking population, leading to vacant 
properties, including valuable historic farmsteads and cloisters. The provincial 
government is tackling these problems through a long-term programme for 
rural development (Provincie Limburg, 2005; Provincie Limburg, 2006) and has 
adopted a Landscape Vision (Kerkstra et al., 2007) as a framework for subsidized 
investments in the Heuvelland National Landscape.
Another pillar in the provincial policy for regional development is economic 
development. The closure of the coal mines during the 1960s and 1970s 
and the resulting socioeconomic problems triggered policies for economic 
development and employment creation that are still being pursued. Stimulation 
programmes were designed to favour certain economic activities, first the 
chemical industry and services, and later medical technology, transport, and 
tourism (Programmacommissie Zuidoost-Nederland, 2007). In 2005, the 
province adopted its Acceleration Agenda (Versnellingsagenda: Taskforce 
Versnellingsagenda, 2005) to deal with its economic difficulties and develop 
an economic advantage over other Dutch and European regions. The ‘new 
economy’ is the latest buzz word in the region, reflecting a desire to create 
opportunities for the development of hi-tech industries, for example in the field 
of medical technology.
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Figure 4.1. Region Heuvelland, South Limburg
Besides technology development, tourism is an important economic sector 
in the region. In the late 19th century, South Limburg was the first region in 
the Netherlands to attract tourists, and by the beginning of the 1990s tourism 
accounted for 18% of the region’s economy, but this declined to 10% in 2004 
(ZKA et al., 2005). The decline was said to be caused by structural problems in 
the tourism sector, such as increasing competition, the increasing preference of 
tourists for foreign and more exotic destinations, the small scale of the tourist 
offer in South Limburg, and the outdated quality of the offer compared with 
other regions (ZKA et al., 2005; Mommaas & Janssen, 2008). Moreover, experts 
and public officials argued that tourism was being threatened by a deterioration 
O. Eckhardt, 27 mei 2012 (CC Flickr) A. Aberson, 26 juni 2010 (CC Flickr)
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in the rural landscape due to the increasing scale of agricultural production 
and urbanization, which makes the landscape less attractive to tourists. The 
provincial government argued that it was necessary to do something to improve 
the tourism economy that would also preserve the quality and identity of the 
region. This resulted in the New Markets Heuvelland initiative.
The New Markets project was launched in 2004 by Limburg Provincial Council 
to deal with the interlinked problems of the tourism economy, the changes in 
agriculture, and the resulting changes in the landscape. The province delegated 
the task of devising new incentives for tourism to the Limburg Investment and 
Development Agency (LIOF). Although LIOF was specialized in other economic 
sectors, like technology development, and did not have much know-how in 
tourism and the primary sector, the province had no other choice because the 
Limburg Tourism Bureau had just been closed. LIOF invited a number of experts 
to give advice on the matter. They came up with the New Markets Heuvelland 
programme to connect tourism to the landscape values of South Limburg and 
to businesses with the financial resources to sustain and further develop the 
sector. LIOF and the panel of experts decided to offer private entrepreneurs 
as much opportunity as possible to develop their own ideas on the economic 
regeneration of Heuvelland. They were afraid that the process might become 
bogged down in discussions between provincial government officers and 
executive councillors; this is why the provincial government did not participate 
actively in the planning process (Horlings & Haarmann, 2008; Mommaas & 
Janssen, 2008).
The experts selected themes that could serve as ‘new markets’, or new product–
market combinations, which were then presented in roundtable meetings with 
private entrepreneurs and investors who had already proved to be innovative, 
active in the region, financially strong, and willing to invest. The goal of the 
meetings was to test how attractive the proposed new markets were to the 
entrepreneurs and to convince them to develop the ideas into business plans. 
The meetings resulted in the selection of five new markets (see Box 4.1), each 
with an entrepreneur who was willing to invest resources to further develop 
and implement the idea. This led to some projects that were successfully 
implemented, such as a hotel package for surgical patients and a regional food 
market in the city of Maastricht.
After the initial energy that flowed from the identification of the new markets, 
action by the entrepreneurs tailed off. The activities that were undertaken tended 
to be the entrepreneurs’ individual projects that did not generate spin-offs, nor 
did they scale up to create new economic perspectives for the region involving 
collaboration between entrepreneurs from different sectors (Van Mansfeld & 
Van der Stoep, 2008; Horlings & Haarmann, 2008). At this point, the province 
thought it would be a good idea to find other ways of injecting new life into the 
New Markets project. The aim this time was to develop a sustainable business 
community and a system for financing the New Markets Heuvelland projects 
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(Horlings & Haarmann, 2008). With the assistance of the experts involved in 
the initial stage of New Markets, the province established a partnership with 
TransForum, a state-financed organization that provides subsidies and know-
how for promising projects that support the transition towards sustainable 
development in rural regions2 . The alliance with TransForum brought in not 
only money, but also the participation of researchers from Alterra research 
institute at Wageningen UR, who would contribute knowledge about rural 
transition processes and organize multi-stakeholder cooperation.
Box 4.1 The five New Markets
A new coalition partner and a new storyline
The coalition with TransForum and Alterra resulted in a shift in emphasis in the 
goals and methods of the New Markets project. The project had initially been 
launched to tackle the problem of declining tourism and the related threat to 
the quality of the landscape. When TransForum and Alterra were brought in, 
attention shifted to conserving and strengthening the unique selling points of 
the region – the nature and landscape qualities – as a condition for improving 
the regional economic structure. The question was how New Markets could 
generate financial support to maintain the landscape. The process was managed 
by a project team consisting of a representative from Alterra, an independent 
2 More information about TransForum: http://www.transforum.nl/en/ (last accessed, 22 July 2013)
source: ZKA et al, 2005
Healing Hills: linking the natural and cultural values of the rural area (hills, meadows, 
woods, convents) and healthcare, specifically by providing hotel accommodation for 
recovering surgical patients.
Rich Tastes: linking the production of food on farms in Heuvelland to distribution 
systems that service the surrounding cities. Regional agricultural products would be 
distributed in a regional chain of quality restaurants, gastronomy courses, etc.
Wellness in Luxury: investing in preventive care activities by healthcare insurance 
companies (e.g. health resort stays, therapeutic baths, training courses).
Glorious Life: matching the extra demand for senior housing and related support 
services resulting from the demographic trend towards an ageing population in the 
region to the large number of empty farms and convents. This warrants financial 
support for the preservation of the historical values of those buildings.
Linked Fields: relating multimedia services to geographical information about the 
location of tourist sites, events, production of regional food, healthcare services, etc.
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consultancy representing the entrepreneurs, and a representative from the 
provincial government’s economic affairs department. In view of the goal of 
securing and strengthening landscape qualities, the Alterra project manager 
wanted to bring other stakeholders into the process: the provincial spatial 
planning and rural development departments, and representatives from nature 
and landscape organizations and farmers’ organizations. This shift in problem 
definition, goals, and process are illustrated in Table 4.1.
The shifts in emphasis in the problem definition and the project goals and 
process were not explicitly discussed by the representatives from Alterra, 
TransForum, the entrepreneurs, and representatives from the provincial 
government’s economic affairs department. However, during the project, the 
involvement of stakeholders from the field of landscape management, preferred 
by TransForum and Alterra, was continuously contested within the project team. 
The other project team members were afraid that a broadened agenda and 
inclusion of more stakeholders would make the process too complex and slow 
for the entrepreneurs, who might then lose interest because their investments 
of time and money would be unlikely to generate concrete outcomes in the 
short term.
I wonder whether I understood correctly what the line of thinking of New Markets 
was. I did write a proposal with the representative from the provincial economic 
affairs department…. However, the approach taken by this department was: 
begin with profit, which will bring the others in. The problem definition of our 
project was not recognized by the entrepreneurs. Most entrepreneurs only think 
about earning money. (Project team member from Alterra) 4-1
Disagreement in the project team about the organization of the process 
hampered the organization of workshops with entrepreneurs and other 
stakeholders. During the first phase of New Markets Heuvelland, attempts to 
involve representatives from the provincial government’s spatial planning and 
rural development departments failed. Civil servants and government officials 
from the economic affairs department, who were responsible for New Markets, 
and from the spatial planning and rural development departments showed little 
interest in cooperation. As the conflicts over the process architecture started to 
dominate discussion in the workshops, little energy was invested in defining the 
ambitions of the project for economic and spatial regional development. As a 
result, the agenda of the New Markets process was not clear to the participants 
or the other stakeholders. We come back to this topic in section 4.3.
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Table 4.1: Problem definition and goals of the New Markets Heuvelland project in 2005 and 
in 2006 3 4
Initial problem definition and goals of New 
Markets in Heuvelland 20043
Problem definition and goals after the 
introduction of TransForum 20064
Problem definition
Tourism is declining because of the changing 
preferences of tourists, accessibility problems, 
decreasing capacity, and the small-scale and 
fragmented tourist offer. The sector is not able 
to anticipate the market. Tourism businesses are 
closing, with a change of use to other functions 
(housing, employment) or are growing in size, 
leading to a loss of environmental quality.
Problem definition
Economic drivers and traditional managers of 
landscape qualities are disappearing; agriculture 
and tourism are declining. Urbanization is putting 
pressure on the conservation of landscape 
qualities in the open area between the cities. 
These related and complex problems threaten 
Heuvelland’s unique selling points, which are 
the starting point for improving the economic 
structure of the region.
Goals:
Improving the structure of Heuvelland’s tourism 
economy in combination with conserving or 
strengthening environmental quality and cultural 
identity.
Goals:
Safeguarding and strengthening of Heuvelland’s 
environmental qualities by achieving a new 
investment dynamic through a vital coalition of 
economic drivers.
Ideas about the intended ‘vital’ coalition
Developing horizontal alliances between tourism 
and sectors with dynamic economic activity, new 
initiatives and investment capital, and which are 
able to provide an economic basis for both the 
tourism sector and environmental quality.
Ideas about the intended ‘vital’ coalition
Facilitation and realization of new higher-level 
coalitions within the region, supported by all 
stakeholders, who will be jointly responsible for 
the conservation, maintenance and development 
of the unique selling points of the landscape.
Healthy Living in South Limburg: winning story
By the end of this phase of the New Markets process (November 2006), the 
process had produced few outcomes, and this frustrated all the stakeholders. 
The provincial government’s executive councillor for economic affairs decided 
to intervene, as he would soon have to account for the investments made by 
the province in the process. The urgency to do something was heightened 
because the term of office of the Provincial Executive was nearing its end. 
The executive councillor for economic affairs pinned his hopes on one of the 
participating entrepreneurs, the director of the healthcare concern, Orbis. In the 
last workshop of the New Markets process, at the request of the economic affairs 
representative on the project team, the Orbis director presented his concept 
for Healthy Living in South Limburg. This had not been discussed with the rest 
of the project team. Not only was the Orbis director given the opportunity to 
present his idea for a business plan, he was also presented as the new project 
leader for the next phase of the New Markets process.
3 ZKA et al., 2005
4 Van Mansfeld & Van der Stoep, 2008
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In his presentation, the Orbis director based his proposal for Healthy Living in 
South Limburg on the problem of the declining market for healthcare in the 
region. An increasing number of people were turning to facilities in Belgium 
and Germany, with consequent adverse effects on the healthcare services 
in South Limburg. He believed that the market for facilities in South Limburg 
could be improved by focusing on the growing number of older and chronically 
sick people in the country. His idea was to combine healthcare services with 
tourist and housing accommodation. The combination with tourism drew 
on the existing Healing Hills theme in the New Markets Heuvelland project 
(rehabilitation and convalescence in hotel accommodation in Heuvelland). 
Moreover, the Orbis director saw opportunities to combine healthcare with new 
housing facilities for older people (the new market, Glorious Life), linking the 
problem of the healthcare market to the economic problem of the shrinking 
population in Heuvelland. In his view, the migration of young people to the west 
of the Netherlands could not be prevented. Instead, efforts should be focused 
on the new market of older people, not only people from Heuvelland, but also 
from other regions. This could be done by combining new housing facilities 
with customized health services. Moreover, new housing could be combined 
with the conservation of cultural heritage (cloisters, farmsteads), and thereby 
contribute to the conservation of landscape qualities.
The problem definition and goals of the Healthy Living in South Limburg 
initiative were more narrowly defined than the goals drawn up by Alterra for the 
New Markets project. The Healthy Living in South Limburg proposal did involve 
new product–market combinations, but they were all health related and scarcely 
addressed how these new markets could contribute to the management of 
landscape qualities in Heuvelland. Nevertheless, this initiative was prioritized 
by the Provincial Executive, without consulting the project team or the wider 
circle of stakeholders. 
The idea of focusing on the opportunities presented by the ageing population, 
investing in the older consumer market, reflected the ambitions of the provincial 
government to establish an economy based on older consumers – the ‘silver 
economy’. The Healthy Living in South Limburg initiative fitted in well with the 
goals of the provincial Acceleration Agenda and the Provincial Executive’s policy 
programme for 2003–2007 (Provincie Limburg, 2003). The Acceleration Agenda, 
which consists of core themes for future economic development, including 
Health, Care, & Cure, was considered the dominant steering mechanism for the 
economic development of the region.
In 2012, South Limburg will have developed much new added value in the so-
called Health, Care, & Cure market. By providing innovative products and services, 
Limburg will help the ageing population of North West Europe to become and 
stay healthy.…The active policy for the older consumer market will deliver 
benefits, and the business community in Limburg will lead the development of 
new products and services for this target group. Limburg has more than enough 
lifetime homes with comfort, wellness, and care arrangements in or close to the 
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home. Tourism will also play its part. In 2012, older tourists will prefer Limburg for 
accommodation and consumption because the tourism products and services 
are also accessible to the less active among them. (Taskforce Versnellingsagenda, 
2005, pp.11–15) 4-2
Even before the Acceleration Agenda of 2005, the Provincial Executive had 
been focusing on the opportunities presented by the ageing population for the 
regional economy, as evidenced by the Provincial Executive’s policy programme 
for 2003–2007.
Limburgers are encouraged to be enterprising and self-confident in seizing the 
opportunities for a technological top region (industry and agribusiness), for a 
stimulus to the quality of tourism offer and for a ‘silver economy’, aimed both 
at retaining elderly people for the labour market and at product innovation for 
older consumers (ICT, healthcare, leisure, service). (Taskforce Versnellingsagenda, 
2005, p. 21) 4-3
By the end of the Provincial Executive’s term of office, the executive councillor 
for economic affairs had to deliver results for both the New Markets project and 
the economic policy presented in the Provincial Executive’s policy programme 
and the Acceleration Agenda. Prioritizing the Healthy Living in South Limburg 
initiative was most profitable for him at that juncture.
A new policy story: the ‘dynamic and vibrant’ region
Only a couple of months after the prioritization of the Healthy Living in South 
Limburg initiative, support from the provincial government came to an end. The 
executive councillor for economic affairs retired after the provincial elections 
of spring 2007. The new Provincial Executive shifted the focus of economic 
development policy, considering the ageing population not as an opportunity, 
but as a threat to the development of the desired knowledge economy 
(Provincie Limburg, 2007).
The knowledge economy had already been a key issue for the previous 
Provincial Executive. The ambition was to play a central role in a technological 
top region, including neighbouring regions in the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Belgium. As part of this larger region, South Limburg would specialize in life 
science technologies and creative industries. The new Provincial Executive 
continued this focus on the knowledge economy and the technological top 
region. However, demographic trends had become an increasing concern in 
the previous two years, as the flow of talented young people into the labour 
market had been decreasing. Not only was the population ageing and shrinking 
more in South Limburg than anywhere else in the Netherlands, but young 
people were migrating to other parts of the Netherlands to find jobs and good 
living environments. New businesses and industries in the field of healthcare 
technologies and creative industries could never develop if there were no 
talented employees to hire. The Provincial Executive therefore decided to 
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prioritize attracting young people over the provision of services and products 
for older people. As the dominant economic policy, the knowledge economy 
pushed the silver economy from the agenda.
As in the previous period, the new Provincial Executive’s policy programme for 
2007–2011 (Provincie Limburg, 2007)  focused heavily on meeting the challenge 
presented by the alarming demographic trends: a shrinking and ageing 
population, and emigration of young people. However, instead of focusing on 
the ageing population and the older consumer market as a driver of economic 
development, attention now turned to keeping young people in the region and 
making them aware of its attractions for employment, housing, and living in 
South Limburg.
Limburg should become a demographically experimental region, because it 
will be many years before the rest of the Netherlands will be confronted with 
the same demographic trends....We want to appeal to people’s talents and 
particularly to offer a challenging environment to young people. (Provincie 
Limburg, 2007, pp.5–6) 4-4
The Acceleration Agenda was renewed in 2008 (Raad van Advies 
Versnellingsagenda, 2008). Emphasis was placed on retaining young people in 
the region as a condition for the development of an innovative and enterprising 
knowledge economy:
The availability of sufficient knowledge workers is indispensable for realizing the 
innovation ambitions in the Acceleration Agenda. However, the demographic 
trend is working against us.… If we let that take its course, we face a growing 
quantitative and qualitative shortage of knowledge workers. The influx of 
young talent from other regions, countries, and continents…will not resolve this 
shortage if we cannot retain this talent in the region. Of course we are pleased to 
observe that our graduates are global citizens and so well qualified that they can 
get a job anywhere. But it would be even more pleasing if these global citizens 
could find their dream job here! Unfortunately, the region is failing on this point. 
Active programmes are necessary to upgrade current employees…to attract 
knowledge workers from elsewhere…and keep talent in the region. (Raad van 
Advies Versnellingsagenda, 2008, p. 43) 4-5
The three clusters, High Tech Materials, Health, Care, & Cure, and Agrifood and 
Nutrition, were continued, but the emphasis now was on specific projects and 
implementation by a limited number of institutions and companies. For the 
Health, Care, & Cure cluster, this meant that the previously broad scope, which 
included housing and leisure services for elderly people, was narrowed down to 
healthcare technology and related businesses.
The ageing of the population in Limburg is going faster than in other parts of 
the country. Ageing results in more demand for healthcare, especially chronic 
care. Moreover, this care increasingly has to meet the wishes of individuals….
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Innovative top healthcare will be combined with developments in areas like 
biomedical materials, molecular medical science, and molecular equipment. 
(Raad van Advies Versnellingsagenda, 2008, pp. 16–18) 4-6
As the Healthy Living in South Limburg initiative had previously been associated 
with the silver economy, it was framed by government representatives as an 
initiative that would create facilities only for the elderly and the sick and not 
for young healthy people who needed a ‘dynamic environment’. The story of 
Healthy Living was therefore not considered appropriate in the light of the new 
policy ambitions, a case that was vividly supported by the image of a ‘rollator 
landscape’:
A care landscape alone can have negative effects. The image of 
stumbling over wheelchairs and rollators is not positive. We have to 
think outside the theme of healthcare, and we should just achieve 
good living environments. (A former local government official) 4-7 
 
During the development of ideas about the regional brand, a division has arisen 
between hi-tech, or the knowledge economy, and a care landscape. This is 
utterly inexplicable, because all studies on the knowledge economy affirm the 
importance of quality of life. A care landscape is about preventive healthcare 
oriented at the well-being of young and elderly people. (Chairman of New 
Markets Heuvelland project phase I) 4-8
The negative impact that a ‘care landscape’ could have on the new goal of 
creating a dynamic top technological region was used to justify the removal of 
the Healthy Living in South Limburg initiative from the economic policy agenda.
Although the province no longer supported the Healthy Living in South Limburg 
initiative, TransForum still saw potential in further developing it. The withdrawal 
of the provincial government did not bother TransForum because they felt 
that in the previous phase the cooperation with the province had caused delay 
and had not led to any useful discussions. Orbis and Alterra drew up a revised 
prospectus for the Healthy Living in South Limburg initiative that proposed 
building Integrated Care Communities (Kranendonk and van Mansfeld, 2009). 
New partners were introduced: an investment bank with an interest in rural 
estates, a property developer, and an agricultural estate agency. The provincial 
government was excluded from this new coalition.
The ‘grand design’: new opportunities 
In the course of 2006, the local authorities, or municipalities, in the Heuvelland 
region decided to develop their own vision for regional development in 
response to the provincial agendas for the National Landscape and economic 
development. They organized themselves into a body called Core Area South 
Limburg. The New Markets initiative, as a new approach to improving tourism, 
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was also discussed. Core Area South Limburg was coordinated by an ex-mayor, 
who was assigned by the provincial government to act as an independent 
liaison officer between the province and the rural municipalities. The 
municipalities agreed to develop a ‘grand design’ for the region in which new 
economic activities, as proposed in New Markets, would be a way to implement 
the proposals in the provincial Landscape Vision for conserving and developing 
landscape qualities. One of the experts who developed the New Markets 
Heuvelland project was invited to the meetings. The grand design initiative 
opened up a new window of opportunity to garner support for New Markets 
as a new approach to area development. With the route via the provincial 
government now apparently a dead end, a new route via the municipalities 
seemed to open up.
However, the initiative for a grand design soon faltered when the municipalities 
started to fight about leadership, competencies, and jurisdictions. Moreover, 
the province considered the initiative redundant because similar activities 
were being pursued by three area committees, which had been implementing 
provincial rural development policies for years. The municipalities also 
participated in these area committees, so in the eyes of the province it was not 
useful to start yet another form of municipal cooperation around the issue of 
landscape development. The municipalities’ initiative was taken over by the 
province, and the municipalities cancelled their financial investments in Core 
Area South Limburg. Instead, they used those resources to support the Regional 
Branding initiative, which was another outcome of the New Markets process.
Beyond the scope of TransForum: Regional Branding
The initiative by entrepreneurs to develop a regional brand5  emerged more or 
less spontaneously during the course of 2006 and developed mostly outside the 
control of the New Markets organization. The ideas for a regional brand were 
developed by entrepreneurs from the New Markets process, who formed a group 
called Zwarte Ruiter Overleg (Black Rider Consultation Group)6. Interestingly, of 
the initiatives discussed so far, this one has been the most successful in terms of 
support from both public and private actors.
The initiative developed from a discussion about collective marketing needs 
among entrepreneurs who participated in the workshops and roundtable 
meetings of New Markets Heuvelland. The shift in emphasis in the New Markets 
process to preserving landscape qualities and building network structures 
5 Branding: All those promotional activities of an area to increase the attractiveness of the region 
as a place for working, living and spending free time (Hospers, 2004). Regional branding is the 
deliberate planning of the image of a region. Whereas marketing focuses on the demands and 
needs of consumers, branding is more of a self-selected vision, mission, and identity (cf Riezebos, 
2006).
6 The name Zwarte Ruiter Overleg was chosen because the first meeting was held in the pub De 
Zwarte Ruiter (The Black Rider) owned by one of the participants.
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seemed to draw attention away from the marketing problems that the 
entrepreneurs had identified. The marketing issue was the only issue to which 
all entrepreneurs could relate, and it was suggested that in addition to the five 
existing new markets (box 4.1) a sixth new market be built around this topic and 
this coalition of entrepreneurs.
According to Zwarte Ruiter Overleg, the regional economy was not dynamic 
enough to be competitive in the European context. Parallel to the provincial 
government’s growing awareness about demographic trends, Zwarte Ruiter 
Overleg believed that the shrinking population and the emigration of young 
people to other parts of the Netherlands further diminished the opportunities 
for new and existing businesses to develop. Zwarte Ruiter Overleg argued that 
policies should be aimed at keeping young people in the region by focusing 
on the attractive living and working environment of South Limburg. To do that, 
the image of the region would have to be upgraded. The excellent work–life 
balance of the region had to be promoted (Zwarte Ruiter Overleg, 2006).
During 2006, these ideas slowly spread to government officials, who were also 
increasingly questioning the image of the region. This happened first in a more 
local context. The city of Maastricht was developing a city marketing strategy to 
promote the city to tourists, residents, and companies. In the summer of 2006, 
Zwarte Ruiter Overleg and experts in the New Markets project came up with the 
idea of linking Maastricht’s city marketing (Gehrels et al, 2005) to the regional 
branding idea developed in the New Markets process. Maastricht could profit 
from the promotion of the wider environment of the city, and Zwarte Ruiter 
Overleg was interested in using Maastricht in the brand because in their view 
Maastricht was the only internationally well known feature in the region. Zwarte 
Ruiter Overleg coalition was therefore broadened to include representatives 
from the municipality of Maastricht, but, despite initial enthusiasm, the 
branding and city marketing initiatives stagnated. This triggered the provincial 
government to intervene and to take over the initiative.
This development should be related to the background of political discussions 
within the provincial administration. As discussed earlier, in that period the 
province shifted its attention to attracting young people to support the 
knowledge economy. Moreover, the National Spatial Strategy (Ministerie van 
VROM, 2004) forced the province to emphasize the importance of the network 
of cities in the region instead of individual marketing and promotion activities 
by each city. Therefore, the branding of the region, specifically relating to the 
South Limburg Urban Network (Stedelijk Netwerk Zuid-Limburg), became a 
major provincial concern in 2007, as reflected in the Provincial Executive’s policy 
programme of 2007 (Provincie Limburg, 2007), the Acceleration Agenda of 2008 
(Raad van Advies Versnellingsagenda, 2008) and the Development Agenda for 
the South-Limburg Urban Network (Stedelijke Netwerk Zuid-Limburg, 2008):
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We want to create an all-round attractive climate for companies, 
employees, and tourists; this is why we will strengthen our regional 
branding and use our characteristic Limburgian cultural institutions 
and media, transboundary cultural economy, and link major 
events to economic priorities. (Provincie Limburg, 2007, p. 20)4-9 
 
Clear and consistent promotion of this region is of great importance in attracting 
international knowledge workers. (Raad van Advies Versnellingsagenda, 2008, 
p. 44) 4-10
In 2007, the province commissioned LIOF to develop the regional branding 
idea into a business plan. LIOF hired experts, and by the end of 2007 a business 
plan (Berenschot, 2007) was presented which included a proposal for a public–
private organization that would steer the regional branding and marketing 
activities of the participating stakeholders. In this business plan, the regional 
brand was formulated as follows:
South Limburg is a European region in which people from all over the world 
come together to make high-quality products. It is a region with a clever balance 
between working and living. Innovation and high quality go together with joie 
de vivre. Maastricht is the pearl of the region and resonates with the culture and 
tradition of the region. (Berenschot, 2007, p. 3) 4-11
The major goals of the regional brand with regard to economic development 
are: development of the knowledge economy (new industries in the field of 
the life sciences, medical technology, and energy systems), gastronomy, and 
creating a good investment climate by focusing on the good work–life balance 
provided by the beautiful landscape of Heuvelland. The province assigned three 
‘pathfinders’ to investigate whether the proposed public and private parties 
were really interested in participation in a foundation for regional branding and 
whether they were willing to translate this interest into financial investment. 
These three pathfinders were influential executives in the public and private 
sectors. In 2008, the efforts resulted in the establishment of the Regional 
Branding Foundation, in which all the municipalities in South Limburg and large 
enterprises participated and collectively invested some 8 million euros in the 
period 2008-2012 (Govers, 2012).
The prioritization of regional branding on the policy agenda marks the shift 
in the provincial government’s attention from both the knowledge and silver 
economies to exclusively the knowledge economy and the related issue of 
retaining young people in the region. The promoters of the idea of regional 
branding were adamant that the regional brand should not be associated with 
elderly people.
We are not focusing on the silver economy because it is not a new concept in 
the country. What is the added value compared with the Achterhoek [a region 
in the east of the Netherlands]? With this topic we cannot distinguish ourselves 
from other regions.…Providing for older people is a core task of the government, 
but we should not expect the market to take the lead. The market is concerned 
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with preventing the migration of young people to other regions. Young people 
are welcome to study abroad, but after that we want them to return to South 
Limburg. We talk about providing a work–life balance. (A member of Zwarte 
Ruiter Overleg) 4-12
This is also stated in the business plan:
We are not targeting older people. They are already well provided for, and prefer 
not to live in a region with an ageing population. The brand should therefore not 
put too much emphasis on wellness and care, but focus primarily on enjoyment 
for the active population and for visitors. (Berenschot, 2007, p. 3) 4-13
At the time of writing, the foundation has presented an Implementation Plan 
for the period 2009–2012 (Stichting Regiobranding Zuid-Limburg, 2009), in 
which Regional Branding is described as an image campaign to improve the 
reputation of the region and prevent further population decline: 
The main goal of Regional Branding is to broaden the reputation of South 
Limburg from a region noted for gastronomy and the good life to the ideal 
work–life balance. It will promote South Limburg as an ideal place not only for 
a holiday, but also for permanent residence [by companies and employees]. 
(Stichting Regiobranding Zuid-Limburg, 2009, p. 9) 4-14
Concluding remarks
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the New Markets initiatives and coalitions developed 
and how they were connected to the regional policy agendas. The diagram 
shows that coalitions within the New Markets process frequently changed and 
fragmented into several coalitions. Moreover, the agenda of the New Markets 
process became increasingly narrow, starting from the ambition of contributing 
to sustainable landscape development and resulting in the establishment of a 
regional image campaign to attract new businesses and improve employment. 
The case narrative tells of two major shifts with regard to storytelling and 
agenda setting in the context of the New Markets process. First, while the more 
general and complicated story of the New Markets process was fading, the 
Healthy Living story was prioritized. The attempts by the New Markets project 
team to give a fresh impetus to the five new product–market combinations and 
to combine this effectively with sustainable landscape management proved 
fruitless. Almost no lines of communication were established with the provincial 
government’s spatial planning and rural developments departments, and there 
was no effect on the policy agendas of those departments.7 In contrast to the 
7 This perspective can be nuanced somewhat: Although the initial ambitions of the New Markets 
project were not achieved, it did generate a buzz in the region with regard to new product–market 
combinations: healthcare and tourism (initiative for care hotels for recovery after surgery, for 
example at Château St. Gerlach), agriculture and tourism (regional products and agri-tourism), 
housing and preservation of cultural heritage (cloisters and farmsteads), and so on. Similar initiatives 
and pilots emerged elsewhere in the province.
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New Markets philosophy, the Healthy Living initiative did become a story that 
mobilized support and was pushed successfully onto the economic policy 
agenda. This shift was marked by the ending of the governing period of the 
current Provincial Executive and decision making about the organization of a 
second phase of the New Markets process. 
Figure 4.2: Development of the New Markets Heuvelland project, stakeholders, and relation 
with shifting issues on the provincial government agenda for regional economic development.
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The second shift concerned a shift from a policy story about the silver 
economy to a story about creating an attractive region for young workers. As 
a consequence, the Healthy Living initiative dropped from the agenda and was 
replaced by the Regional Branding initiative. The story of Healthy Living was 
reframed by supporters of Regional Branding as a story that mainly concerned 
the silver economy, a region for the sick and elderly. Instead, Regional Branding 
told the story about a bright economic future if a ‘dynamic and vibrant’ region 
could be provided for young workers. This shift was marked by the provincial 
elections and increasing political concern for the problem of depopulation, 
especially among young people. 
Both Healthy Living and Regional Branding fitted well into the Provincial 
Executive’s existing policy programme and the Acceleration Agenda. Neither 
initiative questioned or challenged existing economic policies, but contributed 
to current debates and hot issues within provincial government. The stories 
both of the silver economy and of the knowledge economy fitted into and 
reproduced the ambition of the province to create an economically competitive 
region and leave behind the economic traumas of the past. The initiators of the 
Regional Branding initiative in particular seemed to easily adapt and connect to 
social trends that would dominate the new policy programme of the Provincial 
Executive, that is, the shrinking population and migration of young people 
to other regions. The Regional Branding initiative was not revolutionary, but 
reinforced the ideas that had already been developed. 
The case narrative points to the importance of storytelling and (re)framing 
processes to explain shifts in agenda setting and why some initiatives were 
successful whereas others slowly faded. In the next sections, we further analyse 
the shifts in the agenda-setting processes described in the case narrative. First, 
we discuss the problems for effective storytelling in the New Markets process. 
Second, we analyse the barriers that had to be overcome to get attention and 
response from targeted supporters, in this case the provincial government. Next, 
we discuss which efforts were taken to align with the provincial government as 
well as factors that can explain why initiatives were successful or not.
4.2 No clear ambitions, no attractive story 
The case narrative told of the failure to construct a strong story about the 
contribution of the New Markets approach to sustainable area-oriented 
development. TransForum and Alterra were included in the process to ensure 
that the New Markets projects would somehow contribute to the management 
of landscape values as well as the rural economy. However, throughout the 
process, the subtle adjustment of the initial New Markets story to include the 
protection of landscape values and so-called KOMBI-stakeholders (knowledge, 
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governments, interest groups – in this case nature and landscape organizations 
– and businesses)8  was never explicitly discussed, or even put on the agenda of 
the New Markets meetings.
We found that the difficulty of defining clear and shared ambitions was rooted 
in the focus on the organizational aspects of the process instead of on the 
substantive goals of the process. We concentrate on two arguments: (1) efforts 
were aimed mainly at keeping the entrepreneurs in the coalition, and (2) experts 
on the project team argued about who had the power to determine the process 
architecture.
Don’t lose the commitment of entrepreneurs!
Right at the beginning of the process, the members of the project team were 
afraid of losing the commitment of the entrepreneurs. They decided that their 
first priority was to invest energy in getting the entrepreneurs committed to 
the process. The commitment of the entrepreneurs was considered crucial 
because the innovative character of the project was attributed mainly to the 
role of entrepreneurs as initiators. The project was supposed to show that 
linking several private initiatives would be more productive to sustainable 
area development than a slow multi-stakeholder decision-making process 
coordinated by the provincial government. The entrepreneurs’ enthusiasm 
and capacity to act was thought to provide a better solution to sustainable 
area development. The project managers could therefore not afford to lose the 
entrepreneurs’ involvement in the coalition.
Consequently, the strategy for the meetings was to find topics that would 
interest the entrepreneurs: identifying obstacles to the progress of the individual 
projects, constructing a ‘corporate identity’ for the region as a business-oriented 
approach to the qualities of the region, and building a business community and a 
public–private network organization to offer a framework in which cooperation 
between entrepreneurs and other stakeholders could be facilitated. To achieve 
this last objective, several organization models were presented and discussed 
during and between the meetings, but the common goals of such a network 
organization and business community were not discussed. The implicit aim 
of the project manager from Alterra was to construct a network organization 
around the issue of landscape management, but this was never put on the 
agenda. Instead, the emphasis was on the interests of the entrepreneurs, 
as emphasized in the minutes of one of the meetings (August 21, 2006) and 
concerns the mission statement for the New Market project.
8 The KOMBI concept (short for Kennisinstellingen, Overheid, Maatschappelijke organisaties, 
Burgers, Bedrijven, Boeren en Innovatie) refers to collaboration between knowledge institutions, 
governments, interest groups, businesses and farmers aimed at achieving innovation (e.g. Van 
Mansfeld et al., 2003).
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Entrepreneurs come first! The economic interest has priority and other interests 
should tie in with this. 4-15
Despite the efforts of the project team, the entrepreneurs did not become more 
engaged in the process. One of the meetings was even cancelled because the 
majority of the entrepreneurs pulled out. The project managers noted that the 
entrepreneurs were frustrated about all the talking without action.
I cannot get a clear picture of the benefits to the entrepreneurs of the higher goal 
of preserving landscape qualities. The project team member from Alterra has 
developed models, but these confuse the entrepreneurs. (The entrepreneurs’ 
representative on the project team) 4-16 
Paradoxically, the effect of this desire to keep the entrepreneurs committed 
and the resulting discussions on how to build a coalition was the withdrawal 
of the entrepreneurs from the coalition-building process. Interestingly, the 
entrepreneurs did attempt to cooperate with one another and with the 
provincial government in informal settings outside the official New Markets 
process. Some of these activities did lead to successful policy agenda setting, 
such as the Regional Branding initiative.
Two captains on the ship
The second reason for prioritizing organizational aspects on the New Markets 
agenda can be found in the conflicts within the project team about the 
process architecture. The New Markets project management included experts 
who represented two different schools of thought about the organization 
of innovation. The initiator of the New Markets process, who operated as an 
independent chairman in phase I, believed in selective mobilization of actors, 
following the principle that only actors that are really committed to the goal of 
the process and that can invest resources should be involved. New Markets had 
started out with that idea of involving only wealthy entrepreneurs and keeping 
the provincial government at a distance. However, the Alterra project members 
believed in building a network organization with broad representation from 
society, including researchers, experts, government officials and officers, 
interest groups, entrepreneurs, and citizens, arguing that this would generate 
broad support for the proposed ideas and facilitate creative solutions that 
combined all the different kinds of knowledge of the participants. Their goal 
was sustainable landscape management, but this was never explicitly discussed 
with the provincial government representative and the initiator of the New 
Markets process who chaired the meetings of phase I. The main concern of 
these latter persons was to develop the new product–market combinations 
and create spin-offs; so for them it was logical to concentrate attention on the 
entrepreneurs.
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The project team members and the phase I chairman invested considerable time 
and energy discussing and arguing these different approaches to deciding who 
should participate and who should not. The provincial representative and the 
chairman feared that Alterra’s approach would result in an agenda that would 
be too broad in scope and too complicated for the entrepreneurs, who wanted 
fast decisions and action. Initially, Alterra was given the task of organizing the 
meetings, but the very first meeting was cancelled by the provincial government 
representative on the project team because he doubted the effectiveness of the 
approach.
The process management is tricky and not clear at the moment. We want to 
steer, but we also want to allow a lot of room for manoeuvre. As long as the 
organizational aspects have not been decided, we have to take the lead role. We 
hired TransForum, but had to step in because their methods and instruments do 
not work here. We thought TransForum would play a supporting role to solving 
knowledge questions, but they took a leading role. We are not on the same 
wavelength. The experts focus too much on the instrumental aspects and take 
too little account of the culture of governing. We were not happy with that, and 
that is why we took back control. (Provincial government representative) 4-17
From this it is clear that the project team members disagreed not only about the 
process architecture, but also about who had the right to make decisions. In the 
midst of this power struggle, there was no discussion about commonly shared 
concerns or goals. 
The lack of a clear ambition in the New Markets process was an obstacle for the 
construction of an appealing and inviting story. In contrast, the Healthy Living 
and Regional Branding initiatives that developed outside the control of the 
project managers were characterized by a very clear ambition and story about 
the future of the region. 
4.3 Barriers to aligning with the province
Agenda-setting and coalition-building efforts were aimed mainly at gaining the 
political and financial support of the provincial government. In the following 
section, we first discuss why the stakeholders attached so much importance 
to the participation of the provincial government in the New Markets process. 
Next, we analyse the difficulties of establishing effective contact with relevant 
actors in the provincial government and the barriers to generating an effective 
response from the province.  
The constructed power of the province
By focusing on the entrepreneurs’ leading role, the organizers of the New Markets 
process tried hard not to make the province the key actor. However, when we 
look at their expectations about the provincial government’s commitment 
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and their attempts to involve provincial officers and executive councillors, in 
fact the provincial government was assigned a central role. Apparently, it was 
not considered possible or desirable to side-line the provincial government. 
The interviews suggest that, in general, stakeholders perceived the provincial 
government as a decisive player in the region.
First, respondents claimed that people in the region relied on the power 
of individual governors to influence decision-making and negotiation 
processes. The executive councillors from the province’s economic affairs, rural 
development, and spatial planning departments were considered to be such 
influential persons. They were frequently called ‘kings’ of the regions and also 
viewed themselves as people who could make a difference, as this statement by 
a former member of the Provincial Executive shows:
In Limburg, regional officials are influential. That cannot be said everywhere 
else. We do not have a big city in Limburg, which means the province has more 
influence. Every day there is something about the province in the newspaper or 
on the television. People know who their councillors are. They elect people who 
appeal to them. Although this is a national trend, it is more evident in Limburg 
than in other provinces. People want personal contact, empathy, an experience. 
People make the difference. 4-18
This is confirmed by a statement of another participant in the New Markets 
process:
We Limburgians are sensitive to authority and status; what those people say, 
goes. (Consultant city marketing Maastricht) 4-19
The power and authority of individual governors, especially governors who 
were born and raised in the region, is viewed by respondents as a cultural 
characteristic of the region. 
Second, the authority attributed to the provincial government and individual 
governors was said to flow from a passive attitude of civil society stakeholders 
and groups. Respondents with a government background referred to a ‘collective 
lack of willingness to act’ among people in the region. This unresponsive attitude 
was said to originate from a ‘collective lack of self esteem’ and ‘guts and spirit’ 
needed to take the initiative. According to respondents, this can be explained by 
historical reasons, such as the relatively isolated position of the region in relation 
to the rest of the Netherlands and the traumatic period of unemployment after 
the closure of the coal mines. This is illustrated by the following statement by a 
former executive councillor of the provincial government.
Certain qualities are lacking in the region: self-awareness, pushing back frontiers, 
identifying opportunities, not complaining, taking matters into one’s own 
hands. The region looks to The Hague too much and does not want to get things 
done itself. We are the second youngest province in the Netherlands. We never 
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really belonged to the Netherlands. We were incorporated into the Netherlands 
in 1839, but we were also a member of the German Confederation for a long 
time. Actually, during our history we have belonged to everybody at one time or 
another and have been used as a pawn in international deals. We have therefore 
never developed a sense of belonging and have never had the guts and spirit 
to make our own choices for the future of the region. (A former member of the 
Provincial Executive) 4-20
According to respondents, the passive attitude of other actors and groups in the 
region called for an active role on the part of the provincial government. 
Authoritarian and unresponsive attitude
In various other ways as well, the Heuvelland case demonstrates that the 
provincial government had strong views about its role in regional governance. 
For example, the interviews showed that the provincial government had strong 
ideas about what constituted ‘good’ network cooperation, what the conditions 
should be for useful cooperation with local stakeholders, and which types of 
networks should be given more power. Moreover, the provincial government 
considered itself to be the only one with a comprehensive overview of what was 
happening in the region, as illustrated by the following quotation. 
Sometimes, as in the core area of Heuvelland, a separate steering group emerges 
[the initiative by the municipal councils to form the Core Area South Limburg 
network and develop a ‘grand design’]. This group turned out to be doing 
the same things as the area committees, which is why the ‘grand design’ was 
incorporated into those area committees, resulting in only one structure.…That 
is how we try to organize useful cooperation. (A provincial government officer)
With regard to the New Markets process, the province pursued its own course 
and did not invest much energy in responding to new ideas and methods that 
came from outside. This is illustrated with the following examples. 
First, the project manager from Alterra noted, with hindsight, that the 
provincial representatives never commented on the proposal for the New 
Markets project, even though the provincial government was formally one of 
the proposal applicants. The provincial representatives said in the interviews 
that they ‘hired’ TransForum for the job. The writing of the proposal was seen 
as a job for TransForum and Alterra, not as something that would matter to 
the province. Moreover, this attitude suggests that the provincial government 
never considered Alterra to be a party with authority to redefine the goal and 
approach of the New Markets project.
Second, the meeting in November 2006 was supposed to be organized by 
Alterra but was taken over by the provincial representatives.  Discussions were 
for the most part limited to the Healthy Living in South Limburg initiative. The 
executive councillor for economic affairs appointed the Orbis director as the 
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new project manager for New Markets without consulting the project team. 
The Alterra project team member refers to this event as a ‘coup’. Alterra was 
excluded from decisions about the process architecture and desired outcomes.
Third, although there were some attempts to involve the provincial government’s 
rural development and spatial planning departments, these never seriously 
considered New Markets to be a promising initiative for landscape management. 
The departments pursued their own agenda and were not inclined to consider 
initiatives that were not immediately relevant to existing policy goals. For 
example, the initiator of the New Markets process tried to link the New Markets 
vision to the spatial planning department’s objective of drawing up a Landscape 
Vision – the timing was right to couple these two processes as both were at an 
initial stage – but the spatial planning department claimed they first needed to 
design their own vision for the landscape before they could adopt a position on 
the New Markets process. The initiator called this a ‘not invented here’ attitude. 
Later on in the New Markets process, when TransForum introduced the broader 
goal of investing in landscape qualities, the project team wanted to involve 
representatives from the spatial planning and rural development departments 
again. However, according to project team members, the officers from these 
departments and the economic affairs department were unwilling to find ways 
to cooperate.
Finally, the interviews with provincial representatives demonstrated that the 
spatial planning and rural development departments hardly knew what New 
Markets was: ‘something with healing hills’ or ‘something to do with health, 
care, and cure’. Provincial government officers felt that the initiatives were 
‘too vague’; this made it difficult to see the added value for the province. ‘All 
beautiful terms, but I don’t feel it, it doesn’t click’. The New Markets initiatives 
were considered insufficiently detailed to fit in with the specific goals of the 
policy programmes, and consequently they were unattractive for serious 
consideration by the spatial planning and rural development departments. 
The policy frame for the spatial planning and rural development departments 
dictated that policy implementation should take place through bottom-
up initiatives from the region, but only those initiatives were supported that 
fitted to pre-defined goals specified in policy programmes. The New Markets 
unfolding story therefore did not find any response in the spatial planning and 
rural planning departments.  
Doubts about including the province in the coalition 
The strategy of the New Markets project managers towards involving the 
provincial government was unstable and characterized by a great deal of 
uncertainty and distrust. They held ambiguous views about the possibilities 
of partnering with the provincial government. On the one hand, stakeholders 
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claimed that they wanted to remain independent of the provincial government, 
but on the other hand their statements point to a wish for the province to play 
a more active role.
The most frequently raised complaint was that the provincial government was 
too passive and did not take the initiative. The province, reasoning from the 
perspective of a less controlling and decentralized governance model, assumed 
that local stakeholders, such as local authorities, farmers, water boards, and so 
forth, would take the initiative and enable implementation of broad provincial 
policies. However, the New Markets project managers and entrepreneurs saw 
the provincial government as an institution that was too controlling and that did 
not stimulate new developments, assessing initiatives against their applicability 
to existing policy programmes, but not helping to develop ideas or come up with 
new ideas itself. The province was accused of adopting initiatives to incorporate 
and fix them into current institutions, thereby destroying the innovative 
potential of those initiatives. Another obstacle to effective cooperation in the 
respondents’ eyes was the compartmentalization within the organizational 
structure of the authority. It was described as a ‘splitting zone’ because of the 
lack of willingness of the economic affairs, the rural development, and the 
spatial planning departments to share ideas and cooperate in joint projects. 
This was not restricted to communication only between provincial government 
officers, but also between the executive councillors, who were said to act too 
much on their own and to avoid consultation with other stakeholders.
The complaints about the provincial government suggest that it was not 
considered to be a trustworthy partner. Nevertheless, the involvement of the 
province in the New Markets process was considered necessary to achieve 
results. Stakeholders argued that the province should ‘just facilitate’ the 
initiatives of entrepreneurs and ‘nothing more’. The members of the project 
team were afraid that too much government involvement would suffocate the 
process by strangling creativity and productivity. They suspected that, if the 
initiative became dominated by the provincial government, it would become 
institutionalized, thereby diminishing its innovative potential. However, 
‘facilitation and nothing more’ turned out to mean more than the words suggest. 
Stakeholders expected the province to be more helpful with setting up facilities 
for the proposed new businesses, especially by providing information about the 
relevant regulations and financing possibilities. Moreover, some argued that the 
province should be responsible for the coordination between entrepreneurs, 
both in terms of organization and by ‘providing a common theme’ for ideas and 
initiatives. 
We would like to do something together, but then according to one plan, so 
no fragmentation please. Province, coordinate that! Make sure it is arranged. 
But the provincial government lacks the necessary continuity or capacity and 
organization. Entrepreneurs are usually not interested in institutions, but in 
people who are entrepreneurial like themselves, so that they can get going. 
(The entrepreneurs’ representative on the project team) 4-22
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In other words, the province was expected to provide a plan, vision, or framework 
within which initiatives could be embedded. However, such a perspective was 
quite contradictory and ambivalent to the view that the province should not 
meddle with entrepreneurs’ innovative activities. 
The ambivalence concerning the required relation with the province led to 
alternately investing energy in involving provincial representatives in the 
New Markets process and pushing them out again. The New Markets project 
managers never whole-heartedly aimed to engage the provincial government 
out of constant fear of a take-over by the provincial government. This unstable 
strategy resulted in unconvincing attempts to involve provincial officers 
and executives in conversations and meetings. There was no real attempt to 
understand the frames of reference of relevant provincial government actors, 
and this decreased the chance of presenting the New Markets story in a way that 
connected to those policy frames. 
In sum, although there were many doubts about the trustworthiness of the 
province as a partner in the coalition, the general view was that provincial 
support was indispensable because of the province’s decision-making power 
in the region. Getting attention was an enormous challenge because of the 
province’s highly self-referential way of working. The experience of the experts 
was that novel ideas and methods from outside, that did not fit into accepted 
frameworks, were overlooked. In terms of agenda setting, it could be expected 
that the province, performing its dominant role in the region, would only 
prioritize initiatives that would fit into the province’s ideas, visions, and plans. 
Earlier we concluded that overcoming such a barrier would at least require 
a clear and attractive story that represented clear ambitions. On the basis of 
this section, we can add that a clear ambition and strategy to connect to the 
different layers of the provincial government was also required, especially since 
the highly self-referential behaviour of the province was difficult to penetrate. 
As these conditions were not met, the New Markets initiative for a business 
community to protect and develop landscape qualities did not find much 
response. The initiatives for Healthy Living and Regional Branding, however, did 
manage to connect effectively with the provincial government. This is the topic 
of the next section. 
4.4 Alignment of stories, people, and events
During the New Markets process, two initiatives that developed more or less 
autonomously and outside the grasp of the New Markets organization proved 
to be the most successful in setting political agendas: Healthy Living in South 
Limburg and Regional Branding. Both initiatives were taken by entrepreneurs 
to create favourable business conditions for themselves. While doing so, they 
served the objectives of the provincial government. We discuss two factors 
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which explain their success: the ability to connect to formal and informal 
networks, to signal events that could trigger attention from targeted supporters, 
and to incorporate these events into their storytelling.
Connecting informal and formal networks
A paradoxical situation emerged regarding the attempts of the project team to 
construct a stable coalition around New Markets. While discussions in formal 
meetings focused on how to build such a coalition, participating entrepreneurs 
met in different informal settings and in different groups to discuss substantive 
matters that really interested them. This resulted in the Zwarte Ruiter Overleg 
initiative for regional branding. Although the project team never had a complete 
picture of the negotiations that took place behind the scenes in these smaller 
informal groups, these informal discussions were decisive for later decisions 
about the New Markets process, according to the project manager from Alterra:
With regard to the process I am not happy with all these individual discussions. 
There is no context, no sense of cohesion. Here in South-Limburg, one-to-one 
relations are considered more important than collective discussion. You belong 
here, or you do not. If you do not belong, you are excluded unless you have a 
formal position. You will get an assignment if you speak Limburgish. It is very 
much an in-crowd. Everything happens in backrooms, like the Zwarte Ruiter 
Overleg. 4-23
The important role of informal decision contexts is confirmed by statements 
from respondents with a government background.  The following quotation 
reflects how stakeholders engage in informal networking to deal with 
continuously changing coalitions and networks and related political ambitions 
and preferences.
It is not possible to organize cooperation in a rational way. I think this is especially 
the case in Limburg. Here you depend a lot on political and administrative 
relations: ‘who knows who’. The political ambitions of some determine whether 
others will be accepted or removed from a particular position. That always 
happens at eight o’clock in the evening. All the telephones in the province are 
ringing then. That is when business is done in Limburg. It’s all rather intangible. 
(A provincial government officer) 4-24
The emphasis on informal communication can possibly be related to the 
previously described cultural preference for relying on influential individuals 
instead of policy programmes and faceless committees. Informal one-to-one 
discussion between individuals was considered more decisive than negotiation 
in formal settings. In the view of respondents, stakeholders preferred to work 
in smaller coalitions. In such a situation, it was difficult to coordinate a multi-
stakeholder negotiation and to collectively construct a storyline or issue that 
could count on the backing and commitment of so many parties. 
4103
New Markets Heuvelland – Coalition Building and Agenda Setting
The initial success of the Healthy Living initiative can partly be explained by 
considering the opportunities to share the story in informal and formal contexts 
and networks. The prioritization of Healthy Living had little to do with efforts 
in the New Markets process and more with the initiator’s membership of the 
existing policy network around the economic development of the region. This 
is illustrated by the events around the November meeting (November 9, 2006) 
of New Markets when a central role was attributed to the initiator of Healthy 
Living. It came as a surprise to the Alterra project manager that the November 
meeting was primarily devoted to the Healthy Living initiative and that the 
initiator of Healthy Living was suddenly appointed as project manager for the 
second phase of New Markets by the executive councillor for economic affairs. 
This ‘coup’ by the executive councillor was seen as something that occurred 
outside the reality of the New Markets process.
The executive councillor for economic affairs did not know about the involvement 
of TransForum in the New Markets process. His interest was that the project 
would be in good shape at the end of his term. That is why he approached the 
Orbis director. (Alterra project manager) 4-25
The project managers furthermore stated that the executive councillor for 
economic affairs was not interested in attending the New Markets meetings. 
This suggests that he was more interested in concrete business outcomes 
than in the efforts of the New Markets process to create a broader network 
organization with representation from several provincial departments, interest 
groups, and entrepreneurs. Moreover, the executive councillor was apparently 
convinced that the leader of the Healthy Living initiative, a healthcare concern 
director, had the leadership qualities required for the New Markets process. 
The healthcare concern had previously contributed to the Health, Care, & Cure 
theme of the provincial Acceleration Agenda and had already participated 
in the coalition of entrepreneurs and government authorities assembled to 
establish the Acceleration Agenda. The activities and ideas of the healthcare 
concern director therefore already had the attention of the executive councillor 
before the ideas for Healthy Living were proposed. In other words, the success 
of the Healthy Living initiative can at least in part be explained by the earlier 
(informal) engagements of the healthcare concern director in activities of the 
province’s economic affairs department. The healthcare concern director was 
already considered an important and relevant partner in the network. 
The importance of connecting informal and formal networks is also illustrated 
by the development of the Regional Branding initiative. The initiating group, 
Zwarte Ruiter Overleg, arose from informal contacts between entrepreneurs 
who met in the New Markets process and were interested in collective 
marketing needs. As previously described, the New Markets process did not 
result in clear issue framing and was limited mainly to a discussion about 
building a network organization. Although the organizers intended to discuss 
matters that would attract the entrepreneurs, the result of their efforts was in 
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fact a drop in commitment from those entrepreneurs, who then pulled out of 
the formal process and found a way to self-organize in an informal setting. One 
of the Zwarte Ruiter Overleg entrepreneurs explained how he brought together 
other entrepreneurs from the New Markets process in informal meetings.
Zwarte Ruiter Overleg are people from the roundtable meetings in the New 
Markets process. I regularly met them there, and it turned out that we shared 
many of the same views about the lack of action and cooperation. The difference 
was that they were born and raised here and know the ins and outs of this area. 
So I brought these people together to find out if there could be an initiative for 
business interests. We considered who should be involved and who not.…We 
were invited by the former director of the Gulpener brewery to hold the first 
meeting in his pub ‘De Zwarte Ruiter’ [The Black Rider]. At the end we needed a 
name: Zwarte Ruiter Overleg [Black Rider Consultation Group]. 4-26
The group consisted of successful entrepreneurs, including some who were 
active in governmental contexts. Together, they spanned a network of about 50 
successful entrepreneurs. Their connections with the network of government 
officials and the way their ideas connected with the current economic policy 
agenda can explain why in 2007 the province decided to help develop the 
Regional Branding initiative. As already mentioned, three pathfinders were 
assigned to coordinate the development of a business plan and find support 
among entrepreneurs and municipal councils. One of them was a member of 
Zwarte Ruiter Overleg who had earlier proved his ability to combine business 
interests with meeting the objectives of the provincial government. Another was 
a former successful businessman and politician, and the third was a government 
official with firm roots in the political and policy context. Their efforts led to the 
establishment of the Regional Branding Foundation. This shows that, right from 
the start, the informal group of entrepreneurs had firm roots in the informal 
network of government and business executives and were able to build on 
those ties in pursuit of the Regional Branding initiative. 
In sum, the Healthy Living in South Limburg and Regional Branding initiatives 
were self-organized initiatives of entrepreneurs who operated in informal and 
formal policy networks which were highly connected. These networks provided 
the opportunity to share stories and discuss alternatives both informally and 
formally. 
Adapting stories to meaningful events
Agenda-setting research emphasizes the importance of political or social 
trigger events or focusing events which provide an opportunity to focus the 
attention of policymakers on a specific issue (windows of opportunity). This 
suggests that agenda setting depends partly on coincidence. However, on the 
basis of the Heuvelland case, we argue that whether or not events perform as 
triggers depends on the meaning given to them by issue proponents and their 
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targeted supporters. Issue proponents interpret certain events as meaningful 
and useful within the context of what is considered relevant by their targets and 
what has happened before. Therefore, we would rather speak of a concurrence 
or synchronicity of such events with past events.  This can be illustrated with the 
following example from the Heuvelland case.
Initially, the Healthy Living in South Limburg initiative seemed to fit in very well 
with the goals of the Provincial Executive in office at that time, as previously 
described, and it was successfully put on the economic policy agenda. However, 
only three months later, it dropped from the agenda to be replaced with the 
Regional Branding initiative. We can explain this by two concurrent events: 
(1) the emerging awareness among stakeholders in the region about the 
consequences of demographic trends for the economy, initially focusing on the 
ageing population but over the years shifting to the problem of the loss of young 
people from the regional labour market, and (2) the Provincial Council elections 
in 2007, which provided the opportunity for policy changes. Successful issue 
framing in combination with the ability to adapt stories to meaningful events 
was decisive for agenda setting. Apparently, it was crucial to frame ideas into 
issues that would be important to the provincial government for the longer 
term. To do that, initiators had to be able to respond to concurrent events: the 
political debates about problems flowing from demographic trends, and the 
fact that the provincial elections were near.
4.5 Conclusion: how stories became strong attractors or not
In this chapter, we have asked how the New Markets initiatives developed and 
what they did to get support from relevant stakeholders. We discussed outcomes 
in terms of their ambitions and in terms of the provincial government’s planning 
agendas for economic and spatial development in the Heuvelland region. The 
experts’ initiative to propose an alternative approach to spatial development 
with the New Markets philosophy slowly faded. Two initiatives emerged from 
the New Markets process which further developed in informal settings outside 
the control of the New Markets project organization. These two initiatives 
managed to gain political attention and support by constructing strong stories, 
told by the right people and shared with the right people at the right time. Two 
major shifts in the agenda-setting process were identified. First, the Healthy 
Living initiative was prioritized and assigned a central role in the next phase of 
the New Market project. Only a short time later however, this story was suddenly 
replaced by a story about Regional Branding which emphasized stimulating the 
knowledge economy by creating and marketing an attractive region for young 
talented workers. The analysis of shifts in the agenda-setting process pointed 
to the importance of storytelling and strategic framing processes. In relation 
to framing processes and the question of why some stories were successful 
whereas others faded, we have drawn the following conclusions.
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First, we can conclude that a clear direction, in the form of an appealing story, 
was of the utmost importance. In the New Markets process, it was not possible 
to formulate an appealing and directional ambition for area development. 
There was too much focus on building coalitions and managing relations, 
and too little on identifying issues. Identifying issues in a collective multi-
stakeholder setting proved to be difficult because stakeholders preferred to 
realize their own ambitions in smaller and informal settings. As a result, the 
New Markets initiative, presented as an alternative approach to regional spatial 
development, was not able to develop an appealing storyline that would 
generate attention and broad support for the proposed ideas. The lack of 
direction was compounded by a coming and going of stakeholders in the New 
Markets coalition. Coalitions seemed to be unmanageable and directionless. In 
contrast, in smaller and informal settings, two initiatives framed their ambitions 
into strong stories that connected well to existing policy stories about the future 
economic development of the region. From this we derive that, to become a 
strong attractor, that is, a mobilizer of people and resources (see Chapter 2), 
stories required ‘articulators’ or storytellers who could frame stable ambitions 
into stories that were recognizable and considered relevant and important to 
targeted supporters.
Second, a clear connecting strategy with relevant governmental actors was 
essential, in this case with the provincial government. Stakeholders perceived 
the provincial government to be crucial and decisive in regional development. 
Therefore, agenda-setting strategies were aimed mainly at the provincial policy 
agendas and at getting the attention of provincial representatives. The province 
was characterized as authoritative and highly self-referential, thus challenging 
initiatives with a major barrier to becoming noticed and prioritized. However, 
ambiguity about the extent and way of involving various province departments 
resulted in an unstable alignment strategy and prevented the establishment 
of a meaningful connection. On the one hand government involvement was 
considered necessary for resources (money, land, knowledge, regulations) as 
well as coordination, and on the other hand too much government involvement 
was believed to dampen the innovative energy of grassroots initiatives. 
Similar experiences with ambiguous views about (provincial) government 
engagement in regional innovation networks in the Netherlands are found by 
Aarts et al. (2007). In contrast to the New Markets project, the coalition-building 
strategy of Healthy Living and Regional Branding was more straightforward 
and entailed building good relations with the policy network around economic 
development. Overcoming the barrier of a limited government perspective on 
social reality required a stable alignment strategy that fitted to ways of working 
and ways of viewing the world of targeted supporters.  
Third, the Healthy Living and Regional Branding initiatives established 
meaningful alignments through informal networks of business and government 
executives that provided the opportunity to share stories and explore 
alternatives with the right people at the right time. Informal communication in 
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personal one-to-one meetings seemed to prevail and was accepted generally 
as the way things were negotiated in the region. This in part explains why the 
stories of Healthy Living and Regional Branding could spread through relevant 
networks and managed to include decision makers in storytelling. In addition, 
the Regional Branding initiative in particular managed to strengthen its story 
by connecting it to political and social events that were considered highly 
important by the provincial government. Interweaving these events and the 
provincial government’s problem frames into the story about a future dynamic 
and vibrant region triggered wide support from local governments and the 
provincial government as well as businesses. 

Positioning 
landscape values 
of the Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard 
fringe on the policy 
agenda
Verscholen onder de zeespiegel achter hoge dijken in het groene hart
Leven we ons leven met ieder zijn eigen binding met de stad
Hier in het Goudse met haar mooie stadhuis en grachten
En soms chaos, drukte en stress waar je graag aan wilt ontsnappen
Op zoek naar een moment van rust, even weg van de stad ja
Een gebied voor het verwerken van je verdriet of het genieten van het uitzicht
De sluizen hebben in het verleden een belangrijke rol gespeeld
Hierdoor moeten we vechten voor het behoud van de voortuin van Gouda
 
Sluizen en dijken houden het water buiten
Tegen overstromingen en beschermen onze huizen
Sluizen en dijken zijn de bewakers van het Groene hart
En geven toeristen toegang tot de Goudse binnenstad
(fragment of rap song by Straatlogica, March 2006, Gouda)
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The previous chapter about civic initiatives of business leaders and experts 
in Heuvelland demonstrated that discursive processes matter a great deal in 
agenda setting. Alignment with existing policy stories was a crucial factor. In 
this chapter, we build on the results of the Heuvelland case, this time focusing 
on civic initiatives for the protection and development of landscape values in 
the southern urban–rural fringe of the city of Gouda. We direct attention to 
how alignment of stories through social interactions happened, and we ask 
why some stories attracted attention and support, whereas others faded. The 
Heuvelland case pointed to the role of political and social events that triggered 
agenda shifts. In this chapter also, we identify trigger events, and we ask how 
decisive these were as tipping points in agenda setting in relation to other 
agenda-setting factors. The Heuvelland case covered a period of only five years, 
and so we selected a longer timeframe for this case study to achieve more 
understanding about how frames and coalitions change over time.  
The case study in a nutshell
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard urban–rural fringe is situated to the south of the 
city of Gouda in the Netherlands (figure 5.1). The area is separated from the city 
by the Hollandse IJssel river and is part of the Krimpenerwaard polder (figure 
5.2). The Krimpenerwaard has the status of Valuable Cultural Landscape and 
is part of the National Landscape Het Groene Hart (The Green Heart). The 
landscape in the fringe fits in with the rest of the Krimpenerwaard polder, which 
is generally characterized as a wet meadow landscape. The riverside, however, 
has an urban character with industrial activity, a wastewater plant, and the 
Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood, which stretches along the dike. 
As a reaction to government plans for new infrastructure and urbanization, a 
small group of citizens from the city of Gouda started an initiative to attract 
attention to the landscape values in the fringe. They tried to convince local and 
regional authorities that an integrated plan for the fringe should be designed 
to prevent further congestion. Although the various authorities all had 
some sectoral interest in the fringe (bypass, development of riversides, rural 
redevelopment), none had taken the initiative to start an integrated planning 
project. 
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Figure 5.1: The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard urban–rural fringe
Figure 5.2: The polder Krimpenerwaard situated between the cities of Gouda and Rotterdam 
The challenge for citizens to convince local and regional governments to 
develop such an integrated vision on the future of the fringe seemed impossible. 
They were confronted with many institutional barriers. The province considered 
the area a local matter and was only interested in sectoral issues embedded in 
separate policy programmes, such as the construction of a new road around the 
5
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city of Gouda and the Rural Redevelopment Project for the Krimpenerwaard. The 
water board was only interested in the problem of a historic canal lock in the dike 
within the framework of water safety measures. To them, this lock was ‘a hole in 
the dike’ that had to be removed. For the city of Gouda, interest was limited to 
the construction of the new road and the floodplain area within the framework 
of the Hollandsche IJssel Project (see box 5.1). The integral development of the 
fringe area was also not on anyone’s agenda because it was a boundary area. To 
the city of Gouda, it was a peripheral area on the other side of the river with no 
apparent function for the city other than the space it provided for the bypass. To 
the Krimpenerwaard municipalities, it was also a peripheral area that had little 
relation to the concerns of the Krimpenerwaard other than the room it provided 
for industrialization. Moreover, cooperation or discussion between the urban 
municipality of Gouda and the rural municipalities of the Krimpenerwaard 
about opportunities to redevelop the fringe area was very unlikely, because 
they did not want to meddle in one another’s affairs. Until a few years ago, 
the municipality of Gouda and the municipalities in the Krimpenerwaard 
region showed no interest in one another, except for the bypass project. The 
Krimpenerwaard municipalities distrusted the motives of the city of Gouda for 
intervening in the Krimpenerwaard and always feared urban influences (urban 
expansion, mass tourism, disturbance of peace and quiet by urban dwellers). 
The city of Gouda on the other hand found the Krimpenerwaard municipalities 
non-cooperative and conservative. 
In sum, civic initiatives met much resistance from the government system when 
they made any attempt to push their proposals for the fringe onto local and 
regional planning agendas. However, despite various institutional barriers, over 
a long period of time of about 25 years the initiatives managed to achieve most 
of their ambitions for the fringe. In recent years, the fringe has become highly 
valued by local and regional governments as an area with great recreational 
potential for both the city of Gouda and stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard 
polder. It came to be perceived as a recreational node between the city and 
the countryside which would strengthen the economic position of both city 
and countryside. The province no longer considered the fringe a local matter, 
but embraced the restoration of the historic lock and the development of a 
nature park as projects of regional importance and translated this into major 
financial investments which were complemented with contributions from local 
authorities. In total, a collective of local and regional authorities invested millions 
of euros in the fringe area. The water board no longer considered the lock just a 
hole in the dike and understood that other stakeholders attributed great value 
to the monument as a cultural link between city and countryside, as well as an 
important symbol of the cultural identity of the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood1. 
Among stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard, the taboo on discussing boating in 
the polder was lifted. Local authorities in the Krimpenerwaard and agricultural 
1 The perceived cultural identity of the neighbourhood is well illustrated by the article 
“Buurtschap als spil van de wereld” (Volkskrant, 20 April 2012, J. Tromp). Translated title: 
“Neigbourhood as pivot of the world.”
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entrepreneurs were increasingly positive about the economic opportunities 
of such boating and began working out more detailed plans. Moreover, the 
efforts of interest and citizen groups resulted in a shift in the attitude of the 
city and the rural municipalities towards one another. The discussion about 
restoring the Stolwijkersluis lock as a gateway between the city of Gouda and 
the Krimpenerwaard seems to have broken the reserved attitude of the city of 
Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard towards each other. Suspicion was slowly being 
replaced with a dialogue that focused on the positive effects of cooperation in 
leisure and tourism. 
Questions and structure of the chapter
This chapter presents the case study of how civic initiatives successfully 
introduced integrated development of the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard urban–
rural fringe onto the agendas of local and regional governments. The central 
question for this case study is which efforts civic initiatives made to introduce 
landscape values and integrated development of the fringe onto the agendas of 
relevant governments, and how we can understand the processes that resulted 
in tipping points in the agenda-setting process.
To answer these questions, we analysed the agenda-setting strategies of 
initiatives, that is, their actions to build a supporting coalition and become 
connected to relevant government stakeholders. We focused on the way issues 
were constructed and framed into a story about the future of the fringe area, 
and we assessed how coalitions were built and the role that trigger events 
played in the process. We examined a long time period (1985–2010) to get an 
evolutionary perspective of shifts over time. 
The first part of the chapter is a narrative about tipping points in the agenda-
setting process as well as the shifts in storytelling and coalitions that occurred 
over time. This forms an overture to further analysis. Section 2 deals with the 
question of the role of trigger events and puts these into perspective. In the 
following section, we discuss how stories and groups of people were aligned 
in coalitions and how certain stories over time successfully attracted attention 
and support. This leads on to the contributions of certain individual people to 
the agenda-setting process. The significance of individual agents in relation to 
agenda-setting processes is discussed in section 4. The interview quotes and 
text segments in this chapter are translated from Dutch interview data and text 
segments. The original quotes in Dutch are listed in Appendix 8 and are referred 
by numbering the quotes.   
5
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5.1 Shifting stories and coalitions 
In the following, we narrate the relevant events in the period between 1985 and 
2010, but first, in Table 5.1, we summarize the identified tipping points and shifts 
in coalitions and stories to give the reader an overview of the process over time.
Table 5.1: Tipping points: shifting coalitions and issues
Tipping point Event Coalitions Issues
1985–1994 
Emerging initiatives 
for conservation of 
landscape values in the 
fringe
Competition Gouda 
Havenstad, and launch 
of governmental 
Hollandsche IJssel 
Project
Initiatiefgroep 
Gouda Havenstad 
from which later the 
Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard 
emerged
Preventing urban 
expansion of Gouda 
into the fringe and 
conserving the 
‘window to the 
Krimpenerwaard’
1995–2004
Broadening of coalition 
with other actors 
and positioning as 
constructive interest 
group
Government plans 
for the bypass around 
Gouda
Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard 
cooperates with nature 
organization and 
residents in the fringe 
and establishes itself as 
negotiation partner of 
Gouda City
Protecting nature area 
from the bypass
2003–2006
Integrated 
development of the 
fringe on the agenda of 
Gouda
Project Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis 
initiated by the history 
association die Goude
Organization of a broad 
coalition of local and 
regional governments, 
interest groups, and 
citizen organizations
Restoration of historic 
lock, conservation 
of ‘window to the 
Krimpenerwaard’ by 
constructing a city park 
Stolwijkersluis as the 
gateway between city 
and countryside
2007–2009
Mobilization of 
support from the 
Krimpenerwaard
Series of major financial 
setbacks threaten 
implementation, 
resulting in call from 
water board to start 
demolishing the 
historic lock
Government coalition 
disintegrates Citizen 
initiatives link up with 
Krimpenerwaard 
initiative Veenvaren 
and local governors 
and politicians
Reintroducing boating 
in the polder as a new 
source of income for 
farmers who had to 
make way for nature 
development
2009–2010
Coalition of local and 
regional governments 
that invest millions of 
euros in the fringe
Economic crisis 
and granting of 
governmental  crisis 
fund to projects 
that are ready to be 
implemented
Authorities of 
Gouda and the 
Krimpenerwaard 
convince water board 
and province to join a 
coalition and to bring 
together co-financing 
for restoration of the 
lock Province and 
Gouda work together 
in construction of a 
nature park in the 
fringe
The fringe as area of 
regional importance for 
nature development 
and economic tourism 
development of 
both Gouda and the 
Krimpenerwaard
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Once upon a time: emergence of civic initiatives for landscape values in 
the southern fringe
In 1985, a small group of citizens from Gouda city centre decided to start an 
initiative group. In their opinion, the city had focused urban expansion too much 
on the highway and railway situated north of the city centre and neglected the 
areas bordering on the rivers Gouwe and Hollandsche IJssel, although the city 
was once founded on the junction of those rivers. That strategic position along 
the main transport routes had brought prosperity to the city of Gouda. The city 
had a magnificent port right in its centre. However, in the 20th century the port 
lost its economic significance, and for water safety reasons the access from the 
Hollandsche IJssel to the port was blocked up. After that, the Gouda riverfront 
was on a downward track. The initiative group, however, saw new opportunities 
for the old port of Gouda and the riverfront because they could again be 
beneficial, this time for pleasure cruising. In that period, pleasure cruising was 
rapidly gaining economic significance in the Netherlands. The group of citizens 
founded an initiative group, called Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad (translated: 
Initiative Group Gouda Port), with the aim of restoring the historical connection 
between the port and the river Hollandsche IJssel for recreational purposes and 
to develop a vision on the urban development of the riverfront. They called this 
vision “Gouda Havenstad?” (Gouda Port), referring to the central importance of 
the port for the future development of the city centre and the Gouda riverfront 
(Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad, 1987, 1988). 
Figure 5.3: Gouda and its port between the river and the inner city in Blaeu’s city plan of 1649 
(source: OD205, 2005) 
 
5
117
Positioning landscape values of the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe on the policy agenda
Figure 5.4: Front cover of the “Gouda Havenstad” vision and a map indicating the fairways 
(source: Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad, 1987)
The riverfront included not only the city-centre side, but also the other bank 
that marked a sharp change from city to countryside. Although still part of 
the municipal territory of the city, the other side of the river had mostly been 
neglected by the municipality. It became part of the territory of the city in 1964 
when it was obtained for potential urban expansion and utilities (wastewater 
plant, power plant, and so forth). Crossing the bridge to this side, we arrive at the 
historical Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood, which was increasingly characterized 
by messy urban development, for example premises along the dike, the asphalt 
plant, the wastewater purification plant, and the heavy traffic on the dike. It is a 
good example of a cluttered urban–rural fringe. The city of Gouda did not make 
much effort to coordinate urban development on this other side of the river. 
Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad, however, thought that both sides of the river 
should be included in any visioning about the riverfront. 
Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad started developing ideas to improve the 
relation of the city centre with both sides of the river. However, as city residents, 
they felt they had too little knowledge about the polder on the other side 
and how that could be developed in relation to the city. Consequently, they 
organized a competition to invite people to come up with a design for the area 
(Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad, 1988). This idea was supported by the city 
government and other interest groups in the city. Various people responded, 
among which a number of professional landscape architects. Some designs 
emphasized the sharp border between city and countryside, which included 
conservation of the green and open character of the polder. In such plans, the 
‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’, the open view to the Krimpenerwaard polder 
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from the dike, would be conserved. Others wanted to improve the relation 
between the city centre and the river by planning new urban development on 
both sides. This included a marina, tower blocks, and ‘urban villas’.  
Figure 5.5: Two of the entries for the design competition “Gouda Havenstad”(source: 
Initiatiefgroep Gouda Havenstad, 1988) 
Note: the upper design is from Teun Koolhaas, the lower design is from buro Abken
5
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The publication of the designs in the local newspaper drew the attention of the 
city government to the development of the riverbanks on the city side as well 
as on the Krimpenerwaard polder side. However, the competition resulted in 
other outcomes as well, such as the foundation of a new citizen initiative. This 
consisted of a couple of citizens who organized themselves in what they called a 
working group for the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe. It was named Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard. A leading member of both Initiatiefgroep Gouda 
Havenstad and Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard explains:
We have nominated the most talked-about designs for the Gouda Havenstad 
competition, among which a green [nature-oriented] and a red design [urban 
development]. There were also designs that would not be my choice. But it is 
a way of attracting attention for that place. And then one discovers later on 
that, after letting it go for five years, a number of people from the municipal 
department of town planning had been very inspired by that red model. That 
‘Manhattan at the IJssel’ [the river Hollandsche IJssel]. That translated into a plan 
that was presented at the start of the Hollandsche IJssel Project, those six ‘urban 
villas’. Then I thought ‘Hey! That is not our choice! We should start yet another 
group’. 5-1
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard consisted of a small group of citizens 
from the city of Gouda who were concerned about the urban developments 
in the southern fringe. In reaction to the plan of the Project Hollandsche IJssel 
project team (see box 5.1) to design a marina and tower blocks on the polder 
side of the river (Stuurgroep Hollandsche IJssel, 1994; Projectteam Hollandsche 
IJssel, 1999), Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard designed an alternative 
plan for the southern fringe. This plan focused on the conservation of the 
‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’ and the conservation of landscape values in 
the fringe (Werkgroep Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, n.d.). Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard worried about the lack of care for landscape values in the fringe 
and decided to ‘adopt’ the area as is demonstrated in the following quotation , 
which explains the motivations and goals of Werkgroep <—> Krimpenerwaard:
In 1994, the working group was brought into being to preserve and strengthen 
the unique and special relation between the historical inner city of Gouda with 
the bordering open green space of the Krimpenerwaard. …This unique place, 
which we have adopted as it were, makes our Green Heart [Het Groene Hart of 
which the Krimpenerwaard is part] beat faster, in the future hopefully also your 
heart. 5-2
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard had deliberately incorporated 
members with relevant expertise. One of the members was a landscape architect 
who translated the ideas of Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard into 
expressive visualizations. Furthermore, members were chosen based on their 
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affiliation with other social organizations, such as the local history association in 
the city of Gouda, Historische Vereniging die Goude, and the provincial nature 
and landscape conservation organization, Zuid-Hollands Landschap.
Box 5.1: Hollandsche IJssel Project2
In 1999, yet another design competition for the development of the fringe 
was organized, this time by a collective of seven nature- and environmental 
organizations in the province of Zuid-Holland, called Consept. This competition 
was called Stadsrand Natuurlijk, which translates as Fringe Naturally.  Consept 
had set up a project about the development of urban–rural fringes. Consept’s 
interest in fringes resulted from their concern about the on-going urbanization 
of the rural The Green Heart region, the rural and open area enclosed by the 
Randstad conurbation). They considered urbanization a threat to the openness 
and nature of Het Groene Hart. Besides that, they wanted to create more social 
support for the conservation of The Green Heart by improving its accessibility 
to visitors from the surrounding cities (Consept, 1998). The southern fringe of 
Gouda was selected as a pilot because various sectoral government plans for 
the area needed coordination into an integrated vision. These plans were the 
Hollandsche IJssel Project, the construction of a road through the southern fringe, 
the construction of an industrial area in the southern fringe, a leisure and tourism 
plan for the southern fringe, and the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment 
Project. The goal of the project was to ‘design a fringe area which forms an 
attractive and recreational link between city and countryside, and which serves 
as a buffer for the advancing urbanization’ (Consept, 1998, p. 9).
This competition provided the opportunity for Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard to articulate its story about the future of the fringe. It provided 
a stage to tell the story to a large audience, and provided the opportunity to 
publicize it in a well-designed brochure. Their proposal focused on the area 
as a recreational link between Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard and on the 
conservation and further development of the ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’. 
In the brochure, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard constructed a story 
about the desired future of the fringe which counter-framed the municipality’s 
vision in which urban development was planned on the southern side of the river. 
The writers sketch a ‘scary dream’ in which the municipality of Gouda completely 
2 (www.schonermooier.nl (last accessed July 19, 2013) and Projectteam Hollandsche IJssel (1999)
In 1996, the Hollandsche IJssel Project started with the signing of a Starting Contract 
by municipalities along the river Hollandsche IJssel (city of Gouda and west of Gouda), 
the water boards and the provincial government. The cooperation also included 
cooperation with residents and businesses. The project entailed 20 kilometer of the 
river Hollandsche IJssel and was aimed at the decontamination and redevelopment 
of the river and its banks. The banks were cleaned up and redeveloped for leisure and 
tourism objectives. Another goal was improvement of the accessibility of the river and 
its banks for residents and tourists, for example for pleasure cruising. On April 11, 2013, 
the project was officially finalized. 
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builds over the polder and creates a ‘South Gouda’ for rich people. ‘The rest 
of the Krimpenerwaard polder countryside becomes one large nature area. Of 
course prohibited for visitors. It is exclusively intended for the entertainment 
of the residents of South Gouda’ (Werkgroep <—> Krimpenerwaard, 1999). 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard counter-framed that development by 
talking about conserving the ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’ (see figure 5.6). 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard aimed to conserve the aesthetical 
strengths of the fringe, which in their eyes was the contrast between the inner 
city of Gouda and its silhouette on the riverside and the open green landscape 
of the Krimpenerwaard on the other side of the river (see figure 5.7). Another 
goal was to strengthen the recreational connection between the city of Gouda 
and the Krimpenerwaard, in which the fringe played an important role (see 
figure 5.8). For Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, the case area was 
especially meaningful as a green area in which inhabitants of Gouda could take 
a stroll or as a starting point for longer trips into the Krimpenerwaard. 
The southern fringe intrigues us. The often abrupt transition from city to 
countryside makes the landscape surprising and varied. …The peace and quiet 
and space of the polder landscape of the Krimpenerwaard strengthens this 
contrast.  (Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, 1999, p.2) 5-3
The ideal picture that Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard sketches for 
the urban–rural fringe also entails ‘bridging the city of Gouda and her rural 
environment’, meaning that the fringe should be used to enhance the liveability 
of the area for urban dwellers, country people, and visitors (ibid, p. 7). 
Figure 5.6: Window to the Krimpenerwaard (Werkgroep Gouda<—> Krimpenerwaard, 1999)
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Figure 5.7: Visualization of the contrast between Gouda’s inner city and the open polder 
landscape of the Krimpenerwaard (Werkgroep Gouda<—> Krimpenerwaard, 1999)
Figure 5.8: Proposal for recreational routes in the urban-rural fringe Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
(Werkgroep Gouda<—> Krimpenerwaard, 1999)
Together with another designer, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
won the competition. Although the competition did not succeed in getting 
the integrated development of the fringe onto local and provincial policy 
agendas, it was still considered by Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard as 
an important step in the agenda-setting process. Once printed, the brochure 
was continuously used to direct governments and other groups to issues in the 
case area. It was considered by Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard an 
important tool to guide their future actions as well as to continuously focus other 
5
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parties’ attention on the southern fringe. Another outcome of the competition 
was the mobilization of multiple interest organizations from Gouda and the 
Krimpenerwaard into a consultation group that coordinated actions around the 
conservation and strengthening of landscape values in the fringe between the 
city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard. This group was called Beraad Stadsrand 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard (Consultation Group Gouda-Krimpenerwaard Fringe). 
In comparison to Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, Beraad Stadsrand 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard was a more formalized body with many more 
representatives from social organizations from the city of Gouda as well as the 
Krimpenerwaard. Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard was usually used 
in political lobbying when it was necessary to demonstrate wide social support. 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard’s plans and proposals for the fringe 
also included the restoration of the historic lock3 that had fallen into disrepair in 
the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood. This lock, which bears the same name as the 
neighbourhood, was blocked off in 1986 because it was no longer used to transport 
agricultural products between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard. The 
lock now risked demolition by its owner, the water board Hoogheemraadschap 
Krimpenerwaard. The water board perceived the lock, deprived of its function, 
merely as an unwanted rupture in the dike. A Gouda city council member, who 
was interested in historic water works, wanted to prevent demolition of the 
historic lock. He took the initiative to nominate the lock for the list of national 
monuments and started a foundation called Stichting Restauratie Stolwijkersluis 
(Stolwijkersluis Restoration Foundation). In 1990, with the help of the history 
association, Historische Vereniging die Goude, the status of National Monument 
(NM) was legally assigned to the lock. This made demolition virtually impossible. 
Nevertheless, the NM status did not warrant conservation of the lock because the 
arrangement did not oblige the water board to invest in repair and maintenance. 
Even though the lock was now a national monument, it decayed more and more. 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard meanwhile had not forgotten about the Stolwijkersluis. 
It formed a vital link in their ideas about pleasure cruising between Gouda 
city centre and the Krimpenerwaard polder. In the period between 1998 
and 2001, there was an opportunity to get the restoration of the lock onto 
government agendas. A former Gouda city alderman and member of Beraad 
Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard was devising a tourist plan for the 
southern fringe commissioned by a collaboration of municipalities in the 
region (Productontwikkelingsteam ISMH, 2000). He tried to bring the lock 
issue to the attention of the provincial government, the water board, and the 
committee coordinating the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project, 
Landinrichtingscommissie Krimpenerwaard. In these efforts, he got support 
from the Gouda city administration. The lobbying, however, did not lead to 
3 More information about the history of the Stolwijkersluis lock can be found in the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis (Van der Stoep & Van den Brink, 2006) , which is available on-line: http://library.wur.
nl/way/bestanden/clc/stolwijkersluis/start.htm
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successful agenda setting because the restoration of the lock for pleasure 
cruising touched the nerves of farmers and nature organizations in the 
Krimpenerwaard. Only a few years before, stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard 
Rural Redevelopment Project (Landinrichtingscommissie Krimpenerwaard) had 
agreed to limit boating in the Krimpenerwaard to canoes which could only travel 
on fixed routes (Landinrichtingscommissie Krimpenerwaard, 1999). Farmers 
and nature organizations had experienced much inconvenience from tourists 
who disturbed nature and damaged farmers’ fields. Even without the spectre 
of pleasure cruising, the inhabitants and entrepreneurs in the Krimpenerwaard 
generally opposed recreational development because they feared disturbance 
to days of rest in the area, especially on Sundays. So improving the conditions 
for pleasure cruising was considered a taboo in the Krimpenerwaard. 
Figure 5.9: Location and images of the historic lock Stolwijkersluis
Note: Location of the historic lock in the dike (indicated with the white circle) between the 
river Hollandsche Ijssel and the polder landscape (Google Maps)
Note: In 1800, for the purpose of a peat cultivation project in the Krimpenerwaard, the 
lock Stolwijkersluis was constructed in the dike along the river Hollandsche Ijssel together 
with a ring canal and drawbridges in the polder south of the lock. Left picture: the lock 
underneath its drawbridge at the beginning of the 20th century. On the right: a map of the 
peat cultivation project 1837 (Source: Weggeman Guldemont. Het hoogheemraadschap, 
kaartbijlage). For more information about the history of the lock and the peat cultivation 
project see Van den Brink (2003).
5
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Figure 5.10: The lock and its environment
Note: The faded glory of the lock in 2004. 
Note: The left picture shows the wide view on the polder landscape of the Krimpenerwaard 
standing on top of the historic lock. The right picture is the view from the polder on the 
inner city of Gouda. The lock is situated right of the windmill in the city’s silhouette.
Government plan for a new road triggers collective action
At the turn of the millennium, another planning process engaged all the 
attention of policymakers and civic initiatives. It concerned a new road through 
the southern fringe of the city of Gouda. This process marks shifts both in 
storytelling about the fringe area and in coalition building.  
An attention analysis (see Appendix 4) shows that in the period 1994–2004 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard invested most of its energy in 
proposing alternatives to the new road. In their eyes, nature values in the 
fringe were threatened by this plan. Nobody questioned the necessity of such 
a bypass because it would solve traffic congestion in the centre of Gouda, 
and it would considerably reduce the travel time from the Krimpenerwaard 
region to the city of Gouda and other parts of the region. Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard and Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard’s issue 
concerned the planned trajectory of the bypass, which would run through a 
nature area (Dercksen & Van Ginkel, 2004). Besides that, the bypass was linked 
with plans for the development of an industrial area. Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
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Krimpenerwaard and Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard protested 
strongly against the industrial area as well because it would destroy the ‘window 
to the Krimpenerwaard’ and the openness of the historical polder landscape. 
In reaction to the plans that governments (the city of Gouda, the Ouderkerk 
municipality, and the provincial government) had developed for the new 
road, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, together with the regional 
nature and landscape organization Zuid Hollands Landschap and an organized 
group of residents (Bewonersgroep Ouderkerk), developed an alternative 
trajectory for the road that would spare nature (figure 5.11). Besides cooperating 
with Zuid-Hollands Landschap and Bewonersgroep Ouderkerk, Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard also involved residents from the Stolwijkersluis 
neighbourhood who were increasingly concerned about all the government 
plans that affected their living environment. The Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard spokesman explains:
We first got to work with the plan for the Hollandsche IJssel Project in 1994, but 
then this bypass crossed our path. …With that we had our hands full! But it also 
brought us many contacts with people in that fringe. One needs that. 5-4
Figure 5.11: Alternative trajectory for bypass “Weidebloemtracé” (Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard, 1999)
Besides building social support, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
invested much energy in good relations with the city of Gouda and the Ouderkerk 
municipality. The group tried to convince the involved governments – the city of 
Gouda, Ouderkerk, and the province – in all kinds of ways about the feasibility of 
their alternative trajectory. They presented themselves not as an action group, 
but as a group of experts and as constructive conversation partners. Besides 
using formal public participation opportunities, they used more informal ways 
to negotiate their plan. An opportunity for informal conversation was created 
through the organization of a yearly ‘dawn walk’4 in the fringe to which local 
4 Dauwtraptocht. The Dauwtraptocht is an old Dutch folk ritual on Ascension Day. People get up 
at sunrise and take a walk in the country before going to church.
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governors and councillor were invited as well as media reporters and residents 
of Gouda city and the Krimpenerwaard. Apart from designing its own plans 
and alternative solutions, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard aimed to 
demonstrate professionalism by involving expert knowledge from outside. 
For example, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard designed an alternative 
trajectory and asked the University of Delft to check that trajectory via a student 
project. Moreover, they found inspiration in a similar project in a town nearby 
(Leidschendam-Voorburg, Sijtwende Project) and arranged an excursion to that 
project for local councillors and local and regional executives. 
Although the alternative trajectory of the growing coalition around Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard was included in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA, see figure 5.12), it was never seriously considered by the city 
of Gouda and the provincial government. The EIA commission agreed with 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and its partners that the feasibility 
of their alternative trajectory ought to be investigated. However, Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard decided to stop their fight because they became 
aware that they would never achieve a majority of votes in the local councils. 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard decided that it would be better to 
invest energy in other topics, such as preventing the construction of the industrial 
area and continuing the campaigns for the restoration of the Stolwijkersluis lock 
and the ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’. To achieve these goals, they had to 
remain friendly with the city administration. They publicly gave up the fight for 
the alternative trajectory5. They aimed in this way to create a basis of trust that 
would enable future cooperation with the city administration. 
Figure 5.12: Options for the trajectory of the Bypass in the Intermunicipal Strategic Plan 
(Dercksen & Van Ginkel, 2004)
5 See for example: “Wethouder blij met concessie werkgroep”, Rijn en Gouwe, September 30, 
2004, p.3
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Masterplan Stolwijkersluis brings new coalitions and new storylines
During one of Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard’s meetings in 2003, 
a representative of Historische Vereniging die Goude was informed about 
the Stolwijkersluis lock situation. He was not only interested in the historical 
elements in the fringe; as professor of Spatial Planning at Wageningen University, 
he was also interested in the spatial development in the fringes of Gouda city. 
He investigated the history of the lock in an article in the history association’s 
magazine (Van den Brink, 2003). He asked a former student to sketch some 
scenarios for the future development of the lock. The public presentation of 
these design scenarios (Van Dam & Van den Brink, 2004) resulted in substantial 
attention from both governmental and non-governmental participants on 
the future of the lock. After this, he saw an opportunity to push restoration 
onto the policy agendas of Gouda municipality and the lock owner, the 
Hoogheemraadschap Krimpenerwaard water board. 
He managed to build a partnership of local and regional governments to 
finance a project that resulted in a spatial plan for the lock and its environment. 
A more or less coincidental meeting with the alderman for monuments at the 
time provided the opportunity to discuss the lock informally. The alderman, 
who in the past had sailed through the lock himself, strongly supported the idea 
of restoring the lock. He agreed to financially support further plan making on 
the condition that the lock would be used again to lock through boats from the 
de Stolwijkervaart waterway to the Hollandsche IJssel river. The next hurdle was 
the president of the water board who, as the owner of the lock, had to agree to 
its restoration. The president of the water board was open to discussion because 
water safety tests had repeatedly demonstrated that the lock was a weak point 
in the dike. Until then, the water board could not take action because the lock’s 
NM status prevented it from demolishing the lock and repairing the hole in the 
dike. If nothing happened, the impasse around the lock would continue, and 
therefore the president of the water board agreed to join the steering group 
and co-finance plan making for the lock and its environment.  The president 
agreed to participate on the condition that, if no feasible plan for restoration was 
developed, he could start a demolition procedure which would be supported by 
the municipality of Gouda. Another reason for the alderman and the president 
of the water board to participate was the considerable Belvedere-funding that 
the professor and his research team had obtained to finance collaborative plan 
making for the lock and its environment.  The national Belvedere-programme6 
funded planning and design processes that integrated heritage management 
and spatial development and thus contributed to implementation of the 
national Belvedere policy (Ministerie OC&W et al., 1999).
After that, the Zuid-Holland Province and Landinrichtingscommissie 
Krimpenerwaard were also invited to participate. In particular the province 
was expected to be interested because the culture department had a few years 
6 Information about the Belvedere strategy: http://www.belvedere.nu/index.
php?section=01&p=english (last accessed: July 16, 2013
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before been involved in the tourism plan for the southern fringe. And indeed, 
the contact between the former city of Gouda alderman and a provincial civil 
servant in those years had resulted in the civil servant having a memory about, 
and an interest in, the southern fringe and especially the lock. Consequently, 
via this civil servant, Zuid-Holland Province agreed to participate and to give 
financial support for the project. Finally, the Rural Redevelopment Committee 
Krimpenerwaard was included to synchronize plan development and, eventually, 
to arrange financial support for plan implementation. The Rural Redevelopment 
Committee Krimpenerwaard was represented by a governmental service, Dienst 
Landelijk Gebied (Government Service for Land and Water Management). 
By arranging financial contributions from these government bodies and their 
participation in a steering group, two essential results in terms of coalition 
building had been achieved. Whereas before the city of Gouda had hardly 
been aware of the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project, now city and 
countryside were brought together in the project that resulted in a Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis (Van der Stoep & van Den Brink, 2006). Moreover, four different 
government organizations had committed themselves to a process aimed 
at integrated development of the southern fringe, an area in which they 
formerly had not showed much interest. The planning and design process was 
coordinated by the Land Use Planning Group of Wageningen University.
The process had a participatory approach involving inhabitants, interest 
groups, and landscape architects. In the initial phase, the Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard secretary and spokesman was a key informant with 
regard to physical, social, and policy aspects in the southern fringe and the 
stakeholders that should be invited into the participatory design process. A 
large number of interest groups and inhabitants participated enthusiastically, 
among which Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard, Historische Vereniging 
die Goude, Stichting Restauratie Stolwijkersluis, Zuid-Hollands Landschap, and 
residents of the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood. The project, together with 
the plans for the bypass, had triggered the residents of the neighbourhood to 
organize themselves into a neighbourhood council, called Stichting Buurtschap 
Stolwijkersluis.
The project area comprised the whole territory of the city of Gouda on the 
Krimpenerwaard side of the river, except for the wastewater plant and the 
area west of the wastewater plant. To prevent complicated discussions and 
opposition from the governments involved in the bypass (the city of Gouda, 
Ouderkerk municipality, Zuid-Holland Province), the trajectory of the bypass 
and the planned industrial area west of the wastewater plant were not 
included in the project area. This ‘boundary work’ was supposed to facilitate 
easy decision making, because that way the plan would not depend on other 
decision-making processes. The precondition for development of the polder 
behind the lock was ‘green-recreational’ development as a result of the earlier 
initiatives of Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard. This fitted well into 
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the goals of the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project for what they 
called a ‘landscape park’ at that location. The city of Gouda agreed that urban 
development was not an option for the polder. 
The design process resulted in a plan called Masterplan Stolwijkersluis (Van der 
Stoep & Van den Brink, 2006). See figure 5.13. The two major elements of the 
plan are the functional restoration of the lock and a city garden in the polder 
behind the lock (see Box 5.2).
 
Box 5.2: Main points of Masterplan Stolwijkersluis: restoration of the lock and a city garden
Figure 5.13: Masterplan Stolwijkersluis (Van der Stoep & Van den Brink, 2006)
Restoration of the lock and a connection over water between Gouda city centre and 
the Krimpenerwaard:
The lock will be restored to facilitate boating between the river and the Krimpenerwaard. 
The Masterplan expressly connects to the plans of the city of Gouda for the Cultural 
and Port Quarter and to its Urban Development Vision. This should enable boating 
between the historic port in the city and the Krimpenerwaard, via the Stolwijkersluis 
lock. This way, residents and visitors can enjoy the rich cultural heritage and the contrast 
between the compactness of the city and the openness of the polder landscape. 
Green development in the southern fringe of Gouda: a city garden in the 
Veerstalblok polder
The polder behind the lock, which is bordered by the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood, 
the wastewater plant and the future bypass, will be developed as a city garden. In the 
middle of the garden, a water labyrinth is constructed which is accessible on foot or 
by boat. The water labyrinth will also facilitate the exhibition of land art which inspires 
reflection on the surrounding landscape. 
5
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Figure 5.14: Images of one of the design workshops for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis 
(December 2004)
In 2006, just before the municipal elections, the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis was 
festively presented at the city hall in Gouda. This timing was supposed to facilitate 
prioritization on the political agenda of the new Municipal Executive. Indeed, 
many councillors were present because of the municipal election. And indeed 
the Masterplan was recorded in the policy programme of the new Municipal 
Executive. Moreover, a few months later, the government organizations that 
had participated in the steering group signed a Declaration of Intent to jointly 
investigate the feasibility of implementing the Masterplan.
Figure 5.15: The signing of the Declaration of Intent for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis, July 2006 7
7 (source: Pim Mul, gemeente Gouda)
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Financial setbacks and mobilization of the Krimpenerwaard
By signing the declaration, the city of Gouda, the provincial government, 
the water board, Landinrichtingscommissie Krimpenerwaard, and Dienst 
Landelijk Gebied agreed to make every effort to achieve the goals of the plan. 
However, the political agenda setting of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis did not 
automatically mean that the plan was embedded into policymaking. Therefore, 
implementation was not guaranteed. In fact, the declaration contained a clause 
that would enable the water board to start a demolition procedure if, after a 
year, finances for restoration of the lock failed to appear.  
Implementation of the ideas in the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis was now in the 
hands of the four government organizations, with a leading role for the city 
of Gouda. They started a (financial) feasibility study (Dienst Landelijk Gebied, 
2006) and submitted a restoration proposal for the lock to Rijksdienst voor 
Archeologie, Cultuurlandschap en Monumenten (RACM: National Monuments 
Conservancy). However, they soon faced a number of serious financial setbacks. 
In December 2006, the restoration proposal was declined. This was a serious 
setback because the national funding for the lock was supposed to cover 60% 
of the total costs of restoration, which were estimated at a little more than 
two million euros. The participating governments did not want to provide 
that financing themselves, because other investments were higher up on their 
agendas. Moreover, a substantial part of the funding for landscape development 
was cancelled because the national system for rural planning was drastically 
changed8 and no longer accepted the goals in the Masterplan as relevant for the 
rural redevelopment project. By January 2007, almost no financial prospect was 
left for the various plan elements. As a consequence, the coalition partner that 
represented the Rural Redevelopment Project, Dienst Landelijk Gebied, had to 
cancel its participation in the steering group for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis. 
Moreover, the participation of the water board was uncertain because the 
restoration proposal was declined. The water board had continuously urged 
fast decision making in light of dike’s water safety and now had an argument 
to start the demolition procedure. Nevertheless, the city of Gouda alderman 
was able to convince the water board that a new proposal to RACM would have 
more chance of success. 
On top of the financial problems, the steering group had to deal with the 
conflicting interests of efficient implementation of the new road through 
the southern fringe and the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis goal of improving 
recreational mobility between city and countryside. The new road would form 
an impassable barrier for slow transport modes (by boat, bike, horse, and on 
foot). The plan suggested removing the barrier by providing a slow-traffic 
tunnel and a higher bridge over the Stolwijkervaart waterway. The provincial 
department in charge of implementing the bypass, however, was not open to 
these ideas because of the extra costs. Although the provincial government 
8 Introduction of the Investeringsbudget Landelijk Gebied ( ILG) in January 2007.
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participated in the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis steering group, it was difficult 
to achieve any sort of coordination between the provincial departments in 
charge of cultural heritage, nature development, and the bypass. Contact with 
the bypass project team was scarce and only concerned negotiations about 
compensating nature values in the city garden mentioned in the Masterplan. 
Moreover, the steering group did not formally attempt to negotiate the removal 
of the bypass barrier and only discussed this behind the scenes. In fact, the city 
of Gouda considered it more convenient to leave the negotiations to citizen and 
interest groups in the fringe. The alderman feared that if he officially pleaded 
for alternative arrangements, the province would argue that the city of Gouda 
should pay the extra costs.   
As a result of the financial setbacks and coordination problems, the coalition 
of governments was at risk of disintegration. At this point, the municipality 
of Gouda stood alone in its attempts to achieve elements of the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis. However, the municipality had no budget to implement the plans 
and therefore invested much energy in convincing the provincial government 
and the water board to stay on and to find other ways to implement elements of 
the Masterplan. The provincial government in particular was considered the key 
agent for providing solutions: as a funder and coordinator of the various policy 
streams relevant for implementation of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis. 
Meanwhile citizen groups and interest organizations had become impatient 
because of all the delay and the ‘black box’ of the negotiation process between 
the involved government organizations. They publicly questioned the 
activeness and intentions of the city of Gouda during a debate in a meeting 
of the city council (19 April 2007). The city council adopted a resolution 
urging the Municipal Executive to take immediate action with regard to the 
provincial government’s participation. Another initiative directed at the 
provincial government’s participation came from Werkgroep Gouda <--> 
Krimpenerwaard. Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard believed that 
the provincial government could only be convinced to actively participate in 
the implementation of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis if they considered the 
Masterplan a regional rather than a local matter. To achieve such a turn in the 
provincial government’s thinking, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
reasoned that support of parties in the Krimpenerwaard region was required. 
If the Krimpenerwaard somehow demonstrated interest in the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis, then the plan would be relevant for regional development and 
therefore provincial support. 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard believed that the regional relevance 
of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis was exemplified in their ideas for recreational 
connections between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard countryside, 
especially in relation to water. In their eyes, boating in the polder would 
provide a new market for the Krimpenerwaard that would partly compensate 
the economic decline of the agricultural sector. Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
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Krimpenerwaard connected its ideas for boating in the polder to the goals of 
the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project (see Box 5.3) which was high 
on the agenda of the provincial government. They could count on support from 
partners in the Krimpenerwaard with whom they had allied in the fight for an 
alternative road trajectory.
Box 5.3: Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project and the Veenweidepact
However, getting the authorities in the Krimpenerwaard to join the coalition 
around the lock was not an easy endeavour as relations between the rural 
municipalities in the Krimpenerwaard and the city of Gouda had always 
been tense. Stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard looked suspiciously at any 
meddling that came from the city of Gouda. Years previously, Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard had experienced the distrust and restraint on 
the part of stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard with respect to ideas about 
leisure and tourism in the Krimpenerwaard prompted by stakeholders from the 
city (personal communication H. du Pré, 24-09-2009). Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard expected support only if ideas could be connected to initiatives 
The Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project started halfway through the 1990s. 
In 1999, the agreements were recorded in a general plan (Landinrichtingscommissie 
Krimpenerwaard, 1999). In 2005, these agreements were partly revised as a result 
of changes in national water policy. Policymakers in wet meadow areas, such as the 
Krimpenerwaard, had to reconsider their water management. The Krimpenerwaard 
faced the task of drastically decreasing the number of water levels. A lower number of 
water levels meant that nature areas and agricultural areas had to be separated much 
more robustly than in the original plan. The Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment 
Project stakeholders negotiated a new plan and recorded the outcome in a pact 
(“Veenweidepact Krimpenerwaard”, 22 December 2005, Bergambacht). The name of 
the pact reflects the wet meadow landscape.
The Veenweidepact records the new agreements between the municipalities in the 
Krimpenerwaard, the water board, the provincial government and various interest 
groups about rural redevelopment in the Krimpenerwaard. The main goals are 
conservation and development of the valuable agricultural landscape with its nature 
values. The most important precondition for these developments is preventing 
additional subsidence. A major task in the pact is the realization of 2,450 ha nature in 
combination with providing new economic opportunities for farmers. The agreements 
about the total size of the new nature areas remains the same as in the previous 
redevelopment plan of 1999, however the pact entails new agreements about the 
boundaries and locations of the nature areas. The provincial government is taking the 
lead in the implementation of the Veenweidepact and in the negotiation with other 
involved parties.   
One of the trajectories of the Veenweidepact was aimed at finding new economic 
‘carriers’ for the valuable landscape and the liveability for residents of the region. The 
trajectory, called Renewing Entrepreneurship (Vernieuwend Ondernemerschap: van 
der Wal and Joldersma,  2007), aimed to achieve a stronger rural economy, alternatives 
for contemporary agricultural business that are disappearing as a result of water level 
changes and nature development, and sustainable management of the characteristic 
wet meadow landscape. 
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developed by stakeholders from the Krimpenerwaard. That is why the group 
linked up with a civic initiative in the Krimpenerwaard, called Initiatiefgroep 
Veenvaren (Veenvaren Initiative Group). The name of the initiative, Veenvaren 
(peat boating), refers to the possibility of exploring the typical wet (or peat) 
meadow polder by boat as well as using the historic waterways of a two-
hundred-year old peat cultivation plan that had never been implemented. See 
figure 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Possible routes for ‘peat boating’, extracted from the Veenvaren Plan 
(Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren Krimpenerwaard, 2007)
The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman tells about why and 
how he connected to Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren:
Although all the time there were people from the city of Gouda who were 
willing to write letters, I did not think that this made sense anymore. It is nice to 
write yet another letter, but the people from the Krimpenerwaard have to say 
it! There were people there who supported the ideas, but that had to become 
public somehow. These people had to be provoked. One had to make sure that 
they would write or sign letters. That got a start then. It began with helping the 
idea of Veenvaren. …[The leader of Veenvaren] and I had talked before. He was 
completely crazy about wooden scows and he had a boating route in mind of 
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about 25 km provided the Stolwijkersluis lock could be restored. I loved those 
ideas! And then we helped him because this was what we needed to get the lock 
restored. The voice of the Krimpenerwaard! 5-5
The leader of Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren lived in the village of Stolwijk in the 
Krimpenerwaard, and as a former sailor and lockkeeper working for the provincial 
government of Zuid-Holland he had a lot of experience with, and passion for, 
sailing historical boats through the polder. He wanted to restore the historical 
sailing routes in the Krimpenerwaard to enable small-scale recreational boating. 
Like the Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman, the leader of 
Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren wanted only environment-friendly and small-scale 
forms of boating, and he also liked the idea of sailing from the polder to Gouda 
city centre.
The leader of Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren worked out his ideas in a plan which 
he named Plan Veenvaren (Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren Krimpenerwaard, 2007), 
again referring to boating through the wet meadows in the Krimpenerwaard 
(see Box 5.4). He founded Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren Krimpenerwaard with a 
few other sympathizers. Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard offered 
to help the group with lobbying and distributing the plan. They financed the 
production of a brochure summarizing the ideas of the Veenvaren Plan in an 
attractive form (figure 5.17). They advised him to invite a particular provincial 
councillor, who originated from the Krimpenerwaard, to write the foreword for 
the brochure. Because of her position and name in the region, she could attach 
extra weight to the plan.    
Box  5.4: The plan VeenVaren in a nutshell (Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren Krimpenerwaard, 20079
In cooperation with Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren, the story about the fringe was 
extended with a story about the economic value of a boating connection 
between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard. In this extended story, the 
urban dweller was no longer the centre of interest, but rather the entrepreneurs 
in the Krimpenerwaard who could increase their income with pleasure cruisers. 
Part of the story concerned the economic benefits that could come from visitors 
to the city of Gouda who would make excursions ‘from the cheese market to 
9 Dutch translation: Een recreatie-optie, voortvloeiend uit het ‘Veenweidepact Krimpenerwaard 
2006’; en gebruikmakend van het element in de polder, dat het meest karakteristiek voor 
dit veenweidegebied is: HET WATER. Onder het motto: ‘kleinschalige natuurvriendelijke 
recreatievaart is voor deze polder goud waard!’, aanbieden van vaarontspanning in vaarpolders 
Stolwijk en Berkenwoude, voor zowel streekbewoner, randstedeling als in ons land verblijvende 
vakantieganger.
“Veenvaren in the Krimpenerwaard” (translated: peat boating in the Krimpenerwaard): 
A leisure option, flowing from the Krimpenerwaard Veenweidepact 2006 and using the 
element in the polder that is most characteristic for this peat meadow landscape, is: THE 
WATER. With the motto: ‘small-scale and nature-friendly water cruising is invaluable to 
this polder!’ the goal is to offer boating relaxation in the Stolwijk and Berkenwoude 
polders, for both country people and urban dwellers as tourists.9  
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the land of the cheese’. This economic prospect would appeal not only to 
entrepreneurs in the Krimpenerwaard but also to stakeholders in the city of 
Gouda. 
Figure 5.17: Cover of the brochure with the Veenvaren Plan (Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren 
Krimpenerwaard, 2007)
The leader of Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren and the spokesman for Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard managed to get an appointment with the 
alderman from one of the Krimpenerwaard municipalities (Vlist) in spring 
2007. They already knew that this alderman was interested in improving the 
opportunities for recreational boating and that he supported the idea of 
restoring the Stolwijkersluis lock. The alderman was impressed by the story 
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about Veenvaren and agreed to introduce the plan in the discussions with the 
other municipalities about regional tourism and leisure policy. Nevertheless, 
these discussions again demonstrated how touchy the subject of boating in the 
polder was. The other municipalities exercised restraint. The outcome of the 
discussions about the Krimpenerwaard Recreation Vision was a document that 
mainly addressed restoration of the lock as a threat to the peace and quiet in 
the polder because it would lead to mass tourism (Natuur en Recreatieschap 
Krimpenerwaard, 2007). Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman 
kept in contact with the Vlist alderman. He asked the alderman to use his 
contacts with the president of the water board and the Provincial Executive to 
stress that parties in the Krimpenerwaard were becoming interested in the lock 
restoration.  
Apart from the contact with the Vlist alderman, Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard and Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren found other ways to attract the 
attention of parties in the Krimpenerwaard. They used various formal and informal 
communication strategies: for example, they talked formally and informally to 
other local governors in the region (municipalities of Bergambacht and Ouderkerk), 
spoke at conferences, and researched opportunities for European funding 
(LEADER). Slowly, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and Initiatiefgroep 
Veenvaren achieved some results. The story about Veenvaren scored highly at a 
conference about innovative entrepreneurship in the Krimpenerwaard (Van der 
Wal & Joldersma, 2007). Moreover, they got the chance to speak to water board 
officials. As a result, the water board attached the Veenvaren Plan to the new 
proposal for restoration of the historic lock (December 2007) in order to strengthen 
the story about the cultural and economic value of the lock for the region. 
However, in June 2008, yet again RACM declined the proposal, despite all the 
energy that had been put into it. That was the limit for the water board. The safety 
of the dike was still threatened by the weak spot of the lock. As at that point there 
seemed to be no chance left for restoration, the water board wanted to proceed to 
demolish the lock. The water board asked the city of Gouda to cooperate in light 
of the agreements they had signed two years earlier. These agreements between 
the city of Gouda and the water board also meant the end of the steering group 
for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis. The coalition of governments now really had 
disintegrated. 
The news about the declined proposal and the subsequent actions of the water 
board and the city of Gouda caused a whirlwind of reactions from citizen and 
interest groups, individual councillors from the city of Gouda, and municipalities 
in the Krimpenerwaard. The water board agreed not to start the demolition 
procedure immediately in order to allow some time to develop alternative plans.
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard came up with a plan for a portage10 
that would safeguard the dike while stakeholders were trying to find enough 
finance to restore the lock. Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, the history 
10 een overtoom.
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association die Goude, Stichting Restauratie Stolwijkersluis, and the Stolwijkersluis 
neighbourhood discussed possibilities for financing and lobbying. Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard again emphasized the importance of support 
from the Krimpenerwaard as a way to get support from the water board and the 
provincial government as well. 
Meanwhile, in 2008, Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren became a foundation called 
Stichting Veenvaren and worked hard on publicity for the story about Veenvaren. 
In summer 2008, they contributed to a documentary on national TV about Dutch 
cultural landscapes11. In the documentary, the presenter can be seen talking to 
the leader of Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren while they are boating across a waterway 
in the Krimpenerwaard. Filming from the boat demonstrated the advantages 
and joys of exploring the polder by boat. Furthermore, a number of articles 
appeared in the local and regional newspapers, and the foundation members 
lobbied through their contacts in the Krimpenerwaard. The Veenvaren Plan had 
also drawn the attention of the provincial government. The Veenvaren Plan 
brochure was officially presented to the Provincial Executive at the end of 2008.
The history association die Goude sent a letter of protest to the Minister of 
Culture. The letter was co-signed by a dozen of other organizations from both 
the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard, such as Werkgroep Gouda <--> 
Krimpenerwaard, the neighbourhood Stolwijkersluis and Stichting Veenvaren. 
They were highly indignant about the way RACM had assessed the subsidy 
proposals. Despite the well worked out restoration plan, RACM had based its 
ranking of projects only on the total costs and not on the quality of the plans. 
The letter to the minister emphasized a sense of urgency, arguing that delaying 
the restoration would effectively mean demolition, unlike in ‘normal’ restoration 
projects which could survive delay (e.g. churches, fortresses). A copy was sent to 
the executives of the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard municipalities with 
the request to send a letter of support to the minister. The municipal executive 
of the city of Gouda refused because of their agreements with the water board. 
However, the Krimpenerwaard authorities did sign the letter of support; this was 
an important moment in the agenda-setting process as the Krimpenerwaard 
authorities through this act officially confirmed their support.  
In particular, the Vlist alderman and his colleagues on the municipal council 
were outraged with the compliant attitude of the city of Gouda. The alderman 
wanted to do more than sign the letter of support to the minister and appealed 
to the president of the water board and the Provincial Executive to prevent 
demolition and instead support the restoration plans in connection with the 
Veenvaren Plan. He had easy access to the formal and informal consultations 
with these executives because he represented the municipality of Vlist in the 
steering group for the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project, called 
Strategiegroep Veenweidepact. The president of the water board agreed to 
defer demolition for another year. Moreover, the Provincial Executive gave in to 
the argument that restoration of the lock would benefit the recreational sector 
11 NCRV documentary Op reis met Van Rossem, episode ‘Het Westen’, broadcast 2009, April 9.
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in the polder. They agreed to find out whether it would be possible to use a 
few hundred thousand euros from the funding for the Krimpenerwaard Rural 
Redevelopment Project. 
At the same time, some entrepreneurs were demonstrating in everyday 
practice that boating really was a promising new market. They were already 
attracting large numbers of tourists who wanted to sail over the waters in the 
Krimpenerwaard. The Vlist alderman invested much energy in convincing his 
fellow executives from other local authorities by inviting them on boat trips 
and by showing them the opportunities of the waterway network on maps that 
Stichting Veenvaren had provided. All these factors together contributed to a 
positive atmosphere among local authorities and agricultural entrepreneurs in 
the Krimpenerwaard.
The provincial government slowly warms up to issues in the fringe 
Although restoration of the lock was still uncertain, other elements from the 
Masterplan Stolwijkersluis – the city garden and the slow-traffic tunnel for 
cycling, hiking, and horseback riding – were successfully pushed onto the 
provincial agenda in 2008 and 2009. Both these issues point to a significant 
turn in the attitude of the provincial government. Previously, the provincial 
government stood firm in its view that the fringe was a local matter for 
which the city of Gouda was responsible; but now the provincial government 
acknowledged the regional importance of the fringe by investing millions of 
euros in the slow-traffic tunnel and nature restoration. 
In autumn 2008, the city of Gouda informed the stakeholders that negotiations 
with the provincial government about the city garden were at an advanced 
stage. The area would again become part of the Krimpenerwaard Rural 
Redevelopment Project so that the land could be added to the planned nature 
reserve in the north of the Krimpenerwaard. In 2009, Gouda transferred its land 
behind the dike to the provincial government for the construction of the bypass 
and the city garden. The alderman named the city garden Veenweidepark12, 
referring to the wet meadow landscape of the Krimpenerwaard as well as the 
Veenweidepact, the accord between the local and regional authorities in the 
Krimpenerwaard. The name Veenweidepark symbolized that the area was 
meant not only as a city garden for urban dwellers but also as an area that was 
important for the nature and leisure goals in the Veenweidepact. In 2011, the 
Veenweidepark was included in the Zoning Plan Stolwijkersluis with reference 
to the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis (Gemeente Gouda, 2011).  
The construction of a cycling tunnel, enabling a slow-traffic connection 
between city and countryside, was achieved through lobbying in provincial 
politics. For years on end, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and the 
12 Like the Veenweidepark in a village nearby (Oudewater), constructed in 2010.
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Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood had pleaded with the bypass project team for 
a slow-traffic connection. However, the project team would not consider these 
proposals because they would increase the costs of the project. In summer 
2008, the Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman talked about 
this problem with a provincial councillor he knew. The provincial councillor 
raised the idea of a cycling tunnel in a meeting of the Provincial Mobility 
Committee. The Provincial Executive of Leisure who represented the Provincial 
Board of Executives at this meeting13 was enthusiastic about the plan. He liked 
the plan because it connected well to his task of improving city–countryside 
connections as well as the recreational accessibility of The Green Heart. He 
decided that the tunnel should be included in the design of the bypass and 
was unanimously supported by the Provincial Council. Through the provincial 
government, financial resources were found in a budget to improve the network 
of cycling routes. Political lobbying proved much more successful than lobbying 
the civil service.
Figure 5.18: Sketch plan for the Veenweidepark(Dienst Landelijk Gebied, 2012)
By connecting the city garden to the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment 
Project and the cycling tunnel to the provincial ambition to improve the 
accessibility of The Green Heart, the provincial government acknowledged the 
regional significance of the fringe.  
13 Report of the meeting of the Provincial Council Committee for Mobility, Knowledge and 
Economy, 17 Sseptember 2008, provincial government building Den Haag.
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Figure 5.19: The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard’s proposal for a slow traffic tunnel
Happily ever after: the Stolwijkersluis is saved
In April 2009, the Minister of Culture replied to the letter and supporting letters 
from the history association die Goude and partner organizations about the 
rejected subsidy proposal for the historic lock. In his response, the minister 
showed understanding for the concerns about the lock. He offered the owner, 
the water board, an opportunity to renegotiate the subsidy proposal with 
RACM. However, the economic crisis presented a new opportunity which 
made a renegotiation with RACM unnecessary. In the course of 2009, it became 
clear that the state would grant every provincial government a crisis fund for 
restoration projects that could be implemented right away and that would 
generate immediate employment (Crisis- en Herstelwet: Crisis and Recovery 
Law). The provincial government had to decide which restoration projects 
would get this subsidy. The opportunity presented by the crisis fund spurred 
the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard municipalities into action as the lock 
restoration plans fitted precisely into the conditions imposed by the provincial 
government. 
Because of the earlier period in which civic initiatives had managed to interest 
the Krimpenerwaard municipalities, the route to cooperation between the 
city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard was now logical.  The city of Gouda 
alderman took the initiative to contact the Vlist alderman. By lobbying together, 
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they emphasized that the restoration was supported by both the city of Gouda 
and the Krimpenerwaard, making clear to the provincial government that the 
project was widely supported in the region. 
A few months later, in autumn 2009, the Provincial Board of Executives decided 
to nominate the Stolwijkersluis lock for investment from the crisis fund. The 
Provincial Executive of Leisure and Tourism championed the choice of the lock 
project by explaining that the plan for the Stolwijkersluis was already prepared 
and could be implemented right away. It was a practical choice because the crisis 
fund allocation was conditional on implementation of the renovation projects 
in 2010 and 201114. This is where the long process in the earlier period finally paid 
off, because all efforts had slowly resulted in wide support and a well-worked-
out plan for the historic lock. When the right opportunity presented itself, in the 
form of the crisis fund, it only took a relatively small effort to seize it. 
Although the Provincial Board was persuaded, the council still had to be 
convinced of the value of the project for provincial interests. In this political 
process, proponents still feared opposition from the Zuid-Hollands Landschap 
nature organization and conservative farmers. Two persons from Stichting 
Veenvaren and the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood were delegated to explain 
the economic and cultural value of the lock for the Krimpenerwaard and the 
community of Stolwijkersluis. Their passionate pleadings were considered 
essential to obtain a positive decision from the Provincial Council15. The positive 
decisions of the Provincial Executive and the Provincial Council16 confirmed again 
a changing attitude on the part of the provincial government with regard to 
investments in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe. The provincial government 
co-financed the project by investing a substantial part of the budget in the 
Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project. That was remarkable, because 
only a few years earlier the provincial government had excluded all investments 
into the fringe from that particular budget. 
Co-financing was also required from the Krimpenerwaard municipalities, the 
city of Gouda, and the water board. To the Krimpenerwaard municipalities, 
such a financial commitment had been a bridge too far, because of feared 
protest among farmers and other stakeholders. However, the contributions 
of the other parties convinced the Krimpenerwaard municipalities to invest 
also. More crucial, however, was the slowly developing awareness that boating 
was not a threat to the Krimpenerwaard, but an opportunity for its economic 
14 As recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Provincial Council Committee 
“Society”(Verslag van de vergadering van de Statencommissie Samenleving, gehouden op 6 januari 
2010 in het provinciehuis te Den Haag)
15 As recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Provincial Council Committee 
“Society”(Verslag van de vergadering van de Statencommissie Samenleving, gehouden op 6 januari 
2010 in het provinciehuis te Den Haag).
16 On 27 January 2010 the Provincial Council approved the proposal (minutes Provincial Council 
Zuid-Holland, 27 January 2010, provinciehuis Den Haag).
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development. Stichting Veenvaren’s lobbying and discussions with agricultural 
entrepreneurs in the context of the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment 
Project had broken the taboo around boating in the polder. 
The last obstacle was decision making by the water board about cooperation 
and co-financing in the restoration project. On 31 March 2010, a majority of 
the water board council accepted the proposal for co-financing17. Stakeholders 
considered this an important turning point because the water board, owner 
of the lock, had never invested much energy in pursuing restoration. They 
did what they formally had agreed to do as owner of the lock: submitted a 
subsidy proposal to RACM and participated in the steering group; but the 
water board had not been actively pursuing restoration by investing money 
or lobbying together with other organizations. On the contrary, the water 
board saw the lock as an unwanted hole in the dike.  However, the warming 
up of agricultural entrepreneurs and local authorities in the Krimpenerwaard 
to the idea of boating in the polder helped build political support in the water 
board. Moreover, the crisis-fund condition of immediate implementation fitted 
precisely into the wish of the water board to do something about the urgent 
water safety problem of the dike. The timing could not have been better for 
cooperation in the restoration project.   
The restoration project started officially on June 17, 2010, in the presence of 
representatives of the participating governments, as well as initiators and 
supporters from the interest and citizen groups who had been involved in the 
process. The aldermen for the city of Gouda and the municipality of Vlist refer to 
this presence of various stakeholders as evidence of the many stakeholders that 
contributed to the final success of the restoration: ‘success knows many fathers’. 
On 8 September 2012 (National Monuments Day), the restored lock was festively 
reopened. 
Figure 5.20: Opening of the restored lock Stolwijkersluis, 8 September 2013
17 Recorded in the meeting minutes of the Verenigde Vergadering Hoogheemraadschap van 
Schieland en de Krimpenerwaard, 31 March 2010, Rotterdam.
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Summing up: shifting stories and coalitions 
Storytelling about the future of the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe appears to 
really take off when initiatives emerged to address the neglect and congestion 
of the fringe. This movement was triggered by the design process for the 
Hollandsche IJssel Project. Coalitions shifted from a group of Gouda city residents 
who were mainly oriented towards redevelopment of the city to a small group 
that wanted to prevent further urbanization in the open and green polder that 
bordered the inner city. This shift was a crucial point in getting fringe-area issues 
onto the policy agenda, because it was the first time that citizens collectively 
expressed their concern about spatial development in the area. Moreover, it 
formed the beginning of the story construction about future developments 
and the beginning of coalition building in the fringe area. The story about 
Gouda Havenstad was extended to a story about an alternative future for the 
fringe, framed as Fringe Naturally, in reaction to authorities’ plans that would 
lead to further congestion and urbanization. An alternative story was proposed 
about integrated development of the area in which landscape values would be 
maintained and strengthened. Important factors that enabled the promotion 
of this story were windows of opportunity presented by competitions and the 
efforts of a few passionate individuals who prevented demolition of the historic 
lock, designed alternative plans, and seized windows of opportunity.  
Protests against the government plans for a new road marked a new tipping 
point in the agenda-setting process. The story that was being told about the 
fringe focused on the protection of nature and included a new element or event 
about constructing an alternative trajectory that would be environment friendly 
and as financially feasible as proposals that the government had suggested. 
New partners were brought into the coalition, namely Zuid-Hollands Landschap 
and Bewonersgroep Ouderkerk, as well as residents from the Stolwijkersluis 
neighbourhood. Important in the light of agenda setting were the efforts of 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard to build a friendly relationship with the 
municipality by positioning itself as a stable and constructive negotiation partner 
for the municipality.
Next, the initiative for the development of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis 
brought about a shift in the positioning of landscape values in the Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard fringe on the policy agenda. The plan catalysed the efforts of 
citizens’ local initiatives into a project that was supported by local and regional 
governments and a whole range of other actors, such as experts from outside 
and the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood residents. The lock project presented a 
new arena for social groups and residents of the area to discuss again a green and 
recreational development of the area with the involved governments. Moreover, 
the project triggered a shift in the story told. Although the restoration of the lock 
had always been part of the goals of Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
and other organizations in the city of Gouda, it had not been the main issue; but 
now suddenly the story revolved around the lock and its social, economic, and 
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cultural meaning for people in the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard. The 
lock was now the ‘leading character’ in the story about the fringe, whereas the 
issue of landscape conservation had a subsidiary role. 
Financial setbacks and the threat of the water board to demolish the lock formed 
the following tipping point in the agenda-setting process. First, financial setbacks 
threatened the implementation of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis. This triggered 
the disintegration of the governmental coalition as well as a shift to a story that 
emphasized the regional value, for the Krimpenerwaard region, of landscape 
elements in the fringe. All eyes were directed at the provincial government as the 
government actor who could solve financial and coordination problems. Whereas 
the city of Gouda tried hard to make the provincial government problem owner 
of the plan, the original initiators tried to convince the provincial government of 
the regional importance of their proposals by building a coalition with interest 
groups, entrepreneurs, and local governments in the Krimpenerwaard. In this 
process, the story of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis was linked with issues of 
importance to groups in the Krimpenerwaard (the Veenvaren Plan, new economic 
activities for farmers).
The call of the water board to demolish the lock triggered new collective action 
from citizen and interest groups as well as local authorities in the Krimpenerwaard. 
The indignation about the intention to demolish the lock triggered a wider 
movement in which the taboo on discussing pleasure cruising was slowly 
breached. Although the support from the Krimpenerwaard was mainly symbolic 
and was not yet translated into a prioritization of the lock in budget plans, it 
proved to be crucial in the process of warming up the provincial government 
and the water board for decision making later on. The mobilization of the 
Krimpenerwaard as a result of financial setbacks and the demolition threat are 
therefore considered important tipping points in the agenda-setting process. The 
original story about the encounter between city and countryside now included 
new storylines that emphasized the meaning of the fringe area for economic and 
nature goals in the Krimpenerwaard. 
The final tipping point that we narrated was marked by the opportunity 
presented by the crisis fund. The signalling of this fund resulted in cooperation 
between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard municipalities as well 
as a revived coalition with the provincial government and the water board to 
enable restoration of the Stolwijkersluis lock. This tipping point marks a turn in 
the attitude of the Krimpenerwaard, the water board, and most importantly the 
provincial government with regard to the importance of the lock. The lock and 
its environment moved from a local and minor concern to a project of regional 
importance worth an investment of several millions of euros.   
To conclude, in this part of the chapter we have identified tipping points as well as 
the events leading up to these tipping points. The case narrative points to changes 
in coalitions and demonstrates how the story about the fringe developed and 
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was adjusted to become connected to policy stories that gave access to (financial) 
support. Moreover, the narrative shows how certain events and circumstances 
triggered new action and change. Finally, the narrative contains many examples of 
certain individuals who invested much energy in the process and seemed to play 
key roles. This raises the questions of which of those aspects – focusing events, 
storytelling and framing processes, perseverance, and creative campaigning by 
individuals – was most decisive as a tipping point in the agenda-setting process 
and how they relate to one another. Why did some stories attract attention and 
support, whereas others faded? 
In the following sections, we analyse how framing processes, focusing events, and 
individual agents related to one another and the extent to which they explain 
tipping points. In section 2, we analyse the strategies by which frames, stories, and 
people were aligned. In section 3, we analyse the role of trigger events in tipping 
points, and in section 4 we analyse the role of individual agents in relation to other 
agenda-setting factors. 
5.2 Focusing events 
In the case narrative, we identified tipping points with regard to the process of 
putting issues in the urban–rural fringe of Gouda-Krimpenerwaard on the agenda 
of governments. At first glance, these tipping points seem to be directly triggered 
by certain events. An example of a trigger event from the case narrative is the water 
board’s decision to start the lock demolition process, which resulted in strong 
protests and mobilization of not only civic groups but also local governments 
from the Krimpenerwaard. This is illustrated by the following statement of the 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman:
And then there was the shock that the subsidy was not granted. And then the 
Krimpenerwaard woke up. Then even councillors in Schoonhoven [a small town 
some 15 kilometers from Gouda] started to interfere. 5-6 
The mobilizing effect of the water board’s announcement is confirmed by the 
Vlist alderman:
There was a newspaper that said ‘end of story’ and I saw a letter in which the Gouda 
alderman wrote that he would not object to demolition. And I thought ‘what are 
you doing man!’ And then we decided to work on it. 5-7
Another example of a trigger event was the economic crisis and the state’s decision 
to provide a crisis fund for restoration projects that generated employment. This 
triggered a new collective lobby of the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard 
to garner the provincial government’s support for restoration of the lock. The 
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result was successful agenda setting about the restoration and the actual start of 
the restoration project financed by the city of Gouda, the Krimpenerwaard, the 
provincial government, and the water board. 
The water board’s action and the crisis fund seem to be crucial events that directly 
triggered tipping points in the agenda-setting process. Yet, as the case narrative 
demonstrates, in neither case would tipping points have occurred without all 
the events and interactions between actors that happened in the period before. 
During the 25 years of lobbying to protect the landscape values of the fringe area, 
the provincial government and local authorities slowly began to take notice of 
the proposals of civic initiatives and became aware of the growing social support 
for their ideas. Constant talk in the media, feedback groups, personal contact, and 
campaigns, like the yearly dawn walk, resulted in a slow filtering through of ideas 
of civic initiatives in local and provincial government offices. It was a process of 
softening up or warming up the policy system to new ideas (cf. Kingdon, 2003). 
Many of the ideas that are now being implemented had already been envisioned 
in the 1980s. Ever since the 1980s, civic initiatives have tried to attracted 
attention for those ideas and discussed them in numerous formal and informal 
conversations. In a period of approximately 15 years, conversations between 
citizen initiatives and their supporters and opponents resulted in the construction 
of a story about the case area that appealed to government officials. Werkgroep 
Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard, which had already articulated its ideas in the 
second half of 1990s, was able to implement most of the ideas in the 10 years after 
that. Frames like ‘the window to the Krimpenerwaard’ and concrete measures 
have been adopted by the city of Gouda and are recorded in spatial plans and 
visions18 (H+N+S, 2001; OD205, 2004; OD205, 2005; Gemeente Gouda, 2005; Brons 
+ partners, 2008). See also figures 5.21 and 5.22.
The idea of slow filtering through or warming up through various events and 
interactions is demonstrated as well by interviewees’ statements. Interviewees 
talk about ‘filtering through of ideas’, ‘ideas that slowly get into heads’, and 
‘filing into memories’. For example, a member of Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard says:
It is a matter of persevering and holding out. Sometimes there is progress, if 
there is an alderman that feels something for the ideas. But next you are faced 
with an alderman that does not want to do anything or that does not know 
anything about it. 5-8
And the former city of Gouda alderman:   
What also played a role is a visit to the Krimpenerwaard by the Queen’s commissioner 
and the whole Provincial Executive. During this visit, a local councillor from Vlist 
18 Like the Stedenbouwkundige visie voor de binnenstad en haar randen (Urban design for the 
inner city and its edges: OD205, 2004; OD205, 2005) and the Ruimtelijke Structuurvisie Gouda 2005-
2030 (Spatial Strategic Agenda Gouda 2005-2030: Gemeente Gouda, 2005).
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municipality urged for support from the provincial government for restoration 
of the Stolwijkersluis lock. I remember that I read this in the newspaper and that 
I thought: ‘The lobbying work of Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard and 
Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren and the indignation about the rejection of the subsidy 
for the lock has had effect!’ 5-9
Figure 5.21: Sightlines that should not be obstructed by urban developments (Urban design for 
the inner city and its edges, OD205, 2005) 
Note: below the sightlines to the polder Krimpenerwaard.
Figure 5.22: The Spatial Strategic Agenda Gouda 2005-2030 (Gemeente Gouda, 2005).
Note: The arrow below from the river front to the Krimpenerwaard refers to goal to restore 
the window to the Krimpenerwaard and to improve the spatial relation between the city and 
the polder.
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The Vlist alderman argued that, although parties in the Krimpenerwaard were 
outraged by the intended demolition of the lock, initially this did not lead to 
immediate action by the authorities in the Krimpenerwaard. A number of related 
things happened that changed the reserved attitude of the Krimpenerwaard 
authorities and enabled their collective action when the opportunity of 
the crisis fund came along. For example, a number of people, including the 
alderman, had successfully created more support for the Veenvaren Plan among 
farmers. At the same time, a few pioneering entrepreneurs demonstrated that 
tourist boating as a new economic activity could actually work, and this was also 
used in the political lobbying. Many events and negotiations together resulted 
in agreement by the Krimpenerwaard authorities to contribute financially to 
restoration of the lock and to further discuss opportunities for pleasure cruising 
with the city of Gouda. 
Civic initiatives accepted the slowness of the warming up process. They needed 
to be very patient, to hold out for a long time, in this case 15 years. In some 
periods, it was a matter of being patient and waiting until the right time came; 
and in some periods, it meant hard work and campaigning to seize windows of 
opportunity that were difficult to predict beforehand. The right time could also 
take the form of trigger events that provided new opportunities to link old ideas 
to new government priorities or ‘hot’ items, like in the example of the crisis fund. 
The introduction of new planning and policy processes triggered new action 
by civic initiatives to attract attention for their existing ideas. For example, the 
project Masterplan Stolwijkersluis could be organized because it connected 
well with the national Belvedere policy programme about combining spatial 
development and cultural heritage (Ministerie OC&W, 1999). Another reason was 
the prominence of water safety on the water board’s agenda which ensured its 
commitment to the project. The cooperation of local and regional governments 
in the project provided an excellent new opportunity for civic initiatives to 
present ideas about the case area.
The case narrative demonstrates the significance of trigger events, but on the 
basis of the previous arguments (and the remainder of this chapter) we challenge 
the inclination to think of trigger events in terms of linear cause-and-effect 
relations. Tipping points were rather the result of a concurrence of events, past 
negotiations, and framing processes manifested in a slow softening up of the 
policy system, and people who recognized and exploited opportunities. This 
required civic initiatives to have a lot of patience and perseverance and a long-
term commitment to the initiative. Patience, holding out, and attentiveness to 
meaningful windows of opportunity, were important qualities that enhanced 
agenda setting. Not everybody can maintain such patience and perceptivity for 
opportunities. It seems to take special people. Here, we touch upon the role of 
individual agents in agenda-setting processes. In section 4 we come back to 
the role of individuals. First, however, in the next section, we address the crucial 
process of framing and storytelling as a precursor to tipping points and how 
framing and storytelling resulted in decision makers being effectively warmed 
up to civic initiatives’ proposals. 
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5.3 Alignment processes
The narrative shows that, from the beginning, initiatives have attempted to 
involve authorities such as the city of Gouda. This was a difficult task, as the 
various government actors interacted according to their own rules flowing from 
the institutional structure and policy frames that guided their actions. Moreover, 
government actors cooperated and interacted in ‘spaces of engagement’ (cf. 
Van Dijk et al., 2011) which were not directly accessible to non-governmental 
groups. Such exclusive spaces of engagement included, for example, steering 
groups for projects like the Hollandsche IJssel Project, the Veenweidepact, and 
the project for a bypass through the area. 
Civic initiatives faced two problems while trying to engage government actors 
in their planning activities. First, citizens were involved via feedback groups but 
did not take part in decision making and interactions between the participating 
governments. Therefore, they could get only limited understanding of the 
political reasoning and policy frames that influenced actions. Second, where 
citizen initiatives were more concerned about the issues at stake, the talk in 
governmental steering groups and other venues concerned negotiations 
about organizational and institutional matters like the distribution of tasks 
and responsibilities, the distribution of financial investments and budgets, and 
embedding in existing policy programmes. Those existing policy programmes 
formed the structure according to which governments allocated resources as 
well as the rationale for prioritizing actions. From the perspective of citizens, 
much of the time and energy of government actors seemed to flow towards 
shifting responsibilities, steering away attention from issues that they were 
supposed to address. For example, negotiations in the governmental steering 
group for the implementation of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis stagnated 
because cooperation between the city of Gouda and the provincial government 
was very problematic, as illustrated by a civil servant from Gouda municipality: 
The contact with the provincial government was troublesome. One didn’t 
know who to talk to. There were conversations with various people who were 
not authorized to pass judgment or who didn’t know how to create support 
within their own organization. Internally, communication within the provincial 
government was very difficult. Sometimes, the communication between 
civil servants in the provincial government ran through the municipality. 
Provincial civil servants used the municipality to get colleagues at the provincial 
government started. Everybody was dealing with his own professional field. 
The civil servant in the culture department was only interested in the lock and 
not in the city garden. Next, there was somebody from the green department, 
who did nothing with the lock and had no contact with the civil servant in the 
culture department. Next to that, there was the debate about the headroom 
of the bypass’s bridge over the Stolwijkervaart canal and about the slow-traffic 
connection between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard. That was all 
about the bypass project which had its own project team. 5-10 
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The challenge for civic initiatives was to find a way to overcome such institutional 
obstacles. In the presented example, initiatives aimed to bypass the seemingly 
fruitless discussions by seeking other venues to bring their proposals for the 
development of landscape values in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe to the 
attention of local and regional policymakers.  
In this section, we analyse how initiatives tried to push their issues onto 
planning and policy agendas by involving government and non-government 
actors in their coalitions and storytelling efforts. We do so by analysing how 
stories and frames were aligned in the interactions between civic initiatives and 
their targeted supporters. 
Formal and informal communication
Coalition building strategies as part of agenda-setting processes can be 
categorized into formal and informal communication strategies. This can 
concern coalition building between civic initiatives and coalition building 
with targeted governmental supporters. First, we discuss how civic groups 
connected to one another, and then we move to the way they tried to connect 
to governments. 
In this case, civic initiatives worked together in both formal and informal 
structures. Some groups, like Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, wanted 
to operate on a loose and informal basis to be able to act fast. This is reflected 
among other things in the wish to be a working group, and not a foundation, 
association, consultation group, or other more institutionalized organization. 
Often actions were discussed informally through one-to-one contact. In 
contrast, Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, with a similar mission 
for the fringe area, did operate as a formal consultation venue for various 
organizations and groups. Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard was 
often used in communication with governments to show wide social support 
for proposals. The various civic initiatives had much contact with one another 
to attune actions and to share relevant information. Such contact was often 
incidental and informal. Generally, interviewees describe the relations between 
different civic initiatives as a ‘small circuit’: everyone knows everyone else, as 
illustrated by one of the chairmen of the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood: 
In a roundabout way there is much contact. For example, with Milieudefensie when 
we mobilized into action concerning the industrial area. That is again something 
one does with people from the Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and 
others. E-mails are sent on behalf of everybody, for everybody, to everybody. 
…I am now treasurer of Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard. I know the 
former treasurer from volleyball. We know each other’s ways. He asked whether I 
would like to take over. I already helped organizing the dawn walks. This is how it 
is all connected and everywhere on the street we run into each other. In feedback 
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groups and in the neighbourhood team meetings I also meet [Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman, Stichting Restauratie Stolwijkersluis 
chairman, history association die Goude member]. 5-11
Civic initiatives, apart and in coalitions, used various formal and informal 
communications to become noticed by governments and push issues onto 
governmental decision agendas. By formal strategies, we mean interactions 
that take place according to certain rules and procedures and that are recorded 
(e.g. formal meetings, correspondence, formal participation procedures). By 
informal strategies, we mean interactions that are spontaneous, often face to 
face, and not recorded. 
We made a list of formal and informal strategies based on information in 
newspaper articles and e-mails. Categorization into formal and informal 
strategies was difficult as some activities were both formal and informal. 
For example, joining feedback groups organized by governments seems a 
formal strategy at first glance, but actually these meetings also provided the 
opportunity to discuss matters informally with other participants before and 
after the meeting and during breaks. 
With regard to formal strategies, the following items were found. Public 
inquiries, concerning both objections and views, were used as a reaction to 
government plans at the local and regional level. Incidentally, this had led to 
formal objection at the national level. Formal correspondence concerns letters 
from citizen initiatives to government executives to which answers are required. 
Citizen initiatives also used the formal possibility of participating in meetings 
of the municipal and provincial councils. Citizens get speaking time to explain 
their matters of concern. This is a formal meeting limited by rules of the council, 
but on the local level in particular it also offers time to discuss matters informally 
before, during, and after the meeting with politicians and other participants. 
Next, citizen initiatives in the case area participated frequently in feedback 
groups organized by local and regional governments to create support for 
projects, like the Hollandsche IJssel Project and the construction of the bypass 
through the southern fringe of the city Gouda. The meetings of feedback groups 
were also formal in character, but like council meetings gave the opportunity to 
meet and talk to participants informally.  
With regard to informal strategies, we identified the following items. 
Campaigning is an activity which sometimes leads to interaction with 
government officials, but not always. We consider it an informal activity because 
there are no written records of interactions and there are no formal rules of 
interaction. Campaigning entailed for example the use of local and regional 
mass media to attract public and political attention. Besides these informal 
activities, there was also personal informal contact initiated by citizen initiatives 
(direct contact) or by government officials (invited contact). Invited contact 
refers to contact initiated by government officials who seek advice in the start-
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up phase of projects. Direct contact refers to initiatives of citizens to contact civil 
servants and executives via e-mail or telephone. Coincidental contact refers to 
spontaneous encounters on the street in which issues can be raised.
  
What is striking is the great range of activities deployed, both formally and 
informally. Every opportunity for formal and informal communication and 
interactions was used. The importance of formal interaction can be explained by 
the fact that interactions are recorded and used as evidence in later discussions 
and negotiations. Moreover, reactions to plans and policies were only seriously 
considered when, in addition to informal discussions, formal objections and 
views were submitted according to the rules of formal participation procedures. 
Informal interaction, however, provided the opportunity to discuss matters 
in more detail and to really empathize with one another. Informal interaction 
at the local level was considered an important tool by both citizen initiatives 
and governments. In particular, the yearly dawn walks in the case area were 
considered a major opportunity for informal interaction with government 
representatives. Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, and in the last few 
years also the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood, organize this popular walk and 
invite councillors and government executives to join. This way, the organizers 
are able to address issues and problems in the field and interchange ideas in 
a non-committal informal way. The neighbourhood chairman explains this as 
follows: 
The municipality of Vlist now also wants to join. It now sees the interest for the 
municipality. That is not sudden. Under the skin there are many, many contacts. 
We also organize the dawn walk here in the polder. …That dawn walk is a good 
way to talk to people informally. The last time one of the aldermen from Vlist 
municipality joined and we talked to her for a very long time. That is how other 
people are contacted as well, like Zuid-Hollands Landschap. They are also 
involved in the organization of the dawn walk, and it is a good way to talk to 
them informally as well. 5-12   
The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman also considers the 
dawn walks to be crucial to informal coalition building, as illustrated by this 
quotation:
In our informal circuit, that dawn walk has been very important. It once started 
as a joke, and in the meantime it has been organized for 15 years. It is now so 
popular that we have set a limit of 300 participants. It should not be a mass event. 
We always invite councillors and that is THE moment for conversation. You can 
walk together with someone. Last year the Vlist alderman walked along. She had 
never walked there before and she thought it was an eye-opener. 5-13
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The yearly dawn walk is a well-known event in the municipal hall of Gouda and is 
considered a successful way to direct the attention of a large number of people 
to issues in the case area, such as the problems of the bypass and the restoration 
of the lock. The former Gouda city alderman referred to it as a ‘column’ of social 
movement that causes ideas to filter through among many people.
There was hardly any informal contact between citizen initiatives in the case 
area and government officials at regional level. Governments at these levels 
were approached formally or indirectly through local executives and councillors. 
At local level, alignments with government actors could be established more 
easily. As already mentioned, interviewees talk about a small circuit of people 
who negotiate actions and decisions in an informal way. People meet one 
another regularly in the city, for example at events. Moreover, there is a greater 
chance of citizens and executives being part of the same social networks at 
local level. The e-mails show that local executives answer e-mails personally; 
this also confirms the small informal circuit between citizen groups and local 
officials. The neighbourhood chairman illustrates the important role of informal 
communication in access to the municipality of Gouda as follows:
Sometimes you have to be on top of things and be very active to achieve 
something. And then it works. …On Friday afternoon, I sent a short e-mail to 
the alderman and the municipal council, and the next Monday I heard that they 
had informally negotiated, with the result that a draft resolution was sent to 
the provincial government. This is how you see that you can have influence. …
Once you are in that circuit, they don’t forget you soon. The municipality invites 
me to all kinds of events. …You are automatically on the distribution list. That 
is what you receive when you frequently respond and are willing to participate 
enthusiastically. 5-14
We conclude that citizen initiatives aimed for both formal and informal 
interaction with government actors. Both forms of interaction were valuable for 
coalition building and agenda setting and strengthened each other. The formal 
circuit enabled alignment with formal decision making. The informal small 
circuit provided the opportunity to discuss matters in more detail in an earlier 
stage of planning or decision making. Informal interaction gave more room for 
dialogue in which conversation partners together looked for common ground 
and common understanding. 
The informal and formal communication strategies used tells us something 
about the settings in which actors and groups found one another, but it does 
not explain how they became connected and how support for ideas and stories 
was created through interactions. That is the topic of the next section.  
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Frame alignment processes 
The case narrative points to various frame alignment processes that influenced 
agenda setting and that preceded tipping points in the agenda setting of 
landscape values in the fringe area. We identify the following processes that 
were relevant to agenda setting. First, using the concept of frame resonance, 
we discuss the way receptivity of targeted supporters grew. Next, we analyse 
the role of identity framing and empathy and listening by civic initiatives in the 
alignment with targeted supporters. We then discuss the role of conversational 
settings or venues that enabled frame alignment and frame resonance.  
Building responsiveness of targeted supporters (frame resonance)
From the case narrative, we identify four aspects that enabled frame resonance, 
interpreted as responsiveness of targeted supporters to the stories that were 
promoted. 
•	 Easy to pass on story which is simple, clear, and attractive, supported by 
attractive visualizations
•	 Continuous telling, repeating, and sharing story over time in an expanding 
‘storytelling community’ which makes the story (or elements in the story) 
more salient  
•	 Resemiotization (cf. Van Herzele and Aarts, 2013): incorporation of self-
referential frames of targeted supporters into on-going story telling
•	 Credible storytellers 
The following examples from the case narrative support these findings. 
First, the frame ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’, invented by Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, is an example of a frame or story element that 
got positive responses, that resonated well, among various stakeholders. The 
material shows that, over time, the frame was adopted by other parties, like the 
municipality, to refer to the conservation of the green and open character of the 
polder. It was also frequently addressed in interviews with stakeholders, like the 
former Gouda city alderman:
Many ideas emerged in civil society and are adopted by the municipality. 
This was also the case with Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard and their 
‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’. 5-15 
The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman explains how the 
frame ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’ got a response and was adopted by 
other actors, including government actors:
Whatever you do, you should not connect your name to a plan. It is the idea that 
counts. As a person, you should stay in the background. …You should present 
it as an idea of Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, or of organizations 
in the Krimpenerwaard, or of the municipality of Gouda. You have to create 
an opening for others to adopt it. At a certain juncture, you will see that civil 
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servants are using it. And then, whatever you do, you should not say that you 
have invented it. Then you are on the right track. If it lands into the documents 
of the civil service, you should stay very quiet. Then you have to let go, because 
then it is connected. 5-16 
Apparently, the ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’ was a frame or a story that 
was easily passed on to others. It started with a very clear and transparent story 
in which Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard visualized the ‘window’ in 
a map and drawings (see figures 5.6 and 5.7). Moreover, they emphasized the 
urgency of conserving the ‘window’, as there were only a few locations left on 
the riverside where the ‘window to the Krimpenerwaard’ could be experienced. 
They made the matter very concrete, easy to take in, and easy to check (making 
it credible). That is how it became a story that was easily passed on and that 
attracted attention and support. Moreover, the story became more and more 
credible and salient, because over time it was continuously repeated and retold in 
everyday conversations and formal texts.
Second, the process of coalition building and collective designing for the 
Masterplan Stolwijkersluis demonstrates how the story was reconstructed 
and resemiotized to incorporate frames of required supporters. As a result, 
the story presented by the Masterplan combined ideas of Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard about the fringe as a recreational link between city and 
countryside and protection of nature and landscape values in the fringe, the 
campaign of neighbourhood residents to develop ‘Gouda’s front garden’, as well 
as the proposals of various groups to restore the canal lock for pleasure cruising. 
By forming a broad coalition of social groups in the case area, the story shifted 
somewhat, but frames were bridged rather than transformed. The various issues 
promoted did not conflict with one another in the eyes of the stakeholders. 
For the neighbourhood residents, for example, the focus on the lock and other 
landscape values was gratefully connected to the motto ‘Stolwijkersluis, Gouda’s 
front garden’, which they tried to position on the municipality’s agenda.
Moreover, the perspectives of the sponsoring authorities influenced the 
construction of the story. The initiators of the Masterplan tried to get (financial) 
support by constructing the story in such a way that it fitted into the concerns 
and perspectives of potential sponsors. For example, the initiators emphasized 
the urgency of water safety measures, thus making the story much more inviting 
to the water board. The Gouda city alderman was persuaded by emphasizing 
the possibility of restoring the navigability of the lock, thus connecting well 
to his personal experiences and preferences. Moreover, to further develop the 
(financial) commitment of the city of Gouda, aspects of the Masterplan were 
articulated and amplified to fit into Gouda’s ambitions to attract more tourists. 
The Masterplan was framed by its designers as part of the ideas of the municipality 
for branding the city of Gouda as Dutch Water City (Gouda Hollandse Waterstad: 
Consortium Hollandse Waterstad, 2009). This involved not only emphasizing 
the issue of pleasure cruising, but also showing that the city of Gouda had 
more to offer to tourists than just the city and the rivers. It was suggested 
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that Gouda’s city-marketing strategy could also involve the attractiveness of 
the Krimpenerwaard, the possibility of visiting ‘Holland in a nutshell’, with its 
waterworks and landscape that narrate the typically Dutch fight against the 
water. In this story, the historic lock was a crucial element as the gateway to 
that authentic polder. In these ways, by incorporating the concerns and ambitions 
of sponsors into the story, storytelling increased the responsiveness of these 
sponsors. 
A third example concerns the connection of civic initiatives for landscape values 
in the fringe area to governmental and civic initiatives that were concerned 
with the redevelopment of the Krimpenerwaard. The case narrative shows 
how the story about the fringe was carefully adjusted and extended to include 
storylines that would invite participation by the Krimpenerwaard. The story was 
linked with the story about the benefits of the Veenvaren Plan for the economy 
of the Krimpenerwaard. It became a story about the economic value of a 
boating connection between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard. In this 
adjusted story, the urban dweller was no longer the centre of interest, but rather 
the entrepreneurs in the Krimpenerwaard who could increase their income 
through pleasure cruisers.
It was not a story to which farmers, authorities, and nature organizations in the 
Krimpenerwaard responded and contributed easily. Boating had been heavily 
debated 10 years previously in the Krimpenerwaard Redevelopment Project 
and was framed as a destructive activity for nature and farmland, as illustrated 
by the following statement by the Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren leader:
Farmers are against boating because they associate it with noise pollution and 
damage to the banks of the canals as a result of the beating of the waves. …It is 
difficult to enforce boating restrictions. In the past, a lack of enforcement caused 
a lot of nuisance. People will sit in the ground and leave their rubbish behind. …
The farmers have been taken by surprise by the plan to restore the lock. They are 
afraid that this will bring back the yachts of past days. …When the canal shipping 
trade ended, the farmers pressed for the lock to be blocked off. They absolutely 
did not want any more pleasure cruising. …Back then, the farmers fought hard 
for the demolition of the lock. 5-17    
The outcome was a ban on boating in the polder. Farmers and nature and 
landscape organizations did not want to re-open that discussion and, therefore, 
local governments were also not inclined to talk about boating. In reaction to 
this taboo on the subject of boating, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
and Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren constructed a counter-frame in which it was 
emphasized that the boating would be on a very small scale. Besides that, they 
argued that the target group for boating would be nature lovers and seekers of 
peace and quiet, people who would surely not be disrespectful to the farmers’ 
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land and the Sunday rest day so highly valued by Krimpenerwaard residents. 
The draft Veenvaren Plan frames it like this (bold type was used by the author of 
the plan to emphasize the small scale of the boating infrastructure and routes): 
If the Stolwijkersluis lock is used after restoration, then the polder provides 
beautiful small-scale waters through which small boats can sail very well. …
The recreational pressure on the waterways can be controlled by using the 
Stolwijkersluis as the only and natural gateway to the area. This form of sailing 
will only appeal to people who now explore the polder by foot and bike. These 
people are ‘peace-and-quiet’ and nature seekers. So no yachts with excited 
people, and no swarms of boats with noisy and disturbing outboard motors. After 
all, such boats can go to other more suitable waters. We want no disturbance of 
the peace and quiet, or of Sunday’s rest. 5-18
Besides careful framing into the latitude of acceptance (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; 
Sherif et al., 1965) of targeted supporters, the initiatives managed to connect to 
a few politicians and executives who had access to a wider network of decision 
makers and who were considered to be credible frame articulators. In other words, 
they involved people who could pass on the story in their executive networks 
and who would be able align the story to perspectives of targeted groups in 
the region. As recounted in the case-study narrative, on the suggestion of 
Werkgroep Gouda <—-> Krimpenerwaard, Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren invited a 
provincial councillor, who was well-known in the region, to write the foreword 
of the Veenvaren Plan (Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren Krimpenerwaard, 2007) to 
enhance the responsiveness of targeted readers (citizens, entrepreneurs, and 
local and regional politicians). The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
spokesman explains: 
We said to the Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren chairman that he had to find somebody 
from the region. Then there was a provincial councillor who was an enthusiastic 
representative for the region. She lives in Stolwijk. She was flattered to be asked, 
and this is how a ‘driving wheel’ emerged because she started promoting the 
plan as well. Then it was no longer only the Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren. The other 
members of her political party were also supporting the plan because they saw 
opportunities to stimulate the Krimpenerwaard economy. 5-19
Moreover, they managed to involve the Vlist alderman, who had already publicly 
demonstrated his enthusiasm for using the opportunities of waterways in the 
polder for water recreation. He became a passionate champion of Veenvaren 
in the Krimpenerwaard. According to the alderman, convincing farmers of the 
value of Veenvaren was essential because farmers had much influence in local 
politics. To align the ideas of Veenvaren to the concerns of farmers, the alderman 
amplified the idea of financial benefits in the story of Veenvaren. Moreover, he 
understood that previous experiences with water tourism had made farmers 
hesitant and that in any case farmers would want to control activities and protect 
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their property. Therefore, he emphasized the possibility of farmers managing 
boating activities themselves and thereby keeping control and autonomy, as 
demonstrated in the next quotation.
But I was able to turn it around and said: ‘Water tourism can also be your business. 
You can offer it. Those sailing routes are your waterways, so I can imagine a form 
in which you manage the permits. You can set up a foundation or cooperation 
with other farmers and control it yourself. …The farmers will grant the permits 
and receive the earnings and construct the landing stages to provide access to 
the farms. So you will not be the party that tolerates and that has to deal with the 
burden, you will be the party that offers and performs.’ And then, he came round. 
He thought it was an appealing alternative. 5-20
This way, the alderman subtly fitted the idea of Veenvaren to the values and 
everyday concerns of the farmers in the Krimpenerwaard, thus enhancing the 
resonance of the story and increasing the chance that farmers would respond 
positively.  
The reframing of the fringe area from ‘city garden’ into a ‘regional 
Veenweidepark’ is a final example of framing processes and resemiotization to 
position the natural and recreational development of the fringe on the right 
decision agenda, that is, the decision agenda which generated the necessary 
resources. The city of Gouda tried to interest the provincial government in 
taking a leading role for the construction of the city park and framed the park 
in terms that would fit the agenda and procedures of the provincial government. 
To this end, the regional importance of the city park was amplified. The Gouda 
city alderman directed discussions in the steering group of the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis towards linking the city park to the nature development goals 
of the Krimpenerwaard Rural Development Project (the Veenweidepact). That 
would generate resources for land acquisition and legitimize change of the 
current agricultural land allocation. Moreover, the Veenweidepact was a way 
to shift responsibility for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis from the city of Gouda 
to the provincial government, as illustrated by the following statement by the 
former Gouda city alderman: 
We realized that the plan fitted well into the Veenweidepact. It was possible to 
acquire the land for wet nature. …It was actually more practical to cancel the 
agricultural land use. And also in that context it was more practical to include the 
area in the Veenweidepact. I have indicated that in the steering group, that they 
had better extend the project’s area demarcation. One tries to make ever more 
people problem owner of that Masterplan [Masterplan Stolwijkersluis]. 5-21
The story about the meaning of the fringe for nature in the region was 
successful because the provincial government needed the area to meet the 
agreements with the national government about the total acreage of wet 
nature development in the Krimpenerwaard. This was emphasized by naming 
5
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the city park Veenweidepark. Veenweide referred to both the plan for the rural 
redevelopment of the region (Veenweidepact, 2005) as well as the sort of nature 
that would be developed, fitting into the wet peat meadows concept. Thus, the 
development of a city park was framed and legitimized as a project that belonged 
to the Veenweidepact and contributed to the development of wet nature. By naming 
it, it would not be regarded as a local project for citizens of Gouda, but as a 
project that benefitted the Krimpenerwaard and the provincial government. 
This is illustrated by a civil servant from the Gouda municipality: 
The city garden is now called Veenweidepark because it was not desired to 
associate it with the city of Gouda. The word city garden evokes the image 
of a garden for the city of Gouda, but the place is intended for the whole 
environment. The alderman [city of Gouda] invented the name Veenweidepark 
himself.  
Identity framing
Civic initiatives tried to connect to governments by framing their proposals and 
stories such that they would be considered credible and relevant by targeted 
government actors within the framework of their policies and procedures. To 
increase the credibility and salience of their proposals, they aimed to build up 
good relations with government actors to be perceived as credible storytellers. 
This is confirmed by interview statements of both initiators and government 
actors about the attitude of the initiatives towards government stakeholders. 
The following illustrates how civic initiatives framed themselves as a group of 
constructive and cooperative, knowledgeable, and representative partners of 
governments in the region.
First, knowledgeability was an important element in identity framing. For 
example, Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard did not want to be labelled 
as an action group or just a citizen group. They presented themselves as a 
group of professionals with the relevant expertise to develop alternative plans 
and proposals.  Moreover, they did their best to show that they were open to 
debate alternative views, i.e. that they were practical and reasonable. The 
goal of the working group was not only to talk, but to actually take action and 
propose realistic alternatives. The quotations below illustrate that initiative and 
knowledge were basic values for Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard:
‘On whose behalf do you deal with the Veerstalblok and the Krimpenerwaard?’ 
[The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman]: ‘Beraad Stadsrand 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, a professional working group of six people. All 
interest groups are represented in Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard’. 
(Newspaper article AD Groene Hart, 23 April 2008, ‘Randje groen of grijze 
blokkendozen) 5-22
And in a quotation from our interview with the Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard spokesman: 
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Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard is called a working group for good 
reason. It consists of about five people who want to take action. I don’t like those 
structures with an association of a large number of people who all have opinions 
but do nothing. I’d rather have people who want to put their views into actions. 
Furthermore, the working group was built around knowledge. Every member 
had a certain skill and expertise in the field of landscape and civil engineering. 
We had a cartographer, planner, architect, and civil engineers. 5-23 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard not only presented itself as a 
knowledgeable group, but also lived up to that claim in its performance. 
Alternatives were developed and designed in great detail and backed up by 
calculations and sketches. Letters, e-mails, and official reactions to governments’ 
plans were accompanied with detailed explanations and considerations. These 
were supported as well by visualizations and landscape designs to make 
proposals more imaginative and inviting to government representatives. Apart 
from designing its own plans and alternative solutions, Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard tried to display professionalism by involving expertise from 
outside the group. 
As a result of their efforts around the Hollandsche IJssel Project and the 
proposed bypass, Werkgroep Gouda <--> Krimpenerwaard gained much 
knowledge about planning and policy processes in the region as well as the 
socio-spatial processes in both the fringe area and the wider region. This 
included ‘knowing’ about the initiatives and attitude of other stakeholders in 
the wider region. Their place-related contextual knowledge was an important 
resource as they became viewed as valuable informants for other actors. For 
example, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard was regularly consulted 
in the start-up phase of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis Project about various 
matters, such as other stakeholders who should be involved and the policy 
context of the spatial development of the case area. 
Second, apart from framing and manifesting knowledgeability, Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, as well as their partners, presented themselves as 
constructive negotiation partners who were willing to participate in discussions 
instead of just protesting against government proposals. A good example is how 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard positioned itself in the debate about 
the trajectory of the South Western Bypass. In 2004 they decided to give up the 
fight for their alternative trajectory in order to maintain good relations with the 
municipality, as illustrated by the following statement by the Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman:
We realized then that we could have held on this model for another 10 years, 
but that would not imply that we could get it implemented. Because then 
they would have reacted by starting urban renewal activities at that trajectory 
which would make [the alternative presented by Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard] impossible. Those were the tactics. The government was 
also digging its heels in. That is when we threw in the towel. In the Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard we emphasized that this had to be done publicly. 
5
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Together with Zuid-Hollands Landschap and Bewonersgroep Ouderkerk, we 
wrote a letter stating officially that we were reconciled with the government’s 
preferred trajectory, and that from that moment on we were willing to cooperate 
constructively. That was appreciated greatly by many people. …We considered it 
important that we could sit down around the table again. 5-24 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard gained much credit from the involved 
local governments for their constructive involvement in the bypass. Even 
though they had not succeeded in realizing the alternative trajectory, they had 
achieved good relations with governments as well as with other civic groups; 
this appeared to be an important resource in future lobbying. Werkgroep Gouda 
<—> Krimpenerwaard could use friendly relations with the municipality to be 
included in decision or negotiation processes and to get access to information 
known to government representatives. This is illustrated by the following 
statement by the Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman:  
Mind you, we don’t make objections that often! That does not create friends. 
…You have to be careful with that sympathy. If we had continued our lobby 
concerning the bypass, we would have thrown away the sympathy. That is a 
delicate assessment every time. …If you formally object too often, you can throw 
away the stream of information and cooperation with civil servants. In the very 
first stage, you have to convince and inspire people to go in another direction. 
And if you are early, it often succeeds. 5-25
Because of this attitude, Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard in the 
course of time became viewed by the municipality of Gouda as a trustworthy 
conversation partner with a clear sense of political and managerial realities. This 
applies not only to Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, but also to other 
stakeholders in the area. In general, interviewees point to the importance of the 
professionalism of lobbying groups and appreciation of the political games and 
dilemmas. This is illustrated with the following statement by a civil servant from 
Gouda municipality: 
For example, … is very professional and you can build on him. He knew the 
unwritten rules of the game. Others say ‘and now I am going to the press’, and 
that is not right at all because it creates noise and interrupts the conversations. 
Parties benefit from doing the dirty on someone, but they have to continue 
talking. It can be very useful, but if people do not clearly know their role and 
if they approach politics in a weird way, than noise emerges. Consequently, 
as a civil servant you have a difficult position because you have to follow the 
Municipal Executive. Although … is a troublemaker, he does know when to 
stay quiet. And he has many contacts. He has become quite good at the game 
because of his experience for years on end. 5-26 
Third, civic initiatives continuously pointed out how their collective efforts 
represented wide social support in the city and the region. Sometimes, in informal 
negotiations and ad-hoc encounters, it was perceived as more favourable to 
164
Chapter 5
act alone. However, especially in formal negotiations, civic initiatives attached 
much value to voicing interests on behalf of a multiplicity of groups to convince 
government of the representativeness and social basis of their proposal. Beraad 
Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard was frequently used for this purpose as well 
as the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood once they acquired ‘neighbourhood team’ 
status within the municipality. The various groups ensured that they would 
be visible as different groups in their collective actions. Sometimes, letters to 
governments were signed by a long list of different organizations and groups. 
Sometimes groups sent their own letter containing the same message as letters 
from other groups.
 .
By continuously messaging on behalf of a large number of organizations, the 
collective aimed to demonstrate a large backing group of people, and over time 
that strategy worked for several initiatives, like the saving of the historic lock. 
This is illustrated by the next statement by the former Gouda city alderman:
And they often speak in the name of a whole raft of organizations, in which 
often the same organizations are represented. But that provides an image for 
other parties that there is great social support. And then nobody wants to be 
a spoilsport. …That is how you create sympathy for those people in Gouda 
with that nice idea. Not only the alderman, but it is a whole group of people 
who support it. And that makes it special. Here they want to achieve something 
instead of just opposing something. 5-27  
In sum, by framing a favourable identity, that is, framing themselves as 
cooperative, knowledgeable conversation partners who articulate proposals 
supported by many people, initiatives enhanced the responsiveness of 
government actors. This process of identity framing helped to enhance the 
credibility and salience of proposed ‘storied’ alternatives. 
Empathy and listening
We saw earlier how frame alignment as well as identity framing contributed to 
successful agenda setting. Some agents were very good at constructing and 
aligning frames. Telling a story and incorporating it is one side of the story, but 
another important requisite is knowing and understanding the perspective/
frame of ‘the other’ to be able to incorporate these into storytelling and invite 
‘the other’ to join in storytelling. The data reveal that the ability to listen and 
empathize was essential to this process, as demonstrated by this statement by 
the former city of Gouda alderman:
[The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman] is someone who 
can think very empathically. He is very empathic to the problems you encounter 
as an alderman. For how your day looks, your agenda, and what is going on. 
He has much more sense about that than others. So he succeeds in having a 
nice conversation with [the Vlist alderman]. And he shows that he has a lot of 
knowledge about the polder. 5-28
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The quotation suggests that the Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard 
spokesman through his empathic abilities was able to learn about relevant 
frames of prospective supporters, and that this enabled him to fit his own ideas 
into what they considered relevant and important.  Other data also demonstrate 
that he put great effort into understanding political and policy processes. 
The previous discussion about how citizen initiatives framed themselves as 
cooperative and knowledgeable partners for governments confirms this view. 
In general, they tried to maintain good relations with governments, constantly 
linking up ideas to governments’ priorities, trying to understand executives’ 
dilemmas and find solutions. 
Another example of the importance of empathic abilities: the leader of 
Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren was described by the Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard spokesman as someone who had the empathic abilities 
needed to involve the Krimpenerwaard:  
[The chairman of Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] is a real native in the polder, and he 
used to sail the polder waters with his father. In my opinion, he therefore was 
able to integrate the sensitivities about boating in the polder in his plan in a 
good way. 5-29  
The Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren leader’s involvement in the coalition was essential 
because as a person who was born and raised in the Krimpenerwaard he could 
relate more easily to the concerns of agricultural entrepreneurs in the polder. 
His efforts to empathize with farmers are illustrated by his following statement:
During a meeting of an association for farmers in the Krimpenerwaard [Vereniging 
Duurzame Waterbeheersing en Landbouw in de Krimpenerwaard], participants 
carried on terribly against the plan to restore the lock. ‘That lock has to be closed! 
There will be no boating here!’ Then I put on the hair shirt and told them that I 
had caused it. ‘I have written the plan out of your indignation. You have never 
done anything about it. You have always had the opportunity to bend it to your 
will, but that never happened’. …There are many forms and ways to cruise that 
are not at all limited to motor boats. So I explained again that electric boating 
does not cause trouble for farmers. …I said to them: ‘Your history is connected 
to that lock. Because of that lock agriculture could flourish here!’ They agreed 
with that. 5-30
The Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren leader made the effort and had the opportunity 
to learn about the concerns of people in the region by engaging in conversation 
with them during his boating trips, as he explains himself: 
The problem in the Krimpenerwaard is especially that many are averse to 
anything that has to do with tourism or leisure. That’s because of the Calvinist 
nature of the people. Therefore I always try to get into conversation with the 
farmers when I run into them. And then I ask them how in bygone days they 
experienced cruising with the scow. Well, they thought that was quite nice! 
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And then I suggest that maybe other people could also enjoy that. They do 
acknowledge that the perception of the polder is quite different from the water. 
Sunday’s Rest is anyhow a thorny issue. But I like talking to those people when I 
meet them, and then I try to start a conversation about it. 5-31
Empathy is an important competence to incorporate concerns and beliefs of 
targeted supporters in storytelling. This can concern content, but also process. 
For example, the Vlist alderman was able from his own experience to empathize 
with his fellow governors in the region in relation to budget constraints, 
prioritizing, and accountability, as demonstrated by the following statement by 
the Vlist alderman:
I have demonstrated to [the alderman of the Bergambacht municipality] that it 
only took 20,000 euros of his to get those 2.7 billion. So he could not say no to 
that. That is a very small sprat to catch such a big mackerel! 5-32
Only a person like the alderman was able to really understand the reality and 
frame of reference of other local governors and alter the story such that it would 
fit that frame of reference. Only coming from a colleague, a like-minded person, 
would such a story be accepted. Such wheeling and dealing would probably not 
have been accepted from civic lobbying groups.  
In sum, alignment with relevant other stories and people was achieved by first 
listening and empathizing with the concerns and beliefs of conversation partners. 
Targeted supporters were more inclined to participate in the storytelling about 
the future of the fringe because civic initiatives showed understanding of their 
way of working and the political processes in public administration.
Favourable conversational settings
The case narrative shows that frame alignment and connecting and fitting 
stories were supported by certain favourable circumstances. We have discussed 
the more or less coincidental events that provided windows of opportunity to 
connect stories to emerging policy stories. Apart from this, the case narrative 
points to particular conversational settings that enabled participants to 
openly explore, share, connect, and reframe stories. The following examples 
demonstrate the type of settings that enhanced connections between coalitions 
and their stories. 
First, the participative design process for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis provided 
an opportunity for various groups to articulate and link up their interests with 
the unfolding story about the historic lock and its environment. Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and the neighbourhood residents used the 
Masterplan Stolwijkersluis design process to incorporate their own proposals 
in the hope that these would then be noticed by governmental participants. 
The lock project presented a new venue for interest groups and residents to 
discuss a green and recreational development of the area with the involved 
governmental actors. 
 
5
167
Positioning landscape values of the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe on the policy agenda
Second, in the process of aligning the proposals for the restoration of the lock 
and pleasure cruising in the Krimpenerwaard (the Veenvaren Plan), the Vlist 
alderman deliberately looked for the right formal and informal settings to enable 
an open discussion of proposals with targeted supporters (farmers and local 
politicians) and to prevent immediate resistance resulting from the taboo on the 
topic. The alderman considered Strategiegroep Veenweidepact – the steering 
group of local and regional executives responsible for the implementation of 
the new agreements for the rural redevelopment of the Krimpenerwaard – an 
outstanding setting in which financial and political support could be created. 
His position as member of this steering group enabled him to informally raise 
the ideas about Veenvaren in the conversations with fellow executives in the 
steering group. 
The right people and the money are present in the steering group. So that is 
where the game is played. The group consists of the five municipalities, the 
province, and a large bag of money. …In November 2008, I took aside [the 
Provincial Executive] together with [the president of the water board] and said 
‘Come on, it should be possible to restore that lock!’. This is how mainly [the 
Provincial Executive] became convinced to use his power to bring in the money. 
…And another time at a farewell dinner party again [the Provincial Executive], 
[the president of the water board], and I got together a moment to discuss ‘gee, 
wouldn’t it work like this, two tons there, three tons there…’ 5-33  
The interaction between local executives was crucial for getting the support of 
the municipalities in the Krimpenerwaard, the water board, and the provincial 
government. Informal interaction especially was important, as illustrated 
above, but also by other examples in the case study, such as the attempts of 
the city of Gouda to involve the provincial government. The former Gouda city 
alderman had difficulties getting the commitment of provincial executives in 
the Stolwijkersluis steering group. A more or less coincidental opportunity arose 
when he met two provincial executives informally at a meeting about a different 
topic. After that, the provincial government was more serious about their 
representation in the discussions around implementation of the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis. This demonstrates the importance of informal contact between 
local executives, and the effort individual executives have to put in themselves 
to organize such informal contact. 
Furthermore, to organize an open discussion with farmers about boating, the 
alderman had to creatively find his way in the process. Initially, other executives 
in the Krimpenerwaard feared opposition from farmers and would not translate 
their sympathy for the Vlist alderman’s ideas into actions within the formal 
negotiation structure of the rural redevelopment project. Therefore, the 
alderman looked for other ways to position the boating issue on the agenda 
of the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project. A pilot project initiated 
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by the provincial government provided the right context to launch an open 
discussion about boating among stakeholders in the Krimpenerwaard, as 
illustrated by the alderman himself: 
Hiking and biking routes are already embedded in the plan, but not water tourism. 
So that is what we tried to achieve within the Vitaal Platteland programme. That 
was the way to deal with that so-called taboo outside the other committees, 
because the taboo had hardened to such an extent on the official table that no 
local governor dared to burn his finger on it. 5-34
Through the pilot project, the boating topic could be discussed at a conference 
for entrepreneurs about new economic activities necessary to enhance the 
livability of the Krimpenerwaard. Thus, the alderman contributed substantially 
to making the provincial government responsive to the restoration of the 
lock and boating in the polder. The Vlist alderman connected the story about 
Veenvaren to the dominant story of the redevelopment of the Krimpenerwaard 
and thus provided access to the necessary resources. 
Two things can be noticed in these examples about conversational settings. 
First, to enable attention catching and alignment, participants and supporters 
of initiatives avoided the existing official channels. They looked for settings 
in which there was room to explore various options with targeted supporters 
and to be creative. The case narrative provides many other examples of how 
such settings enabled connections, like the competitions about future plans 
for the fringe area (Gouda Havenstad and Fringe Naturally). At the same time, 
the examples show that informal conversations among decision makers (local 
and regional executives) were also essential to generate enough political 
and financial support. The settings involved are those in which local and 
regional governmental executives meet one another and both formally and 
informally discuss alternatives, or settings that enable informal networking 
and establishing connections and alignments. For the coalition around the 
Veenvaren Plan, it was very valuable to have a member who was also a member 
of a regional executive network and had access to conversations in which he 
could align the story about Veenvaren with policy stories about the future of 
the region.  
5.4 People who make a difference 
The case narrative contains many persons that seem to have played an 
important or even decisive role in agenda setting. To name a few: the spokesman 
of Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard, the successive city of Gouda 
aldermen, the professor who initiated the design process for the Masterplan 
Stolwijkersluis, the alderman of Vlist municipality in the period in which essential 
connections with initiatives from the Krimpenerwaard were established, the 
initiator of the Veenvaren Plan, the chairmen of the neighbourhood association, 
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the successive chairmen of the history association die Goude, and many more. 
It is impossible to point to leading characters as many different persons were 
involved in storytelling and coalition building, and they all depended on one 
another for cooperation. However, without certain people who made great 
efforts to bring issues to the fore and connect with relevant other people, it 
would have been business as usual. This raises the question of how we can 
assess the role of individual agents in relation to previously described processes 
like coincidental trigger events and alignment processes. 
Connective capacities
Individual agents who manage to influence policy change have both 
organizational and discursive capacities. In the literature (cf. Kingdon, 2003; 
Zahariadis, 2007), it is emphasized that successful policy entrepreneurs are 
people or groups who have the availability of access to decision-making venues 
and politicians, and to resources, such as time, knowledge, money, passion, and 
motivation. These are certainly recognizable in this case study, as is illustrated 
for example by this statement by the Stolwijkersluis neighbourhood chairman:
Under the skin there are many contacts. In that respect, I have to compliment 
[the Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman]. He knows many 
people and has time for this. That makes a difference. It is lobby work, and he is 
very active in it. 5-35
The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman and the Stolwijkersluis 
neighbourhood chairman put a lot of energy into knowing all that was going on 
in policy circles and sharing this information with other parties in the network 
around issues in the southern fringe. They invested a lot of time and energy in 
attending meetings, writing letters, and gathering and publishing information 
in different media. Passion and enthusiasm for certain issues was an important 
resource as well. For example, it would have been much more difficult to align 
with a governor who did not harbour old memories about the historic lock. He 
frequently referred to his personal passion for the lock, like in his speech at the 
presentation of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis (March 2006) where he recalled 
his grandfather’s boathouse which was situated next to the lock, and where he 
noticed the presence of the former lockkeeper’s son. 
Sometimes, civic initiatives were joined by civil servants who were enthusiastic 
about proposals and wanted to contribute. An example comes from the period 
in which proposals were designed for Gouda Havenstad, illustrated by the 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman: 
Back then, there was a civil servant in the municipality of Gouda responsible for 
the conservation of monuments. He said that he wanted to join us. We said, ‘But 
you are a civil servant at the municipality’. He said: ‘Yes, but I think it is a great 
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idea. I would like to help develop it further. You can keep me on the side-lines if 
necessary’. He contributed to that report. I thought it was special that he dared 
to do that as a civil servant. 5-36
People who had a relevant network and obtained influential positions were 
important for agenda setting as well. In this case study, successful agenda 
setting could not have occurred without the presence of a few governors who 
performed as ‘connectors’, the term used by Shirky (2008) and Gladwell (2000) 
to indicate highly connected people that hold social networks together and 
enable robust connectedness in a wider network. These governors were able 
to span boundaries between departmental sectors and vertical governance 
layers because of their position in the formal and informal network of local 
and regional executives. For example, the Vlist alderman was a member of 
the steering group for the Krimpenerwaard Rural Redevelopment Project; this 
provided the opportunity for him to position the Veenvaren Plan and the lock 
restoration on the agenda of other executives in the steering group.
However, investing resources like time, money, and networks does not 
necessarily mean that the right connections are established and that the 
presented story is accepted and considered relevant. Before, we concluded 
that an important agenda-setting activity was establishing connections in the 
wider network by carefully framing and reframing stories and incorporating the 
perspectives of others. We found that discursive processes are crucial in agenda 
setting. In the following, we show how individual agents performed as crucial 
links in the spreading of a story. They performed as the ‘connectors’ (Shirky, 
2008; Gladwell, 2000) of stories, people, events, and resources, and facilitated 
the occurrence of tipping points. 
The discursive performance of connectors is apparent in the case narrative 
in various ways. In the previous section, we identified a number of alignment 
processes that can be attributed to the discursive performance of connectors: 
telling an imaginative, simple, and credible story;  aligning the story to self-
referential frames of others in which empathizing and listening were important 
acts; increasing credibility by connecting to credible frame articulators and 
storytellers; and finally, incorporating focusing events into the story; this 
required patience, perseverance, and constant scanning of opportunities. In 
sum, connectors were imaginative and credible storytellers, empathic listeners, 
and patient scouts of opportunities. That is supported by the following 
examples from the case study. 
The Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren leader was considered as someone who could 
tell and sell his story very well. The Vlist alderman, for example, states that he 
viewed him as the most important and convincing lobbyist because he had a lot 
of knowledge about the polder and its history, and he showed that the plan was 
feasible and connected well with public goals in the polder:  
5
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The Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren chairman has played a very important role. For 
years, he has been very consistently asking for attention to be paid to Veenvaren. 
…He has provided us consistently with information and has demonstrated that 
it is feasible. …I think he is more influential than [lobbyists from the fringe], 
because he shows very nicely that it is possible, by what kind of routes, and how 
the idea is connected to the history of the polder. He shows convincingly that the 
reintroduction of sailing fits in the region. 5-37  
The Vlist alderman himself invested a lot of time and energy in convincing 
his fellow governors at other municipalities to support the lock restoration 
and the related ideas for pleasure cruising in the polder. He appealed to their 
imagination by showing how boating would work in practice, as he explains 
himself: 
I took the mayor of Bergambacht on a boating trip, and she was wildly enthusiastic 
about that. She was immediately convinced. She was even so enthusiastic that, 
despite the forbidding attitude of the alderman on her board, she publicly said 
‘we are simply going to do this’. …The new alderman of the municipality of 
Schoonhoven had an eye for other interests than just those of the municipality. 
And he cruises himself, so that makes a difference. …I have shown him the map 
with possible boating routes which makes clear that, if the lock re-opens, it 
could be possible to travel with your boat from Schoonhoven to Gouda. That 
performed wonders in the committee. 5-38
A civil servant from Gouda municipality confirms that the Vlist alderman had 
effective telling and selling qualities: 
[The Vlist alderman] had the charm and the flair to involve people in his ideas. 
That has been very important. He just set to work with it. 5-39 
The ideas of the Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren leader would not have resonated 
so well without the support of people from the Krimpenerwaard, who added 
to the credibility and salience of the story in the eyes of targeted supporters, 
as described in section 3. For example, the Vlist alderman states that he was 
only really convinced of supporting the ideas in Veenvaren when he realized 
that the chairman of the regional agricultural organization, LTO, participated in 
Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren:  
Moreover, it was important that the local chairman of the LTO [agricultural 
interest group] is a member of Stichting Veenvaren. …That to me is very 
important, because that so-called taboo did not exist for him. And that is why 
I found the Veenvaren Plan important and that is why I believed it. And I could 
push the idea, because [the LTO chairman] also participated! 5-40
Connectors were also people who established the links with groups and 
networks that attributed credibility and relevance to stories, like in this example 
the chairman of the agricultural interest organization, LTO. Credible frame 
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articulators were sometimes initiators themselves, in which case credibility 
was strongly based on the knowledge and representativeness attributed to 
initiators, as well as positive experiences in former negotiations (see also section 
5.3). Initiators also involved people who, because of their status and influence in 
networks, were considered credible. 
Connectors: heroes or fellow performers? 
From the case narrative we can derive that various persons performed as 
connectors, and that they established alignments by passing on stories in their 
networks and by incorporating other perspectives and relevant events. Specific 
heroes in the narrative cannot be identified, because multiple connectors 
performed at the same time or in different periods. Connectors are not by 
themselves able to bring about change; they perform as connectors always in 
the context of interplay both with other people who also perform as connectors 
and with the specific circumstances at stake. This means that the concept of 
connectors is very fluid and contextual. Whether people were connectors 
depended on the particular situation, the issue at stake, and the alignments that 
were to be made, and a particular period in which opportunities for alignment 
emerged. Connectors come and go depending on the issue at stake. When 
individual or group ambitions were achieved, others took over; but storytelling 
about the future of the fringe area and the wider region always continued, 
as demonstrated by the case study that covers 25 years. It was perpetuated 
by a great number of groups and people that participated in storytelling at 
different times. Therefore, we conclude that it is unrealistic to try to identify a 
few heroes or leaders of change and that the process in which stories spread 
and get adopted is facilitated by a multitude of connectors that link up a wider 
network. Moreover, it is difficult to predict who will perform a connecting role in 
what situation and in what period; it is a highly contextual property. Or in other 
words, connectors may be considered an emergent property in complex change 
processes (cf. Holland, 1998; Johnson, 2001; Van Gunsteren, 2006), meaning that 
connectors can emerge spontaneously, unpredicted and unintended, out of the 
many interactions between people who negotiate all kinds of issues. 
That said, in this case study it was apparent that citizens performed connecting 
roles at crucial turning points in the story. Where alignment between different 
government organizations could not be established by government actors 
themselves, civic initiatives did align with government representatives and 
spanned institutional and cultural boundaries. For example, the bad relation 
between the city of Gouda and the Krimpenerwaard was one of the reasons 
why Gouda’s municipal representatives left the lobbying for the lock restoration 
and a boating route mainly to civic initiatives, as explained by the former city of 
Gouda alderman: 
[The Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard spokesman] and [the 
Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren leader] have lobbied in the Krimpenerwaard and 
that is how the municipality of Vlist joined in and how support from the 
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Krimpenerwaard was established. …Parties in the Krimpenerwaard were 
strongly against it in the beginning. They saw the big city Gouda as a threat, so 
we were not able to talk to them. 5-41
Also in this example, in the end, multiple actors with different backgrounds 
and network memberships were required to link up the network. The passion 
and energy of just a few was neither enough nor decisive. Civic initiatives in the 
fringe area were able to network the network effectively (cf. Gilchrist, 2000).  
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the puzzle of how over time civic initiatives managed 
to position the protection and restoration of landscape values in the urban–
rural fringe on the agendas of local and regional governments despite various 
institutional barriers and blockages related to governments’ self-referential 
perspectives. The main goal was to understand the processes that preceded 
tipping points in the agenda-setting process. On the basis of the theoretical 
framework and the previous chapter about civic initiatives in the Heuvelland 
region, we focused on storytelling as an agenda-setting mechanism, that is, 
how issues were framed into stories and how stories further developed over 
time. Moreover, the findings in the Heuvelland case directed attention to 
interactional processes, alignment strategies, and the extent to which trigger 
events were decisive.  
Tipping points in agenda setting were usually marked by particular political 
events, shifts in coalitions, and sudden shifts in the attention paid by 
government organizations to issues in the fringe area. These were described; 
but, to understand why shifts occurred, we asked what happened in the 
process and in the period leading up to tipping points. We found that the 
continuous and everyday interactions between stakeholders were essential, 
as these interactions enabled continuous framing of stories and fitting stories 
to the frames and stories of targeted supporters. Ambitions of civic initiatives 
remained stable, but these were framed into an evolving story that over 
time shifted multiple times to emphasize new or different elements. Shifts in 
storytelling occurred when coalition building required alignments with other 
groups. To get support from governments, this especially concerned fitting the 
story to relevant policy stories. This was particularly apparent in the process in 
which the story about the future of the fringe was framed as a regional matter, 
as relevant to the rural redevelopment of the Krimpenerwaard, to secure the 
attention and commitment of the provincial authority. 
We found a number of answers to the question of how alignments between 
different stories and groups of people were established. Frame alignment 
strategies, as described in chapter 2, concerned bridging, amplification, and 
extension of ideas to relate to the concerns and frames of potential supporters. 
Frames of citizen initiatives were not transformed in the sense that totally new 
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ideas were adopted. The issues in the case area remained the same, ambitions 
were stable, but the story about the future of the fringe area changed to fit well 
into policy stories in order to facilitate implementation. 
Aligning and reframing stories
With regard to the question of why alignment strategies were successful in terms 
of resonance with, and increased responsiveness from, targeted supporters, the 
following explanations were found. First, positive response was enhanced by 
telling a story that was easy to understand and that triggered the imagination, 
for example through visualizations and design. 
Second, we found that stories needed time to filter through or, in the words of 
Kingdon, the policy system had to be slowly warmed up to new stories. Repetition 
and continuously telling and sharing the story in various contexts helped this 
process of filtering through. Through continuous framing and reframing, civic 
initiatives and their coalition partners slowly enlarged governments’ latitude of 
acceptance. 
Third, alignment with others required resemiotization of stories to include 
targeted supporters’ perspectives and to invite them to participate. With regard 
to securing attention and support of governments, their ambitions, concerns, 
and policy stories had to be incorporated into the story about the future of the 
fringe area. Incorporating the self-referential frames of others into storytelling 
increased the credibility and salience of the story by connecting to targets’ 
values and beliefs as well as to their personal everyday experiences. This was 
especially demonstrated in the process in which alignments with initiatives for 
the rural development of the Krimpenerwaard were established.  We describe 
this process as ‘navigating the self-referential frames’ of potential supporters. 
Thus, the responsiveness of targeted audiences, especially governmental 
stakeholders, was improved. 
Fourth, empathy and listening to stories of others was an important condition to 
understand the perspectives of others, exchange views, and construct a shared 
story. Storytellers had to listen carefully to understand targeted supporters’ 
frames and incorporate them effectively. Empathizing with targeted supporters 
was an effective strategy to get or keep a position at the negotiation table and 
to get access to relevant information. This means that telling and selling a story 
was important, but could not work without carefully listening to relevant other 
people. 
Presenting a story that would be considered relevant and credible was the main 
challenge. This was achieved not only through the incorporation of perspectives 
of relevant others (resemiotization), but also by constructing an identity that 
would render proponents credible and relevant in the eyes of others. Civic 
initiatives framed themselves as the sort of partner with whom other groups, 
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especially governments, like to cooperate: knowledgeable, constructive, 
and representative. They continuously tried to maintain good relations 
with government to be included in planning processes and to get access to 
information. Furthermore, civic initiatives tried to be considered credible and 
relevant by connecting with people that already had this label.  
Facilitating conditions: focusing events, connectors, and conversational settings
We found that other agenda-setting factors – focusing events and individual 
agents who performed as connectors of people and stories – derive meaning 
in the context of storytelling and frame alignment.  The analysis of focusing 
events resulted in the conclusion that events only get meaning as triggers 
in relation to what has happened before and in relation to the stories being 
developed. Storytelling was supported by incorporating certain events that 
were meaningful to targeted supporters. Trigger events facilitated alignment 
processes. Whether events were noticed and considered meaningful to 
storytelling also depended on the extent to which stories had already filtered 
through in the wider network. Once stories about the fringe area increasingly 
resonated among governmental stakeholders, the chances increased of 
particular opportunities being connected to that story, like in the case of the 
sudden opportunity of the crisis fund.
We found that certain individuals, depending on the issue and situation at 
stake, perform as connectors in the network and stimulate the spreading of 
stories. Connectors had meaning in relation to one another and in relation to 
the stories shared. No single heroes or change agents were identified because 
the performance of connectors depended on their interactions with other 
connectors and the specific context in which they were given meaning as 
connectors. Connectors contributed to alignment processes through discursive 
acts: empathizing, listening, sharing perspectives, and telling and selling 
stories. They were able to recognize and exploit events that could trigger new 
mobilizations and connections, and they awaited favourable circumstances 
patiently while continuing their storytelling. In short, individuals who 
performed as connectors were characterized by patience, connectedness in the 
wider network, empathy to be able to reframe based on ‘what they think’, and 
by attentiveness to favourable contexts and opportunities. 
The analysis revealed another element that facilitates storytelling and alignment: 
conversational settings that provide the opportunity to learn about, and share, 
perspectives and experiences. The case study points to the importance of 
informal communication, connection to informal networks of decision makers 
(in this case local and regional governors), and venues and meetings that aimed 
for open exploration and exchange of ideas to generate innovations, like the 
Masterplan Stolwijkersluis’ participative design process and the conferences 
for innovative entrepreneurship in the context of the Krimpenerwaard Rural 
Development Project. Although informal interaction was especially important, 
176
Chapter 5
formal venues also provided the opportunity to meet people informally. In this 
case, civic initiatives took every opportunity to participate in both formal and 
informal conversations. This increased their chance of hearing about relevant 
stories that could strengthen their own story, as well as of learning about events 
that could be relevant, and provided the opportunity to share perspectives and 
invite others into storytelling.  
Concluding remarks
In this case study, civic initiatives appeared to be very important connectors. 
To get support and overcome institutional barriers, they creatively fitted their 
story to stories of other initiatives and governments. In fact, their storytelling 
and coalition-building efforts resulted in connections between vertical 
and horizontal government departments that were not established by the 
government actors themselves. Government actors were more inclined to stick 
to their own policy stories, whereas civic initiatives were challenged to create 
bridges and connect different frames into their storytelling about the future of 
the urban–rural Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe. 
Moreover, the case study illustrates that shifts in the agenda-setting process 
were often unexpected and could not be explained by any single cause or 
chain of causes. The development of the story about the fringe area and its 
various storylines depended on many interplaying processes. The connection 
of the story to other policy stories depended on changing circumstances, like 
political and financial opportunities or setbacks, as well as changes in coalitions, 
the creativity of connectors, and coincidental meetings. Opportunities were 
as emergent as the performance of connectors. Stories were emergent as 
well because beforehand it was not clear how various social interactions 
and participation in storytelling would lead to new storylines. Yet, the non-
linearity of change did not mean that the process was without direction. The 
ambitions of civic initiatives and government stakeholders remained the 
same, but stories were slightly adapted to changing circumstances. The case 
further demonstrates that shifts, although sometimes perceived as sudden and 
unexpected, were actually the result of more gradual processes in which many 
small and seemingly meaningless events and social interactions in  the end 
made a big difference. 
Sticky stories: 
conversations, 
connectors, and 
opportunities
“Truth [is] being involved in an eternal 
conversation about things that matter […], 
truth is not in the conclusion so much as in the 
process itself” (Palmer 1990:12).
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Sticky stories: conversations, connectors, and opportunities
The chapters about the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard and Heuvelland case studies 
narrated how civic initiatives tried to bring unsolicited proposals for local–
regional spatial development to the attention of relevant governments. 
Some stories managed to attract and mobilize attention and support through 
processes of storytelling and frame alignment, whereas other stories faded 
away. We have analysed the processes and conditions in which stories became 
sticky, first for the case studies separately. In the cases, we first identified 
tipping points in the agenda-setting process. Next, we analysed what processes 
preceded tipping points by considering the construction of stories around the 
proposed issues through the interactions between initiatives and potential 
supporters in the region. Now, in this chapter, we bring together the results. The 
two cases enable a comparative perspective, but not in terms of a comparison 
based on pre-fixed variables and indicators. The aim of our comparison was 
not generalization of knowledge but improving insight into the unique cases 
to get in-depth understanding. The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case generated 
new understandings about agenda setting and storytelling processes which are 
used in this chapter to revisit the findings of the Heuvelland case. 
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6.1 The two cases in a nutshell
Plots of the case narratives and characteristics
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the characteristics of the two cases. In short, the 
plots of the cases can be summarized as follows. The Heuvelland case contains 
three stories that in the end competed with one another for attention and 
support – both financial and political. All three started with the New Markets 
initiative to build a community of capital rich entrepreneurs who would invest 
in landscape qualities through new product–market combinations, which it was 
assumed would generate economic returns (improved tourism). However, this 
initiative could not mobilize enough support from entrepreneurs and relevant 
governments and stagnated, while at the same time the Healthy Living story 
and Regional Branding story emerged, around which a number of participating 
entrepreneurs self-organized. These were both successful in mobilizing support, 
although later on the Healthy Living initiative was dropped from the agenda in 
favour of the Regional Branding initiative, which received investments of several 
millions of euros for a regional branding campaign.
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case concerns citizens’ initiatives to propose 
plans for the protection and development of landscape values in the urban–
rural Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe. Over a period of about 25 years, these led 
to successfully positioning the integrated development of the fringe area on 
governments’ policy agenda. When the initiatives started, governments were 
paying only fragmented attention (‘tunnel visions’) to the relevant area, and the 
initiatives perceived this as a big threat to natural and historical landscape values. 
After 25 years, the attention and support of local and regional governments 
were mobilized, and this resulted in the investment of several millions of euros 
in the protection and development of landscape values. 
Connecting to existing policy stories
In both cases, efforts were aimed at alignment with the provincial government, 
and initiatives were challenged with substantial institutional barriers to get 
‘inside’ the formal perspective of the provincial government. Alignment with 
the provincial government involved storytelling and frame alignment processes 
in which the provincial government’s existing policy frames were confirmed 
and reproduced. These policy frames concerned the provincial government’s 
priorities, which related in both cases to the improvement of the region’s 
economy. The initiatives’ storytelling strategies were aimed at stretching the 
‘latitude of acceptance’1 within the current policy story about regional economic 
development. Both in Heuvelland and in Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, successful 
initiatives did not present their proposals as complete alternatives, but as fitting 
1 Latitude of acceptance is the concept used to indicate the range of ideas that a person sees as 
reasonable or worthy of consideration (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif et al., 1965)
6
181
Sticky stories: conversations, connectors, and opportunities
with, and contributing to, existing policy stories to increase the chance that 
their proposals would be considered relevant and meaningful by government 
actors. ‘Only the story with the best fit survives’ (Van Dijk, 2011, p. 138).
Table 6.1: Characteristics of the two case studies of civic initiatives
Cases/ 
characteristics
Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard
Heuvelland
Initiative (labels used 
in this thesis)
Citizen initiatives 
Landscape 
values Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard 
initiative 
Experts, 
entrepreneurs:
New Markets 
initiative
Entrepreneurs: 
Healthy Living 
initiative
Entrepreneurs:
Regional Branding 
initiative
Where? Southern urban–
rural fringe of city of 
Gouda, connecting 
to Krimpenerwaard 
polder region 
Local-regional level
Region South-
Limburg 
Regional level
Idem Idem
Reason for starting 
initiative
Lack of government 
vision about Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard 
urban–rural fringe
Lack of government 
vision on how 
economic activities 
could improve 
landscape quality
Market potential of 
new product–market 
combination (living, 
leisure, healthcare, 
rural economy)
Strategy for 
regional (economic) 
development 
should be based on 
a good marketing 
(branding) strategy
Ambition Getting attention 
and support 
(financial and 
political) for 
proposal for 
development 
and protection of 
landscape values 
(nature, traditional 
landscape structure, 
historic lock)
Integrated 
improvement of 
(tourist and rural) 
economy and 
landscape quality: 
founding of a 
business community 
around New Markets
Integrated 
improvement of 
health sector, leisure, 
and revitalizing 
rural economy and 
cultural heritage
Establishing a 
regional brand 
and a branding 
campaign to attract  
businesses and 
employees (dealing 
with shrinking 
and ‘silvering’ 
population)
Ambition achieved? Yes No Partly: some spin-
off*, but dropped 
from the political 
agenda
Yes (branding 
campaign was 
executed)
Connection to what 
sort of government 
agendas?
Local and regional 
development
Regional 
development
Local and regional 
development
Regional economic 
development
Duration of process 1988–2010 2006–2009 2006–2009 2007–2012
*Spin-off in Integrated Care Community concept (see Kranendonk & van Mansfeld, 2009; 
Haarmann et al., 2009) 
Within these existing policy stories, there was subtle change in governments’ 
latitude of acceptance, but only gradually and with small steps. To understand the 
dynamics of such subtle changes and how they prelude change that is perceived 
as radical or sudden, we focused on what happens in human interactions 
and who tells what to whom, when, and why, and with what outcomes. Such 
questions elucidate the conditions in which, through storytelling, support and 
attention were mobilized and why at a certain juncture stories ‘tipped’.
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6.2 Stories made to stick
To address how stories travel among a wider audience, how they are memorable 
or not to people and resonate, and how they fit to existing (policy) stories, 
we used a metaphor that we labelled ‘sticky stories’, inspired by the works of 
Heath & Heath (2007) and Gladwell (2000) who refer to ‘sticky messages’. Sticky 
stories are stories that enable the building of coalitions and the mobilization of 
action, and that attract the attention of decision makers. Stickiness enhances 
the chances of a tipping point being reached in an agenda-setting process. 
Sticky stories are stories that are elastic and fluid (Baker, 2010); this means that 
listeners or readers can stick their own experiences and frames to the story. 
They enhance the responsiveness of potential listeners or readers by providing 
a framework for interpretation that connects well to the personal experiences, 
ambitions, and interpretive frames of targeted actors. 
Not all stories are ‘made to stick’ (cf. Heath & Heath, 2007). Some stories fade 
away. Revisiting the case studies, we found a number of factors that influenced 
the stickiness of stories.
Clear and stable ambitions
In Chapter 2, we suggested that clear ambitions are an important part of putting 
across messages and constructing a strong plot for a story. In the Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard case, this condition was met very well. Initiatives in Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard had a clear and stable ambition throughout the 25 years of 
campaigning. Even though the story shifted to an emphasis on the advantages 
of landscape protection for economic and nature development, the original 
ambitions, that is, the plot of the story (renovation of a historic lock and nature-
oriented recreational development), remained the same. Many of the ideas 
developed in the 1980s were achieved throughout the 2000s without major 
alterations. The initiators in the fringe were very persistent and had patience to 
wait for the right time. The stability of ambitions and the sheer persistence and 
consistency of initiatives formed the basis for a sticky story about the value of 
the fringe. The story was sometimes adjusted when new partners entered the 
coalition, but it remained a story to which all relevant actors could stick their 
ambitions.  
The New Markets initiative in the Heuvelland case, however, had many difficulties 
in establishing a clear ambition. And as there were no stable ambitions, no 
sticky story emerged from the interactions between the participants. There 
was continuous discussion and disagreement between entrepreneurs and 
experts about the organization of the project, and this deflected attention 
from constructing an ambition for the development of landscape qualities 
and economic activities. No storyline or plot emerged from the discussions. 
Finally, entrepreneurs self-organized around other storylines: first, the story of 
Healthy Living and later the story about the importance of a strong brand for 
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the region. The Regional Branding story became very sticky, and not only the 
initiating entrepreneurs, but also other entrepreneurs and local and regional 
governments clustered around it. Once the regional branding story had tipped, 
many supporters and resources flowed to it from all kinds of budgets for 
regional development. The story, with the motto ‘Zuid-Limburg: Bright site of 
life’, became a million-euro story.  
Relevance, credibility, and salience
Stories that are considered credible and salient by audiences are more easily 
passed on from teller to listener in an expanding community (see also Chapter 
2). In the original New Markets Heuvelland initiatives, it was not possible to 
develop a shared story because the proposed frames did not connect well 
to issues that were considered relevant and credible by other stakeholders 
(provincial government, entrepreneurs). The conditions of credibility and 
salience were not met, as illustrated below.
The talk about building a network organization and wider business community 
including interest groups, and so on, did not resonate with the culture of the 
region, in which communication was more informal and based on one-to-one 
relations on the one hand and relied on the authoritativeness of particular 
individuals on the other hand (network of executives). The story about building a 
network organization with equal participation of wide-ranging interests did not 
fit into the regional culture. Therefore, the storylines developed by experts in the 
project were not culturally resonant; they had no narrative fidelity. Moreover, 
such a story was not empirically credible, because participating entrepreneurs 
wanted to address problems that were real to them: the managerial and 
spatial obstacles in starting up innovative pilot projects and scaling these up 
to the regional level. Even though later on these wishes were fulfilled by the 
knowledge institutions in the project, it proved too difficult to compete with the 
stories that the entrepreneurs had set in motion themselves and around which 
they self-organized and attracted supporters. Another problem in the experts’ 
storytelling was a lack of experiential commensurability. Both entrepreneurs 
and policymakers found the proposed concepts too abstract and too distant 
from their own work and understandings. In contrast, stickiness principles like 
simplicity, unexpectedness, specificity, credibility, and emotion (cf. Heath & 
Heath, 2007; Baker, 2010) were established in the construction of the Healthy 
Living and Regional Branding stories. Both were considered specific, simple, and 
credible stories by audiences. The Regional Branding message connected well 
to the personal concerns and ideas of entrepreneurs about what the regional 
economy needed. To tell the stories of Healthy Living and Regional Branding, 
many symbols were used that spoke to the imagination of targeted audiences, 
for example the beautiful hilly landscape, regional products (beer, syrup, and 
so forth) and culture (gastronomy, festivals, art). The name of the self-organized 
group of entrepreneurs, the Zwarte Ruiters (Black Riders), was connected with 
the traditional beer brewery, De Zwarte Ruiter.  
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The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case also provides many examples of the 
construction of clear, imaginative, credible, and attractive stories through 
social interactions. For the Veenvaren initiative, a strong emotive symbol 
was the traditional boat in which one of the initiators sailed the waters of the 
Krimpenerwaard polder, representing the ambition to reintroduce boating in 
the polder. He regularly sailed across the waters with his traditional boat and 
took visitors on board to show them the benefits of boating. By enacting the 
story of Veenvaren in actual practice, the initiator tried to prove that it was 
credible and consistent with existing practices and experiences. His boat 
became an important symbol for the Veenvaren initiative. It spoke well to 
the imagination of listeners as it resonated well with both the culture and the 
personal everyday experiences of listeners and their beliefs and values.
These examples show how symbols were used to construct strong, appealing 
stories that connected to the personal life experiences of targeted audiences. 
The continuous construction and shaping of stories show that credibility, 
salience, and emotion are never inherent qualities of stories. A story is not sticky 
in itself. A story becomes sticky because of what people do with it when they 
pass it on to one another.
Good stories are told by great listeners
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case shows that stories became sticky when tellers 
were able to connect well to the beliefs, concerns, and ambitions of targeted 
listeners. This requires on the part of issue proponents a certain amount of 
empathy and the ability to listen. Initiators in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
case strove to be open and responsive to ideas of potential partners. 
Empathizing entailed careful listening to the stories of conversation partners, 
seeking to see things from the other’s perspective by relating to the other’s 
everyday concerns and experiences. For example, the Werkgroep <--> Gouda 
Krimpenerwaard spokesman invested much time and energy in listening to 
the concerns of entrepreneurs and inhabitants in the Krimpenerwaard, as well 
as to the politicians with whom he wanted to connect. He thus became very 
knowledgeable about the frames with which he had to align his own story. 
Storytelling required a great deal of listening; or, in other words, strong sticky 
stories were told by great listeners with much patience. 
The Heuvelland analysis suggests that the process managers – the experts 
– were focusing so hard on building the right coalition according to their 
own beliefs that there was little room left for listening and empathizing. The 
meetings and website set up to facilitate joint fact finding and exploring 
alternative perspectives did not provide enough opportunity for listening. One 
of the process managers complained that she really wished to talk in person 
to participant entrepreneurs in an informal atmosphere, but was unable to 
because she was excluded from such informal gatherings. This suggests that 
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in Heuvelland, cultural rules of community building were hindering ‘outsider’ 
actors from listening and empathizing. Thus, outsider participants were unable 
to align frames and start a sticky story. This view is supported by the examples 
of the initiatives (Healing Hills and Regional Branding) of entrepreneurs who 
were part of the regional executive network and apparently had no problems 
aligning their ideas with the dominant policy stories. They were able to navigate 
the self-referential frames of the provincial government formed by concerns 
about the economic competitiveness of the region in relation to other Dutch 
and European regions. 
Processes in which stories become sticky
Stories have all kinds of properties, such as a beginning and end, a plot, and 
main characters; but whether a story is sticky, i.e. memorable and contagious, 
is not inherent in the story itself.  A story becomes sticky because of how 
people construct and alter it when they pass it on to one another. This happens 
through careful navigation of the self-referential frames of targeted supporters, 
frame alignment, and resemiotization in social interactions (see also Benford 
& Snow, 2000; Van Herzele & Aarts, 2013). The case findings demonstrate that, 
to understand how people mobilize and influence the policy process, we can 
focus on the human interactions in which stories are told, listened to, aligned, 
and subtly altered. In other words, the power or fading of a story, for example 
policy stories, can be explained by what happens to stories in social interactions 
(see also Aarts, 2009). This process of meaning construction is influenced by a 
number of factors. Stories become sticky when they are connected to relevant 
policy stories at the right time, in the right ‘language’, and by the right persons. 
In the next sections, we discuss the findings of the two cases with respect to 
circumstances that influence the processes in which stories become sticky.  
6.3 Formal and informal conversations as driver of sticky stories
In line with, for example, Huitema & Meijerink (2010) who identify the recognizing 
and exploiting of multiple venues as a strategy of policy entrepreneurs, our case 
findings indicate that stories were made sticky by creating and using various 
opportunities for conversation which enabled learning about different life 
worlds and frames. Through conversations, stories were shaped, reproduced, 
and resemiotized to connect to existing stories of potential supporters. 
In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, many opportunities for conversation were 
used and created. The civic initiatives’ strategy was aimed at conversing at all 
times, everywhere, and in every way. Throughout 25 years of campaigning, 
proponents of the initiative to protect landscape values in the fringe attended 
many meetings in the region about related topics, they talked informally on the 
street, wrote letters to governmental representatives and potential supporters, 
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contributed to newspaper coverage, held informal meetings, used channels of 
formal public participation, and more. This resulted very slowly in the resonance 
of the story in a large network of regional stakeholders. 
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case shows that frame alignment and the 
connecting and fitting of stories were supported by particular conversational 
settings that enabled participants to openly explore, share, connect, and 
reframe stories. Two things were noticed about favourable conversational 
settings. First, to enable attention and alignment, participants and supporters 
of initiatives avoided the existing official channels. They looked for settings in 
which there was room to openly and informally explore various options with 
targeted supporters and to be creative. The case provides many examples 
of such settings, like the competitions about future plans for the fringe area 
(Gouda Havenstad and Stadsrand Natuurlijk) and the participative design process 
for the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis. Secondly, informal conversation between 
decision makers (local and regional executives) was also essential to generate 
enough political and financial support. This involves settings in which local and 
regional governmental executives meet one another and both formally and 
informally discuss alternatives, or i.e. settings that enable informal networking 
and establishing connections and alignments. Informal conversation settings 
which favoured exploration of perspectives and brainstorming enabled actors 
to empathize and listen and thereby facilitated learning about various frames 
and stories which could be relevant for establishing connections.  
In Heuvelland, one of the problems for the experts’ initiative to advance an 
attractive story about area-oriented development was a lack of opportunity to 
discuss it in formal or informal conversations. It was suggested that the process 
managers – the experts – were focusing too much attention on building the 
right coalition according to their own beliefs and were unable to create a 
situation in which they could listen and empathize. Despite efforts to organize 
meetings and a virtual platform to facilitate informal and collaborative exchange 
of views and alternatives, sticky stories did not emerge. Process managers were 
not able to create conditions for informal conversations with entrepreneurs in 
which decisions in formal meetings could be prepared. In Heuvelland, informal 
one-to-one conversations were an essential vehicle for creating sticky stories 
and connecting different worlds and networks. However, they were excluded 
from informal conversations between the engaged entrepreneurs. The findings 
suggest that the closed character of the managerial network of entrepreneurs 
and government executives was hindering outsider actors from listening and 
empathizing. As a result, the stories of the experts and of the entrepreneurs 
developed separately and competed with one another. Outsider participants 
were unable to align ambitions and frames and start a sticky story.
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The conclusions about favourable conversational settings are supported 
by a growing body of literature on the role of conversations in organization 
management (Shaw, 2002; Ford & Ford, 1995; Ford, 1999; Baker, 2010; Van Herzele 
& Aarts, 2013). This literature argues that the activity of conversation is the key 
process through which forms of organizing are reproduced and changed. 
[Conversations] are integral to work and play and are a hub of organizational life. 
Conversations are the channel through which people work with others, make 
decisions, and build relationships. (Baker, 2010, p. 3).
Ford (1999, p. 483) indicates that conversations, at the most basic level, can be 
perceived as ‘what is said and listened to’ between people. But conversations 
also include the symbols, artefacts, theatrics, and so forth that are used in 
combination with or as substitutes for what is spoken (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; 
Ford, 1999). The value of conversations lies in the opportunity they provide to 
make sense of ambiguity together and to understand a little bit better complex 
and continuous change (Baker, 2010). By storytelling through conversations, 
people can make sense of and anticipate change. Especially in complex 
change processes, conversations provide opportunity for feedback that may 
generate new and unimagined ideas (ibid.). People can explore differences in 
conversations, achieve a better understanding of the situation, and discover 
new aspects and possibilities. Through such conversations, new patterns, 
knowledge, and storylines may emerge, or they may lead to adjustment or 
transformation of existing stories. 
Under certain circumstances, conversations are precursors to transformative 
change. Baker (2010) argues that conversations can ‘catalyze’ change when 
they have some qualitative properties; that is, when conversations provide a 
context of trust, respect, curiosity, and hope. Other conditions are acceptance 
of differences and patience with respect to the process. Such properties of 
conversations create an advantageous situation for people to open up their 
minds, become responsive, and come out of their comfort zone. 
The arguments about catalytic conversations support the case findings 
about the type of conversational settings that favour storytelling and frame 
alignment. Our findings suggest that such a catalytic context can be achieved 
when conversations provide room for empathizing and listening2. By listening 
genuinely, differences in perceptions can be discovered. And after understanding 
the other, one can try to be understood by presenting ideas in the context of the 
perceptions, paradigms, and concerns of the other person. Along similar lines, 
Scharmer (2001, 2010) points to the relation between states of conversation 
and the resulting extent of listening and learning. According to Scharmer 
(2010, p. 4), conversations which take the form of conforming and talking nice 
2 See also Buizer (2008) who with similar cases of civic initiatives and their relation to government 
bodies points to the importance of empathy in coalition building.
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lead to listening to what you already know (downloading). More confrontation 
through debate can lead to recognizing new facts (factual listening). Dialogue 
that provides room for empathizing en reflection, results in empathic listening, 
that is, seeing a situation through the eyes of another and thus seeing yourself 
as part of a larger whole. The three forms of listening combined can lead to 
generative listening, where creativity emerges and potential for innovation 
is recognized. Thus, conversations which provide room for empathizing are 
critical to innovation and collaboration. 
The importance of conversations is often overlooked and taken for granted. 
However, on the basis of the case study results, and supported by a body 
of literature about conversations as triggers of change, we conclude that 
conversations were essential hubs in the shaping of sticky stories. Conversations 
were needed to start, shape, and spread a story. Frame alignment was 
stimulated by conversational settings that provided room for telling, listening, 
and empathizing. Building on the empirical findings and on the literature, we 
argue that stories are made sticky in human interactions through ‘catalytic 
conversations’ (cf. Baker, 2010), that is, conversations in which people are 
curious about new perspectives, accept differences, and take time to listen and 
empathize.
6.4 Events and opportunities: the power of the small and the many
The Heuvelland and Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case studies point to the decisive 
roles of specific events in storytelling efforts. For example, the opportunity of 
the crisis fund in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case enabled the attachment of 
emotion and urgency to the story of the civic initiative by stressing that it was 
now or never, a unique opportunity which could not be missed. This enhanced 
the perceived urgency of the issue (to local and regional governments) to such 
an extent that the story about renovating the historic lock became sticky and 
tipped. In Heuvelland, triggering events could also be observed. In the Regional 
Branding case, changes in political circumstances were used to make the story 
stickier. The story aligned well with the existing policy story about the regional 
economy, which was faced with the threat of young people leaving for other 
parts of the country. 
Although political opportunities and events certainly triggered action, we found 
that they cannot explain change in themselves. The case study findings point to 
more subtle and smaller contextual factors and circumstances that were equally 
important to the process in which stories became sticky or faded. The findings 
support and strengthen arguments (e.g. Kingdon, 2003; Cheny & Christensen, 
2001; Hudalah et al., 2010; Van Woerkum et al., 2011) that focusing events 
need something else to carry a subject onto a policy agenda. ‘Focusing events 
reinforce pre-existing perceptions of a problem (Zahariadis, 2007). The results 
from the case studies indicate that political and social events and opportunities 
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were social constructs which were given meaning as triggers in the light of 
many smaller and bigger events in the past, and in the light of negotiations and 
stories that had evolved over a long period of time. It was a matter of ‘filling the 
cup’, or in the words of Kingdon (2003), ‘softening up’ prospective adherents.
In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, the initiators used various opportunities 
to attract attention to alternative plans for the fringe area. Over a period of 25 
years, they used design competitions, formal participation procedures around 
government plans for the region, the project Masterplan Stolwijkersluis, and 
their own yearly dawn walk to suggest alternative plans, and many other 
occasions. The variety of contexts in which they promoted their ideas enabled 
a slow filtering through in the policy system. The only thing required to actually 
implement the ideas was resources that, ultimately, had to flow from the 
provincial government. That happened when the province realized that they 
needed a few hectares more to achieve their ambitions for nature development. 
To solve that problem, the provincial government could connect to the proposals 
that had already been floated by the civic initiative. The province’s problem of 
the hectares for nature development was the final small drop that made the cup 
run over. The concurrence of a large number of small things was what tipped 
stories and ideas. In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, civic initiatives enabled 
the cup to be filled with many small drops by telling their story always and 
everywhere over a long period of time. The right context was created to make 
the story stick.  
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard analysis provides many examples of more subtle 
and smaller circumstances that together preluded change. One of these is the 
vigorous debates about the construction of a new road around Gouda and the 
related industrial area that at first glance seem unrelated to the story that was 
promoted later on, but still mattered a great deal in the coalition-building process. 
The passionate engagement of Werkgroep <--> Gouda-Krimpenerwaard in the 
debate about the new road led them into a coalition with stakeholders from 
the Krimpenerwaard polder. These contacts remained and helped Werkgroep 
<--> Gouda-Krimpenerwaard to know about the beliefs, concerns, interests, and 
values of people in the Krimpenerwaard. They understood through on-going 
conversations with Krimpenerwaardians over a long period of time that the 
nature–agriculture controversy was the major concern also for the province, 
which was responsible for solving the conflicts. Thus, they knew exactly how 
to deal carefully with the political culture in the Krimpenerwaard and how to 
use that to get to the province. Because they knew that the intrusion of urban 
dwellers was undesired by Krimpenerwaardians, they gratefully accepted and 
stimulated the alignment with the Veenvaren initiative. A sticky story was 
created out of it, in which the restoration of landscape values in the fringe (such 
as the historic lock) and recreational amenities were connected to a story about 
the economic opportunities of reintroducing boating in the Krimpenerwaard 
polder. At first glance, the conflicts and discussions about the new road at 
the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s seem to have little to 
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do with the story about Veenvaren and the restoration of the lock. However, 
the Veenvaren story and the role of the lock in that story were only able to 
become sticky as a result of the previous engagements of Werkgroep Gouda 
<--> Krimpenerwaard with Krimpenerwaardians around the issue of the bypass. 
Little things can matter a great deal. 
In Heuvelland, small contextual changes were at play as well and help 
explain why some initiatives tipped, whereas others faded. For example, the 
participation of Transforum and Alterra in the New Markets project subtly 
changed the context, and this had a big effect in terms of coalition building 
and agenda setting. Alterra’s participation slightly changed the emphasis in 
the project’s goals. Alterra believed that if the project was about landscape 
development and protection, then other stakeholders should be invited into 
the project (nature and landscape organizations, policymakers from relevant 
policy domains, and so on). The original project managers opposed this view 
because they felt that the key, innovative economic activities could only be 
provided by entrepreneurs. The small change of adding a new participant, who 
subtly and tacitly changed the project focus, led to a conflict about the project 
organization that deflected attention from a collective attempt to introduce a 
new approach to area-oriented development. 
The tipping of the Regional Branding story in the Heuvelland case was also 
a result of smaller contextual changes that together made the cup overflow. 
During 2006 and 2007, the ideas about a ‘silver economy’ were slowly meeting 
increased resistance inside and outside the policy system. The observation that 
in fact a specialization in the elderly would lead to an even more rapid leaking 
away of youngsters from the region, and thereby present a real threat to the 
knowledge economy, led to a shift in political and policy attention towards 
retaining youngsters. The Regional Branding initiative was well aware of that 
changing political circumstance, and it fitted nicely into the concern already 
raised at province headquarters. However, a tipping point was reached only 
when the province took over the initiative as a result of other circumstances. 
The Regional Branding initiative had started out as an idea connected to 
efforts by the city Maastricht to develop a city marketing strategy. The province 
considered it undesirable for Maastricht to develop a brand for itself isolated 
from the other cities in the region. The province, conforming to its ambition to 
develop a strong urban network in the South-Limburg region, thought it would 
be wiser to construct a regional brand for the whole urban network. Therefore, 
the branding of the region, specifically in relation to the South Limburg Urban 
Network, became a major provincial concern in 2007. Thus, the story of Regional 
Branding gained more and more power as various circumstances reinforced its 
attraction. 
On the basis of our findings, we argue that the triggering effect of an event 
or opportunity can only be understood by considering preceding events and 
processes of storytelling. As already stated, it is a matter of filling the cup, or 
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‘softening up’ prospective adherents. When the cup is filled, it only takes a 
small drop more to make the cup run over. This argument corresponds with 
complexity perspectives on change, indicating that small and seemingly 
irrelevant or unimportant changes can have large effects in relation to one 
another (Morgan, 1986). Change may then seem radical, but is in fact the result 
of gradual and step-by-step change. 
In the context of storytelling processes and conditions that enable stories to 
become sticky, it is important to note the following: 1) events or circumstances 
were incorporated into storytelling as triggers or opportunities, when such 
events and circumstances were important and relevant to targeted supporters 
(for example the crisis fund) and 2) successful initiatives tried out novelties, 
proposals, and stories all the time and searched actively for various conversational 
settings in which these could be discussed.  For both efforts, initiatives required 
much patience and had to continuously scan the environment for relevant 
events and opportunities. They created favourable circumstances to a certain 
extent. Although issues and events can arise unexpectedly, sometimes 
perceived as coincidence or luck, there is often a planned part (see also Van 
Woerkum et al., 2011). 
6.5 Connectors: people who make things happen
The general argument in policy agenda-setting research, at least in the multiple 
streams model (Kingdon, 2003) and the punctuated equilibrium model (Jones 
& Baumgartner, 2005), is that, although institutions and focusing events make 
things possible, people make things happen (Zahariadis, 2007; Huitema & 
Meijerink, 2010). The point made is that the importance of structure and 
institutions in policy change is tempered considerably by individuals, timing, 
and context. What people do, how they prepare change by ‘selling’ alternative 
proposals, and how they influence (policy) frames through their interactions 
is what matters. In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, we found that individual 
agents, who we labelled ‘connectors’ (after Gladwell, 2000; Shirky, 2008), 
connected ambitions, storylines, people, resources, events, and contexts. 
These connecting activities enabled the emergence, strengthening, spreading, 
adapting, and fitting of stories in the following ways. 
Connecting qualities
First, the case study findings point to connectors who had key positions in 
networks and could therefore connect different networks and groups. Examples 
in the Heuvelland case were the leading entrepreneurs who used their informal 
executive networks effectively. They bridged the entrepreneurial network and 
the relevant policy networks. In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, we found that 
connectors also included engaged citizens who spread and shared knowledge 
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with many others and thus made ideas spread rapidly through a wider network. 
Meeting and knowing many others, preferably in relevant sub-networks and 
groups, proved to influence the mobilization of attention. 
 
Second, individual agents also operated as connectors when they were 
considered a credible storyteller by other people or when they were able to 
mobilize credible storytellers3. In Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, we identified a 
number of credible storytellers who had status or were considered experts 
in the field and therefore were able to persuade influential actors in their 
network. However, storyteller credibility was not exclusive to people who 
were considered to be authorities. Sometimes, storytellers had a good claim 
to a hearing because they were considered genuine and credible on the basis 
of their cultural background and knowledge about the place or region. The 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case provides the example of the Veenvaren initiator 
who was considered as a credible conversation partner by crucial political 
actors in the Krimpenerwaard, because he belonged to the community of 
Krimpenerwaardians and contributed valuable local knowledge. In this way, the 
Veenvaren initiative established a fruitful connection between civic initiatives 
in the city of Gouda and decision makers in the Krimpenerwaard. In Heuvelland, 
people assigned with authority were credible storytellers. This worked out 
positively for the Regional Branding initiative. For the New Markets initiative, 
it was a delimiting factor as the experts themselves were not part of the select 
club of individuals who were considered to have authority. Here, they would 
have needed other connectors that did have the right cultural background and 
position and that could reinforce the story and pass it on. Apparently, sometimes 
credibility entailed the attributed authority of people, sometimes expertise 
mattered, or cultural background, or local knowledge. On this basis, we can 
conclude that a storyteller’s credibility is a social construct, i.e. it depends on 
what is considered important by his or her conversation partners in particular 
situations.
A third connecting quality is being able to empathize and listen to stories of 
conversation partners. In Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, we see that even regular 
citizens, who were not part of a powerful managerial network, could still 
operate as connectors. They managed to align frames by empathizing and 
listening, that is, they tried to understand the other’s perspective. People 
who could empathize with, and listen carefully to, potential supporters were 
crucial connectors. Moreover, key players were those connectors who liked 
to share information and knowledge to help other people; and by being very 
knowledgeable about different contexts they could bridge different networks 
and reach other connectors whose connecting qualities lay more in ‘selling’ and 
‘networking’ the story.
3 Benford & Snow (2000) use the term ‘credible frame articulators’, see also Chapter 2.
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A fourth connecting quality is being attentive to events, circumstances, 
and contexts that provide the opportunity to connect and align stories and 
people. For example, the group of entrepreneurs in the Regional Branding 
initiative built an informal network and provided a suitable context for informal 
conversations. They seized political opportunities and tried to create the right 
context. The same happened in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, in which 
initiatives continually searched for contexts to promote their messages and tell 
their story. Waiting, searching, and creating the right (conversational) context 
required a great deal of knowledge and sensitivity about various contexts as 
well as patience and perseverance. Successful connectors knew how to ‘nudge’ 
contexts, or in other words, they knew how to signal, use, and create contexts 
to a certain extent. Thus, connectors were critical agents in the construction of a 
sticky story, or conversely they could weaken a competing story. 
No single heroes
The case studies demonstrated that change could not be traced to single heroes 
or leaders of change. As one of the respondents in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
case said, ‘success had many fathers’. Connectors become connectors only in 
relation to other people also performing as connectors and in relation to specific 
issues. This conclusion is supported by arguments put forward in Shirky’s work 
(2008). His central argument is that messages and stories are most effectively 
and efficiently passed on in network structures in which small, highly connected 
groups are linked to other small connected groups in a loose connection. See 
Figure 6.1. Connectors refer to the highly connected people that hold social 
networks together and enable robust connectedness in a wider network. Note 
that, in the figure, the connectivity of the smaller clusters in the network does 
not depend on one person, but multiple persons. 
As long as a couple of people in each small group know a couple of people in 
other groups, you get the advantages of tight connection at the small scale and 
loose connection at the large scale. (Shirky, 2008, p. 216) 
According to Shirky (2008, p. 225), connectors bring to the network the ‘bridging 
capital’ required to establish connections in the network that enable messages 
to spread, similar to our previous discussions about frame alignment processes. 
Shirky’s model of the small world network and the importance of connectors 
says a great deal about innovative potentials within the network but does not 
elucidate the circumstances and processes through which connections are 
actually established. Our findings show that this depends on the actions and 
interactions of the connectors involved and the discursive contexts in which 
connections are deemed relevant. In our approach to connectors, we refer to 
social contact and the framing and reframing efforts of people in conversations. 
Our interpretation of the connector concept adds an emphasis on discursive 
abilities to the notion of mathematical connectedness. 
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Figure 6.1: Connectors in a network (Shirky, 2008, p. 217)
The connector concept is a relational concept involving the communicative 
process in which people connect to other people, stories, and frames, and 
relevant events and context. The concept tells us that people who take the lead 
in a group initiative cannot by themselves succeed in spreading a message and 
achieving goals. Any group initiative requires multiple connectors who link up 
a wider network. Connectors are not only leaders or initiators, but also group 
members who know how to establish connections with relevant other groups 
and make stories spread.
Policy entrepreneurs and discursive power
In relation to the concept of policy entrepreneurs, addressed in Chapter 2, we 
can make a few observations. First, our findings about the various strategies 
deployed by issue proponents to promote particular stories reflect many 
elements of studies about policy entrepreneurs and their strategies (cf. Huitema 
& Meijerink, 2010; Mintrom, 1997). Such strategies include the development 
and ‘selling’ of new ideas, building coalitions and networking, recognizing and 
exploiting windows of opportunity, and recognizing, creating, and exploiting 
multiple venues for getting attention. The main idea is that successful policy 
entrepreneurs are skilled at coupling, which means attaching problems to 
solutions and finding politicians receptive to their ideas. 
Second, Kingdon (2003) and Zahariadis (2007) emphasize that entrepreneurs 
who have better access to policymakers and more resources (especially time) are 
more likely to have success. We have demonstrated that, although such aspects 
are important, ultimately it is what people do and communicate that matters. 
The critical factor that enables a story to spread and become sticky is how people 
‘sell’ and connect ideas and stories through careful learning about the frames 
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and perspectives of targeted supporters and how they establish connections 
in the wider network (not only politicians). The concept of connectors, that 
is, our interpretation of the concept, emphasizes the discursive qualities that 
affect agenda setting: credibility, empathy, and listening, framing and reframing 
stories, and establishing connections between various relevant groups in the 
network. Of course, it helps when there is access, and when time and other 
resources can be invested facilitating on-going storytelling and fitting stories to 
existing policy stories, but what happens in interactions and how people come 
to a shared understanding is what makes the change, not resources or access 
in themselves. If stories get no response, do not touch a chord, then there is 
no attention and no support. We argue that successful policy entrepreneurship 
requires connectors: people who can connect stories, people, and events. 
Citizens and business entrepreneurs
The question may be raised of whether it matters whether initiatives are 
essentially driven by business entrepreneurs (Heuvelland case) or by citizens 
(Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case) with respect to goal achievement and agenda 
change. This is essentially a question about power, in policy agenda-setting 
research operationalized as ‘access’, ‘resources’, and ‘manipulation’ (e.g. 
Zahariadis, 2007). Do business entrepreneurs have more power than citizens 
and are they therefore more likely to be successful policy entrepreneurs? 
On the basis of our analysis, we are inclined to say that this is not the case. 
Business entrepreneurs had more financial resources and access through their 
connectedness in executive networks. However, we have demonstrated that 
resources and access were only one aspect of how stories became sticky and 
how issues got prioritized. The way ambitions were framed into attractive 
stories and how the story was fitted and resemiotized to establish connections 
with potential supporters was maybe even more important. ‘Network power’ 
can also come about through collective meaning construction (cf. Booher & 
Innes, 2002). We have demonstrated with the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case that 
citizens can effectively mobilize discursive power as well, without having many 
resources at their disposal or without access to decision-making arenas. How 
people in networks establish a flow of ideas and stories through conversations 
is what matters most. In other words, whether business entrepreneurs are more 
powerful agenda setters than residents depends entirely on the context and 
how they manage to bring about a spreading of a story in the wider network by 
connecting to relevant other people. 
Context matters, connectors come and go
One final observation about connectors should be addressed. We concluded 
from the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case that the connector label is not exclusive 
to a particular person but depends on context, i.e. time, place, situation, and 
the stories being promoted or competing. Persons performed as connectors 
at certain junctures, whereas at other junctures other persons had this task. 
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Individual people performed as connectors at different times depending on the 
specific context and the qualities needed at the time. Therefore, we use the term 
connector to emphasize the communicative connections established by people 
in continuously changing webs of relations. We did not aim to locate particular 
individuals who performed as change agents. Change could not be attributed 
to a few people who merit the label of change agent or leaders of change. 
Change knew many ‘fathers’. Moreover, connectors were always dependent on 
the interactions in the wider network of which they were part, so all they could 
do was ‘nudge’ contexts. 
6.6 Conclusion
From the case study findings, we conclude that agendas are influenced by 
people essentially through the interactional framing of ambitions into sticky 
stories, and the incorporation of smaller and bigger events into those stories. 
Stories do not become sticky as result of their properties or by coincidence 
through focusing events; rather they are made sticky by people through their 
conversations with one another. This entails slow processes of continuous 
resemiotization and frame alignment in order to frame and ‘story’ issues into 
targeted audiences’ latitude of acceptance. On the part of proposal promoters, 
this requires attentive listening to, and empathizing with, what is said and 
brought forward by potential supporters, i.e. attentive navigation of their self-
referential frames. Thus, storytelling is not about transmitting stories, but about 
careful listening, empathizing, sharing, and aligning. Storytelling that enables 
the mobilization of political and policy attention is not so much persuasive (cf. 
Throgmorton, 1996; Sandercock, 2003) as connective (cf. Baker, 2010). 
Three conditions have been identified that facilitate the process of stories 
becoming sticky: catalytic conversations, incorporation of smaller and bigger 
events, and people who perform as connectors of groups, stories, and events. 
In the next chapter, these three conditions and their interplay are further 
developed into a model that elucidates the process of stories becoming sticky.
Planning as 
connective 
storytelling: 
conclusions and 
discussion
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7.1 Introduction
The goal of this research was to contribute to insights about how planners can 
make better connections with civic initiatives without falling into the trap of 
‘government-centrism’. It was argued that a more responsive and enabling 
planning practice should give careful attention to where civic initiatives emerge 
and to the meaning they have for planning practices to promote liveable and 
sustainable places (Healey, 2006; Booher, 2008; Albrechts, 2008). This requires 
an ‘outside-in’ approach to civic engagement in planning practices (e.g. 
Boonstra & Boelens, 2011); this, in turn, entails understanding the dynamics 
of social networks beyond the boundaries of formal planning processes. The 
focus of analysis was not on how planners engage citizens, but on how citizens 
engage planners in their planning work. The research aimed to elucidate how 
civic initiatives organize themselves and relate to government-led planning and 
policy practices, and the circumstances under which they manage to transform 
planning agendas for regional spatial development despite the blockages and 
dominating structures of a self-referential government (e.g. Healey, 2006). 
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The following question was central to the research:
How do civic initiatives connect to government organizations, and how can we 
understand outcomes of these connections in terms of the achievement of ambitions 
of civic initiatives and planning agendas for regional spatial development?
In Chapter 2, we operationalized this research question by focusing on whether 
and how civic initiatives mobilize support and attention for their proposals 
about improving the quality of places by constructing inviting stories. Strategic 
framing of issues, selecting certain aspects and ignoring others (cf Entman, 1993), 
was considered a powerful agenda-setting mechanism (Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005; McCombs & Shaw, 1993). This implied a focus on the day-to-day social 
interactions and use of language that constitute, reconfirm, and transform the 
way we think about things and act upon them, and how this subtly influences 
political agendas (Healey, 2006; Fischer & Forester, 1993). 
The analysis was based on the idea that storytelling is a strategic form of framing 
in which problem definitions, solutions, strategies, and motivations for action 
are brought together in a coherent whole, providing an interpretive framework 
for the listener to make sense of an ambiguous reality. The chances of stories 
mobilizing support are increased if they are inviting to listeners who will then 
pass the story on to others. Civic initiatives are challenged to fit stories to the 
self-referential frames of targeted supporters to get attention and support. 
This happens in an interactive process of ‘making sense’ together, in which 
the telling and sharing of stories plays an important role. We have argued that 
stories mobilize attention and support when they are told and framed such 
that they are considered relevant, credible, truthful, and emotive by listeners. 
Moreover, the attraction of stories is enhanced when they are connected 
to events and specific contexts that are considered important or relevant by 
targeted audiences. Therefore, in this study, we have looked for the way civic 
initiatives construct, align, and reshape stories in their interactions with other 
actors and in relation to the specific context. Basically, this involved asking ‘who 
is telling what to whom in what context, why, and with what kind of outcomes?’
In Chapter 3, we elaborately discussed the interpretive methodology used to 
analyse the agenda-setting and storytelling endeavours of civic initiatives. 
Two in-depth case studies were selected concerning civic initiatives which 
produced unsolicited proposals for local and regional spatial development in 
two different regions in the Netherlands: 1) the New Markets initiatives in the 
Heuvelland region, and 2) the positioning of landscape values in the Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard urban-rural fringe on policy agendas. The results of these 
case studies were presented and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, and compared 
with each other in Chapter 6. In this final chapter, we wrap up the findings and 
discuss the implications for planning and policy research and practice. 
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7.2 Civic initiatives and unfolding sticky stories 
The case studies demonstrated that agenda setting is not only achieved by the 
‘usual suspects’, i.e. influential lobby groups, politicians, and policymakers, but 
can also be influenced by common citizens and entrepreneurs. Under certain 
circumstances, they are able to self-organize and mobilize support in the webs 
of relations that define shared spaces (Castells, 2004, 2012; Healey, 2006), i.e. 
they can develop ‘network power’ (Booher & Innes, 2002). Similar conclusions 
have been drawn in other recent research about citizens’ self-organized action 
and how this can lead to changes in policymaking and spatial planning (e.g. 
Winnubst, 2011; Warner, 2008; Aarts et al., 2007; Buizer, 2008). We contribute a 
number of new insights on the way citizens may contribute to policy change 
through agenda setting and storytelling. In this section, we discuss the main 
findings of this research, and in section 3 we discuss the contributions of these 
findings to policy and planning science. 
Storytelling and agenda setting in Heuvelland
In the Heuvelland case, experts’ initiatives to propose an alternative approach 
to spatial development with the New Markets philosophy slowly faded. Two 
initiatives emerged from the New Markets process which further developed in 
informal settings outside the control of the New Markets project organization. 
These two initiatives managed to construct strong stories which gained political 
support. Two major shifts in the agenda-setting process were identified. First, 
the Healthy Living initiative was prioritized and assigned a central role in the 
next phase of the New Market project, but only a short time later this story 
was suddenly replaced by a story about Regional Branding, which emphasized 
stimulating the knowledge economy by creating and marketing an attractive 
region for young talented workers. The analysis of shifts in the agenda-setting 
process pointed to the importance of storytelling and strategic framing 
processes. In relation to framing processes and the question of why some stories 
were successful whereas others faded, we drew the following conclusions.
First, we concluded that a clear direction, in the form of an appealing story, 
was of the utmost importance. In the New Markets process, it was not possible 
to formulate an appealing and directional ambition for spatial and economic 
development of the region. There was too much focus on building coalitions 
and managing relations, and too little on identifying issues. Identifying issues 
in a collective multi-stakeholder setting proved difficult because stakeholders 
preferred to realize their own ambitions through smaller and informal settings. 
As a result, the New Markets initiative, presented as an alternative approach to 
existing spatial policies and planning strategies for the region, was not able 
to develop an appealing storyline that would generate attention and broad 
support for the proposed ideas. The lack of direction was compounded by a 
coming and going of stakeholders in the New Markets coalitions. Coalitions 
seemed to be unmanageable and directionless. In contrast, in smaller and 
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informal settings, two initiatives framed their ambitions into strong stories that 
connected well to existing policy stories about future economic development 
in the region. From this, we derive that, to become sticky, stories required stable 
ambitions that were flexibly framed into a story that was recognizable and 
relevant to targeted audiences.
Second, a clear connecting strategy with relevant governmental actors was 
essential, in this case to the provincial government. Stakeholders perceived 
the provincial government as crucial and decisive in regional development. 
Therefore, agenda-setting strategies were mainly aimed at the provincial 
policy agendas and at getting the attention of provincial representatives. 
The province was characterized as authoritative and highly self-referential, 
and this challenged initiatives with a major barrier to becoming noticed and 
prioritized. However, ambiguity about the extent and way of involving various 
provincial departments resulted in an unstable alignment strategy and 
prevented the establishment of a meaningful connection. On the one hand, 
government involvement was considered necessary for resources (money, 
land, knowledge, regulations) as well as coordination, and, on the other hand, 
too much government involvement was believed to dampen the innovative 
energy of grass-roots initiatives. Similar experiences with ambiguous views 
about (provincial) government engagement in regional innovation networks 
in the Netherlands were found by Aarts et al. (2007). In contrast to the New 
Markets project, the coalition building strategies of Healthy Living and Regional 
Branding were more straightforward and entailed building good relations with 
the policy network around economic development. Overcoming the barriers of 
a limited government perspective on social reality required a stable alignment 
strategy that fitted to ways of working and ways of viewing the world of targeted 
supporters.  
Third, the Healthy Living and Regional Branding initiatives established meaningful 
alignments through informal networks of business and government executives 
that provided the opportunity to share stories and explore alternatives. Informal 
communication in personal, one-to-one meetings seemed to prevail and was 
accepted generally as the way things were negotiated in the region. This in 
part explains why the stories of Healthy Living and Regional Branding could 
spread through relevant networks and managed to include decision makers in 
storytelling. In addition, the Regional Branding initiative in particular managed 
to strengthen its story by connecting it to political and social events that were 
considered highly important by the provincial government. By interweaving 
these events and the provincial government’s problem frames into the story 
about a future ‘dynamic and vibrant’ region, it triggered wide support from 
local governments and the provincial government, as well as businesses.
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Storytelling and agenda setting in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe
In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, tipping points in agenda setting were 
marked by particular political events, shifts in coalitions, and sudden shifts in 
the attention paid by government organizations to issues in the fringe area. To 
understand why shifts occurred, we asked what happened in the process and 
in the period leading up to tipping points. We found that the continuous and 
everyday interactions between stakeholders were essential, as these interactions 
enabled continuous framing of stories and fitting stories to the frames and 
stories of targeted supporters. The ambitions of civic initiatives remained stable, 
but these were over time framed into an evolving story that shifted multiple 
times to emphasize new or different elements. Shifts in storytelling occurred 
when coalition building required alignments with other groups. To get support 
from governments, this especially concerned fitting the story to relevant policy 
stories. This was particularly apparent in the process in which the story about 
the future of the fringe was framed as a regional matter, as relevant to the rural 
redevelopment of the Krimpenerwaard, to get the attention and commitment 
of the provincial authority. 
We found a number of answers to the question of how alignments between 
different stories and groups of people were established. Frame alignment 
strategies, as described in Chapter 3, in this case study concerned bridging, 
amplification, and extension of ideas to relate to the concerns and frames of 
potential supporters. Citizen initiatives’ frames were not transformed in the 
sense that totally new ideas were adopted. The issues in the case area remained 
the same, ambitions were stable, but the story about the future of the fringe 
area changed to fit well into policy stories that could facilitate implementation. 
 
With regard to the question of why alignment strategies were successful in 
terms of resonance and increased responsiveness of targeted supporters, the 
following explanations were found. First, positive response was enhanced by 
telling a story that was easy to understand and that triggered the imagination, 
for example through visualizations and design. 
Second, we found that stories needed time to filter through or, in the words of 
Kingdon (2003), the policy system had to be slowly ‘softened up’ to new stories. 
Repetition and continuously telling and sharing the story in various contexts 
helped this process of filtering through. By continuously framing and reframing, 
civic initiatives and their coalition partners slowly enlarged the ‘latitude of 
acceptance’ of governments (cf. Sherif & Hovland, 1961). 
Third, alignment with others required resemiotization (cf. Iedema, 2001; Van 
Herzele & Aarts, 2013) of stories to include perspectives of targeted supporters 
and to invite them to participate. To secure their attention and support, 
governments’ ambitions, concerns, and policy stories had to be incorporated 
into the story about the future of the fringe area. Incorporating the self-
referential frames of others into storytelling increased the credibility and 
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salience of the story by connecting to the values and beliefs of targets as well 
as their personal everyday experiences. This was especially demonstrated in the 
process in which alignments with initiatives for the rural development of the 
Krimpenerwaard were established. We described this process as navigating the 
self-referential frames of potential supporters. In this way, the responsiveness of 
targeted audiences, especially governmental stakeholders, was improved. 
Fourth, empathy and listening to stories of others was an important condition 
to understand the perspectives of others, exchange views, and construct 
a shared story. Storytellers had to listen carefully to understand the frames 
of targeted supporters and incorporate them effectively. Empathizing with 
targeted supporters was an effective strategy to get or keep a position at the 
negotiation table and to get access to relevant information. This means that 
telling and selling a story was important, but could not work without carefully 
listening to relevant other people. 
Presenting a story that would be considered relevant and credible was the 
main challenge. This was achieved not only through the incorporation of 
perspectives of relevant others (resemiotization), but also through construction 
of an identity that would render the proposal’s promoters credible and relevant 
in the eyes of others. The diverse civic initiatives in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
case framed themselves as the sort of partner with whom other groups, 
especially governments, like to cooperate: knowledgeable, constructive, 
and representative. They continuously tried to maintain good relations 
with government to be included in planning processes and to get access to 
information. Furthermore, the diverse civic initiatives tried to be considered 
credible and relevant by connecting with people that already had this label.
Wrapping up: how stories became sticky or faded
The case studies demonstrated that storytelling and story alignment efforts of 
civic initiatives and their supporters resulted in subtle and step-by-step changes 
in existing policy stories rather than structural or radical change. Fitting stories 
to existing policy stories through a slow process of softening up the policy 
system implied a reproduction of hegemonic policy stories. This is illustrated 
by the Regional Branding story in the Heuvelland case and the story about 
economic vitality and rural renovation in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case. 
Existing policy stories became a bit wider, but only to include new elements 
which re-confirmed rather than transformed the original story. This confirms 
arguments in other agenda-setting research that change is almost never radical 
(Kingdon, 2003) and even punctuated change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; 
Jones & Baumgartner, 2005) can be explained as a slow filtering through, a slow 
framing and reframing of new ideas and proposals. Civic initiatives contribute to 
change only in subtle ways. However, such subtle and small changes are crucial 
to understand larger effects (cf. Morgan, 1986). 
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Some stories became epidemic through on-going framing processes and 
‘tipped’, resulting in the achievement of ambitions of civic initiatives, like the 
story about the urban–rural fringe as a gateway between city and countryside 
in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case. And sometimes stories faded away to 
the benefit of other stories that became more dominant, like the fading of the 
Healing Hills story in favour of the Regional Branding story in the Heuvelland 
case. 
Synthesizing the results of the empirical chapters, including the comparison of 
the case studies in Chapter 6, we conclude that the following processes and 
conditions were critical for stories to become sticky.
1. Framing clear and stable ambitions into flexible stories
Successful civic initiatives had clear and stable ambitions which they packaged 
in flexible stories that changed over time. Storytelling enabled the incorporation 
of different perspectives and different ambitions of targeted supporters as well 
as adaptation to changing circumstances such as political events, new actors 
on the scene, and so forth. Flexible stories enabled alignment with potential 
supporters’ stories. Moreover, stories had to be flexible to incorporate occurring 
events that provided opportunities. Thus, ambitions remained stable, but they 
were incorporated into elastic stories that changed subtly through framing and 
reframing in social interactions. 
2. Navigating targeted supporters’ self-referentiality
We concluded in Chapter 6 that stickiness involves connecting to and enhancing 
the responsiveness of targeted supporters. In the cases this was done by 
stretching audiences’ latitude of acceptance (cf. Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Civic 
initiatives did not present stories as completely alternative ideas, but as ideas 
that fitted into existing (policy) stories. Thus, the chances were increased that 
potential supporters would consider the proposed stories credible, relevant, 
and meaningful. The extent to which original stories changed varied. In some 
cases, only bridging of similar stories took place, whereas, in other cases, stories 
were extended and amplified to include new storylines, like the inclusion of the 
Veenvaren storyline in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case. Thus, connections 
and stickiness of stories were established in storytelling processes where 
participants navigated one another’s self-referential frames and stories. 
3. Empathizing and listening
Connecting to the beliefs, concerns, and ambitions of targeted listeners required 
on the part of issue proponents a certain amount of empathy and the ability 
to listen. Empathizing entailed careful listening to the stories of conversation 
partners, seeking to see things from the other’s perspective by relating to the 
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other’s everyday concerns and experiences. Thus, storytelling required a great 
deal of listening; or, in other words, strong sticky stories were told by great 
listeners with much patience. 
4. Enabling conditions: focusing events, catalytic conversations, and connectors
The research results point to three enabling conditions which, in relation to one 
another, clarify how stories become sticky or fade away. These conditions are 1) 
focusing events and changing contexts that provide opportunity for alignment, 
2) conversations as the medium of storytelling, and 3) connectors as the people 
who connect stories, people, and events.
First, the case studies showed that stories became sticky at certain critical 
junctures marked by events interpreted and framed by proponents as a trigger 
or window of opportunity. By connecting a story to particular events that 
focus attention, alignment was enabled with potential supporters to whom 
these events were meaningful. However, events did not trigger by themselves 
and cannot by themselves explain change. The case studies showed that the 
triggering effect of an event could only be understood in relation to the way 
people framed and interpreted those events as triggers in the light of past events 
and discussions. Over time the interactions, conversations and storytelling 
between civic initiatives and potential supporters shaped the context in which 
new events were given meaning. In Chapter 6, we described this process as the 
filling of a cup where the final drop that makes the cup run over represents the 
event that is interpreted as the trigger or tipping point. That final drop can be a 
big event, like a shift in the national mood or a catastrophe, or a relatively small 
or seemingly meaningless event, like a coincidental encounter on the street 
with the right person. Thus, we concluded that even a small event or change 
can tip a new idea or story. 
Second, stories did not become sticky because of their own inherent properties, 
they were ‘made to stick’ by people through everyday conversations. The 
research revealed that to understand how stories become sticky and result 
in tipping points, one has to consider the medium of storytelling: formal 
and informal conversations1.  Civic initiatives that engaged in all kinds of 
conversations, everywhere and at all times, increased the chance of learning 
about relevant stories of potential supporters, and of connecting their own 
stories to them through frame alignment processes. (Re)framing stories can be 
strategic but can also be unplanned. It happens in the flow of conversations 
as people start to see things differently when they listen to other stories and 
add their own experiences. Building on the empirical findings and the literature, 
we concluded in Chapter 6 that stories are made sticky in human interactions 
through ‘catalytic conversations’ (cf. Baker, 2010), that is, conversational settings 
in which people are curious about new perspectives, accept differences, and 
1 For a discussion of formal–informal conversations, see also Van Assche et al., 2012.
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take time to listen and empathize. The case studies demonstrated that although 
informal conversations provided the best settings for catalytic conversations, 
such opportunities for informal interaction were also provided via formal 
conversation contexts. 
Third, we argued that stories become sticky because of certain people who 
are critical to the spreading and connecting of stories. Using the term of Shirky 
(2008), we called these people connectors: people who connect people, 
ambitions, stories, resources, and events through storytelling in conversations. 
Connectors enabled the emergence, strengthening, spreading, adapting, and 
fitting of stories through a number of connecting qualities which are discussed 
in Chapter 6. Summarized, people performing as connector 1) had key positions 
in network which enabled them to establish connections between different 
networks and groups; 2) were considered credible storytellers themselves, or 
were able to mobilize other people who were considered credible storytellers; 
3) empathized with targeted supporters and listened carefully to the stories 
of targeted supporters to be able to connect their own story, and 4) ‘nudged’ 
and created favourable contexts for agenda setting by signalling events that 
were considered important and relevant by targeted supporters, and by 
incorporating these events into their stories. 
A stories-becoming-sticky model
With Figure 7.1 we aim to model the agenda-setting process as a process of 
storytelling and interactional framing in which issue proponents frame their 
ambitions into elastic stories, and continuously resemiotize these stories to 
establish a ‘fit’ with the stories of potential supporters as well as with events 
that are considered important and relevant by potential supporters. 
The model aims to emphasize that stories do not become sticky, or in other words, 
successfully mobilize attention and support, as result of their own properties or 
by coincidence through focusing events; rather, they are made sticky by people 
through their conversations with one another. This entails slow processes 
of continuous resemiotization and frame alignment in order to frame and 
‘story’ issues into the targeted audiences’ latitude of acceptance. This requires 
promoters of proposals to listen attentively to, and empathize with, what is said 
and the issues raised by potential supporters, i.e. attentive navigation of their 
self-referential frames. Thus, storytelling is not about transmitting stories, but 
involves careful listening, empathizing, sharing, and aligning. Furthermore, the 
model visualizes how stories become sticky through the interplay of the three 
enabling conditions discussed in the previous section: 1) conversations as the 
medium of storytelling; 2) incorporation of focusing events, and 3) people who 
perform as connectors of people, stories, and events. 
Focusing events
small contextual changes,
creating right context,
timing
Connectors
empathic, attentive
credible, knowledgeable
well-connected
patient, perceptive
clear, simple
imaginative, emotive
Sticky
Storytelling
frame alignment
resemiozation
Conversations
informal, open
listening, exploring
sharing, (re)framing
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The relation between conversations and focusing events can be described 
as follows: Creating opportunities for conversations in which knowledge and 
information are shared can enhance the innovation and self-organization 
of people around stories. Such an opportunity for conversation can come 
about when certain focusing or shock events give impetus to bring a story 
to the attention of targeted supporters. Moreover, conversations can open 
up windows on new perspectives and possibilities when people tell one 
another about relevant events and contexts. Events are socially constructed in 
conversations as trigger events or as windows of opportunity. They are given 
meaning as triggers of change in the light of past events and negotiations. This 
also means that an event can only trigger when there has been preparation in 
the form of ‘filling the cup’ with discussions and conversations, in which a story’s 
attraction can become stronger, until an event comes along that is the drop that 
makes the cup run over.
Figure 7.1: Stories becoming sticky: a model
The relation between conversations and connectors is just as important. Through 
conversations, connectors can bring together people, ambitions, resources, 
and meaningful events. Moreover, connectors develop an antenna for creating 
a conversational context that enables collective storytelling and coalition 
building. Connectors use conversations to share information and perspectives on 
problems and solutions with one another, and to transfer emotion and establish 
frame alignment. To do this, connectors use conversations to empathize with, 
and listen to, other people’s perspectives and stories. In order to convince other 
people to support a particular story and contribute to storytelling, connectors 
have to be considered credible frame articulators or should be able to connect 
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to others who are considered credible frame articulators. Credibility is also a 
social construct that is established through conversations in which people 
connect frames to the values, beliefs, and personal concerns and experiences 
of conversation partners. 
Focusing events trigger the spreading and tipping of a story only when 
connectors recognize them as opportunities. This requires connectors to have 
a great deal of patience, attentiveness, persistence, and perceptiveness to 
establish connections at the right time, or in other words, to recognize when 
an idea’s time has come (cf. Kingdon, 2003). Connectors recognize and exploit 
focusing events by incorporating them into storytelling. They can nudge the 
context of storytelling and coalition building by framing bigger and smaller 
events as windows of opportunity. These events are not necessarily major 
events that shock (cf. Wiering & Immink, 2006; Veenman et al., 2009) like crises 
and disasters, but can include even small events such as newly emerging issues, 
relations, and procedures, i.e. changing contexts, that provide the opportunity 
for connections. Connectors may frame particular events and circumstances as 
the right moment for action, a window of opportunity that cannot be missed. 
In other words, connectors connect not only people and ambitions, but also 
events.
Figure 7.2: The unfolding of a story that becomes sticky over time 
In sum, the stories-becoming-sticky model provides a way to understand the 
process and outcomes of attempts by civic initiatives to connect to local and 
regional governments to achieve goals. The model conceptualizes agenda 
setting and mobilization in terms of the discursive practice of storytelling. In 
the model, a successful story is a story that can self-multiply and travel rapidly 
through a wider social network, or in other words, a story that evolves over time 
into a story that sticks. The unfolding and evolution of a story that becomes 
sticky through a process of fitting, aligning, and resemiotization is represented 
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in Figure 7.2.  Stories become sticky in a process of on-going social interactions 
in which (interplaying) conversations, focusing events, and connectors are 
critical conditions.
7.3 Scientific contributions and research recommendations
Complexity, communication, and storytelling
With this thesis, we join those who point to the potential of the concept of 
social self-organization to move away from the instrumental–rational trap that 
results from a high degree of self-referentiality in government-led planning 
(e.g. Healey, 2008; Booher, 2008; Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Rauws & De Roo, 
2011). This research supports the argument that a communicative approach to 
planning, focusing on the processes of interaction and meaning construction 
between people, is critical to understanding complexity, that is, the dynamics 
and unpredictability in systems and networks which result from the multiplicity 
of interactions between people and organizations. We have added a strong 
emphasis on the social construction of meaning through storytelling and how 
this mobilizes social self-organization and agenda change. Storytelling enables 
coordination and interpretation of the multiple rationalities that occur within 
complex webs of relationships (Throgmorton, 1996). The stories-becoming-
sticky model helps to elucidate why ideas or innovations that emerge in self-
organizing networks become sticky or not, and are adopted or not. Hence, it 
contributes to debates among planners and policy scientists about managing 
complex change, and, related to that, how meaningful connections between 
government and civil society may be enabled.
Navigating structural forces
The starting point of the research was the difficulty for any collective effort 
to break through structural forces presented by policy routines and planning 
institutions. These structures are characterized by powerful self-referentiality, 
consisting of the systems of meaning and sets of values and norms that have 
evolved over time, leading to a limited perspective on social reality and the 
seeds of change that reside there. In Giddens’ structuration theory (1984), 
individuals and groups have power to change and shape structural forces, and 
these in turn shape our actions. ‘We have choices about what to accept of our 
structured, social embeddedness, and what to reject. As we make these choices, 
so we maintain, modify and transform the structuring forces which shape our 
lives’ (Healey, 2006, p. 57) In structuration theory, it is emphasized that our day-
to-day decisions, which are established in social interactions, not only affirm 
routines, repertoires, and systems of meaning that have developed over time, 
but can also modify and change them. 
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The conclusions of this research, building on and contributing to the storytelling 
literature, imply that action in the form of storytelling has the power to produce, 
reproduce, and alter structuring forces. Stories provide frameworks that guide 
our actions and are constitutors of social realities (Yanow, 2000; Gabriel, 2010; 
Bate, 2004; Boje, 1991; Throgmorton, 1996; Rein & Schön, 1996). When we tell 
stories, listen to stories, discuss them, and pass them on, we are creating the 
future that the story is representing (Van Dijk, 2011; Sandercock, 2003). 
Furthermore, our conclusions confirm the views of those who argue that 
structural forces are never radically transformed by introducing new stories and 
proposals (Ford, 1999; Kingdon, 2003; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). By listening 
to, telling, sharing, and aligning stories, promoters of proposals navigate 
targeted supporters’ existing structures and frames of reference. Every new story 
is interpreted and given meaning by listeners in a context of existing structures 
constituted by ‘background conversations’ (Ford, 1999, p. 484) and by existing 
stories (Ford & Ford, 1995; Van Dijk, 2011). Agency thus concerns the meaningful 
connecting of one’s own story to existing modes of thinking, to create room to 
manoeuvre within the structure presented by dominant modes of thinking. The 
metaphor of the widening attractor (Coleman, 2006, 2007) or subtle nudging 
of formal perspectives of government (Wagemans, 2002), illustrates how the 
dominant mode of thinking, which structures action, is subtly and more or less 
imperceptibly widened to include new ideas. Storytelling is thus considered an 
important form of action that constitutes, reconfirms, and transforms structural 
forces. 
Strategic communication
The communicative approach to planning, based on Habermas’ notion of 
communicative action and rationality (1984), understands planning as a process 
of collective reasoning, carried out through the medium of language, in discourse. 
In this conception of planning, the focus is on how priorities are identified, and 
how strategies for collective action are developed through interaction, through 
a debate in which claims and arguments are subject to critical reflection (Healey, 
2006; Leeuwis, 2000). With the conclusions of this thesis we argue that strategic 
communication, as the interactive construction of good reasons for decisions and 
actions is best understood as continuous storytelling in everyday conversations. 
This builds on a growing body of literature in the planning field that focuses on 
the way knowledge is given meaning in stories, thereby providing a framework 
for action (Forester, 1999; Throgmorton, 1996; Sandercock, 2003; Mandelbaum, 
1991; Van Dijk, 2011; Van Woerkum et al., 2011). ‘In most planning-related cases, 
the facts matter far less than their interpretation. It is how facts are configured 
relative to one another, how they are interpreted, or, in a word, what they mean 
that matters’ (Throgmorton, 2003, p. 131). The persuasive power of storytelling 
lies in the integration of ‘knowledge of what happened with an understanding 
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of why it happened and a sense of what it means to us’ (Sandercock, 2003, p. 19). 
Thus, it is argued that storytelling is the necessary link between knowledge and 
action (Throgmorton, 1996; Marris, 1997; Sandercock, 2003).
The conclusions of this thesis emphasize the importance of storytelling as 
mobilizer of meaning and action, and as a vital link between knowledge and 
action. They elucidate how some stories come to dominate planning strategies 
and policies, instigated by social movements or from within government walls. It 
was stressed that stories do not become sticky as result of their own properties or 
by coincidence through focusing events; rather, they are made sticky by people 
through their conversations with one another. This involves slow processes of 
continuous resemiotization (Iedema, 2001) and frame alignment in order to 
frame and ‘story’ issues into the targeted audiences’ latitude of acceptance. 
This requires promoters of proposals to listen attentively and empathize2 with 
what is said and raised by potential supporters, i.e. attentive navigation of 
their self-referential frames (see also Van Herzele & Aarts, 2013). We build on 
the argument of Forester (1999) that telling stories that matter, requires from 
storytellers the capacity to empathize with the particular situation, needs, and 
possibilities of their listeners. Strategic communication as storytelling is not 
about telling stories in a one-way direction, but involves careful listening to 
and empathizing with targeted audiences. Sticky stories are generated through 
the on-going interaction between tellers and listeners, or writers and readers. 
In that process stories are shared, connected, reframed and adjusted. Thus, 
storytelling that enables the mobilization of political and policy attention is not 
so much persuasive (cf. Throgmorton, 1996, 2003) as connective. The model 
presented in this chapter further contributes to the storytelling literature the 
idea that stories become sticky when new and existing stories are connected 
in ‘catalytic conversations’ (cf. Baker, 2010) at the right time by the right people. 
Catalytic conversations 
With this research, we make a further contribution to the literature by 
emphasizing the importance of conversation, especially in the form of 
storytelling, in (organizational) change and social self-organization (Shaw, 
2002; Stacey, 2000; Ford, 1999; Baker, 2010). The case studies in this research 
have shown how, in efforts to become noticed in the context of background 
conversations (Ford, 1999) that have shaped existing structures and routines, 
it is again conversations that provide contexts in which alternative stories can 
be constructed and reframed. Storytelling in conversations invites different 
perspectives, various information sources, arguments, and alternative 
storylines. In this way, continuous reflection on such alternative storylines and 
2 See Chapter 6 and the works of Baker (2010) and Scharmer (2001, 2010) who also argue that 
conversations that provide room for empathic listening are critical to innovation.
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elements takes place and facilitates the selection of best options. Conversations 
that enable storytelling enhance cyclic interactions of feedback, memory, and 
learning (Baker, 2010; Johnson, 2001; Rycroft & Kash, 1999). 
Both organizational change and communicative planning approaches point 
to the importance of ‘shifting conversations’ in the management of change, 
especially through dialogue (Ford, 1999; Healey, 2006; Innes & Booher, 1999). 
‘The power of dominant discourses can be challenged at the level of dialogue, 
through the power of knowledgeable, reflective discourse, through good 
arguments, through the transformations which come as people learn to 
understand and respect each other across their differences and conflicts’ 
(Healey, 2006, p. 67). Dialogue refers to conversations that take people out of 
the daily discourses that generate the way things are and facilitates learning in 
which alternative perspectives are explored and new meanings are constructed 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Bateson, 1972; Ford, 1999). Innes & Booher’s (1999, 
2010) concept of authentic dialogue suggests that chances for innovative self-
organization and adaptation to changing circumstances are increased when 
conversations enable open information sharing, and allow for ambiguity and 
differences. Baker’s (2010) notion of catalytic conversations adds to this an 
emphasis on conversations that are based on trust and informal relationships 
and leave room for spontaneity. Based on our research findings we have 
concluded that especially conversations that provide room for empathizing and 
listening can catalyse change. 
Planning approaches that address dialogue and storytelling in the management 
of change focus strongly on the role of professional planners in storytelling. It is 
argued that planners, if they want to be more effective in translating knowledge 
into action, should pay more attention to the craft of storytelling in both written 
and oral forms (Sandercock, 2003; Forester, 1999; Van Dijk, 2011). This emphasis 
on what planners should do is also present in notions about storytelling as an 
interactive activity in collaborative dialogue. Innes & Booher (2010) argue that 
authentic dialogue requires careful facilitation by professional mediators. They 
suggest that interventions are required to organize diversity, feedback, and 
interaction, in order to catalyse desirable forms of self-organization in networks. 
As problematized at the start of this thesis however, such an approach may 
entail the danger of planners or other professionals trying to get direct control 
over the interaction process, thus hampering spontaneous interaction and 
diversity and resulting in outcomes that are ineffective or less smart than might 
be expected. 
The conclusions of this research suggest that there can also be situations in 
which people themselves create the opportunity for catalytic conversation, 
and that catalytic conversation can occur spontaneously in the middle of self-
organized movements of people in the wider network. Catalytic conversation 
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may concern a larger group of people in which discussion is facilitated, but it 
can also occur between two people who perform as connectors in the wider 
network and are able to provoke a rapid travelling of stories in their networks. 
Therefore, the question is open as to what the role of planners is in catalytic 
conversation, and the extent to which facilitation and mediation can leave 
room or even provide room for spontaneity and open information sharing. 
Further research might focus on conditions in which diversity is enhanced 
or dampened, starting from the competing assumptions that consensus 
building dampens diversity (e.g. Hillier, 2003) versus that it actually generates 
and enhances diversity (Innes & Booher, 1999, 2010). More generally, we have 
demonstrated how the concepts of conversation and storytelling can contribute 
to understanding agenda change and socio-spatial change, but still relatively 
little of the literature on policy and planning is devoted to language-based 
perspectives. Consequently, there is room to expand the inquiry of planning 
practices as phenomena in language using the discursive analysis literature. 
Networks beyond governance 
The network perspective refers to the connections of individuals and groups, or 
specific technologies or policies, performing as interacting nodes in boundless 
webs of relationships (Castells, 2004). Such networks are not centrally steered, but 
constantly shaped and reshaped through the pushing and pulling by different 
actors who try to influence the situation (Aarts & Lokhorst, 2012). Various models 
of network management have emerged in the policy sciences (e.g. Kickert et al., 
1997; Rhodes, 1997; Adam & Kriesi, 2007) ever since Scharpf (1978) predicted that 
the increasing interweaving and organizational fragmentation in society would 
lead to a network-like structure of policy processes in which governments 
would cooperate with civil society stakeholders. However, many of those 
network models are still reasoning from the perspective of governments taking 
up central positions in policy and governance networks. 
The conclusions in this thesis point to the active role of civic initiatives in 
the establishment of meaningful connections in networks in sometimes 
unexpected and invisible ways. They may even be able to do this more 
effectively than government actors who have highly self-referential views 
on what goes on in social reality. The point made is that we should view 
social networks not only from government perspectives focusing on the 
construction and implementation of policies, but also from the perspective of 
non-governmental actors and how they mobilize attention in wider networks, 
bringing about dynamical change in relationships over time. People are active 
agents, interacting with one another and organizing themselves in order to get 
things done. The conclusions of this research emphasize that, in many cases, 
change cannot be understood or explained by the behaviour of an individual or 
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identifiable group of actors. Mutual interdependence between people and the 
way they interactively construct and reconstruct realities ultimately determine 
the course of things (cf. Elias, 1978; Stacey, 2001). 
Contributing to work on network governance (e.g. Gilchrist, 2000; Aarts & 
Lokhorst, 2012), we point out that, in a network perspective, governments 
need to be constantly alert to what is happening, paying attention to informal 
networks. People engaged in planning work, on behalf of both government and 
social movements, face the challenge of ‘networking the network’ (Gilchrist, 
2000, p. 271). We have demonstrated, using a historical and holistic perspective, 
that it is the interplay between focusing events, conversations, and connectors 
in the network that helps to elucidate how various actors in the wider network 
make a difference in policy and planning or not.   
Connectors and policy entrepreneurs
This research has generated a dynamic explanatory model of change in which 
connectors play an important part. We have concluded that individual people 
who perform as connectors in social networks enhance the stickiness or 
travelling capability of a story by establishing a flow of information through the 
wider network. Connectors are the individual agents in a network who connect 
ambitions, storylines, people, resources, events, and contexts. They are creative 
and credible storytellers, as well as empathic listeners and patient scouts of 
opportunities.
The connector concept in the sticky story model corresponds with the general 
argument in policy agenda-setting research, in the multiple streams model 
(Kingdon, 2003) and the punctuated equilibrium model (Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005), that, although institutions and focusing events make things possible, 
people make things happen (Zahariadis, 2007; Huitema & Meijerink, 2010). The 
point made is that the importance of structure and institutions in policy change 
is tempered considerably by individuals, timing, and context. What people 
do, how they prepare change by ‘selling’ alternative proposals, and how they 
influence (policy) frames through their interactions is what matters.
In our model, the concept of connectors is used to emphasize that individual 
agents become connectors only in relation to other people also performing as 
connectors and in relation to specific issues. We contribute to this the focus on 
the discursive power that connectors generate when they connect different 
networks, stories, events, and contexts. People who take the lead in a group 
initiative cannot by themselves succeed in spreading a message and achieving 
goals. Any group initiative requires multiple connectors who link up a wider 
network. They are not only leaders or initiators, but also other members of 
groups who know how to establish connections with relevant other groups and 
make stories spread. 
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This adds perspective to other policy science concepts that focus on the role 
of individual agents in change processes, such as knowledge and innovation 
brokers (Winch & Courtney, 2007; Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2009), bricoleurs (Lévi-
Strauss, 1966; Cleaver, 2002; Padt, 2007), boundary spanners (Noble & Jones, 
2006; Williams, 2002), policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007; 
Mintrom, 1997), and leadership (Horlings & Padt, 2011; Collinge & Gibney, 
2010). For example, Kingdon (2003) and Zahariadis (2007) emphasize that 
entrepreneurs who have better access to policymakers and more resources 
(especially time) are more likely to have success. We have demonstrated that, 
although such aspects are important, ultimately it is about what people do and 
communicate that matters. The critical factor that enables a story to spread 
and become sticky is how people ‘sell’ and connect ideas and stories through 
careful learning about the frames and perspectives of targeted supporters and 
how they establish connections in the wider network (not only politicians). The 
concept of connectors, that is, our interpretation of the concept, emphasizes 
the discursive qualities that affect agenda setting: credibility, empathy and 
listening, framing and reframing stories, and establishing connections between 
various relevant groups in the network.
Policy change at different levels of governance
We argue that the model is robust enough to assist in elucidating socio-spatial 
change processes, such as agenda setting and adoption of innovation, at other 
levels of governance, local and international. Agenda-setting research, on 
which our model builds, often concerns the national and the supranational 
level. However, at a local level also, initiatives encounter regional, national, and 
sometimes European governance levels. Civic initiatives’ agenda-setting efforts 
usually have a multi-level character, except for issues that do not exceed local 
jurisdictions (e.g. management of public space in neighbourhoods). Questions 
about the transferability of the sticky stories conceptual model to other 
governance levels can inform further case-study research. For example, such 
case studies might concern initiatives with proposals for the planning, design, 
or management of a larger area, or initiatives influencing planning at higher 
governance levels. 
Our research involved the question of how novel ideas of grass-roots 
initiatives may lead to changing planning agendas to learn something about 
civic engagement in the context of managing change. However, grass-roots 
initiatives can be seeds of structural change or even transition (Rotmans, 2001; 
Geels, 2004). It would be interesting to investigate the role of small groups of 
citizens or entrepreneurs vis-à-vis professional planners or change managers in 
transitions and the processes through which initial ideas developed into socio-
spatial transition. See for example the case study about Plan Ooievaar in De 
Jonge (2009) and Hagens (2010). Much of the work of transition and innovation 
researchers already aims to find answers to this question but focuses mainly 
on macro-level drivers (economy, politics, physical calamities, and so forth) 
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or institutional conditions. We suggest that a focus on human interactions at 
a micro level and on the processes of meaning construction can reveal more 
detailed insights about why and how more structural change and transitions 
come about. 
In this research, using a holistic perspective, we have demonstrated how micro-
level processes may influence processes at other and higher levels of governance. 
We have shown how small contextual changes can make big differences as 
they develop in relation to one another. Latent attractors, or stories, that 
on the surface seem to have little meaning, can under certain circumstances 
grow to become strong attractors, or sticky stories, around which people self-
organize. Using a historical, comparative, and holistic perspective, focusing on 
the construction of meaning, our research indicates that transformative change 
may be explained by factors such as patience, timing, creating coincidence, 
empathizing and listening, and sharing stories, in relation to the more structural 
forces at macro levels.  
7.4 Towards connective planning practices and practitioners
The conclusions of this research have a number of implications for the planning 
work of governmental planners who aim to establish meaningful connections 
with civil society initiatives, i.e. capitalize on civic initiatives, as well as for the 
planning work of self-organizing citizens and other non-governmental actors.
First of all, contrary to the argument that a self-organization perspective reduces 
the role of planners to spectating or a humble activity (e.g. Devisch, 2008; 
Portugali, 2000), we argue that professional planners have a meaningful and 
active role in the management of change. Creating conditions for meaningful 
connections between emerging initiatives from both governments and 
civil society actors can be the key to a planning approach that is able to deal 
with complexity and non-linearity and that is responsive to movements and 
initiatives in civil society. Creating room for self-organization does not mean 
letting go and leaving planning initiatives to civil society completely. It does 
not imply governance without any government participation. The engagement 
of planners and government actors in the work and activities of civic initiatives 
is required, not to control what happens, but to create conditions in which 
initiatives can develop solutions that promote the sustainable development 
of places.  Planners are necessary to carefully observe the directions, desirable 
or undesirable, in which forms of self-organization are moving. Planners can 
engage in self-organizing processes as the promoters of common interests or the 
more vulnerable interests in the process. They can actively help integrate forms 
of self-organization, private and public, that would otherwise be fragmented 
and ineffective. Moreover, planners can bring their knowledge and experience 
about sustainable regional development into the storytelling processes that 
take place among various initiatives. 
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Second, professional planners have an inevitable ‘will to order’ that should take 
the shape of a ‘will to connect’ (see also Hagens, 2010). Connecting refers to 
people, groups, issues, stories, resources, spatial scales, and governance scales. 
Professional and non-professional planners with a will to connect may be able 
to create conditions that enable innovative self-organization as well as the 
development of sticky stories that envision sustainable and liveable places. A will 
to connect enables a form of planning that is responsive to emerging alternative 
stories in civil society. On the basis of the conclusions and the model presented 
earlier in this chapter, we now summarize a number of suggestions to help 
government actors and civic initiatives improve their connective competences 
while performing their planning work. 
Empathizing and listening
Connecting requires attentive listening to, and empathizing with, what is said 
and raised by conversation partners. Forester (1999) advises to listen carefully to 
the stories of stakeholders (practice stories) the way one might do with friends, 
meaning that friends can make us see what really matters to us, and remember 
relevant events in the past, and this way they can make us see new perspectives 
and blind spots in critical ways. Thus, connective storytelling is not a matter of 
transmitting a message, by professional planners to a target group or by civic 
initiatives to governmental planners and other targeted actors, but happens 
in everyday interactions between people engaged in planning practice and 
involves careful listening, empathizing, and sharing. This means being open and 
receptive to alternative views, trying to enter into the life world of the other and 
seeking to see things from the other’s perspective.
Using and creating opportunities for catalytic conversations
To discover, and connect to, promising (or undesirable) stories, opportunities for 
informal conversation should be valued and created to enable open exploration 
and exchange of stories and favourable circumstances.  Conversations can 
take many forms, like one-to-one meetings that are organized, but also 
spontaneous conversations ‘on the street’ or through social media. Planners 
do not necessarily have to initiate and facilitate conversations themselves, 
although there are situations where this is favourable (see the earlier discussion 
on catalytic conversations). 
Accepting and embracing diversity
When striving for conversations that have the potential to catalyse change, 
professional and non-professional planners have to suppress the tendency to 
focus too much on establishing consensus and getting control. To develop a 
sticky story, it is neither necessary nor desirable that ambitions are fully shared 
and agreed upon. Participants’ ambitions can differ and still be connected to a 
shared story. Thus, planners should accept and embrace diversity and differences 
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and aim to create conditions that provide room for different ambitions, open 
exploration of different opinions, and reflection. This may also involve allowing 
for experimentation and accepting failures. 
Attentiveness to meaningful events and opportunities
Another important competence is being attentive to and exploiting events 
and opportunities that can trigger the tipping of a story. This requires from 
practitioners good timing as well as patience and perseverance to await the 
right circumstances. Good timing can be established by carefully monitoring the 
situation by participating and listening in storytelling processes. Before events 
can trigger, audiences have to be warmed up to an unfolding story. Planners 
can help by keeping the storytelling process running. They can use the local 
knowledge of citizens, for example residents, in monitoring and continuous 
storytelling. Good timing can be achieved by using the wisdom that flows from 
the wider network of people who may be interested in a particular story. 
Network the network: identifying and mobilizing connectors
Finally, as planners should aim to avoid government-centrism and try to create 
room for innovative self-organization, they can take up the challenge of letting 
(other) connectors establish meaningful connections between people, sub-
networks, stories, and events. The main challenge, also for non-governmental 
issue proponents, is to mobilize potential connectors, representing a diversity 
of groups and networks, in storytelling processes to increase the chance of 
stories spreading through the network and becoming sticky. The challenge is to 
stimulate innovative self-organization by ‘networking the network’. Engaging in 
all kinds of conversations increases the chance of encountering and engaging 
people who are potential connectors. 
7.5 Concluding remarks
A complexity perspective on planning reveals that self-organization is 
everywhere. Planning is part of the self-organizing processes that influence the 
futures of places. Although it seems a paradox, such a view on planning can 
provide plausible and innovative starting points for a better understanding of 
socio-spatial change processes in regions, as well as for a form of planning that 
is more adaptive and more responsive to potentially innovative civic initiatives. 
Planning with a complexity perspective accepts reality as unpredictable, non-
linear, complex, and chaotic and views this as an opportunity rather than a 
threat. We become better planners if we acknowledge chance and unplanned 
change and take into account our limited power to plan. Spatial planning can 
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assist sustainable futures of places and regions by encouraging conditions for 
innovative self-organization by engaging in the storytelling processes that 
emerge in civil society. 
We began this thesis with the story about The Dutch Mountain, an example 
of citizens’ self-organization which is successfully connecting businesses and 
knowledge institutions to it. Right now, the initiative can still be considered a 
grass-roots initiative that is challenged to mobilize support to enable further 
feasibility research. The initiators are looking for forms of private investment 
because they do not want to depend on government (subsidies). Even 
though I am still ambivalent about the idea of a mountain in the middle of 
our characteristic flat and open landscape, like many others, I cannot help but 
become enthusiastic about the story of sustainable-energy and food production 
on the mountain. The initiative manages to tell a story that is contagious and 
potentially can become epidemic. But is it made to stick? The framework 
developed in this thesis suggests that the chances of this happening will be 
increased if the initiators and their adherents navigate existing structures by 
listening carefully to targeted supporters’ stories and frames and aligning these 
with the Mountain story through subtle resemiotization. Such an endeavour 
may be supported by creating opportunities for catalytic conversation, by 
continuously scanning the environment for events and opportunities that can 
enhance the attraction of the story, and by mobilizing connectors to connect 
relevant social and professional contexts in the wider network.  
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Attended and reported meetings in the 
New Markets Project
Meeting Date Participants
Steering group New Markets 11 april 2006 RABO, Thermae 2000, van Melik/food group/
Achmea Arbo, ZRO, Orbis, Time spots, Chateau 
Hotels, Transforum, Provincie
Heuvelland Hotels, LIOF, core team
Workshop steering 
group plus (Maastricht 
provinciehuis)
21 augustus 2006 23 participants from the five New Markets 
projects, core team, observants
Core team – knowledge 
institutions
(Telos)
23 augustus 2006 Telos, UvT, WUR
Workshop
(Kasteel Vaeshartelt)
21 september 2006 Core team, Transforum, City marketing 
Maastricht Heuvelland Hotels, ZRO, Dolce, 
Valkenburg, VVV, RABO
Workshop New Markets 
Heuvelland 
(end of phase I)
Maastricht NH hotel
9 november 2006 43 participants from the five New Markets, and 
interest organisations, core team
Evaluation New Markets 
phase I
24 November 2006 TransForum, Provincie Limburg, Alterra, 
Wageningen UR
Joint Fact Finding Meeting 
“Heerlijkheid Heuvelland” 
(phase II)
(Kasteel Vaeshartelt)
5 December 2007 Core team, monitoring team, Orbis, ProYact, 
Rabobank, Hogeschool Zuyd, Alterra, 
TransForum, RO-groep, MyLimburg, Expertise 
Centrum ICT, vertegenwoordiger Heuvelland-
gemeenten, Universiteit Maastricht, Universiteit 
Tilburg, Provincie Limburg.
Meeting IP Heuvelland 
(phase II)
(Kasteel Limbricht)
11 March 2008 Core team, Monitoringteam (Telos, WUR), 
Provincie Limburg, representative Heuvelland-
municipalities, Orbis, Hogeschool Zuyd, Arvalis, 
My Limburg, Rabobank, RO-groep, Alterra, 5 
external experts
Core team “Ons Zuid-
Limburgs Landschap”
(Orbis)
16 April 2008 Orbis, ProYact, TransForum, Alterra, monitoring 
team (Telos, WUR), Urban Unlimited
Appendix 2. Interview topics and questions Heuvelland Case
Two groups of interviewees were distinguished in the Heuvelland Case:
1. Participants in the New Markets Heuvelland initiatives (entrepreneurs, 
experts, project managers)
2. Governmental stakeholders and other involved stakeholders who were at 
some point in time involved in the process and who could give information 
about the initiative or the relevant policy context.
Topics and questions group 1: participants New Markets initiatives
•	 Why did the New Markets initiatives emerge? What were the goals?
•	 How should the rural area of Heuvelland develop spatially in the initiative’s 
view? How does the initiative contribute to that future image? 
•	 Which actors were involved in the initiative, who were central/ leading, 
when, and why?
•	 Did the participating actors change over time, why?
•	 What were key events, decisive moments, for the initiative. Why decisive?
•	 How did you / the initiative try to achieve goals? Which formal and informal 
strategies were used? 
•	 Did you / the initiative try to get support from government actors? When, 
why, how? 
•	 What were hindering or enabling factors for goal achievement. Why? 
Topics and questions group 2: governmental stakeholders and other indirectly 
involved stakeholders
•	 Do you know the New Markets initiatives? How? Why involved or not?
•	 What do you think of the goals of the initiatives?
•	 How should the rural area of Heuvelland develop spatially in your view? 
How do the New Markets initiatives contribute to that future image? 
•	 Is the initiative successful? Why (not)?
•	 What were key events, decisive moments, for the initiative. Why decisive?
•	 Were you approached by the New Markets initiatives for support? When, 
how, why and with what result?
•	 What were hindering / enabling factors for the initiative. Why? 
Depending on the interviewee and the way my insight into the situation 
progressed, I asked additional questions to learn more about specific events 
and relations between certain actors and policy issues and processes.
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Name Affiliation Date Place Interviewer Taped
Dhr. R. Eweg TransForum, projectregisseur 17-03-2008 Wageningen Hetty van der Stoep No
Dhr. H. van 
Muyden
Initiatiefnemer Zwarte Ruiter 
Overleg, marketingspecialist
08-04-2008 Cadier en Keer Hetty van der Stoep, 
Christian Curré
Yes
Dhr. P. 
Roomberg
Staatbosbeheer, Koepelproject 
Nationaal Landschap
08-04-2008
07-05-2008
Schin op Geul Hetty van der Stoep, 
Christian Curré
Yes
No
Dhr. M. Valk Provincie Limburg, Economische 
Zaken, projectleider Cluster 
Leisure
10-04-2008 Maastricht Hetty van der Stoep No
Dhr. H. Meijers verbindingsofficier 
Heuvellandgemeenten
10-04-2008 Maastricht Hetty van der Stoep, 
Christian Curré
Yes 
Dhr. M. Eurlings Burgemeester Valkenburg, 
ex-gedeputeerde Economische 
Zaken, Provincie Limburg
22-04-2008 Valkenburg Hetty van der Stoep, 
Christian Curré
Yes
Dhr. De Jongh Provincie Limburg, 
afdeling Landelijk 
Gebied, programmaleider 
Meerjarenprogramma
25-04-2008 Maastricht Hetty van der Stoep Yes
Mevr. G. Silanoe ProYact, projectmanager Nieuwe 
Markten Heuvelland namens de 
ondernemers 
25-04-2008
15-07-2008
Maastricht Hetty van der Stoep No
Yes
Dhr. H. 
Mommaas
Universiteit Tilburg / Telos, 
initiator New Markets (chairman 
phase I) until 2007
13-05-2008 Utrecht Hetty van der Stoep Yes
Dhr. J. Houwen Provincie Limburg, afdeling 
Ruimtelijke Ontwikkeling, 
projectleider Landschapsvisie
15-07-2008 Maastricht Hetty van der Stoep yes
Interviews performed by research team in earlier phase (process monitoring New Market project)
Dhr. H. Burks LIOF, hoofd ontwikkeling en 
innovatie
21-06-2006 Maastricht Ina Horlings, 
Wim Haarmann
No 
Dhr. E. Rosier R2M, City Marketing Maastricht 
2006-2007
21-06-2006 Maastricht Ina Horlings / 
Wim Haarmann
No 
Dhr. F. 
Verkooyen en 
dhr. H. Dassen 
Provincie Limburg, Economische 
Zaken
25-06-2006 Maastricht Ina Horlings, 
Wim Haarmann
No 
Mevr. G. Silanoe ProYact, vertegenwoordiger 
ondernemers Nieuwe Markten
18-07-2006 Maastricht Ina Horlings, 
Wim Haarmann
No 
Dhr. W. 
Uitterhoeve
Hogeschool Zuyd, directeur 
Expertise centrum ICT
18-07-2006 Maastricht Ina Horlings, Wim 
Haarmann
No 
Mevr. M. van 
Mansfeld
Alterra, procesmanager Nieuwe 
Markten Heuvelland
14-08-2006
24-11-2006
telefonisch
Nijmegen
Ina Horlings
(Hetty van der 
Stoep)
No
No
Dhr. H.  
Mommaas
Universiteit Tilburg / Telos, 
initiator New Markets (chairman 
phase I) until 2007
16-08-2006 ? Ina Horlings No 
Dhr. G. Broos Orbis Zorgconcern, directeur 15-06-2007 Sittard Ina Horlings No 
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Appendix 4. Attention analysis Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
case
Development of attention of Werkgroep Gouda-Krimpenerwaard for issues in 
the period 1994-2009 was analyzed with regional newspaper articles. I selected 
130 articles from the regional daily newspapers Rijn & Gouwe (1994–2005) and 
AD Groene Hart (2005–2009) by using as a search term the name Werkgroep 
Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard and a related interest group called Beraad 
Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard.
Results:
•	 The diagram below indicates that most attention is paid to the construction 
of a new bypass through the urban-rural fringe Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
(the purple color labeled ZWR).
•	 Until 2005 there is much attention for the bypass and after that year only 
little. Peaks in attention are visible in the years 2001, 2003 en 2004. A 
reason for the sudden fading of attention for the bypass after 2005 can 
be that Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard gave up the fight for the 
alternative trajectory the working group proposed. See chapter 5.1. 
•	 Attention for the planned industrial area seems to increaase from 2006. 
•	 Only a few articles about the aims and plans to restore the historic lock 
Stolwijkersluis. 
•	 In addition to articles about the bypass, there are many articles about 
‘cluttering’ of the banks of the rivier Hollandsche IJssel and the urban-rural 
fringe as a whole. 
•	 Between 1998 and 2001 there is relatively much attention for the 
development of the river banks of the river Hollandsche IJssel. 
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Appendix 5. Interview topics and questions Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard Case
With a first round of data collection, an extensive collection of (e-mail) 
correspondence related to the process of the Masterplan Stolwijkersluis, reports 
of meetings, a collection of newspaper articles about civic initiatives for the 
fringe area, and policy documents, I had constructed a detailed time table which 
enabled a reconstruction of important event in the agenda-setting process. To 
fine-tune information about certain critical junctures, about why stories were 
framed and reframed in particular ways, and why coalitions developed the way 
they did, I completed the data collection with 9 interviews with key stakeholders. 
These concerned semi-structured interviews in the period November 2009 to 
the summer of 2011 with representatives of both civic initiatives and the local 
governments with whom they interacted the most. 
Two groups of interviewees were distinguished in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard Case:
1. Representatives / key players of the relevant civic initiatives in the fringe 
area: Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard / Beraad Stadsrand 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren, Neighbourhood 
Stolwijkersluis (residents)
2. Representatives of the municipalities of Gouda and Vlist who could give 
information about the agenda-setting process at local and regional policy 
levels, and who were directly involved in discussions about the fringe area. 
Topics 
The interviews with key stakeholders served to clarify and get more 
contextualized and detailed understanding of the relations between certain 
events, the agenda-setting strategies used, and relations between actors that 
mattered. They also provided more in-depth information about how issues 
were framed and ‘storied’ over time. I used the developing time table of events 
to structure the different interviews, depending on the interviewee, and asked 
which events were perceived as decisive and why. I also asked about particular 
events and issues that seemed important and asked what exactly happened, 
when, who were involved, what were the outcomes, and why. Thus, depending 
on the interviewee and the issues at stake, different topics and events were 
discussed. Essentially, the interviews provided feedback on my interpretations 
of important patterns in the process and pointed to other patterns that were 
meaningful in understanding the agenda-setting process.
Specific topics for interviews with civic initiatives:
•	 most important issues / goals
For issues that were important to the relevant civic initiative:
•	 decisive junctures, tipping points
•	 most important strategies to achieve goals (communication, relations, 
coalitions)
•	 results of the process and hindering and enabling factors for goal 
achievement
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Specific topics for interviews with governmental stakeholders
•	 How did you become aware of civic initiatives for protection of landscape 
values in the fringe? 
•	 [Check of the reconstruction of events with interviewee]: decisive junctures, 
tipping points in agenda-setting process
•	 How did landscape values over time become prioritized on local planning 
agendas (e.g. historic lock). Why was there initially little attention for the 
development of the fringe?
•	 What did you do yourself to support or oppose to proposals of civic 
initiatives, with what results, and why? Specifically, what did municipal 
representatives do to get support from other governments for proposals 
of civic initiatives they supported (e.g. Masterplan Stolwijkersluis)?
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Appendix 6. List of interviewed actors Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard Case
Name Affiliation Date Place Taped
Dhr. H. du Pré Werkgroep Gouda <—> 
Krimpenerwaard
24-09-2009
11-05-2011
Gouda Yes
Dhr. C. van der Horst Stichting Buurtschap Stolwijkersluis, 
voorzitter
27-09-2009 Stolwijkersluis No 
Dhr. J. Potharst Bestuurslid Historische Vereniging 
die Goude; Beraad Stadsrand 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard; ex-
wethouder Gouda
01-12-2009 Gouda Yes
Dhr. A. Menkveld Ex-wethouder Gouda 25-06-2010 Gouda Yes
Dhr. L.F.M. Crouwers Wethouder gemeente Vlist 01-07-2010
07-07-2010
Stolwijk Yes
No
Mevr. M. van Loon Gemeente Gouda, beleidsadviseur 
cultuurhistorie / Hollandse 
Waterstad
06-07-2010 Gouda Yes
Dhr. P. Schraven Gemeente Gouda, beleidsadviseur 
openbare ruimte
13-08-2010 telephone No
Dhr. J. Jager Stichting Veenvaren 30-08-2011 telephone No
Dhr. R.H. van der Pols Early promoter restoration 
historic lock and one of initiators 
to get the lock status of National 
Monument, oud- gemeenteraadslid 
Gemeentebelangen  Gouda
16-09-2011
20-09-2011
e-mail No
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Appendix 7. Quotations in Dutch, Heuvelland case (ch.4)
1. Ik vraag me af of ik wel goed begrepen heb wat de lijn van denken van 
Nieuwe Markten was. Ik heb wel samen met de vertegenwoordiger van 
Economische Zaken een voorstel geschreven. De benadering van EZ was 
echter: begin met profit, dat trekt de anderen mee. De probleemdefinitie van 
ons project is niet erkend door de ondernemers. De meeste ondernemers 
denken alleen aan geld verdienen.
2. In 2012 ontwikkelt Zuid-Limburg veel nieuwe toegevoegde waarde in de 
zogenaamde Health, Care & Cure. Met inventieve producten en diensten 
helpt Limburg de vergrijzende bevolking van Noordwest-europa gezond 
te worden en te blijven…. Het actieve seniorenbeleid werpt zjin vruchten 
af. Het Limburgse bedrijfsleven loopt voorop in de ontwikkeling van 
nieuwe producten en diensten voor deze doelgroep. Limburg biedt 
ruim voldoende levensbestendige woningen met comfort-, welzijn- en 
zorgarrangementen in of nabij de woning. Ook het toerisme neemt 
hierin zijn verantwoordelijkheid. In 2012 genereert Limburg de meeste 
overnachtingen en bestedingen door senioren omdat de toeristische 
producten en diensten ook toegankeiljk zijn voor de minder vitalen onder 
hen.
3. Limburgers worden aangezet om ondernemend en zelfbewust de kansen te 
grijpen voor een technologische topregio (industrie inclusief agribusiness), 
voor een kwaliteitsimpuls aan het toerisme én voor een senioreneconomie, 
zowel gericht op behoud van ouderen voor de arbeidsmarkt, als door inzet 
op productinnovatie voor oudere doelgroepen (ICT, zorg, vrije tijd, service).
4. Daar waar overig Nederland pas over vele jaren geconfronteerd wordt met 
demografische gevolgen, moet Limburg een demografische proefregio 
worden… We willen mensen aanspreken op hun talent en daarbij speciaal 
jongeren een uitdagende omgeving bieden.
5. De beschikbaarheid van voldoende kenniswerkers is onmisbaar voor het 
realiseren van de innovatieambities zoals die in deze Versnellingsagenda 
zijn neergelegd. De demografische ontwikkeling werkt daaraan evenwel 
niet mee…. Laten we dit op zijn beloop, dan dreigt zowel kwantitatief 
als kwalitatief een nijpend tekort aan kenniswerkers te ontstaan. De 
instroom van jong talent vanuit andere regio’s, landen en continenten… 
zal het tekort niet verhelpen als we dat talent vervolgens niet kunnen 
vasthouden. Natuurlijk is het verheugend om te constateren dat onze 
afgestudeerden wereldburgers zijn en zo goed gekwalificeerd dat ze overal 
aan de slag kunnen. Nog verheugender zou het zijn als die wereldburgers 
hun wereldbaan hier zouden vinden! Tot op dit moment schiet de regio 
hierin helaas tekort. Actieve programma’s zijn nodig om te komen tot het 
opwaarderen van de zittende werknemers… voor het aantrekken van 
kenniswerkers van elders… en voor het in de regio hechten van talenten.
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6. De vergrijzing van de bevolking gaat in Limburg harder dan in andere 
delen van het land. Vergrijzing leidt tot meer vraag naar zorg, voornamelijk 
chronische zorg. Deze zorg moet bovendien steeds meer aan de wensen van 
de individuele zorgvrager voldoen: zorg op maat… Vernieuwende topzorg 
wordt gecombineerd met de ontwikkeling van onder andere biomedische 
materialen, moleculaire geneeskunde en moleculaire apparatuur.
7. Een zorglandschap alleen kan negatief werken. Het beeld van struikelen 
over karretjes. Dat is geen goed imago. Misschien zou je los van die zorg 
moeten denken. Je moet goede woonomgevingen realiseren.
8. In het branding traject is een tegenstelling gecreëerd tussen high tech, zeg 
maar kenniseconomie, en zorglandschap. Volstrekt onbegrijpelijk, omdat 
alle onderzoeken die over kenniseconomie verschijnen kwaliteit van leven 
als een enorm belangrijk aspect zien. Zorglandschap is niet per definitie 
een verlaten landschap. Integendeel. Het ging daar juist met name in die 
preventieve lifestyle trajecten om het koppelen van HRM aan het landschap.
9. We willen een in alle opzichten uitnodigend vestigingsklimaat voor 
bedrijven, personeel en gasten ontwikkelen. Daarom zetten we in op 
versterken van regiobranding en inzet van onze beeldbepalende Limburgse 
culturele instellingen en media, grensoverschrijdende cultuureconomie, en 
koppeling van grote evenementen aan economische speerpunten.
10. Een eenduidige promotie van deze regio ten behoeve van het werven van 
internationale kenniswerkers is van groot belang.
11. Zuid-Limburg is een Europese regio bij uitstek, waar mensen vanuit de 
hele wereld samenkomen om hoogwaardige producten te maken. Het is 
een regio met een uitgekiende balans tussen werken en leven. Innovatie 
en hoogwaardige kwaliteit gaan samen met ’joie de vivre’. Maastricht is de 
parel van de regio die de cultuur en traditie van de regio uitstraalt.
12. Wij zetten niet in op de senioren economie. Het is een gemeengoed, wat 
is de toegevoegde waarde ten opzichte van de Achterhoek? Dit gebeurt in 
heel Nederland al. Wij zijn niet onderscheidend. De overheid moet er wel 
op inzetten, dat is een kerntaak, om voorzieningen aan te leggen. Maar 
men moet niet verwachten dat markt zich daar op inzet. Zorgen dat er geen 
ontgroening plaatsvindt. De jeugd mag best in het buitenland studeren, 
maar daarna moeten ze terugkomen. Wij praten over een ‘work-life balance’.
13. We richten ons niet op senioren. Die worden al goed bediend, en wonen 
bij voorkeur niet in een vergrijsde regio. In het merk moet dus niet te veel 
nadruk worden gelegd op wellness en zorg. Het gaat in eerste instantie over 
genieten voor de actieve bevolking en bezoekers.
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14. Het hoofddoel van Regiobranding is om de reputatie van Zuid-Limburg 
te verbreden van vooral ‘bourgondisch’ naar de ideale ‘work-life balance’. 
Zodat Zuid-Limburg niet alleen als een aantrekkelijke plek wordt gezien 
voor een vakantie, maar ook voor blijvende vestiging.
15. Ondernemers eerst! Het economische belang staat voorop en de andere 
belangen koppelen mee.
16. Ik kan niet helder krijgen bij ondernemers wat de benefits zijn van het hogere 
doel van het behouden van landschapskwaliteit. Het projectteamlid van 
Alterra heeft ook modellen ontwikkeld maar het duizelt de ondernemers.
17. De procesbegeleiding is lastig en nu niet helder. We willen sturen maar 
ook heel veel ruimte geven. Zolang het niet georganiseerd is moeten wij 
de regierol nemen. We hebben TransForum ingehuurd, maar moesten 
op de rem gaan staan. Hun aanpak en instrumenten werken hier niet. We 
dachten dat TransForum volgend zou zijn als instrument om kennisvragen 
uit te zetten, maar ze stelden zich leading op. We zitten of twee golflengtes. 
De houding van experts is te veel ‘het instrument werkt’ en men houdt 
onvoldoende rekening met de cultuur van het besturen. Daarmee waren 
we niet gelukkig en daarom hebben we de regie teruggenomen.
18. Wat je hier in Limburg wel hebt: Je bent een factor als regionale bestuurder, 
dat kun je niet overal zeggen. Hier hebben we niet echt een grote stad, 
waardoor de provincie meer invloed heeft. Er staat ook wel iedere dag 
iets over de provincie in de krant of op televisie. Mensen kennen hun 
bestuurders. Hier kiest men heel erg op personen die mensen aanspreken. 
Dat is een nationale trend, maar in Limburg wel evidenter aanwezig dan in 
andere regio’s. Mensen willen een persoonlijk contact hebben, een gevoel, 
een beleving. Mensen maken het verschil.
19. Wij Limburgers zijn overigens autoriteit gevoelig. Status en wie het zegt is 
belangrijk.
20. De regio komt op bepaalde dingen echt tekort. Zelfbewustzijn, teveel 
naar Den Haag kijken en niet zelf iets neerzetten en willen, zelf je grenzen 
verleggen, kijken naar kansen en mogelijkheden, niet zeuren. Zelf de 
handen uit de mouwen steken. We zijn de op een na jongste provincie 
die bij Nederland is gekomen. We hebben er eigenlijk nooit helemaal bij 
gehoord. We zijn in 1839 verbonden zijn aan Nederland, maar we zijn ook 
een tijd lid geweest van de Duitse Bond, we hoorden eigenlijk overal bij. We 
zijn ook altijd internationaal wisselgeld geweest. Misschien dat wij daardoor 
te weinig hebben geleerd dat we ergens bij hoorden en nooit de ‘guts’ en 
de ‘spirit’ hebben gehad om onze eigen keuzes te maken voor de toekomst 
van de regio.
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21. Soms zie je ook, zoals rond het middengebied van het Heuvellandgebeuren, 
het Nationale Landschap, dat daar ook een aparte stuurgroep ontstond die 
hetzelfde bleek te gaan doen als de gebiedscommissie doet. Vervolgens is 
Grand Design ingelijfd bij die gebiedscommissies, waardoor er nu nog maar 
een structuur is... Zo probeer je te komen tot een nuttige samenwerking, dat 
organiseer je dan.
22. We willen wel iets samen doen, maar dan wel onder één plan, dus geen 
versnippering alsjeblieft. Provincie, coördineer dat! Zorg dat het geregeld 
wordt. Maar bij de provincie mist een stuk continuïteit of capaciteit en 
organisatie. Ondernemers zijn vaak niet op zoek naar instituten, maar naar 
mensen die zelf ook ondernemend zijn. Zodat ze direct van start kunnen 
gaan.
23. Qua proces ben ik niet gelukkig met alle één-op-één’s de laatste tijd. Er is 
geen context, geen gevoel van samenhang. Eén-op-één relaties worden 
hier belangrijker gevonden dan overleg met z’n allen. Je hoort er wel bij 
of niet. Als je er niet bij hoort, wordt je buitengesloten mits je een formele 
positie hebt. Je krijgt een opdracht als je Limburgs spreekt. Het is heel erg 
incrowd. Het gebeurt in achterkamertjes, zoals het Zwarte Ruiter Overleg.
24. Je kunt samenwerking niet rationeel organiseren. Ik denk dat dit met name 
geldt in Limburg. Hier ben je denk ik toch heel erg afhankelijk van hoe 
politieke en bestuurlijke verhoudingen liggen, van wie kent wie, en wie 
vindt het nou handig om vanuit zijn politieke ambitie op de ene plek iemand 
anders op een andere plek te pushen of te dulden of eigenlijk niet te willen 
hebben. Dat gebeurt eigenlijk altijd ’s avonds rond acht uur, telefonisch. 
Dan staan alle telefoonlijnen in de provincie roodgloeiend, dan worden in 
Limburg zaken gedaan. Dat is vaak heel ongrijpbaar.
25. De gedeputeerde van Economische Zaken wist niets van de deelname van 
TransForum in het Nieuwe Markten proces. Zijn belang is dat aan het einde 
van zijn termijn het project Nieuwe Markten stevig staat. Vervolgens is de 
gedeputeerde naar de Orbis directeur gegaan.
26. Zwarte Ruiter Overleg zijn mensen uit het ronde tafel overleg Nieuwe 
Markten. Ik kwam ze regelmatig tegen en het bleek dat wij veel van dezelfde 
opvattingen hebben over het gebrek aan dynamiek en samenwerking, 
alleen zijn zij hier geboren en getogen en kennen hoe de hazen hier lopen. 
Dus ik heb die mensen bijeengebracht om te kijken of er initiatief kan komen 
voor ondernemersbelang. Er is gekeken wie er wel en wie er niet bij kan …. 
Op uitnodiging van de voormalig directeur van de Gulpener brouwerij, was 
de eerste bijeenkomst in zijn café de Zwarte Ruiter in Gulpen. Aan het einde 
hadden we een naam nodig; Zwarte Ruiter Overleg.
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Appendix 8. Quotations in Dutch, Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard case (ch.5)
1. We hebben de meest spraakmakende ontwerpen genomineerd voor de 
prijsvraag Gouda Havenstad, waaronder een groene en een rode. Er zaten 
ook ontwerpen tussen die mijn keuze niet zouden zijn. Maar het is een 
manier om aandacht te krijgen voor dat gebied. En dan ontdek je later, 
nadat je het vijf jaar los hebt gelaten, dat een aantal mensen van de afdeling 
stedenbouw van de gemeente heel erg geïnspireerd waren door het rode 
model. Dat Manhattan aan de IJssel. Dat vertaalde zich in het plan dat naar 
buiten kwam bij de start van het Project Hollandsche IJssel, die 6 urban 
villa’s. Toen dacht ik ho! Dat is niet onze keuze. We moeten maar weer eens 
een andere groep oprichten.
2. De werkgroep is in 1994 speciaal in het leven geroepen om de unieke en 
bijzondere relatie tussen de historische binnenstad van Gouda met de 
aangrenzende open groene ruimte van de Krimpenerwaard te behouden 
en te versterken. …Dit unieke gebied, dat wij als het ware geadopteerd 
hebben, doet ons Groene Hart sneller kloppen, in de toekomst hopelijk ook 
het uwe. 
3. De zuidelijke stadsrand intrigeert ons. De vaak abrupte overgang tussen 
stad en ommeland maakt het landschap verrassend en afwisselend. …Het 
polderlandschap van de Krimpenerwaard versterkt met haar rust en ruimte 
het contrast.
4.  We zijn eerst aan de slag gegaan met de structuurschets PHIJ in 1994, maar 
toen kwam die randweg op onze weg. …Daar hadden we onze handen vol 
aan. Maar dat heeft ons ook heel veel contacten opgeleverd met mensen in 
die stadsrand.  Dat heb je nodig.
5.  Er waren wel telkens mensen uit Gouda die brieven wilden schrijven. Maar 
volgens mij had dat geen zin meer. Leuk om nog een brief te schrijven, 
maar de mensen uit de Krimpenerwaard moeten het zeggen! Er waren 
wel mensen die voor waren, maar dat moest wel naar buiten komen. Die 
moesten uitgedaagd worden. Je moest zorgen dat zij brieven gingen 
schrijven of dat ze brieven gingen ondertekenen. Dat is toen op gang 
gekomen. Dat begon met het helpen van het idee van Veenvaren. …[De 
voorzitter van Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] had ik wel eens gesproken. Die 
was helemaal gek van houten schouwen en had een vaarroute in zijn hoofd 
van 25 kilometer als de sluis gerestaureerd zou worden. Die ideeën vond ik 
geweldig. Toen hebben wij hem geholpen. Want dit hadden we nodig om 
die sluis gerestaureerd te krijgen. Het geluid vanuit de Krimpenerwaard!
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6.   En toen kwam de klap dat de subsidie niet werd toegewezen. En toen 
werden ze wakker in de Krimpenerwaard. Toen gingen zelfs raadsleden in 
Schoonhoven zich ermee bemoeien.
7.  Er kwam een krantenbericht van ‘einde verhaal’ en ik zag een brief 
waarin de wethouder van Gouda schreef dat hij mee zou werken aan die 
sloopvergunning. En ik dacht ‘jeetje, wat doe je nou man!’ En toen zijn we 
aan de slag gegaan.
8.  Het is een kwestie van een lange adem en van volhouden. Soms zit er wat 
schot in bij de gemeente, als er een wethouder is die er wel gevoel voor 
heeft. Maar vervolgens heb je een wethouder die er niets aan wil doen of er 
niks van weet.
9. Wat ook een rol heeft gespeeld is een bezoek van de Commissaris van 
de Koningin en alle gedeputeerden aan de Krimpenerwaard. Tijdens dit 
bezoek is door met name [VVD gemeenteraadslid] van de gemeente 
Vlist aangedrongen op steun bij de provincie voor restauratie van de 
Stolwijkersluis. Ik herinner mij dat ik dat las in de krant en dacht ‘het 
lobbywerk van [voorzitter Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] en [woordvoerder 
Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard] en de verontwaardiging over het 
niet doorgaan van de restauratie na de tweede afwijzing werkt toch door.
10. Het contact met de provincie was lastig. Je wist niet wie je moest hebben. 
Je had gesprekken met verschillende mensen die niet gemandateerd waren 
om uitspraken over bepaalde zaken te doen of die geen draagvlak wisten te 
creëren binnen de eigen organisatie. Intern liep het binnen de provincie heel 
moeizaam. Soms verliep de communicatie tussen provincieambtenaren via 
de gemeente en gebruikten ambtenaren van de provincie de gemeente 
om collega’s bij de provincie aan de slag te zetten. Iedereen was erg bezig 
met zijn eigen vakgebied. De ambtenaar van het Bureau Cultuur richtte zich 
alleen op de sluis en niet op de stadstuin. Vervolgens kwam er iemand van 
het Bureau Groen, die niets deed met de sluis en geen contact had met de 
ambtenaar van het Bureau Cultuur. Daarnaast was er de discussie over de 
doorvaarthoogte van de brug van de randweg over de Stolwijkervaart en 
over de langzaamverkeersverbinding. Dat ging over de randweg en die had 
ook een eigen projectteam.
11. De gemeente Vlist wil nu ook meedoen. Die ziet het belang voor de gemeente 
nu wel in. Dat is niet ineens. Onderhuids zijn er heel veel contacten. We 
organiseren ook dauwtrappen hier in de polder. …Dat dauwtrappen is een 
goede manier om een informeel met mensen te kunnen praten. De vorige 
keer was een van de wethouders van Vlist erbij en daar hebben we een hele 
poos mee zitten praten. Zo doe je dat met meer mensen, zoals het Zuid-
Hollands Landschap. Die zijn ook in de organisatie van de dauwtraptocht 
betrokken en dat is een goede manier om hen ook eens informeel te 
spreken. 
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12. In ons informele circuit is dat dauwtrappen heel belangrijk geweest. Dat is 
ooit als geintje begonnen en inmiddels al 15 jaar georganiseerd. Het is nu 
zo populair dat we een grens hebben gelegd bij 300 deelnemers. Het moet 
geen massaal evenement worden. Daar nodigen we altijd de raadsleden uit 
en dat is hét moment voor gesprek. Je kan samen met iemand oplopen. Vorig 
jaar liep de wethouder van Vlist mee. Die had daar nog nooit gewandeld en 
ze vond het een eye-opener.
13. Soms moet je er wel heel erg bovenop zitten en actief zijn om wat te 
bereiken. En dan werkt het ook. …Ik stuurde op vrijdagmiddag een mailtje 
naar de wethouder en naar de gemeenteraad en de maandag erop hoorde 
ik dat ze datzelfde weekend informeel hadden overlegd met als resultaat 
dat een conceptmotie woensdag naar de provincie werd gestuurd. Zo zie 
je dat je best een invloed kan hebben. …Als je eenmaal in dat circuit zit, 
vergeten ze je niet zo snel. Door de gemeente wordt ik voor van alles wat 
er speelt uitgenodigd. Tot aan een VIP-kaart voor de kaarsjesavond. Je zit 
standaard in de distributielijst. Dat krijg je als je regelmatig reageert en 
enthousiast mee wilt doen.
14. Veel ideeën zijn maatschappelijk ontstaan en worden overgenomen door 
de gemeente. Zo ook de Werkgroep krimpenerwaard met het ‘venster op 
de krimpenerwaard’.
15. Je moet vooral niet je naam verbinden aan een plan. Het gaat om het idee. 
Je moet zelf op de achtergrond blijven. …Je moet het presenteren als een 
idee van het beraad stadsrand, of van de Krimpenerwaard of van de stad 
Gouda. Je moet de opening bieden dat anderen het kunnen overnemen. 
Op een gegeven moment zie je dat ambtenaren dat ook gaan gebruiken. En 
dan moet je vooral niet zeggen dat je het zelf bedacht hebt. Dan ben je op 
de goede weg. Als het in stukken van de ambtenarij terecht komt, dan moet 
je je heel stil houden. Dan moet je het loslaten, want dan is het geland.
16. Boeren zijn met name tegen varen omdat ze dat associëren met 
geluidsoverlast en oeverbeschadiging door golfslag. …Het lastig om 
gedeeltelijke vaarverboden te handhaven. In het verleden was er gebrek 
aan handhaving, waardoor er veel overlast was. Mensen gaan in het land 
zitten en laten rotzooi achter. …De boeren zijn ook overvallen door het plan 
om de sluis te herstellen. Ze zijn bang dat er net zoals vroeger weer jachten 
gaan varen in de polder. …Toen de bedrijfsvaart eindigde, hebben de 
boeren aangedrongen op het afdammen van de sluis. Ze wilden absoluut 
geen recreatievaart meer. …De boeren hebben in die tijd hard gevochten 
voor het slopen van de sluis.
17. Als de Stolwijkersluis na herstel in gebruik kan worden genomen, dan ligt er 
een pracht kleinschalig vaargebied beschikbaar, waar met kleine vaartuigjes 
prima gevaren kan worden. …Door de Stolwijkersluis als enige en natuurlijke 
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toegang te benutten is recreatiedruk op de erachter gelegen vaarroute 
prima in de hand te houden. …Het zal ook slechts die mensen trekken, 
die nu al wandelend en op de fiets deze Waard doorkruisen. Namelijk: 
rust-  en natuurschoonzoekers. Dus geen jachten vol uitgelaten mensen en 
drommen bootjes met stilte verstorende benzinebuitenboordmotoren, en 
of speedboten. Daar zijn immers geijkte vaargebieden genoeg voor. Geen 
verstoring van de nu aanwezige rust, ook niet de Zondagse.
18. Tegen [voorzitter Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] hebben we gezegd dat hij 
iemand moest vinden die uit de streek komt. Toen was er [het] Statenlid 
voor de VVD en heel enthousiast vertegenwoordiger van de streek. Woont 
in Stolwijk. Zij was gevleid dat ze daarvoor gevraagd was en zo ontstaat er 
een vliegwiel, want zij is het ook gaan promoten. Dan is het niet meer alleen 
[voorzitter Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren]. Die andere VVD’ers gingen het ook 
dragen, want ze zagen kansen om zo de economie van de Krimpenerwaard 
te stimuleren.  
19. Maar ik heb het om kunnen draaien en zei ‘meneer Boer, die waterrecreatie 
kan ook jouw business zijn. Jij kunt de aanbieder zijn. Die vaarroutes zijn 
jouw vaarroutes, dus ik kan me ook een vorm voorstellen waarbij jij de 
beheerder bent van de vergunningen. Waarbij jij met andere agrariërs in 
een Stichting of cooperatie gaat zitten om dat te beheren. Dus de agrariërs 
worden dan Stichting Veenvaren Krimpenerwaard. De agrariërs verlenen de 
vergunningen en krijgen de inkomsten en leggen aanlegsteigers aan om 
bij de boerderijen te kunnen komen. Dus niet de partij die gedoogd en die 
er last van heeft, maar de partij die het doet en die het aanbiedt.’ En toen 
gingen ze er anders inzitten. Dus niet ‘wat gaan jullie doen om te zorgen dat 
ik er geen last van heb’, maar ‘als je zelf de aanbieder bent, dan weet je zelf 
of het goed geregeld is’. Dat vond ie een aantrekkelijke optie.  
20. Wij zagen dat het plan mooi paste in het Veenweidepact. Je zou het gebied 
voor natte natuur kunnen aankopen. … Eigenlijk was het handiger om 
daar de agrarische bestemming eraf te halen. En ook in die context was het 
handiger om het gebied te betrekken bij het Veenweidepact. Ik heb dat 
toen ook aangegeven in de stuurgroep, dat ze het gebied beter konden 
verbreden. Je probeert steeds meer mensen probleemeigenaar te maken 
van dat masterplan.
21. De stadstuin heet nu het Veenweidepark, want men wilde niet dat het 
geassocieerd werd met Gouda. Het woord stadstuin roept het beeld op dat 
het een tuin voor Gouda is, maar het gebied is voor de hele omgeving. [De 
wethouder van Gouda] heeft die naam Veenweidepark zelf bedacht.
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22. ‘Namens wie bemoeit u zich met het Veerstalblok en de Krimpenerwaard?’ 
[De woordvoerder van Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard]: 
‘Het Beraad Stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard, een professionele 
werkgroep van zes mensen. In het beraad zijn alle belangengroeperingen 
vertegenwoordigd’.
23. De Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard heet niet voor niets een 
werkgroep. Het bestaat uit een man of vijf die wat willen doen. Ik houd niet 
van die structuren met een vereniging van een groot aantal mensen met 
allemaal een mening, maar die niets doen. Ik heb liever mensen die hun 
mening willen omzetten in daden. Verder werd de werkgroep opgebouwd 
rondom kennis. Ieder lid had een bepaalde kundigheid en kennis op 
het gebied van landschap en bouwkunde. We hadden een cartograaf, 
planoloog, architect en weg- en waterbouwkundigen.
24. Wij hebben toen wel ingezien, we kunnen dit model nog tien jaar volhouden, 
maar dat wil niet zeggen dat we het gerealiseerd krijgen. Want dan zou 
men op dat tracé al stadsvernieuwingsactiviteiten in werking zetten die dat 
Weidebloemtrace uiteindelijk onmogelijk zouden maken. Zo was de tactiek. 
De overheid ging zich ook ingraven. Toen hebben we de handdoek in de 
ring gegooid. In de WGK hebben we gestimuleerd dat je dat dan wel openlijk 
moet doen. Samen met Zuid-Hollands Landschap en de Bewonersgroep 
Ouderkerk hebben we een brief geschreven waarin we officieel kenbaar 
maakten dat we ons neerlegden bij het voorkeurstracé van de overheid en 
dat we vanaf dat moment constructief mee wilden denken. Dat hebben veel 
mensen enorm op prijs gesteld. …Wij vonden het belangrijk dat we weer 
aan tafel konden komen.
25. Bezwaar maken doen we niet zo vaak hoor. Daar maak je geen vrienden 
mee. …Je moet voorzichtig omgaan met die sympathie. Als we bij de 
randweg waren doorgegaan, dan hadden we de sympathie verspeeld. Dat 
is iedere keer weer een delicate afweging. …Als je te vaak bezwaar maakt 
kan je de informatiestroom en samenwerking met ambtenaren verspelen. 
Je moet mensen in die voorfase zien te overtuigen, te inspireren tot een 
andere richting. En als je er vroeg bij bent, lukt het ook vaak.
26. Bijvoorbeeld … is heel professioneel en dan kan je op hem vertrouwen. Hij 
kende de ongeschreven regels van het spel. Anderen zeggen ‘en ik ga nu 
naar de pers’ en dat is helemaal niet goed, want het geeft ruis en verstoort 
de gesprekken. Partijen hebben er belang bij om te fungeren als ‘luis in de 
pels’, maar ze moeten wel blijven praten. Je kan er veel aan hebben, maar als 
mensen hun rol niet duidelijk kennen en als het politiek raar wordt ingezet, 
dan ontstaat ruis. Als ambtenaar heb je dan een moeilijke positie, want je 
moet het bestuur volgen. …is wel een lastpak, maar hij weet wanneer hij 
z’n mond moet houden en hij heeft veel contacten. Door zijn jarenlange 
ervaring is hij heel goed geworden in het spel.
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27. En ze spreken vaak namens een hele rij organisaties, waarin wel vaak 
dezelfde organisaties zitten. Maar dat geeft bij andere partijen het beeld 
dat er een heel groot maatschappelijke draagvlak is. En dan wil niemand 
een spelbreker zijn. …Zo zorg je dat er sympathie ontstaat voor die mensen 
in Gouda met dat leuke idee. Niet alleen die wethouder, maar het is een hele 
groep mensen die dat wil. Dat maakt het wel bijzonder. Ze willen hier iets 
wel en vaak gaat het om een groep mensen die juist tegen een bepaald plan 
is.
28. [De woordvoerder van de Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard] is 
iemand die heel empathisch kan denken. Hij is heel inlevend is voor de 
problemen die je als wethouder hebt. Voor hoe jouw dag eruit ziet, jouw 
agenda en wat er speelt. Daar heeft hij veel meer gevoel voor dan anderen. 
Dus hij slaagt erin om een leuk gesprek met [de wethouder van Vlist] te 
hebben. En laat zien dat hij heel veel kennis heeft over de polder.
29. Doordat [de voorzitter van Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] een echte autochtoon 
in de polder is en daar met zijn vader al vaarde heeft hij naar mijn mening de 
gevoeligheden die er zo al leven in de polder over varen goed meegenomen 
in zijn plan.
30. Tijdens een vergadering van een vereniging voor boeren in de 
Krimpenerwaard [Vereniging Duurzame Waterbeheersing en Landbouw in 
de Krimpenerwaard] werd er flink tekeer gegaan tegen het plan voor herstel 
van de sluis. ‘De sluis moet dicht! Er wordt hier niet gevaren!’. Ik heb toen 
het boetekleed aangetrokken en verteld dat ik de veroorzaker was. ‘Ik heb 
het plan geschreven vanuit jullie ergernis. Jullie hebben er zelf nooit werk 
van gemaakt. Jullie hebben altijd de kans gehad om het zelf naar je hand te 
zetten, maar dat is nooit gebeurd.’ …Er zijn vele vormen en manieren om te 
varen, dat is niet beperkt tot motorboten. Dus ik heb nogmaals uitgelegd 
dat elektrisch varen geen overlast oplevert voor boeren. …Ik zei tegen ze: 
‘Jullie geschiedenis hangt aan die sluis. Door de sluis kon de landbouw hier 
floreren!’ Daar waren ze het wel mee eens.
31. Het probleem in de Krimpenerwaard is vooral dat velen wars zijn van 
alles wat met toerisme of recreatie te maken heeft. Dat komt door de 
calvinistische inslag van de mensen. Ik probeer daarom telkens om met de 
boeren in gesprek te komen als ik ze tegenkom. En dan vraag ik aan ze hoe 
ze het vroeger zelf ervaarden toen ze met de schouw meegingen. Nou dat 
vonden ze wel mooi. En dan opper ik dat een ander dat toch ook mag. Ze 
erkennen wel dat de beleving van de polder vanaf het water heel anders is. 
…De zondagsrust is hoe dan ook een heikel punt. Maar ik praat graag met 
die mensen als ik ze tegenkom en dan probeer ik het gesprek daarover op 
gang te brengen. Het hoeft ook niet meteen. Ik trek er jaren voor uit. Het 
mag ook niet snel gaan, want dan overval je ze.
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32. Ik heb [aan de wethouder van Bergambacht] laten zien dat het nog aankwam 
op 20.000 van hem om die 2.7 miljoen los te krijgen. Dus daar kon hij geen 
nee op zeggen. Dat is zo’n klein aaltje voor zo’n walvis!
33. In de Strategiegroep Veenweidepact zitten de mensen en het geld, dus 
daar moet je spelen. Je hebt er de vijf gemeentes en de provincie en een 
grote zak geld. …In november 2008 nam ik tijdens een of ander etentje 
van de strategiegroep [de gedeputeerde] apart samen met [de dijkgraaf] 
van ‘kom op, het moet toch lukken om die sluis te restaureren’. Zo werd [de 
gedeputeerde] aanspreekpunt van ‘jij kan dat geld binnenhalen’. …En weer 
eens bij een afscheidsdineetje ook weer [de dijkgraaf], [de gedeputeerde], 
zo even met z’n drieën bij elkaar van ‘goh, kan dat niet lukken zo, twee ton 
daar, drie ton daar’.
34. Wandelpaden en fietspaden zijn al belegd, maar de waterrecreatie is niet 
belegd. Dus dat gingen wij doen binnen het programma Vitaal Platteland. 
Dat was de manier om buiten de andere gremia om dat zogenaamde taboe 
eens aan te pakken. Want op de officiële tafel was het taboe zo verhard, zo 
dat geeneen wethouder daar z’n vinger aan durfde te branden.
35. Onderhuids zijn er heel veel contacten. Wat dat betreft moet ik toch [de 
woordvoerder van Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard] wel weer 
complimenteren. Die kent heel veel mensen en contacten en heeft daar ook 
de tijd voor. Dat scheelt. Het is lobbywerk en daar doet hij actief aan mee. 
36. Er was toen ook een ambtenaar van Monumentenzorg in Gouda. Die zei ik 
wil met jullie meedoen. Maar jij bent ambtenaar bij de gemeente! Ja, maar ik 
vind het een geweldig idee, ik wil graag meehelpen om dat uit te werken. Hij 
zei: dan houden jullie mij toch af en toe in de luwte als dat nodig is. Hij heeft 
meegewerkt aan dat rapport toen. Ik vond het wel bijzonder dat hij dat als 
ambtenaar durfde.
37. [De voorzitter van Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] heeft een belangrijke rol 
gespeeld. Al jaren is hij heel consequent bezig met vragen van aandacht voor 
Veenvaren. Hij is de belangrijkste lobbyist. Hij heeft ons heel consequent 
voorzien van informatie en heeft ons laten zien dat het kan. Hij heeft ook 
een keer voor de raadscommissie van Vlist een presentatie gegeven, nog ver 
voor 2008. Wat mij betreft is hij sterker en invloedrijker dan [lobbyisten in 
de stadsrand]. Want hij laat heel mooi zien dat het kan, met welke routes en 
hoe het verbonden is aan de historie. Hij laat op overtuigende manier zien 
dat het opnieuw in leven brengen van varen past bij het gebied. 
38. Ik heb de burgemeester van Bergambacht meegenomen voor een tochtje 
over de Lansingervaart en die was daar laaiend enthousiast over. Die was 
onmiddellijk om. Die was zelfs zo enthousiast: haar wethouder was nog 
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steeds grimmig, maar zei zij publiekelijk dat ‘we gaan dat gewoon doen’. 
…Die nieuwe wethouder van Schoonhoven had wel oog voor andere 
belangen dan alleen die van Schoonhoven. En hij vaart ook zelf, dus dat 
scheelt. …Ik heb de kansenkaart, route kaart, laten zien die duidelijk maakt 
dat als de sluis opengaat … dat je dan  met je bootje van Schoonhoven naar 
Gouda kan.  Dat deed wonderen in de commissie. 
39. [De wethouder van Vlist] had de charme en de flair om mensen mee te 
nemen in zijn ideeën. Dat is erg belangrijk geweest. Hij ging er gewoon mee 
aan de slag.
40. Daarnaast was het ook belangrijk dat [de voorzitter van LTO Krimpenerwaard] 
lid is van de Stichting Veenvaren. …Dat is wat mij betreft heel belangrijk, 
want dat zogenaamde taboe was bij hem al lang weg. En daarom vond ik 
Veenvaren erg belangrijk en hechtte ik er veel geloof aan. En ik kon daar 
zwaar op leunen, want [de LTO-voorzitter] doet ook mee!
41. [De woordvoerder van Werkgroep Gouda <—> Krimpenerwaard] en 
[de voorzitter van Initiatiefgroep Veenvaren] hebben gelobbyd in de 
Krimpenerwaard en daardoor is de gemeente Vlist aangeschoven en is er 
steun van de Krimpenerwaard gekomen. … De Krimpenerwaard-partijen 
waren in het begin sterk tegen. Ze zagen de grote stad Gouda als een 
bedreiging, dus wij konden niet met hen praten.
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Stories becoming sticky
How civic initiatives strive for connection to governmental spatial planning 
agendas
Chapter 1. The dilemma of civic engagement
In reaction to difficulties of government-controlled citizen participation to fulfil 
the promises of more effective and democratic spatial planning strategies, 
attention is growing for self-governing and self-organizing movements in civil 
society. It is believed that such civic initiatives have the potential to construct 
their own places, to envision possible futures, and to construct relevant 
governance structures. However, concern is expressed about what happens 
when civic initiatives look for the support of government actors to achieve 
their goals. It is argued that the promotion of the idea of active citizenship is 
just political rhetoric, that citizen-driven engagement will be either overlooked 
or ‘regularized’ and adjusted to fit in existing government procedures and 
frameworks, squeezing out their transformative energy.
This thesis aims to understand the phenomenon of self-organizing civic 
initiatives, how they engage in, and connect to, planning practices aimed at 
the improvement of the quality of places, and why these connections lead or 
do not lead to alteration or transformation of governmental planning agendas. 
By providing greater understanding about these processes, the thesis aims 
to contribute to debates about how governmental planners can make better 
connections with civil society initiatives and how a more responsive and 
adaptive attitude towards a dynamically changing society can be achieved. 
The following question was central to the research:
How do civic initiatives connect to government organizations, and how can we 
understand outcomes of these connections in terms of the achievement of ambitions 
of civic initiatives and planning agendas for regional spatial development?
Chapter 2. Shifting agendas: framing and storytelling
The research question was operationalized with agenda-setting and framing 
theory. A powerful agenda-setting strategy is issue framing, selecting certain 
aspects and ignoring others. For the analysis, this implied a focus on the day-
to-day social interactions and use of language that constitute, reconfirm, and 
transform the way we think about things and act upon them, and how this 
subtly influences political agendas. The analysis was based on the following 
assumptions: Civic initiatives mobilize support and attention for their proposals 
through the construction of stories that act as latent attractors of people and 
resources. Storytelling is a strategic form of framing in which problem definitions, 
solutions, strategies, and motivations for action are brought together in a 
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coherent whole, providing an interpretive framework for the listener to make 
sense of an ambiguous reality. The attractiveness of a story is increased if it is 
considered inviting, credible, relevant, truthful, and emotive by listeners who 
will then pass the story on to others. Thus, civic initiatives are challenged to fit 
stories to dynamically changing self-referential frames of targeted supporters 
to get attention and support. This happens in an interactive process of making 
sense together, in which the continuous construction and sharing of stories 
plays an important role. The attractiveness of stories is enhanced when they 
are connected to events and specific contexts that are considered important or 
relevant by targeted audiences. Thus, in this study, we have looked at the way 
civic initiatives construct, align, and reshape stories in their interactions with 
other actors and in relation to the specific context. 
Chapter 3. A tale of doing interpretive analysis
Two in-depth case studies were selected concerning civic initiatives that 
produced unsolicited proposals for local and regional spatial development in 
two different regions in the Netherlands. The New Markets Heuvelland case 
contains three stories that in the end competed with one another for attention 
and (financial and political) support. All three started with the New Markets 
initiative to build a community of capital rich entrepreneurs who would invest 
in landscape qualities through new product–market combinations, which it 
was assumed would generate economic returns (improved tourism). However, 
this initiative could not mobilize enough support from entrepreneurs and 
relevant governments and stagnated, while at the same time stories about 
Healthy Living and Regional Branding emerged, around which a number 
of participating entrepreneurs self-organized. This latter initiative was very 
successful in mobilizing support and resulted in collective investments of some 
8 million euros in a regional branding campaign.
The Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case narrates how initiatives of citizens in the 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard fringe area led to landscape values being successfully 
positioned on the planning agenda over a period of 25 years. The initiative 
started because governments were paying only limited and fragmented 
attention to the area in question, and this was perceived by the initiative as 
a big threat to natural and historical landscape values. After 25 years, the 
attention and support of local and regional governments were mobilized, and 
this resulted in the investment of several million euros in the protection and 
development of landscape values.
The research, with its focus on human interactions, communication processes, 
and struggles for meaning in spatial planning contexts, is positioned within the 
interpretive research tradition. The focus was on the way language shapes what 
things we see, how we see them, and how this shaping of things constitutes 
reality. We aimed to get meaningful and convincing interpretations through a 
holistic, evolutionary, and comparative research approach. Sensitizing concepts 
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were refined as we went up in the ‘hermeneutic circle’. Triangulation, using a 
combination of interviews, (policy) document analysis, participant observation, 
visual data, and in the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case also newspaper articles 
and (e-mail) correspondence, enabled detailed data collection about relevant 
events and social interactions.  
Chapter 4. New Markets Heuvelland: coalition building and agenda 
setting
For the Heuvelland case, in relation to framing processes and the question of 
why some stories were successful whereas others faded, we drew the following 
conclusions. First, we concluded that a clear direction, in the form of an appealing 
story, was of the utmost importance. In the New Markets process, it was not 
possible to formulate an appealing and directional ambition for regional spatial 
and economic development. There was too much focus on building coalitions 
and managing relations, and too little on identifying issues. In contrast, in 
smaller and informal settings, two initiatives framed their ambitions into strong 
stories that connected well to existing policy stories about future economic 
development in the region. Stories that successfully attracted attention and 
support were founded on stable ambitions that were flexibly framed into a 
story recognizable and relevant to targeted audiences. 
Second, a clear connecting strategy with relevant governmental actors was 
essential, in this case with the provincial government. The province was 
characterized as authoritative and highly self-referential, and this challenged 
initiatives with a major barrier to becoming noticed and prioritized. 
However, ambiguity about the extent and way of involving various provincial 
departments resulted in an unstable alignment strategy and prevented the 
establishment of a meaningful connection. In contrast to the New Markets 
project, the coalition building strategy of Healthy Living and Regional Branding 
was more straightforward and entailed building good relations with the policy 
network around economic development. Overcoming the barriers of a limited 
government perspective on social reality required a stable alignment strategy 
that fitted to targeted supporters’ ways of working and ways of viewing the 
world.  
Third, the Healthy Living and Regional Branding initiatives established meaningful 
alignments through informal networks of business and government executives 
that provided the opportunity to share stories and explore alternatives. Informal 
communication in personal, one-to-one meetings seemed to prevail and was 
accepted generally as the way things were negotiated in the region. This in 
part explains why the stories of Healthy Living and Regional Branding could 
spread through relevant networks and managed to include decision makers in 
storytelling. In addition, the Regional Branding initiative in particular managed 
to strengthen its story by connecting it to political and social events that were 
considered highly important by the provincial government. By interweaving 
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these events and the provincial government’s problem frames into the story 
about a future ‘dynamic and vibrant’ region, it triggered wide support from 
local governments and the provincial government, as well as businesses.
Chapter 5. Positioning landscape values of the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard 
fringe on the policy agenda 
In the Gouda-Krimpenerwaard case, ambitions of civic initiatives were stable, 
but the story about the future of the fringe area changed to fit well into policy 
stories that could facilitate implementation. Shifts in storytelling occurred 
when coalition building required alignments with other groups. To get support 
from governments, this especially concerned fitting the story to relevant policy 
stories. Frame alignment strategies concerned bridging, amplification, and 
extension of ideas to relate to the concerns and frames of potential supporters. 
The following explanations were found with regard to why certain alignment 
strategies were successful in getting a response from targeted supporters: First, 
positive response was enhanced by telling a story that was easy to understand 
and that triggered the imagination, for example through visualizations and 
design. Second, stories needed time to filter through or, in the words of, the 
policy system had to be slowly softened up to new stories. By continuously 
telling and sharing the story in various contexts, civic initiatives and their 
coalition partners slowly enlarged governments’ latitude of acceptance. Third, 
frame alignment required resemiotization of stories to include perspectives of 
targeted supporters and to invite them to participate. To secure governments’ 
attention and support, governments’ ambitions, concerns, and policy stories 
had to be incorporated into the story about the future of the fringe area. 
Navigating potential supporters’ self-referential frames, connecting to the 
values and beliefs of targets as well as their personal everyday experiences, 
increased the credibility and salience of the evolving story. Fourth, this required 
a great deal of empathy and listening on the part of storytellers to understand 
the perspectives of others, reframe, resemiotize, and construct a shared story. 
Telling and selling a story could not work without careful listening. Fifth, a 
relevant and credible story was achieved through construction of an identity 
that rendered storytellers credible and relevant in targeted supporters’ eyes.
Chapter 6. Sticky stories: conversations, connectors, and opportunities
On the basis of the case studies, we concluded that agendas were influenced by 
people essentially through the interactional framing of ambitions into stories, 
and the incorporation of smaller and bigger events into those stories. Stories 
did not become sticky as a result of their own properties or by coincidence 
through focusing events; rather, they were made sticky by people through 
their conversations with one another. It entailed slow processes of continuous 
resemiotization and frame alignment in order to frame and ‘story’ issues into the 
targeted audiences’ latitude of acceptance. This required proposal promoters to 
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listen attentively to, and empathize with, what was said and the issues raised 
by potential supporters, i.e. attentive navigation of their self-referential frames. 
Thus, storytelling was not about transmitting stories, but involved careful 
listening, empathizing, sharing, and aligning. 
Storytelling and story alignment efforts of civic initiatives and their supporters 
resulted in subtle and step-by-step changes in existing policy stories rather than 
structural or radical change. Fitting stories to existing policy stories through 
a slow process of softening up the policy system implied a reproduction of 
hegemonic policy stories. Civic initiatives contribute to change only in subtle 
ways. However, such subtle and small changes are crucial to understand larger 
effects. 
The case-study comparison points to three interplaying conditions that facilitate 
framing processes through which stories become sticky: 
Focusing events and opportunities
Stories became sticky at certain critical junctures, marked by events interpreted 
and framed by proponents as a trigger or window of opportunity. When a story 
was connected to particular events, alignment was enabled with potential 
supporters to whom these events were meaningful. This required a softening 
up of the policy system to new ideas and stories by ‘filling the cup’ with many 
events and discussions. This implies that even a small change could ‘tip’ a new 
idea or story. It required a great deal of patience and perseverance on the part 
of proposal promoters. 
Conversations as medium of storytelling
Civic initiatives that engaged in all kinds of formal and informal conversations, 
everywhere and at all times, increased the chance of learning about relevant 
stories and events and of connecting their own stories to them. Informal 
settings which favoured exploration of perspectives and brainstorming enabled 
actors to empathize and listen. Favourable conversational settings were first of 
all settings in which there was room to openly and informally explore various 
options with targeted supporters and to be creative. Secondly, informal 
conversation between decision makers (local and regional executives) was also 
essential to generate enough political and financial support. 
Connectors
Some people were at certain junctures critical to the spreading and aligning 
of stories. We called them connectors: people who connect people, ambitions, 
stories, resources, and events through storytelling in conversations. They 
enabled the emergence, strengthening, spreading, adapting, and fitting of 
stories in the following ways: 1) they had key positions that enabled them to 
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connect relevant networks and groups; 2) they were considered credible 
storytellers themselves or were able to mobilize credible storytellers; 3) they 
had the empathic and listening abilities essential to storytelling; and 4) they 
were attentive and perceptive to favourable events and contexts that provided 
the opportunity to connect and align stories and people. 
Chapter 7. Planning as connective storytelling. Conclusion and discussion
Besides summarizing the main findings of the thesis, this chapter presents a 
model in which the relations between sticky stories, conversations, focusing 
events and contexts, and connectors are visualized. The model offers a way to 
elucidate dynamic change in political and planning agendas by focusing on the 
interactive construction, connection, and subtle alteration of stories in day-to-
day conversations by the right people at the right time. 
Scientific contributions
The sticky story model helps to elucidate why ideas or innovations that emerge 
in self-organizing networks become adopted or not. Hence, it contributes to 
debates among planners and policy scientists about managing complex change, 
and, related to that, how meaningful connections between government and 
civil society may be enabled in a number of ways. First, it shows that action 
in the form of storytelling has the power to produce, reproduce, and alter 
structuring forces. Agency concerns the meaningful connecting of one’s own 
story to existing modes of thinking in order to create room to manoeuvre within 
the structure presented by dominant modes of thinking. Strategic storytelling is 
not about transmitting stories; rather, it involves careful listening, empathizing, 
sharing, and aligning. Storytelling that enables the mobilization of political 
and policy attention is not so much persuasive as connective. The model 
contributes the idea that stories become sticky when new and existing stories 
are connected in catalytic conversations at the right time by the right people. 
The question is open as to what the role of planners is in catalytic conversation, 
and the extent to which facilitation and mediation can leave room or even 
provide room for spontaneity and open information sharing. Further research 
might focus on conditions in which diversity is enhanced or dampened, starting 
from the competing assumptions that consensus building dampens diversity 
versus that it actually generates and enhances diversity. More generally, we 
have demonstrated how the concepts of conversation and storytelling can 
contribute to understanding agenda change and socio-spatial change, but still 
relatively little of the literature on policy and planning is devoted to language-
based perspectives. Consequently, there is room to expand the inquiry of 
planning practices as phenomena in language by using the discursive analysis 
literature.
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Summary
Second, the conclusions in this thesis point to the active role of civic initiatives 
in the establishment of meaningful connections in networks in sometimes 
unexpected and invisible ways. They may even be able to do this more effectively 
than government actors who have highly self-referential views on what goes 
on in social reality. The point made is that we should view social networks 
not only from government perspectives focusing on the construction and 
implementation of policies, but also from the perspective of non-governmental 
actors and how they mobilize attention in wider networks, bringing about 
dynamic change in relationships over time. People are active agents, interacting 
with one another and organizing themselves in order to get things done. 
Contributing to work on network governance, we point out that, in a network 
perspective, governments need to be constantly alert to what is happening, 
paying attention to informal networks. People engaged in planning work, 
on behalf of both government and social movements, face the challenge of 
‘networking the network’. We have demonstrated, using a historical and holistic 
perspective, that it is the interplay between focusing events, conversations, 
and connectors in the network that helps to elucidate how various actors in the 
wider network make a difference in policy and planning or not.   
Third, grass-roots initiatives can be seeds of structural change or even transition, 
but there is still little known about how small initiatives, latent attractors, evolve 
into socio-spatial transition. Much of the work of transition and innovation 
researchers aims to find answers to this question but focuses mainly on macro-
level drivers (economy, politics, physical calamities, and so forth) or institutional 
conditions. We suggest that a focus on human interactions at a micro level and 
on the processes of meaning construction can reveal more detailed insights 
about why and how more structural change and transitions come about. We 
have shown how small contextual changes can make big differences as they 
develop in relation to one another. Latent attractors, or stories, that on the 
surface seem to have little meaning, can under certain circumstances grow to 
become strong attractors, or sticky stories, around which people self-organize. 
Using a historical, comparative, and holistic perspective, focusing on the 
construction of meaning, our research indicates that transformative change 
may be explained by factors such as patience, timing, creating coincidence, 
empathizing and listening, and sharing stories, in relation to the more structural 
forces at macro levels.  
Towards a connective planning practice
Creating room for self-organization does not mean letting go and leaving 
planning initiatives to civil society completely. It does not imply governance 
without any government participation. The engagement of professional 
planners and government actors in the work and activities of civic initiatives 
is required, not to control what happens, but to create conditions in which 
initiatives can develop solutions that promote the sustainable development 
of places. Creating conditions for meaningful connections between emerging 
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initiatives from both governments and civil society actors can be the key to a 
planning approach that is able to deal with complexity and non-linearity. It can 
be the key to planning that is more responsive to emerging alternative stories 
in civil society. 
The following recommendations for improving the ‘connective’ competences 
of planners, both governmental and non-governmental, were suggested: 1) 
empathizing and listening: connective storytelling is not a matter of transmitting 
, but involves careful listening, empathizing, and sharing; 2) using and creating 
opportunities for catalytic conversations; 3) accepting and embracing diversity: 
when striving for conversations that have the potential to ‘catalyse’ change, 
planners have to suppress their tendency to focus too much on establishing 
consensus and getting control; 4) attentiveness to meaningful events and 
opportunities: this requires from practitioners good timing as well as patience 
and perseverance to await the right circumstances; and 5) network the network: 
identifying and mobilizing connectors.
Planning with a complexity perspective accepts reality as unpredictable, non-
linear, complex, and chaotic and views this as an opportunity rather than a 
threat. The acknowledgment of chance and unplanned change stresses the 
enduring importance of spatial planning. Spatial planning can assist sustainable 
futures of places and regions by engaging in, and providing conditions for, 
innovative self-organization by engaging in storytelling processes that emerge 
in civil society.
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Plakkende verhalen
Hoe burgerinitiatieven streven naar verbinding met ruimtelijke planning 
agenda’s van overheden
1. Het dilemma van burger betrokkenheid
De verwachting dat de overheid via interactieve beleidsvorming en 
burgerparticipatie meer effectieve en democratische besluitvorming kan 
realiseren, blijkt in de praktijk tegen te vallen. In reactie daarop groeit de aandacht 
voor zelfsturing en zelforganiserende bewegingen in de burgermaatschappij. 
Verondersteld wordt dat burgerinitiatieven een groot innovatief potentieel 
hebben om zelf hun leefomgeving te (her)ontwikkelen, om zelf mogelijke 
toekomsten te verbeelden, en ook om zelf structuren te bedenken waarmee dit 
aangestuurd kan worden. Tegelijkertijd wordt zorg geuit over wat er gebeurt met 
dergelijke initiatieven wanneer zij steun zoeken van overheden om hun doelen 
te verwezenlijken. Critici beweren dat het propageren van actief burgerschap 
puur politieke retoriek is en dat burgerinitiatief dan wel over het hoofd wordt 
gezien, dan wel wordt ‘gereguleerd’ en aangepast om te passen in bestaande 
procedures en kaders van de overheid. Resultaat: de transformerende energie 
van burgerinitiatief wordt gesmoord. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is een beter begrip te krijgen van het fenomeen 
zelforganiserende burgerinitiatieven die alternatieve voorstellen ontwikkelen 
voor de verbetering van de ruimtelijke kwaliteit van plekken en gebieden. 
Het gaat in het bijzonder om de wijze waarop deze burgerinitiatieven zich 
verhouden met bestaande planning- en beleidspraktijken en waarom 
aandachtstrategieën van burgerinitiatieven al dan niet leiden tot aanpassing 
of transformatie van ruimtelijke planning agenda’s van overheden. Door een 
groter begrip te krijgen van deze processen, draagt dit proefschrift bij aan het 
debat over de relatie tussen overheid en initiatieven uit de samenleving en 
hoe overheidsfunctionarissen een meer ontvankelijke en adaptieve houding 
kunnen ontwikkelen ten aanzien van een snel veranderende samenleving.
De volgende vraag stond centraal in het onderzoek:
Hoe verbinden burgerinitiatieven zich met overheidsorganisaties, en hoe kunnen 
we de uitkomsten van deze verbindingen begrijpen gelet op de ambities van 
burgerinitiatieven en de planning agenda’s van overheden voor regionale 
ruimtelijke ontwikkeling?
2. Theoretisch kader: schuivende agenda’s, framing en verhalen vertellen
De onderzoeksvraag is geoperationaliseerd met agenda-setting theorie en 
framing theorie. Een krachtige agenda-setting strategie is framing, dat wil 
zeggen het selectief articuleren van kwesties, waarbij bepaalde aspecten 
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worden benadrukt en andere aspecten worden weggelaten. Framing analyse 
richt zich op de dagelijkse sociale interacties en het taalgebruik waarmee 
we onze manier van denken en ons handelen vormgeven, bevestigen en 
veranderen en hoe daarmee politieke agenda’s subtiel worden beïnvloed. 
Storytelling, verhalen construeren en doorvertellen, is een strategische vorm 
van framing waarmee percepties van problemen, oplossingen, strategieën en 
motivaties voor acties samen worden gebracht in één interpretatief kader. Zo’n 
verhaal stelt de  luisteraar in staat om betekenis geven aan de complexe en 
dubbelzinnige werkelijkheid en daarop zijn handelen te baseren.  
Voor de analyse werd verondersteld dat burgerinitiatieven steun en aandacht 
voor hun voorstellen mobiliseren door het construeren van verhalen die werken 
als attractoren. Dat wil zeggen, verhalen die een sterke aantrekkende kracht 
hebben op mensen met als doel beschikking te krijgen over middelen waarmee 
ambities verwezenlijkt kunnen worden. De aantrekkingskracht van een verhaal 
wordt groter als luisteraars het beschouwen als uitnodigend, geloofwaardig, 
relevant, waarheidsgetrouw, en emotief. Dit impliceert dat burgerinitiatieven 
voor de opgave staan een verhaal te vertellen dat potentiële medestanders vanuit 
hun eigen perspectief op de sociale werkelijkheid beschouwen als uitnodigend 
en relevant. De aantrekkingskracht van een verhaal wordt onder meer vergroot 
wanneer het wordt verbonden aan gebeurtenissen die door luisteraars relevant 
en belangrijk worden gevonden. Het mobiliseren van steun en aandacht betreft 
dus een interactief proces waarin mensen verhalen uitwisselen en aan elkaar 
verbinden om daarmee betekenis te geven aan de wereld om hen heen. In dit 
onderzoek hebben we geanalyseerd hoe burgerinitiatieven in relatie tot de 
specifieke context verhalen construeren, aan elkaar verbinden, en herscheppen 
via hun interacties met andere groepen en individuen.
3. Een verhaal over het uitvoeren van interpretatieve analyse
Het onderzoek bestond uit twee casestudies over burgerinitiatieven die eigen 
voorstellen ontwikkelden voor lokale en regionale ruimtelijke ontwikkeling in 
twee verschillende Nederlandse regio’s. De casus Nieuwe Markten Heuvelland 
gaat over het proces waarin drie toekomstverhalen over de regio tot stand 
kwamen die met elkaar concurreerden om aandacht en steun, financieel en 
politiek. Het initiatief Nieuwe Markten richtte zich op het ontwikkelen van 
nieuwe product-marktcombinaties met een collectief van kapitaalskrachtige 
ondernemers die een nieuwe economische drager zouden vormen voor 
landschapswaarden in Heuvelland. Het uiteindelijke doel was het verbeteren 
van de economische perspectieven van de regio, met name het toerisme. 
Het initiatief slaagde er echter niet in om voldoende steun te genereren van 
ondernemers en de provincie en stagneerde. Ondertussen werkten enkele van 
de betrokken ondernemers op eigen houtje aan plannen die wel succesvol 
bleken: Gezond Leven en Regiobranding. Met name het laatste initiatief was 
erg succesvol in het mobiliseren van bedrijven en overheden in de regio. Dit 
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resulteerde in een collectieve investering van ongeveer acht miljoen euro in een 
marketing campagne voor de regio, momenteel bekend met het motto “Zuid-
Limburg: Bright site of life”. 
De casus Gouda-Krimpenerwaard gaat over de aandachtstrategieën van 
verschillende burgerinitiatieven voor de bescherming en ontwikkeling van 
landschapswaarden in de stadsrand Gouda-Krimpenerwaard. De initiatieven 
ontstonden als reactie op een gebrek aan aandacht van de overheid voor de 
integrale ontwikkeling van de stadsrand en de landschapskwaliteiten in het 
gebied. De door de overheid voorgestelde sectorale maatregelen, zoals een 
randweg en een industrieterrein, werden gezien als een grote bedreiging voor 
de natuurwaarden en de cultuurhistorische waarden in de stadsrand. In reactie 
daarop ontwikkelden burgers door de tijd heen eigen voorstellen en vormden 
coalities met andere belangengroepen. Gedurende 25 jaar werd langzamerhand 
aandacht en steun van lokale en regionale overheden gemobiliseerd. Het 
resultaat was een investering van een paar miljoen euro in de bescherming en 
ontwikkeling van landschapswaarden in de stadsrand. 
Het onderzoek focust op interacties tussen mensen, communicatie processen 
en de strijd om betekenisgeving in de context van ruimtelijke planning. Het 
past daarmee in de wetenschappelijke traditie van interpretatieve analyse. Het 
onderzoek richtte zich op de wijze waarop taal vorm geeft aan de dingen die we 
zien, hoe we ze zien, en hoe daarmee werkelijkheden worden geconstrueerd. Ons 
doel was het verkrijgen van betekenisvolle en overtuigende interpretaties van de 
gegevens uit de casestudies, door een holistische, evolutionaire en vergelijkende 
benadering. Zogeheten sensitizing concepten werden aangescherpt terwijl 
we gegevens uit de cases interpreteerden en herinterpreteerden. Door 
triangulatie, het gebruiken van verschillende methoden van dataverzameling, 
werd gedetailleerde en genuanceerde informatie verkregen over relevante 
gebeurtenissen, planning processen en communicatie processen. Het ging om 
een combinatie van interviews, analyse van (beleids)documenten, observatie 
van bijeenkomsten (participant observatie), beeldmateriaal, en in de casus 
Gouda-Krimpenerwaard werden daarnaast ook krantenartikelen en (e-mail)
correspondentie geanalyseerd. 
4. Nieuwe Markten Heuvelland: coalitievorming en agendering
Ten aanzien van de casus Heuvelland werden de volgende conclusies getrokken 
over framing processen en de vraag waarom sommige verhalen succesvol 
bleken terwijl andere verhalen van het toneel verdwenen. Allereerst was een 
duidelijke richting, in de vorm van een aantrekkelijk verhaal, van groot belang. 
In het proces van Nieuwe Markten bleek het niet mogelijk om een duidelijke 
en richtinggevende ambitie te formuleren voor de ruimtelijke en economische 
ontwikkeling van de regio. Het proces richtte zich teveel op het inrichten 
van een business community en een breder netwerk van relevante actoren, 
terwijl er relatief weinig energie werd geïnvesteerd in het identificeren van de 
272
problemen en mogelijke oplossingen. Mede in reactie hierop, ontstonden er in 
kleinere en informele settingen twee ondernemersinitiatieven die hun ambities 
wisten te vertalen in aantrekkelijke verhalen die goed aansloten bij bestaande 
beleidsverhalen over de toekomstige economische ontwikkeling van de regio. 
Verhalen die succesvol de aandacht en steun wisten te trekken waren stevig 
verankerd in stabiele ambities die flexibel verpakt werden in verhalen die voor 
beoogde luisteraars herkenbaar en relevant waren.  
Ten tweede was een duidelijke strategie voor het verbinden met relevante 
overheidsactoren essentieel, in dit geval met de provinciale overheid. 
De provincie werd gekarakteriseerd als autoritair en in zichzelf gekeerd 
(zelfreferentieel), en dit stelde de Nieuwe Markten initiatieven voor een flinke 
uitdaging om opgemerkt en geprioriteerd te worden. Omdat er ambiguïteit 
heerste over de mate waarin en de manier waarop de verschillende provinciale 
afdelingen betrokken zouden moeten worden, lukte het niet om de provincie 
op een zinvolle manier te betrekken bij de initiatieven. Daarentegen werkten 
het Gezond Leven initiatief en het Regiobranding initiatief vanaf het begin 
aan het opbouwen van een goede relatie met het beleidsnetwerk rondom 
regionale economische ontwikkeling en wisten zij zich effectief te verbinden 
met de relevante provinciale beleidsmakers. Daaruit valt te concluderen dat het 
slechten van institutionele barrières, die voortkomen uit een beperkt perspectief 
van de overheid op de sociale werkelijkheid, een stabiele verbindingsstrategie 
vergt die aansluit bij de manier van werken en manier van denken van beoogde 
medestanders. 
Ten derde konden het Gezond Leven initiatief en het Regiobranding initiatief 
zinvolle verbindingen met overheden en andere ondernemers tot stand 
brengen omdat zij al waren ingebed in een informeel netwerk van bestuurders 
dat de gelegenheid bood om verhalen te delen en alternatieven te verkennen. 
Zaken werden gedaan via informele communicatie in persoonlijke één-op-één 
ontmoetingen. Uit de interviews blijkt dat deze manier van onderhandelen 
en samenwerken werd geaccepteerd als een kenmerk van de regionale 
cultuur. Dit verklaart voor een deel waarom de verhalen van Gezond Leven 
en Regiobranding zich konden verspreiden door relevante netwerken en 
waarom beleidsmakers gingen participeren in het vertellen en doorvertellen 
van die verhalen. Bovendien was vooral het Regiobranding initiatief in staat om 
de aantrekkingskracht van het verhaal te versterken door daarin politieke en 
sociale gebeurtenissen op te nemen die de provinciale overheid erg belangrijk 
vond. Door de frames van de provinciale overheid op de regionale problematiek 
te verweven met een verhaal over een toekomstige dynamische en levendige 
regio, kwam brede steun op gang van zowel de lokale en provinciale overheid 
als bedrijven.  
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5. Het agenderen van landschapswaarden in de stadsrand Gouda-
Krimpenerwaard op de beleidsagenda 
De volgende conclusies werden getrokken over het proces storytelling als 
aandachtstrategie en waarom dit al dan niet leidde tot steun en verandering 
van agenda’s van de overheid voor ruimtelijke ontwikkeling. 
Ten eerste vertaalden burgerinitiatieven hun stabiele ambities in elastische 
verhalen over de toekomst van de stadsrand zodat deze goed aansloten 
bij beleidsverhalen die het vehikel voor daadwerkelijke uitvoering konden 
vormen. Verschuivingen in storytelling vonden plaats telkens wanneer men de 
hulp nodig had van andere groepen en organisaties. Dit betekende dat bij het 
zoeken van steun van bepaalde overheden het eigen verhaal werd aangepast 
aan relevante beleidsverhalen van die overheden. Zogeheten frame alignment 
strategieën bestonden uit overbruggen (bridging), uitbreiding (amplification), 
en het aanvullen van ideeën (extension) om daarmee aan te sluiten bij de zorgen 
en referentiekaders van mogelijke medestanders. 
Daarnaast zijn een aantal verklaringen gevonden voor de vraag waarom 
inspanningen om verhalen aan te sluiten op die van anderen al dan niet 
leidden tot een positieve weerklank. Allereerst was het van belang een verhaal 
te vertellen dat makkelijk te begrijpen was en dat tot de verbeelding sprak, 
bijvoorbeeld door visualisaties en een aantrekkelijk ontwerp. Ten tweede 
hadden verhalen tijd nodig om door te dringen in de geheugens van mensen 
en organisaties. Met andere woorden: het beleidssysteem moest opgewarmd 
raken om ontvankelijk te worden voor alternatieve verhalen. Door verhalen 
continu te vertellen en te delen in diverse contexten waren burgerinitiatieven 
en hun medestanders in staat om langzaam de latitude of acceptance van 
overheden te vergroten. Ten derde vergde het op elkaar afstemmen van frames 
dat nieuwe betekenissen werden geven aan het verhaal (resemiotization), zodat 
deze voor de beoogde medestanders herkenbaar werd en uitnodigend. Om 
de aandacht en steun van overheden te trekken, werden ambities, zorgen en 
beleidsverhalen van de overheid opgenomen in het vertellen van verhalen 
over de toekomst van de stadsrand. De aannemelijkheid en opvallendheid 
van het zich ontwikkelende verhaal werd vergroot door aan te sluiten bij de 
waarden, overtuigingen, en persoonlijke ervaringen van luisteraars. Ten vierde 
impliceert dit navigeren op de zelfreferentialiteit van beoogde medestanders 
dat verhalenvertellers moesten beschikken over een goed empathisch en 
luisterend vermogen. Een verhaal vertellen en verkopen ging niet zonder 
eerst de perspectieven van gesprekspartners te begrijpen, verhalen uit te 
wisselen en geleidelijk een gedeeld verhaal te construeren. Tot slot werd de 
kracht en aannemelijkheid van het verhaal vergroot wanneer de vertellers 
zelf werden beschouwd als geloofwaardig. De burgerinitiatieven in de casus 
werkten bewust aan een geloofwaardige identiteit door zich op te stellen als 
constructieve, representatieve en goed geïnformeerde gesprekspartners.  
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6. Plakkende verhalen: gesprekken, verbinders en windows of 
opportunity
Op basis van de bevindingen in de casestudies concludeerden we dat agenda’s 
voor ruimtelijke planning subtiel veranderden via een geleidelijk proces waarin 
ambities werden vertaald in elastische verhalen die aansloten bij bestaande 
beleidsverhalen en gebeurtenissen die belangrijk waren in de ogen van 
overheden. We gebruikten hiervoor de term plakkende verhalen (sticky stories), 
dat wil zeggen verhalen die memorabel zijn en een sterke aantrekkingskracht 
uitoefenen omdat ze plakken aan de ervaringen en verhalen van luisteraars. 
Verhalen zijn dus niet plakkend uit zichzelf, maar ze worden plakkend 
gemaakt door mensen via hun onderlinge gesprekken. Dit omvatte langzame 
processen van betekenisgeving en het afstemmen van frames, zodat kwesties 
werden beschouwd als relevant en belangrijk door beoogde medestanders. 
Initiatiefnemers die zich goed inleefden en goed luisterden naar de verhalen 
van beoogde medestanders, waren in staat om het eigen verhaal te koppelen 
aan de perspectieven en ervaringen van beoogde medestanders. De kunst 
van storytelling ligt dus niet zozeer in het aanprijzen en uitzenden van het 
verhaal, maar in het empathisch luisteren en het delen en subtiel aanpassen 
van verhalen. 
De inspanningen van burgerinitiatieven en hun medestanders om een 
aanstekelijk verhaal te vertellen en verhalen aan elkaar te verbinden resulteerde 
in subtiele stap-voor-stap veranderingen in bestaande beleidsverhalen. Van 
radicale of ingrijpende verandering was geen sprake in de casestudies. De wijze 
waarop burgerinitiatieven bijdragen aan verandering was dus heel subtiel. Maar 
juist die subtiele en kleine veranderingen waren wel cruciaal in het begrijpen 
van grotere effecten. 
De vergelijking van de casestudies wijst op drie met elkaar samenhangende 
factoren die conditioneren hoe verhalen plakkend worden of van het toneel 
verdwijnen:
Focusing events en windows of opportunity
Verhalen werden plakkend wanneer deze werden verbonden met politieke 
en maatschappelijke gebeurtenissen die de speciale aandacht trokken van 
mogelijke medestanders. Dergelijke focusing events werden verpakt als windows 
of opportunity in het verhaal. In afwachting van betekenisvolle gebeurtenissen 
en gunstige momenten werd continu gewerkt aan het warm maken van het 
beleidssysteem voor nieuwe ideeën en verhalen door het verhaal telkens weer 
te vertellen en te delen in verschillende contexten. Als het ware werd een emmer 
gevuld met allerlei conversaties, vertellingen, en gebeurtenissen waarbij het 
verhaal steeds meer omarmd werd, totdat een bepaalde gebeurtenis de emmer 
deed overlopen en er sprake was van een tipping point. Dat is het moment 
waarop het verhaal werd aanvaard als een relevant en belangrijk verhaal en 
daarmee een prominente plek kon krijgen op de beleidsagenda. Dit betekende 
ook dat zelfs een kleine gebeurtenis, zoals een toevallige ontmoeting, de 
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emmer kon doen overlopen. Het signaleren van betekenisvolle gebeurtenissen, 
en het langzame proces van het opwarmen van het beleidssysteem voor een 
alternatief verhaal, vergde veel geduld, volharding en oplettendheid van 
initiatiefnemers. 
Gesprekken als het medium van storytelling
Burgerinitiatieven die zich mengden in allerlei formele en informele 
gesprekken, overal en altijd, vergrootten hun kans om te leren over relevante 
verhalen en gebeurtenissen en daarmee de kans om hun eigen verhalen 
daarmee te verbinden. Informele settingen die gelegenheid boden voor een 
open verkenning van diverse perspectieven, stimuleerden participanten om 
zich in te leven en om te luisteren naar elkaar. Gunstige gesprekssituaties waren 
in de eerste plaats settingen met ruimte voor open en informele verkenning 
van diverse opties en voor creativiteit. Ten tweede waren informele gesprekken 
tussen besluitvormers (lokale en regionale bestuurders) essentieel om 
voldoende politieke en financiële steun te bewerkstelligen.  
Verbinders
Het handelen van sommige mensen was op bepaalde momenten cruciaal in 
de verspreiding en het op elkaar aansluiten van verhalen. We noemden deze 
mensen connectors, oftewel verbinders.  Dit zijn mensen die via gesprekken 
verbindingen tot stand brengen tussen individuen, verschillende groepen 
en subnetwerken, ambities, verhalen, middelen en gebeurtenissen. Op de 
volgende manieren maakten verbinders het mogelijk dat verhalen ontstonden, 
werden versterkt, zich verspreidden, werden aangepast en op elkaar werden 
aangesloten: 1) ze hadden sleutelposities waarmee ze in staat waren om 
relevante sociale netwerken en groepen met elkaar te verbinden; 2) ze werden 
zelf beschouwd als geloofwaardige verhalenvertellers of ze konden andere 
mensen mobiliseren die door mogelijke medestanders werden gezien als 
geloofwaardig; 3) ze hadden het empathische en luisterende vermogen dat 
essentieel is voor storytelling, en 4) ze waren alert en oplettend ten aanzien van 
windows of opportunity voor het verbinden van verhalen en mensen. 
7. Planning als verbindende storytelling. Conclusies en discussie 
Dit hoofdstuk vat de bevindingen samen en presenteert een model waarin 
de concepten plakkende verhalen (sticky stories), gesprekken (conversations), 
betekenisvolle gebeurtenissen (focusing events) en verbinders (connectors) met 
elkaar in verband worden gebracht. Het model werpt licht op de dynamische 
verandering van politieke en planning agenda’s door te focussen op de 
interactieve constructie, verbinding en subtiele aanpassing van verhalen in 
alledaagse gesprekken door de juiste mensen op het juiste moment. 
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Het plakkende-verhalen-model helpt verklaren waarom ideeën en innovaties, 
die opkomen in zelforganiserende netwerken, al dan niet worden opgemerkt 
en aanvaard. Aldus draagt het model bij aan het debat tussen planners en 
beleidswetenschappers over het omgaan met complexe veranderprocessen, 
en daaraan gerelateerd, hoe betekenisvolle verbindingen tussen overheid 
en samenleving tot stand kunnen komen. Allereerst laat het model zien dat 
actie in de vorm van storytelling kan leiden tot het produceren, reproduceren 
en veranderen van structurerende krachten. Handelingsvermogen (agency) 
betreft het betekenisvol verbinden van het eigen verhaal met bestaande 
denkwijzen. Strategische storytelling omvat dus niet alleen het overbrengen en 
verkopen van verhalen, maar begint met nauwgezet luisteren, inleven, delen 
en aaneensluiten. Storytelling waarmee politieke en beleidsaandacht succesvol 
wordt gemobiliseerd is niet zozeer overtuigend als wel verbindend. Het 
model voegt de notie toe dat verhalen plakkend worden wanneer nieuwe en 
bestaande verhalen met elkaar worden verbonden in zogeheten katalytische 
gesprekken op het juiste moment door de juiste mensen. 
De vraag is welke rol planners hebben in katalytische gesprekken, en de 
mate waarin procesmanagement en bemiddeling ruimte laat of creëert voor 
spontaniteit en open uitwisseling van informatie en perspectieven. Nader 
onderzoek zou zich kunnen richten op de condities waarin diversiteit wordt 
bevorderd of beperkt. Gestart kan worden vanuit de elkaar tegensprekende 
veronderstellingen dat consensus-building een beperking vormt voor diversiteit 
dan wel juist diversiteit voortbrengt en stimuleert. 
Meer in het algemeen hebben we laten zien hoe de concepten gesprekken 
en storytelling kunnen bijdragen aan het begrijpen van agendaverandering 
en maatschappelijk-ruimtelijke verandering. Echter, betrekkelijk weinig 
literatuur over beleidsvorming en planning wordt gewijd aan discursieve 
perspectieven. Er is dus ruimte om het onderzoek naar ruimtelijke planning 
praktijken als ‘taalfenomenen’ uit te breiden, gebruik makend van literatuur 
over discoursanalyse. 
Ten tweede wijzen de conclusies van dit proefschrift op de actieve rol 
van burgerinitiatieven in het bereiken van betekenisvolle verbindingen in 
beleidsnetwerken op soms onverwachte en onzichtbare manieren. Ze zijn 
wellicht zelfs beter in staat om zinvolle verbindingen tot stand te brengen dan 
overheidsactoren met hun zelfreferentiële blik op de sociale werkelijkheid. 
Dit punt impliceert dat we sociale netwerken niet alleen zouden moeten 
beschouwen vanuit formele overheidsperspectieven die de nadruk leggen 
op beleidsvorming en beleidsuitvoering, maar juist ook vanuit het perspectief 
van zelforganiserende initiatieven in de samenleving en hoe deze initiatieven 
aandacht mobiliseren in het bredere netwerk en daarmee in de loop van de tijd 
dynamische verandering in gang kunnen zetten. Mensen zijn ondernemende 
individuen, die elkaar continu opzoeken en zich organiseren om doelen te 
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bereiken. Voortbouwend op studies naar netwerksturing, betogen we dat 
een netwerkperspectief betekent dat overheden constant alert moeten zijn 
op wat er gebeurt en aandacht moeten hebben voor informele netwerken. 
Mensen die zich mengen in planningactiviteiten, zowel namens overheden 
als maatschappelijke groepen, staan voor de uitdaging om ‘het netwerk te 
netwerken’. We hebben laten zien, gebruikmakend van een holistisch en 
evolutionair perspectief, dat juist de wisselwerking tussen focusing events, 
gesprekken en verbinders in het sociale netwerk verklaring biedt voor de 
manier waarop actoren al dan niet het verschil maken in planning en beleid.
Ten derde kunnen burgerinitiatieven, ook wel aangeduid als 
samenlevingsinitiatieven of grass-roots initiatieven, de kiem zijn van structurele 
verandering of zelfs transities, maar er is nog weinig bekend over de wijze 
waarop kleinschalige initiatieven evolueren naar maatschappelijk-ruimtelijke 
transitie. Veel van het werk van transitie en innovatie wetenschappers richt 
zich op deze vraag, maar focust vooral op drijvende krachten op macroniveau 
(economie, politiek, natuurrampen, etc.) of op institutionele condities. Wij wijzen 
op het belang van menselijke interactie op het microniveau en op processen 
van betekenisgeving om meer gedetailleerde inzichten te krijgen over waarom 
structurele veranderingen en transities tot stand komen. We hebben laten 
zien hoe een opeenstapeling van kleine contextuele veranderingen een groot 
verschil kan maken. Latente alternatieve verhalen, die aan de oppervlakte weinig 
betekenis lijken te hebben, kunnen onder bepaalde omstandigheden uitgroeien 
tot verhalen met een grote aantrekkingskracht, tot plakkende verhalen waar 
omheen mensen zichzelf organiseren. Gebruikmakend van een holistisch, 
evolutionair en vergelijkend perspectief, gericht op de sociale constructie van 
betekenissen, wijst dit onderzoek op het belang van factoren als geduld, timing, 
toeval creëren, empathie, luisterend vermogen en het uitwisselen van verhalen, 
in relatie tot de meer structurele krachten op macroniveau. 
Naar een verbindende planning praktijk
Het scheppen van ruimte voor zelforganisatie betekent niet dat planning 
initiatieven zomaar worden losgelaten en worden overgelaten aan de 
burgermaatschappij. Het impliceert geen planning zonder overheid. De 
betrokkenheid van professionele planners en overheidsactoren bij het werk 
en de activiteiten van burgerinitiatieven blijft nodig, niet om controle uit 
te oefenen, maar om de condities te scheppen waarin burgers gezamenlijk 
oplossingen kunnen ontwikkelen die bijdragen aan de duurzame ontwikkeling 
van gebieden en plekken. Het scheppen van condities voor betekenisvolle 
verbindingen tussen initiatieven van zowel overheid als samenleving kan de 
sleutel vormen voor een planningpraktijk die kan omgaan met complexiteit en 
onvoorspelbaarheid. Het kan de sleutel vormen voor een planningpraktijk die 
ontvankelijk is voor opkomende alternatieve verhalen in de samenleving.  
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De volgende aanbevelingen worden gegeven voor het verbeteren van de 
verbindende competenties van planners (overheid en niet-overheid): 1) inleven 
en luisteren: verbindende storytelling bestaat niet zozeer uit zenden, maar uit 
nauwgezet luisteren, inleven en delen; 2) gebruiken en scheppen van kansen 
voor katalytische gesprekken; 3) aanvaarden en omarmen van diversiteit: 
in het streven naar katalytische gesprekken moeten planners hun neiging 
onderdrukken om consensus te organiseren en controle uit te oefenen; 4) alert 
zijn op betekenisvolle gebeurtenissen en omstandigheden: dit vereist goede 
timing als ook geduld en volharding; en 5) het netwerk netwerken: identificeren 
en mobiliseren van verbinders.
Planning met een complexiteit perspectief aanvaard de sociale werkelijkheid 
als onvoorspelbaar, non-lineair, complex en chaotisch en beschouwt dit 
eerder als een kans dan als een bedreiging. De erkenning van toevallige 
samenlopen en ongeplande verandering benadrukt het voortdurende belang 
van ruimtelijke planning. Ruimtelijke planning kan duurzame toekomsten van 
plekken en gebieden faciliteren door gunstige omstandigheden te scheppen 
voor innovatieve zelforganisatie. Dat kan onder meer door te participeren in 
het vertellen en doorvertellen van verhalen die ontspringen in de samenleving. 
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Abstract
This thesis aims to understand the phenomenon of self-organizing civic 
initiatives, how they engage in and connect to planning practices aimed at 
the improvement of the quality of places and why these connections lead to 
alteration or transformation of governmental planning agendas or not. By 
providing greater understanding about these processes the thesis aims to 
contribute to debates about how planners can improve connections with civil 
society initiatives and how a more responsive and adaptive attitude towards a 
dynamically changing society can be achieved. 
Conclusions were drawn from two in-depth case-studies of civic initiatives 
in two Dutch regions: 1) initiatives of business entrepreneurs and experts to 
develop New Markets which support the cultural landscape of the region 
Heuvelland, and 2) initiatives of citizens for the protection and development 
of landscape values in the urban-rural fringe Gouda-Krimpenerwaard. Building 
on agenda-setting and framing theory the analysis focused on how initiatives 
self-organized and connected to other stakeholders and how outcomes of 
their efforts in terms of their ambitions and government agendas could be 
understood. 
The research results point to the crucial role of storytelling and the day-to-day 
interactions in which stories emerge and become ‘sticky’. Sticky stories are 
strong ‘attractors’ that mobilize attention and support. The stickiness of a story 
was enhanced through discursive processes in which the story was connected 
to the self-referential frames of targeted supporters. Thus, sticky stories could 
not emerge without empathic listening, timing and patience. Three interplaying 
conditions were critical in the process of a story becoming sticky or fading away: 
1) formal and informal ‘catalytic’ conversations as the medium of storytelling; 2) 
storytelling by people who perform as connectors and enable the travelling of 
stories through a wider network, and 3) signalling and incorporating focusing 
events into evolving stories in ways considered meaningful and relevant by 
targeted supporters. This results in a model that offers a way to understand 
dynamical change of policy and planning agendas by focusing on the 
interactive construction, connection, and subtle alteration of stories in day-to-
day conversations, by the right people, at the right moments.
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